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At least 991 records · Page 55

Neutronic Analysis of an Advanced Fuel Design Concept for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

This study presents the neutronic analysis of an advanced fuel design concept for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) that could significantly extend the current fuel cycle length under the existing design and safety criteria. A key advantage of the fuel design herein proposed is that it would not require structural changes to the present HFIR core, in other words, maintaining the same rated power and fuel geometry (i.e., fuel plate thickness and coolant channel dimensions). Of particular practical importance, as well, is the fact that the proposed change could be justified within the bounds of the existing nuclear safety basis. The simulations herein reported employed transport theory-based and exposure-dependent eigenvalue characterization to help improve the prediction of key fuel cycle parameters. These parameters were estimated by coupling a benchmarked three-dimensional MCNP5 model of the HFIR core to the depletion code ORIGEN via the MONTEBURNS interface. The design of an advanced HFIR core with an improved fuel loading is an idea that evolved from early studies by R. D. Cheverton, formerly of ORNL. This study contrasts a modified and increased core loading of 12 kg of 235U against the current core loading of 9.4 kg. The simulations performed predict a cycle length of 39 days for the proposed fuel design, which represents a 50% increase in the cycle length in response to a 25% increase in fissile loading, with an average fuel burnup increase of {approx}23%. The results suggest that the excess reactivity can be controlled with the present design and arrangement of control elements throughout the core's life. Also, the new power distribution is comparable or even improved relative to the current power distribution, displaying lower peak to average fission rate densities across the inner fuel element's centerline and bottom cells. In fact, the fission rate density in the outer fuel element also decreased at these key locations for the proposed design. Overall, it is estimated that the advanced core design could increase the availability of the HFIR facility by {approx}50% and generate {approx}33% more neutrons annually, which is expected to yield sizeable savings during the remaining life of HFIR, currently expected to operate through 2014. This study emphasizes the neutronics evaluation of a new fuel design. Although a number of other performance parameters of the proposed design check favorably against the current design, and most of the core design features remain identical to the reference, it is acknowledged that additional evaluations would be required to fully justify the thermal-hydraulic and thermal-mechanical performance of a new fuel design, including checks for cladding corrosion performance as well as for industrial and economic feasibility.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Non-destructive assay of spent nuclear fuel using passive neutron Albedo reactivity

Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) is one of fourteen techniques that has been researched and evaluated to form part of a comprehensive and integrated detection system for the non-destructive assay (NDA) of spent nuclear fuel. PNAR implemented with {sup 3}He tubes for neutron detection (PNAR-{sup 3}He) is the measurement of time correlated neutrons from a spent fuel assembly with and without a Cadmium (Cd) layer surrounding the assembly. PNAR utilizes the self-interrogation of the fuel via reflection of neutrons born in the fuel assembly back in to the fuel assembly. The neutrons originate primarily from spontaneous fission events within the fuel itself (Curium-244) but are amplified by multiplication. The presence and removal of the Cd provides two measurement conditions with different neutron energy spectra and therefore different interrogating neutron characteristics. Cd has a high cross-section of absorption for slow neutrons and therefore greatly reduces the low energy (thermal) neutron fluence rate returning. The ratios of the Singles, Doubles and Triples count rates obtained in each case are known as the Cd ratios, which are related to fissile content. A potential safeguards application for which PNAR-{sup 3}He is particularly suited is 'fingerprinting'. Fingerprinting could function as an alternative to plutonium (Pu) mass determination; providing confidence that material was not diverted during transport between sites. PNAR-{sup 3}He has six primary NDA signatures: Singles, Doubles and Triples count rates measured with two energy spectra at both shipping and receiving sites. This is to uniquely identify the fuel assembly, and confirm no changes have taken place during transport. Changes may indicate all attempt to divert material for example. Here, the physics of the PNAR-{sup 3}He concept will be explained, alongside a discussion on the development of a prototypical PNAR-{sup 3}He instrument using simulation. The capabilities and performance of the conceptual instrument will be summarized, in the context of (a) quantifying Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies and (b) detecting pin diversion (through a discrepancy between declared and measured properties of the fuel assembly) when the instrument is deployed. These quantitative capabilities are complementary to the 'fingerprinting' capability which is part of ensuring continuity of knowledge and custody of spent nuclear fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Determination of the 235U Mass and Enrichment within Small UF6 Cylinders via a Neutron Coincidence Well Counting System

The construction of three new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States has sparked renewed interest in the development and enhancement of methods to determine the enrichment and fissile mass content of UF6 cylinders. We describe the design and examine the expected performance of a UF6 bottle counter developed for the assay of Type 5A cylinders. The counter, as designed and subsequently constructed, is a tall passive neutron well counter with a clam-shell configuration and graphite end plugs operated in fast neutron mode. Factory performance against expectation is described. The relatively high detection efficiency and effectively 4 detection geometry provide a near-ideal measurement configuration, making the UF6 bottle counter a valuable tool for the evaluation of the neutron coincidence approach to UF6 cylinder assay. The impacts of non-uniform filling, voids, enrichment, and mixed enrichments are examined

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Nonproliferation Uncertainties, a Major Barrier to Used Nuclear Fuel Recycle in the United States

A study and comparison of the goals and understandings of nonproliferation authorities with those of used nuclear fuel (UNF) recycle advocates have uncovered (1) some of the basic reasons for the creation of uncertainties by each of the parties, (2) why these uncertainties have become a major barrier to a decision to recycle UNF components in the United States, and (3) what steps can be taken to clarify these uncertainties. Recent papers and viewpoints expressed by nonproliferation authorities and technical consultants were reviewed, summarized, and compared with results of recent fuel cycle systems analyses made at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1 Similarities and differences were identified, including both technical and policy factors. Nonproliferation authorities and a few UNF recycle advocates have recognized that the reprocessing technologies used for UNF component recycle do not offer significant nonproliferation differences; thus, the methods used can be chosen on some other basis, such as process efficiency, maturity, and/or economics. This paper reviews the safeguards implications beyond the simple assessment of UNF recycle technology selection. Differences in understanding that led to uncertainty barriers to UNF recycle include (1) the vulnerability of unseparated UNF, (2) the effects of time factors on production and accumulation of fissile plutonium isotopes and decay of the ?self-protecting radiation barrier,? (3) the chemistry of UNF components and relative ease of separation, and (4) the significant differences in commercialscale ?safeguards-by-design? UNF recycle facilities and smaller-scale covert operations. Application of safeguards-by-design and engineered safeguards can provide the defense-in-depth necessary for sufficient safeguards. Establishing these requirements for governing acceptable commercial UNF component recycle is essential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Effect of U-234 Content on the Neutronic Behavior of Uranium Systems

When analyzing uranium systems, the usual rule of thumb is to ignore the U-234 by assuming that it behaves neutronically like U-238. Thus for uranium systems, the uranium is evaluated as U-235 with everything else being U-238. The absorption cross section of U-234 is indeed qualitatively very similar to that of U-238. However, thermal absorption cross section of U-234 is about 100 times that of U-238. At low U-235 enrichments, the amount of U-234 is quite small so the impact of assuming it is U-238 is minimal. However, at high enrichments, the relative ratio of U-234 to U-238 is quite large (maybe as much as 1 to 5). Thus, one would expect that some effect of using the rule of thumb might be seen in higher enriched systems. Analyses were performed on three uranium systems from the set of Benchmarks. Although the benchmarks are adequately characterized as to the U-234 content, often, materials used in processing are not as well characterized. This issue may become more important with the advent of laser enrichment processes, which have little or no effect on the U-234 content. Analytical results based on the relationship of U-234 activity to that of U-235 have shown good predictive capability but with large variability in the uncertainties. Rucker and Johnson noted that the actual isotopics vary with enrichment, design of the enrichment cascade, composition of the feed material, and on blending of enrichments so there is considerable uncertainty in the use of models to determine isotopics. Thus, it is important for criticality personnel to understand the effects of variation of U-234 content in fissile systems and the impact of different modeling assumptions in handling the U-234. Analyses were done on LEU, IEU and HEU benchmarks from the International Handbook. These indicate that the effect of ignoring U-234 in HEU metal systems is non-conservative while it seems to be conservative for HEU solution systems. The magnitude of change in k-effective was as high as 0.4%, which has implications on selection of administrative margins and the determination of the upper subcriticality limit.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Method to calibrate fission chambers in Campbelling mode

Fission chambers are neutron detectors which are widely used to instrument experimental reactors such as material testing reactors or zero power reactors. In the presence of a high level mixed gamma and neutron flux, fission chambers can be operated in Campbelling mode (also known as 'fluctuation mode' or 'mean square voltage mode') to provide reliable and precise neutron related measurements. Fission chamber calibration in Campbelling mode (in terms of neutron flux) is usually done empirically using a calibrated reference detector. A major drawback of this method is that calibration measurements have to be performed in a neutron environment very similar to the one in which the calibrated detector will be used afterwards. What we propose here is a different approach based on characterizing the fission chamber response in terms of fission rate. This way, the detector calibration coefficient is independent from the neutron spectrum and can be determined prior to the experiment. The fissile deposit response to the neutron spectrum can then be assessed independently by other means (experimental or numerical). In this paper, the response of CEA made miniature fission chambers in Campbelling mode is studied. We use a theoretical model of the signal to calculate the calibration coefficient. Input parameters of the model come from statistical distribution of individual pulses. Supporting measurements have been made in the CEA Cadarache zero power reactor MINERVE. Results are compared to an empirical Campbelling mode calibration.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Remote safeguards and monitoring of reactors with antineutrinos.

The current state-of-the-art in antineutrino detection is such that it is now possible to remotely monitor the operational status, power levels and fissile content of nuclear reactors in real-time. This non-invasive and incorruptible technique has been demonstrated at civilian power reactors in both Russia and the United States and has been of interest to the IAEA Novel Technologies Unit for several years. Expert's meetings were convened at IAEA headquarters in 2003 and again in 2008. The latter produced a report in which antineutrino detection was called a 'highly promising technology for safeguards applications' at nuclear reactors and several near-term goals and suggested developments were identified to facilitate wider applicability. Over the last few years, we have been working to achieve some of these goals and improvements. Specifically, we have already demonstrated the successful operation of non-toxic detectors and most recently, we are testing a transportable, above-ground detector system, which is fully contained within a standard 6 meter ISO container. If successful, such a system could allow easy deployment at any reactor facility around the world. As well, our previously demonstrated ability to remotely monitor the data and respond in real-time to reactor operational changes could allow the verification of operator declarations without the need for costly site-visits. As the global nuclear power industry expands around the world, the burden on maintaining operational histories and safeguarding inventories will increase greatly. Such a system for providing remote data to verify operator's declarations could greatly reduce the need for frequent site inspections while still providing a robust warning of anomalies requiring further investigation.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Remote safeguards and monitoring of reactors with antineutrinos.

The current state-of-the-art in antineutrino detection is such that it is now possible to remotely monitor the operational status, power levels and fissile content of nuclear reactors in real-time. This non-invasive and incorruptible technique has been demonstrated at civilian power reactors in both Russia and the United States and has been of interest to the IAEA Novel Technologies Unit for several years. Expert's meetings were convened at IAEA headquarters in 2003 and again in 2008. The latter produced a report in which antineutrino detection was called a 'highly promising technology for safeguards applications' at nuclear reactors and several near-term goals and suggested developments were identified to facilitate wider applicability. Over the last few years, we have been working to achieve some of these goals and improvements. Specifically, we have already demonstrated the successful operation of non-toxic detectors and most recently, we are testing a transportable, above-ground detector system, which is fully contained within a standard 6 meter ISO container. If successful, such a system could allow easy deployment at any reactor facility around the world. As well, our previously demonstrated ability to remotely monitor the data and respond in real-time to reactor operational changes could allow the verification of operator declarations without the need for costly site-visits. As the global nuclear power industry expands around the world, the burden on maintaining operational histories and safeguarding inventories will increase greatly. Such a system for providing remote data to verify operator's declarations could greatly reduce the need for frequent site inspections while still providing a robust warning of anomalies requiring further investigation.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

ALPHA SPECTROMETRIC EVALUATION OF SRM-995 AS A POTENTIAL URANIUM/THORIUM DOUBLE TRACER SYSTEM FOR AGE-DATING URANIUM MATERIALS

Uranium-233 (t{sub 1/2} {approx} 1.59E5 years) is an artificial, fissile isotope of uranium that has significant importance in nuclear forensics. The isotope provides a unique signature in determining the origin and provenance of uranium-bearing materials and is valuable as a mass spectrometric tracer. Alpha spectrometry was employed in the critical evaluation of a {sup 233}U standard reference material (SRM-995) as a dual tracer system based on the in-growth of {sup 229}Th (t{sub 1/2} {approx} 7.34E3 years) for {approx}35 years following radiochemical purification. Preliminary investigations focused on the isotopic analysis of standards and unmodified fractions of SRM-995; all samples were separated and purified using a multi-column anion-exchange scheme. The {sup 229}Th/{sup 233}U atom ratio for SRM-995 was found to be 1.598E-4 ({+-} 4.50%) using recovery-corrected radiochemical methods. Using the Bateman equations and relevant half-lives, this ratio reflects a material that was purified {approx} 36.8 years prior to this analysis. The calculated age is discussed in contrast with both the date of certification and the recorded date of last purification.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Utilization of accelerators for transmutation and energy production

Given the increased concern over reliable, emission-free power, nuclear power has experienced a resurgence of interest. A sub-critical accelerator driven system (ADS) can drive systems that have either safety constraints (waste transmutation) or reduced fissile content (thorium reactor). The goals of ADS are some or all of the following: (1) to significantly reduce the generation or impacts due to the minor actinides on the packing density and long-term radiotoxicity in the repository design, (2) preserve/use the energy-rich component of used nuclear fuel, and (3) reduce proliferation risk. ADS systems have been actively studied in Europe and Asia over the past two decades and renewed interest is occurring in the U.S. This talk will cover some of the history, possible applicable fuel cycle scenarios, and general issues to be considered in implementing ADS systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

THERMAL UPGRADING OF 9977 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (RAM) TYPE B PACKAGE

The 9977 package is a radioactive material package that was originally certified to ship Heat Sources and RTG contents up to 19 watts and it is now being reviewed to significantly expand its contents in support of additional DOE missions. Thermal upgrading will be accomplished by employing stacked 3013 containers, a 3013 aluminum spacer and an external aluminum sleeve for enhanced heat transfer. The 7th Addendum to the original 9977 package Safety Basis Report describing these modifications is under review for the DOE certification. The analyses described in this paper show that this well-designed and conservatively analyzed package can be upgraded to carry contents with decay heat up to 38 watts with some simple design modifications. The Model 9977 package has been designed as a replacement for the Department of Transportation (DOT) Fissile Specification 6M package. The 9977 package is a very versatile Type B package which is certified to transport and store a wide spectrum of radioactive materials. The package was analyzed quite conservatively to increase its usefulness and store different payload configurations. Its versatility is evident from several daughter packages such as the 9978 and H1700, and several addendums where the payloads have been modified to suit the Shipper's needs without additional testing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

THE CALCULATION OF BURNABLE POISON CORRECTION FACTORS FOR PWR FRESH FUEL ACTIVE COLLAR MEASUREMENTS

Verification of commercial low enriched uranium light water reactor fuel takes place at the fuel fabrication facility as part of the overall international nuclear safeguards solution to the civilian use of nuclear technology. The fissile mass per unit length is determined nondestructively by active neutron coincidence counting using a neutron collar. A collar comprises four slabs of high density polyethylene that surround the assembly. Three of the slabs contain {sup 3}He filled proportional counters to detect time correlated fission neutrons induced by an AmLi source placed in the fourth slab. Historically, the response of a particular collar design to a particular fuel assembly type has been established by careful cross-calibration to experimental absolute calibrations. Traceability exists to sources and materials held at Los Alamos National Laboratory for over 35 years. This simple yet powerful approach has ensured consistency of application. Since the 1980's there has been a steady improvement in fuel performance. The trend has been to higher burn up. This requires the use of both higher initial enrichment and greater concentrations of burnable poisons. The original analytical relationships to correct for varying fuel composition are consequently being challenged because the experimental basis for them made use of fuels of lower enrichment and lower poison content than is in use today and is envisioned for use in the near term. Thus a reassessment of the correction factors is needed. Experimental reassessment is expensive and time consuming given the great variation between fuel assemblies in circulation. Fortunately current modeling methods enable relative response functions to be calculated with high accuracy. Hence modeling provides a more convenient and cost effective means to derive correction factors which are fit for purpose with confidence. In this work we use the Monte Carlo code MCNPX with neutron coincidence tallies to calculate the influence of Gd{sub 2}O{sub 3} burnable poison on the measurement of fresh pressurized water reactor fuel. To empirically determine the response function over the range of historical and future use we have considered enrichments up to 5 wt% {sup 235}U/{sup tot}U and Gd weight fractions of up to 10 % Gd/UO{sub 2}. Parameterized correction factors are presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A new MCNPX PTRAC coincidence capture file capability: a tool for neutron detector design

The existing MCNPX{trademark} PTRAC coincidence capture file allows a full list of neutron capture events to be recorded in any simulated detection medium. The originating event history number (e.g. spontaneous fission events), capture time, location and source particle number are tracked and output to file for post-processing. We have developed a new MCNPX PTRAC coincidence capture file capability to aid detector design studies. New features include the ability to track the isotopes that emitted the detected neutrons as well as induced fission chains in mixed samples before detection (both generation number and isotope). Here, the power of this tool is demonstrated using a detector design that has been developed for the non-destructive assay (NDA) of spent nuclear fuel. Individual capture time distributions have been generated for neutrons originating from Curium-244 source spontaneous fission events and induced fission events in fissile isotopes of interest: namely Plutonium-239, Plutonium-241, and Uranium-235. Through this capability, a full picture for the attribution of neutron capture events in the detector can be simulated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assessment of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Spent Nuclear Fuel Assay

In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of gamma rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. NRF promises the unique capability of directly quantifying a specific isotope without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as is required in other measurement techniques. We have analyzed the potential of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique for quantitative measurements of Pu isotopes in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Given the low concentrations of 239Pu in SNF and its small integrated NRF cross sections, the main challenge in achieving precise and accurate measurements lies in accruing sufficient counting statistics in a reasonable measurement time. Using analytical modeling, and simulations with the radiation transport code MCNPX that has been experimentally tested recently, the backscatter and transmission methods were quantitatively studied for differing photon sources and radiation detector types. Resonant photon count rates and measurement times were estimated for a range of photon source and detection parameters, which were used to determine photon source and gamma-ray detector requirements. The results indicate that systems based on a bremsstrahlung source and present detector technology are not practical for high-precision measurements of 239Pu in SNF. Measurements that achieve the desired uncertainties within hour-long measurements will either require stronger resonances, which may be expressed by other Pu isotopes, or require quasi-monoenergetic photon sources with intensities that are approximately two orders of magnitude higher than those currently being designed or proposed.This work is part of a larger effort sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to develop an integrated instrument, comprised of individual NDA techniques with complementary features, that is fully capable of determining Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE CYCLE LENGTHS FOR FULLY-CERAMIC MICRO-ENCAPSULATED FUEL-BASED LIGHT WATER REACTOR CONCEPTS

The use of TRISO-particle-based dispersion fuel within SiC matrix and cladding materials has the potential to allow the design of extremely safe LWRs with failure-proof fuel. This paper examines the feasibility of LWR-like cycle length for such a low enriched uranium fuel with the imposed constraint of strictly retaining the original geometry of the fuel pins and assemblies. The motivation for retaining the original geometry is to provide the ability to incorporate the fuel 'as-is' into existing LWRs while retaining their thermal-hydraulic characteristics. The feasibility of using this fuel is assessed by looking at cycle lengths and fuel failure rates. Other considerations (e.g., safety parameters, etc.) were not considered at this stage of the study. The study includes the examination of different TRISO kernel diameters without changing the coating layer thicknesses. The study shows that a naive use of UO{sub 2} results in cycle lengths too short to be practical for existing LWR designs and operational demands. Increasing fissile inventory within the fuel compacts shows that acceptable cycle lengths can be achieved. In this study, starting with the recognized highest packing fraction practically achievable (44%), higher enrichment, larger fuel kernel sizes, and the use of higher density fuels have been evaluated. The models demonstrate cycle lengths comparable to those of ordinary LWRs. As expected, TRISO particles with extremely large kernels are shown to fail under all considered scenarios. In contrast, the designs that do not depart too drastically from those of the nominal NGNP HTR fuel TRISO particles are shown to perform satisfactorily and display a high rates of survival under all considered scenarios. Finally, it is recognized that relaxing the geometry constraint will result in satisfactory cycle lengths even using UO{sub 2}-loaded TRISO particles-based fuel with enrichment at or below 20 w/o.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Direct Measurement of Initial Enrichment, Burn-up and Cooling Time of Spent Fuel Assembly with a Differential Die-Away Technique Based Instrument

An outline of this presentation of what a Differential Die-Away (DDA) instrument can do are: (1) Principle of operation of DDA instrument; (2) Determination of initial enrichment (IE) ({sigma} < 5%); (3) Determination of burn up (BU) ({sigma} {approx} 6%); (4) Determination of cooling time (CT) ({sigma} {approx} 20-50%); and (5) DDA instrument as a standalone device. DDA response (fresh fuel vs. spent fuel) is: (1) Fresh fuel => DDA response increases (die-away time is longer) with increasing fissile content; and (2) Spent fuel => DDA response decreases (die-away time is shorter) with higher burn-up (i.e. more neutron absorbers present).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗