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At least 991 records · Page 55

PSA 2025 DPRA for Cyber Optimization

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Evaluating defense options should include quantitative evaluation of overall effectiveness to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation and have difficulty with time dependent scenarios. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related integrity is a requirement set by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But companies are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want reliability analysis while optimizing cost, which requires more than safety modeling methods. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with timing and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues such as state-base explosion found in Markov-based tools. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Comparison of a Traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment Approach with Advanced Safety Analysis

As part of the Light Water Sustainability Program (LWRS) [1], the purpose of the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) [2] Pathway research and development (R&D) is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margin management with the aim to improve economics, reliability, and sustain safety of current NPPs. In this paper, we describe the RISMC analysis process illustrating how mechanistic and probabilistic approaches are combined in order to estimate a safety margin. We use the scenario of a “station blackout” (SBO) wherein offsite power and onsite power is lost, thereby causing a challenge to plant safety systems. We describe the RISMC approach, illustrate the station blackout modeling, and contrast this with traditional risk analysis modeling for this type of accident scenario. We also describe our approach we are using to represent advanced flooding analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Failure environment analysis tool applications

Understanding risks and avoiding failure are daily concerns for the women and men of NASA. Although NASA's mission propels us to push the limits of technology, and though the risks are considerable, the NASA community has instilled within, the determination to preserve the integrity of the systems upon which our mission and, our employees lives and well-being depend. One of the ways this is being done is by expanding and improving the tools used to perform risk assessment. The Failure Environment Analysis Tool (FEAT) was developed to help engineers and analysts more thoroughly and reliably conduct risk assessment and failure analysis. FEAT accomplishes this by providing answers to questions regarding what might have caused a particular failure; or, conversely, what effect the occurrence of a failure might have on an entire system. Additionally, FEAT can determine what common causes could have resulted in other combinations of failures. FEAT will even help determine the vulnerability of a system to failures, in light of reduced capability. FEAT also is useful in training personnel who must develop an understanding of particular systems. FEAT facilitates training on system behavior, by providing an automated environment in which to conduct 'what-if' evaluation. These types of analyses make FEAT a valuable tool for engineers and operations personnel in the design, analysis, and operation of NASA space systems.

Pack, Ginger L.↗

Failure environment analysis tool applications

Understanding risks and avoiding failure are daily concerns for the women and men of NASA. Although NASA's mission propels us to push the limits of technology, and though the risks are considerable, the NASA community has instilled within it, the determination to preserve the integrity of the systems upon which our mission and, our employees lives and well-being depend. One of the ways this is being done is by expanding and improving the tools used to perform risk assessment. The Failure Environment Analysis Tool (FEAT) was developed to help engineers and analysts more thoroughly and reliably conduct risk assessment and failure analysis. FEAT accomplishes this by providing answers to questions regarding what might have caused a particular failure; or, conversely, what effect the occurrence of a failure might have on an entire system. Additionally, FEAT can determine what common causes could have resulted in other combinations of failures. FEAT will even help determine the vulnerability of a system to failures, in light of reduced capability. FEAT also is useful in training personnel who must develop an understanding of particular systems. FEAT facilitates training on system behavior, by providing an automated environment in which to conduct 'what-if' evaluation. These types of analyses make FEAT a valuable tool for engineers and operations personnel in the design, analysis, and operation of NASA space systems.

Pack, Ginger L.↗

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Reducing Tick-Borne Disease in Alabama: Linking Health Risk Perception with Spatial Analysis Using the NASA Earth Observing System

Lyme disease (LD) accounts for most vector-borne disease reports in the U.S., and although its existence in Alabama remains controversial, other tick-borne illnesses (TBI) such as Southern Tick-Associated Rash Illness (STARI) pose a health concern in the state. Phase One of the Marshall Space Flight Center-UAB DEVELOP study of TBI identified the presence of the chain of infection for LD (Ixodes scapularis ticks carrying Borrelia burgdorferi bacteria) and STARI (Amblyomma americanum ticks and an as-yet-unconfirmed agent) in Alabama. Both LD and STARI are associated with the development of erythema migrans rashes around an infected tick bite, and while treatable with oral antibiotics, a review of educational resources available to state residents revealed low levels of prevention information. To improve prevention, recognition, and treatment of TBI in Alabama, Phase Two builds a health communication campaign based on vector habitat mapping and risk perception assessment. NASA Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) satellite imagery identified likely tick habitats using remotely sensed measurements of vegetation vigor (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index) and soil moisture. Likely tick habitats, identified as those containing both high vegetation density and soil moisture, included Oak Mountain State Park, Bankhead National Forest, and Talladega National Forest. To target a high-risk group -- outdoor recreation program participants at Alabama universities -- the study developed a behavior survey instrument based on existing studies of LD risk factors and theoretical constructs from the Social Ecological Model and Health Belief Model. The survey instrument was amended to include geographic variables in the assessment of TBI knowledge, attitudes, and prevention behaviors, and the vector habitat model will be expanded to incorporate additional environmental variables and in situ data. Remotely sensed environmental data combined with risk perception assessments inform an ongoing outreach campaign consisting of stakeholder meetings and educational seminars.

Hemmings, S.↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology and Demonstration

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the risk impact of plant modernization, considering the introduction of high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT OF DIGITAL I&C SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems provides the foremost means to improve performance and reduce costs for existing light-water reactors (LWRs). However, qualification of digital technologies remains a challenge?especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws might become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. In 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy?s (DOE?s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C (RADIC) process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI& systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Tiered Approach to Resilience Assessment

Regulatory agencies have long adopted a three-tier structure for risk assessment and risk management. We build on this structure to propose a tiered approach for resilience assessment that can be integrated in the existing regulatory processes. Comprehensive approaches to assessing resilience at appropriate and operational scales, reconciling analytical complexity as needed with stakeholder needs and resources available, and ultimately creating actionable recommendations to enhance resilience is still lacking. Our proposed structure consists of tiers by which analysts can scale a resilience assessment and associated management actions relative to the scope and urgency of the risk and the capacity of resource managers to improve system resilience. We use an application of water allocation decisions in the Platte River Basin, Nebraska, USA to illustrate this approach.

Sustainability, natural resources management, disa↗

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) / Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS Evaluation of Risk-Informed Margins Management Strategies for a Representative Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)

A Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) toolkit and methodology are proposed for investigating nuclear power plant core, fuels design and safety analysis, including postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis. This toolkit, under an integrated evaluation model framework, is name LOCA toolkit for the US (LOTUS). This demonstration includes coupled analysis of core design, fuel design, thermal hydraulics and systems analysis, using advanced risk analysis tools and methods to investigate a wide range of results.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

New Mobility Technology Assessment - Benefits, Risks, and Safety

The age of vehicle automation is upon us. The fundamental perception and control technology is maturing as we speak (and write) with robo-taxis proliferating in select US cities. The news cycle is no longer filled with technological skepticism, but rather societal commentary on our collective response and use of the technology. This maturing of the technology is also accompanied by a renaissance in new types of urban movement technology to more effectively link people with goods, services, and employment, particularly in dense development areas where vehicle congestion (even automated vehicles) prevents high quality mobility. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory, through the DOE Clean Energy to Communities (C2C) program has worked with two jurisdictions to assess the benefits, risks, and safety concerns for a new product offering based on suspended cable technology which is fully automated and proposes an aerial network of self-propelled gondolas. The recognized need, independent of the technology, is to fairly assess the benefits of the proposed transportation system, assess its technical maturity, as well as risks and safety concerns. Using this new technology as an example, a technology represented by Swyft Cities, NREL developed a succession of mini-studies that characterized the technical maturity level, assessed the proposed benefits for Greenville, SC, examined the risks involved in moving forward with an emerging mobility technology, and determined the governing safety protocols and standards that are applicable to the space. These mini-case studies, though centered on Swyft Cities aerial automated gondola technology, are highly transferable to any type of new mobility technology and lays out a repeatable process for assessing new technology within an city or community context.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

SU-E-T-509: Inter-Observer and Inter-Modality Contouring Analysis for Organs at Risk for HDR Gynecological Brachytherapy

Purpose This study quantifies errors associated with MR-guided High Dose Rate (HDR) gynecological brachytherapy. Uncertainties in this treatment results from contouring, organ motion between imaging and treatment delivery, dose calculation, and dose delivery. We focus on interobserver and inter-modality variability in contouring and the motion of organs at risk (OARs) in the time span between the MR and CT scans (∼1 hour). We report the change in organ volume and position of center of mass (CM) between the two imaging modalities. Methods A total of 8 patients treated with MR-guided HDR brachytherapy were included in this study. Two observers contoured the bladder and rectum on both MR and CT scans. The change in OAR volume and CM position between the MR and CT imaging sessions on both image sets were calculated. Results The absolute mean bladder volume change between the two imaging modalities is 67.1cc. The absolute mean inter-observer difference in bladder volume is much lower at 15.5cc (MR) and 11.0cc (CT). This higher inter-modality volume difference suggests a real change in the bladder filling between the two imaging sessions. Change in Rectum volume inter-observer standard error of means (SEM) is 3.18cc (MR) and 3.09cc (CT), while the inter-modality SEM is 3.65cc (observer 1), and 2.75cc (observer 2). The SEM for rectum CM position in the superior-inferior direction was approximately three times higher than in other directions for both the inter—observer (0.77 cm, 0.92 cm for observers 1 and 2, respectively) and inter-modality (0.91 cm, 0.95 cm for MR and CT, respectively) variability. Conclusion Bladder contours display good consistency between different observers on both CT and MR images. For rectum contouring the highest inconsistency stems from the observers’ choice of the superior-inferior borders. A complete analysis of a larger patient cohort will enable us to separate the true organ motion from the inter-observer variability.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Dosimetric Analysis of Organs at Risk During Expiratory Gating in Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy for Pancreatic Cancer

Purpose: To determine how the respiratory phase impacts dose to normal organs during stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) for pancreatic cancer. Methods and Materials: Eighteen consecutive patients with locally advanced, unresectable pancreatic adenocarcinoma treated with SBRT were included in this study. On the treatment planning 4-dimensional computed tomography (CT) scan, the planning target volume (PTV), defined as the gross tumor volume plus 3-mm margin, the duodenum, and the stomach were contoured on the end-expiration (CT{sub exp}) and end-inspiration (CT{sub insp}) phases for each patient. A separate treatment plan was constructed for both phases with the dose prescription of 33 Gy in 5 fractions with 95% coverage of the PTV by the 100% isodose line. The dose-volume histogram (DVH) endpoints, volume of duodenum that received 20 Gy (V{sub 20}), V{sub 25}, and V{sub 30} and maximum dose to 5 cc of contoured organ (D{sub 5cc}), D{sub 1cc}, and D{sub 0.1cc}, were evaluated. Results: Dosimetric parameters for the duodenum, including V{sub 25}, V{sub 30}, D{sub 1cc}, and D{sub 0.1cc} improved by planning on the CT{sub exp} compared to those on the CT{sub insp}. There was a statistically significant overlap of the PTV with the duodenum but not the stomach during the CT{sub insp} compared to the CT{sub exp} (0.38 ± 0.17 cc vs 0.01 ± 0.01 cc, P=.048). A larger expansion of the PTV, in accordance with a Danish phase 2 trial, showed even more overlapping volume of duodenum on the CT{sub insp} compared to that on the CT{sub exp} (5.5 ± 0.9 cc vs 3.0 ± 0.8 cc, P=.0003) but no statistical difference for any stomach dosimetric DVH parameter. Conclusions: Dose to the duodenum was higher when treating on the inspiratory than on the expiratory phase. These data suggest that expiratory gating may be preferable to inspiratory breath-hold and free breathing strategies for minimizing risk of toxicity.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

SU-E-T-128: Applying Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to a Risk-Based Quality Management for Stereotactic Radiosurgery in Brazil

Purpose: The goal of the present work was to evaluate the process maps for stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) treatment at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil and apply the FMEA technique to evaluate similarities and differences, if any, of the hazards and risks associated with these processes. Methods: A team, consisting of professionals from different disciplines and involved in the SRS treatment, was formed at each center. Each team was responsible for the development of the process map, and performance of FMEA and FTA. A facilitator knowledgeable in these techniques led the work at each center. The TG100 recommended scales were used for the evaluation of hazard and severity for each step for the major process “treatment planning”. Results: Hazard index given by the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is found to range from 4–270 for various processes and the severity (S) index is found to range from 1–10. The RPN values > 100 and severity value ≥ 7 were chosen to flag safety improvement interventions. Number of steps with RPN ≥100 were found to be 6, 59 and 45 for the three centers. The corresponding values for S ≥ 7 are 24, 21 and 25 respectively. The range of RPN and S values for each center belong to different process steps and failure modes. Conclusion: These results show that interventions to improve safety is different for each center and it is associated with the skill level of the professional team as well as the technology used to provide radiosurgery treatment. The present study will very likely be a model for implementation of risk-based prospective quality management program for SRS treatment in Brazil where currently there are 28 radiotherapy centers performing SRS. A complete FMEA for SRS for these three radiotherapy centers is currently under development.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗