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At least 991 records · Page 55

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 1: Executive summary. Part 2: Space shuttle nuclear system safety

The nuclear safety integration and operational aspects of transporting nuclear payloads to and from an earth orbiting space base by space shuttle are discussed. The representative payloads considered were: (1) zirconium hydride-Brayton power module, (2) isotope-Brayton power module, and (3) small isotope power systems or heat sources. Areas of investigation also include nuclear safety related integration and packaging as well as operational requirements for the shuttle and payload systems for all phases of the mission.

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A design procedure and handling quality criteria for lateral directional flight control systems

A practical design procedure for aircraft augmentation systems is described based on quadratic optimal control technology and handling-quality-oriented cost functionals. The procedure is applied to the design of a lateral-directional control system for the F4C aircraft. The design criteria, design procedure, and final control system are validated with a program of formal pilot evaluation experiments.

Stein, G.↗

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 1: Reference Design Document (RDD)

The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)

The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2A: Accident model document, appendix

The detailed abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride (ZrH) reactor power module that have been generated for each phase of the reference Space Base program mission are presented. The trees are graphical representations of causal sequences. Each tree begins with the phase identification and the dichotomy between success and failure. The success branch shows the mission phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch is subdivided, as conditions require, into various primary initiating abort conditions.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 3: Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)

Nuclear safety analysis as applied to a space base mission is presented. The nuclear safety analysis document summarizes the mission and the credible accidents/events which may lead to nuclear hazards to the general public. The radiological effects and associated consequences of the hazards are discussed in detail. The probability of occurrence is combined with the potential number of individuals exposed to or above guideline values to provide a measure of accident and total mission risk. The overall mission risk has been determined to be low with the potential exposure to or above 25 rem limited to less than 4 individuals per every 1000 missions performed. No radiological risk to the general public occurs during the prelaunch phase at KSC. The most significant risks occur from prolonged exposure to reactor debris following land impact generally associated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories can be high.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 4: Space shuttle nuclear system transportation. Part 1: Space shuttle nuclear safety

An analysis of the nuclear safety aspects (design and operational considerations) in the transport of nuclear payloads to and from earth orbit by the space shuttle is presented. Three representative nuclear payloads used in the study were: (1) the zirconium hydride reactor Brayton power module, (2) the large isotope Brayton power system and (3) small isotopic heat sources which can be a part of an upper stage or part of a logistics module. Reference data on the space shuttle and nuclear payloads are presented in an appendix. Safety oriented design and operational requirements were identified to integrate the nuclear payloads in the shuttle mission. Contingency situations were discussed and operations and design features were recommended to minimize the nuclear hazards. The study indicates the safety, design and operational advantages in the use of a nuclear payload transfer module. The transfer module can provide many of the safety related support functions (blast and fragmentation protection, environmental control, payload ejection) minimizing the direct impact on the shuttle.

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