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At least 1,009 records · Page 56
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NASA NTRS2013

Lessons Learned in the Selection and Development of Test Cases for the Aeroelastic Prediction Workshop: Rectangular Supercritical Wing

The Aeroelastic Prediction Workshop brought together an international community of computational fluid dynamicists as a step in defining the state of the art in computational aeroelasticity. The Rectangular Supercritical Wing (RSW) was chosen as the first configuration to study due to its geometric simplicity, perceived simple flow field at transonic conditions and availability of an experimental data set containing forced oscillation response data. Six teams performed analyses of the RSW; they used Reynolds-Averaged Navier-Stokes flow solvers exercised assuming that the wing had a rigid structure. Both steady-state and forced oscillation computations were performed by each team. The results of these calculations were compared with each other and with the experimental data. The steady-state results from the computations capture many of the flow features of a classical supercritical airfoil pressure distribution. The most dominant feature of the oscillatory results is the upper surface shock dynamics. Substantial variations were observed among the computational solutions as well as differences relative to the experimental data. Contributing issues to these differences include substantial wind tunnel wall effects and diverse choices in the analysis parameters.

Heeg, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRS2012

A First Person Shooter/Real Time Strategy Hybrid: Lessons Learned

Today's military training bears little resemblance to the methods of previous generations. The Cold War is over and the enemy has changed. Doctrine that was once useful is now woefully out of date. No longer are we confronting a predictable nation but instead a diverse collection of independent fighters spread out over several countries. The enemy has changed, his tactics have changed amI cin.:urnsLance dictates that we must change as well. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have tested virtually all aspects of the military's support infrastructure. After fighting continuously for over a decade, many weaknesses have been revealed by the steady grind of war. Chief among them is the inability of the military to rapidly and adequately train its soldiers in the latest doctrines. In response to the enemy developing new strategies on a near monthly basis, the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) was first created. Designed to supplement the current training system, it would attempt to address the current training shortfalls. As a result, new methods were devised to streamline training.

Stoup, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned in the Decommissioning of the Stardust Spacecraft

The Stardust spacecraft completed its prime mission in 2006, returning samples from the coma of comet Wild 2 to earth in the sample return capsule. Still healthy, and in a heliocentric orbit, the Stardust spacecraft was repurposed for a new mission - Stardust NExT. This new mission would take the veteran spacecraft to a 2011 encounter with comet Tempel 1, providing a new look at the comet visited in 2005 by the Deep Impact mission. This extended mission for Stardust would push it to the limits of its fuel reserves, prompting several studies aimed at determining the actual remaining fuel on board. The results were used to plan mission events within the constraints of this dwindling resource. The team tracked fuel consumption and adjusted the mission plans to stay within the fuel budget. This effort intensified toward the end of the mission, when a final assessment showed even less remaining fuel than previously predicted, triggering a delay in the start of comet imaging during the approach phase. The flyby of comet Tempel 1 produced spectacular up close views of this comet, imaging previously seen areas as well as new territory, and providing clear views of the location of the 2005 impact. The spacecraft was decommissioned about a month after the flyby, revealing that the fuel tank was now empty after having flown successfully for 12 years, returned comet dust samples to earth, and flown by an asteroid and two comets.

repurposed spacecrafts↗
NASA NTRS2013

Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) Instrument Thermal Subsystem Design and Lessons Learned

The Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) is one of two instruments on the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), which is scheduled to launch in February of 2013. The TIRS instrument was officially added to the mission later in the flow, which led to a highly aggressive schedule that became one of the main drivers during instrument development. The thermal subsystem design of the TIRS Sensor Unit is comprised of five thermal zones which range in temperature from less than 43 Kelvin to 330 Kelvin. Most zones are proportional heater controlled, and all are within a volume of 35 cu.ft. A two-stage cryocooler is used to cool the "cold stage" including three QWIP detectors to less than 43 Kelvin, and cool the "warm stage" to 105 Kelvin. The excess power dissipation from the cryocooler is rejected via ammonia transport heat pipes to a dedicated Cryocooler Radiator with embedded ammonia heat pipes. The cryogenic subsystem includes a series of shells used to radiatively and conductively isolate the cold stage from the warmer surroundings. The Optical System (telescope) is passively cooled to 180-190 Kelvin using a "thermal link" (comprised of a Flexible Conductive Thermal Strap and an APG Bar) which couples the telescope stage to a dedicated radiator with embedded ethane heat pipes. The Scene Select Mechanism, which is responsible for moving the Scene Select Mirror to three distinct positions (including Nadir, Space, and On-board Black Body Calibrator pointing), runs nominally at 278 Kelvin and is thermally isolated from the cryogenic thermal zones. The On-board Black Body Calibrator requires a dedicated radiator which allows for a temperature range of 260-330 Kelvin at the Source. The detectors are powered by the FPE Box, which is mounted to the nadir external surface of the composite honeycomb structure. There are two additional electronics boxes which are wet-mounted directly to the spacecraft shear panel, the Main Electronics Box and Cryocooler Electronics Box; thermal control of these boxes is the responsibility of Orbital Sciences Corporation, the spacecraft developer. The TIRS thermal subsystem design was successfully verified during months of testing campaign, from component & subsystem level to two instrument-level thermal vacuum tests. The Instrument, despite an aggressive schedule, was delivered to the spacecraft vendor in February of 2012 and is currently undergoing the final stages of spacecraft environmental testing in preparation for launch.

Otero, Veronica↗
NASA NTRS2004

Rocket Exhaust Cratering: Lessons Learned from Viking and Apollo

During the Apollo and Viking programs NASA expended considerable effort to study the cratering of the regolith when a rocket launches or lands on it. That research ensured the success of those programs but also demonstrated that cratering will be a serious challenge for other mission scenarios. Unfortunately, because three decades have elapsed since NASA last performed a successful retro-rocket landing on a large planetary body - and ironically because Apollo and Viking were successful at minimizing the cratering effects - the space agency has a minimized sense of the seriousness of the issue. The most violent phase of a cratering event is when the static overpressure of the rocket exhaust exceeds the bearing capacity of the soil. This bearing capacity failure (BCF) punches a small and highly concave cup into the surface. The shape of the cup then redirects the supersonic jet - along with a large flux of high-velocity debris - directly toward the spacecraft. This has been observed in terrestrial experiments but never quantified analytically. The blast from such an event will be more than just quantitatively greater than the cratering that occurred in the Apollo and Viking programs. It will be qualitatively different, because BCF had been successfully avoided in all those missions. In fact, the Viking program undertook a significant research and development effort and redesigned the spacecraft specifically for the purpose of avoiding BCF [1]. (See Figure 1.) Because the Apollo and Viking spacecraft were successful at avoiding those cratering effects, it was unnecessary to understand them. As a result, the physics of a BCF-driven cratering event have never been well understood. This is a critical gap in our knowledge because BCF is unavoidable in the Martian environment with the large landers necessary for human exploration, and in Lunar landings it must also be addressed because it may occur depending upon the design specifics of the spacecraft and the weakening of the regolity by gas diffusion.

Metzger, Philip T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Lessons Learned Entry: Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires

The attached report is a compilation of all credible, unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, Titan Program, and a few other programs. Spill sites include the following government facilities: KSC, JSC, WSTF, VAFB, CCAFS, EAFB, Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. The root causes and consequences of the incidents contained in this document vary drastically; however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: (1) Improper configuration control and complacency can lead to being falsely comfortable with a system (2) Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or hardware is damaged (3) Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure (4) Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger (5) Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs (6) Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident (7) Improper local cleanliness or compatibility can result in fires or explosions The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling of hypergolic fluids or processing of vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above that have been found during nearly the entire spectrum. of hypergolic propellant and/or vehicle processing.

Nufer, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2012

Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) 2010 Science Operations: Operational Approaches and Lessons Learned for Managing Science during Human Planetary Surface Missions

Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of hardware and operations tests carried out annually in the high desert of Arizona on the San Francisco Volcanic Field. These activities are designed to exercise planetary surface hardware and operations in conditions where long-distance, multi-day roving is achievable, and they allow NASA to evaluate different mission concepts and approaches in an environment less costly and more forgiving than space.The results from the RATS tests allows election of potential operational approaches to planetary surface exploration prior to making commitments to specific flight and mission hardware development. In previous RATS operations, the Science Support Room has operated largely in an advisory role, an approach that was driven by the need to provide a loose science mission framework that would underpin the engineering tests. However, the extensive nature of the traverse operations for 2010 expanded the role of the science operations and tested specific operational approaches. Science mission operations approaches from the Apollo and Mars-Phoenix missions were merged to become the baseline for this test. Six days of traverse operations were conducted during each week of the 2-week test, with three traverse days each week conducted with voice and data communications continuously available, and three traverse days conducted with only two 1-hour communications periods per day. Within this framework, the team evaluated integrated science operations management using real-time, tactical science operations to oversee daily crew activities, and strategic level evaluations of science data and daily traverse results during a post-traverse planning shift. During continuous communications, both tactical and strategic teams were employed. On days when communications were reduced to only two communications periods per day, only a strategic team was employed. The Science Operations Team found that, if communications are good and down-linking of science data is ensured, high quality science returns is possible regardless of communications. What is absent from reduced communications is the scientific interaction between the crew on the planet and the scientists on the ground. These scientific interactions were a critical part of the science process and significantly improved mission science return over reduced communications conditions. The test also showed that the quality of science return is not measurable by simple numerical quantities but is, in fact, based on strongly non-quantifiable factors, such as the interactions between the crew and the Science Operations Teams. Although the metric evaluation data suggested some trends, there was not sufficient granularity in the data or specificity in the metrics to allow those trends to be understood on numerical data alone.

Eppler, Dean↗
NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned in Decadal Planning in Space Science

This summary has been prepared by the workshop rapporteurs as a factual summary of what occurred at the workshop. The planning committee's role was limited to planning and convening the workshop. The views contained in the report are those of individual workshop participants and do not necessarily represent the views of all workshop participants, the planning committee, or the National Research Council. This summary was written using video recordings of the entire workshop proceedings. Speakers attributed in this summary were not asked to review the workshop summary before its release. This workshop summary has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the summary meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this summary: George Paulikas, The Aerospace Corporation (retired), Marcia Rieke, University of Arizona, Kunio Sayanagi, Hampton University, Marcia Smith, Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC, and Warren Washington, National Center for Atmospheric Research. Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they did not see the final draft of the workshop summary before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Kenneth Kellermann, National Radio Astronomy Observatory. Appointed by the NRC, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authors and the institution.

Groswald, Lewis↗
NASA NTRS2014

Human Factors Lessons Learned from Flight Testing Wingless Lifting Body Vehicles

Since the 1960s, NASA, the Air Force, and now private industry have attempted to develop an operational human crewed reusable spacecraft with a wingless, lifting body configuration. This type of vehicle offers increased mission flexibility and greater reentry cross range than capsule type craft, and is particularly attractive due to the capability to land on a runway. That capability, however, adds complexity to the human factors engineering requirements of developing such aircraft.

Human Factors Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2014

Design and Lessons Learned on the Development of a Cryogenic Pupil Select Mechanism (PSM)

Calibration and testing of the instruments on the Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM) of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is being performed by the use of a cryogenic, full-field, optical simulator that was constructed for this purpose. The Pupil Select Mechanism (PSM) assembly is one of several mechanisms and optical elements that compose the Optical Telescope Element SIMulator, or OSIM. The PSM allows for several optical elements to be inserted into the optical plane of OSIM, introducing a variety of aberrations, distortions, obscurations, and other calibration states into the pupil plane. The following discussion focuses on the details of the design evolution, analysis, build, and test of this mechanism along with the challenges associated with creating a sub arc-minute positioning mechanism operating in an extreme cryogenic environment. In addition, difficult challenges in the control system design will be discussed including the incorporation of closed-loop feedback control into a system that was designed to operate in an open-loop fashion.

PSM Design↗
NASA NTRS2014

ATLAS LTCS Vertically Challenged System Lessons Learned

Re-planning of LTCS TVAC testing and supporting RTA (Receiver Telescope Assembly) Test Plan and Procedure document preparation. The Laser Thermal Control System (LTCS) is designed to maintain the lasers onboard Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) at their operational temperatures. In order to verify the functionality of the LTCS, a thermal balance test of the thermal hardware was performed. During the first cold start of the LTCS, the Loop Heat Pipe (LHP) was unable to control the laser mass simulators temperature. The control heaters were fully on and the loop temperature remained well below the desired setpoint. Thermal analysis of the loop did not show these results. This unpredicted behavior of the LTCS was brought up to a panel of LHP experts. Based on the testing and a review of all the data, there were multiple diagnostic performed in order to narrow down the cause. The prevailing theory is that gravity is causing oscillating flow within the loop, which artificially increased the control power needs. This resulted in a replan of the LTCS test flow and the addition of a GSE heater to allow vertical operation.

Loop Heat Pipe↗