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At least 991 records · Page 55

EV SALaD 2023 Demonstration: Best Practices and Mitigations for Protecting EVSE Infrastructure

The Electric Vehicle Secure Architecture Laboratory Demonstration (EV SALaD) program is a demonstration of cybersecurity best practices for high-power electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in collaboration with other DOE National Laboratories participating in the EVs at Scale Consortium.a Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) participated in the first 2-year (FY22-23) demonstration cycle for EV SALaD. This report documents the FY23 demonstration, the second in a series of demonstrations and collaborations in deploying and operating cybersecure EV charging infrastructure. It includes a summary of improvements from the FY22 demonstration, technical analysis of the FY23 demonstration, how the research demonstrates cyber-physical and cybersecurity best practices for high-power EV charging infrastructure, and related impacts to national and energy security. For EV SALaD, the FY22 demonstration focused on the detection, ranking, and prioritization of anomalous events for high-power EV charging. The FY23 demonstration additionally included the demonstration of cybersecurity best practices, which included protection and mitigation solutions to prevent, respond, and recover from anomalous events. During the demonstrations, the multi-lab EV SALaD team conducted a Test Effect Payload (TEP)b evaluation on extreme fast charger (XFC) hardware equipped with Cerberus, a detection and response solution, to demonstrate anomaly detection and mitigation cybersecurity best practices against cyber-enabled events.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Networked-based Cyber Analysis using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) for High-Speed Networks

Today’s networked systems utilize advanced security components such as Next Generation Firewall (NGFW), Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), and methods for network traffic classification. A fundamental aspect of these security components and methods is network packet visibility and packet inspection. To achieve packet visibility, a compute mechanism used by these security components and methods is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). DPI is used to obtain visibility into packet fields by looking deeper inside packets, beyond just IP address, port, and protocol. However, DPI is considered extremely expensive in terms of compute processing costs and very challenging to implement on high speed network systems. The fundamental scientific paradigm addressed in this research project is the application of greater network packet visibility and packet inspection at data rates greater than 40Gbps to secure computer network systems. The greater visibility and inspection will enable detection of advanced content-based threats that exploit application vulnerabilities and are designed to bypass traditional security approaches such as firewalls and antivirus scanners. Greater visibility and inspection are achieved through identification of the application protocol (e.g., HTTP, SMTP, Skype) and, in some cases, extraction and processing of the information contained in the packet payload. Analysis is then performed on the resulting DPI data to identify potentially malicious behavior. In order to obtain visibility and inspect the application protocol and contents at high speed data rates, advanced DPI technologies and implementations are developed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Supply Chain Management in Cyber Grid Guard Framework

Grid modernization has impeded innovative power grid applications and energy resources that are increasingly distributed. Blockchain/distributed ledger technology (DLT) has the potential to enhance the resilience of the electric infrastructure, particularly in a decentralized and distributed environment. The benefits of blockchain are to ensure asset information and lifecycle events are secure and traceable and identify potential malicious modification of data. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has developed a framework, Cyber Grid Guard (CGG), incorporating blockchain. The system implements a low-energy, fast, and robust enhancement to system trustworthiness within and across electric grid systems, including substations, control centers, and metering infrastructures. Currently, one of the major concerns is supply chain attacks. There have been several recent attacks that have significantly impacted critical infrastructures and organizations around the world. This document focuses on how CGG can be used to address the supply chain issue.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Managing Cyber Supply Chain Risk for Renewable Energy Technologies

On July 1, 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) hosted a virtual workshop facilitated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Cybersecurity supply chain experts, researchers, and leaders in government and industry came together to share information on current and future challenges in securing emerging technologies and technical architecture. From a cybersecurity perspective, we need to move from a cybersecurity approach that focuses principally on legacy asset owners to one that incorporates more emphasis on end-point device manufacturers and third-party integrators. Cybersecurity for the global digital supply chain for manufacturers of consumer end-point devices—such as smart solar inverters and smart electric vehicle (EV) chargers—will be critical to the future cyber health of the grid.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Security Evaluation of Smart Cards and Secure Tokens: Benefits and Drawbacks for Reducing Supply Chain Risks of Nuclear Power Plants

The supply chain attack pathway is being increasingly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive networks and equipment (e.g., Critical Digital Assets). Cyber-attacks targeting supply chain generally aim to compromise the environments, products, or services of vendors and suppliers to inject, add, or substitute authentic software and hardware with malicious elements. These malicious elements are deemed to be authentic as they arise from the vendor or supplier (i.e., the supply chain). This research aims to leverage findings and assumptions made from the previous report to determine the security benefits and drawbacks of a smart card- based hardware root of trust. Smart cards can provide devices inside Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) with a secure environment to store keys in and perform sensitive operations such as digital signature generation. These abilities can be leveraged to increase supply chain cybersecurity by autonomously providing NPP Licensees with reports on device integrity, authenticity and measurements of executable and non-executable data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Principles: What’s in it for me?

CIE is an emerging method to integrate cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring, or control. CIE complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Rather, it expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve, and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. These principles are aimed at system or design engineers, operators, and technicians, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners, because the engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. This approach creates new opportunities for engineering teams—and not just cybersecurity teams—to secure the system using the physics and mechanics of engineering controls—not just digital monitoring and controls.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities

After completing this session, you should be able to: Describe the Insider Threat; Characterize the cyber insider threat; Describe preventive measures against the insider threat; Describe protective measures against the insider threat.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber–physical vulnerability and resiliency analysis for DER integration: A review, challenges and research needs

High penetration of renewable and sustainable Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the traditional distribution system requires a well-coordinated control strategy for the improvement of system-wide reliability and resiliency. Implementation of such a holistic control architecture requires a flexible, near real-time, and bi-directional communication framework for facilitating the participation of various agents in a multi-vendor heterogeneous smart grid. While the sustainability of energy generation is ensured, this exposes the smart grid to extrinsic cyber threats, and appropriate defense mechanism(s) must be deployed to guarantee continued reliability and resiliency of the power grid. Further, the comprehensive literature review presented in this paper discusses the latest trends in the DER control schemes with fast communication requirements and their accompanying cyber–physical vulnerabilities. These control schemes are compared and contrasted for various traits. A three-level DER system architecture has been depicted, facilitating the deployment of these control schemes. The current developments of standard communication protocols, key security mechanisms, and best practices along major standards and guidelines are explored. The impacts of different attack types with miscellaneous DER functions based on various control schemes and associated mitigation solutions are also provided. Finally, challenges and future research directions for limiting cyber-power susceptibility to enhance resiliency are summarized. The work presented here will help us enabling a cyber-resilient and sustainable smart electric grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Dynamic attack surfaces in nuclear power plants - 162

In this paper, we will summarize a group of architectural principles that inform the development of secure control system architectures, followed by a methodology that allows designers to understand the attack surface of components and subsystems in a way that supports the integration of these surfaces into a single attack surface. We will then show how this methodology can be used to analyze the control system attack surface from a variety of threats, including knowledgeable insiders. We close the paper with an overview of how this approach can be folded into a more rigorous mathematical analysis of the system to define the system's security posture. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Passive Network Cyber Threat Intelligence Framework for Legacy Critical Control Systems using Machine Learning

The importance of Internet and communication networks in our daily life and in any organization’s daily operations is well known and cannot be overstressed. A nation’s economy is fully reliant on its critical infrastructure. Energy sector is one of the 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors identified by the Department of Homeland Security. Securing these critical infrastructure sectors is challenging but is also of utmost priority in this day of constant and persistent cyber threats. Threat is any circumstance or event that has the potential to adversely impact an agency's assets and operations. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is the process of collection, analysis, and identification of potential cyber threats to the organization. This goal of current research performed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Aiken, SC, is to develop a Cyber Threat Intelligence framework for gathering Threat Intelligence passively from the network traffic from and to a real or simulated Critical Control Systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Industrial control system device classification using network traffic features and neural network embeddings

Characterization of modern cyber–physical Industrial Control System (ICS) devices is critical to the evaluation of their security posture and an understanding of the underlying industrial processes with which they interact. In this work, we address two related ICS device identification tasks: (1) separating ICS from non-ICS devices and (2) identifying specific ICS device types. We propose two distinct methods (one based on the existing IP2Vec method, and a novel traffic-features-based method) for achieving the first task. For transferability of the first task between two datasets, the traffic-features-based method performs significantly better (75% overall accuracy) compared to IP2Vec (22.5% overall accuracy). We further propose a novel method called DNP2Vec to address the second task. DNP2Vec is evaluated on two different datasets and achieves perfect multi-class classification accuracy (100%) for both datasets.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Secure Learning Control Strategy via Dynamic Camouflaging for Unknown Dynamical Systems under Attacks

This paper presents a secure reinforcement learning (RL) based control method for unknown linear time-invariant cyber-physical systems (CPSs) that are subjected to compositional attacks such as eavesdropping and covert attack. We consider the attack scenario where the attacker learns about the dynamic model during the exploration phase of the learning conducted by the designer to learn a linear quadratic regulator (LQR), and thereafter, use such information to conduct a covert attack on the dynamic system, which we refer to as doubly learning-based control and attack (DLCA) framework. We propose a dynamic camouflaging based attack-resilient reinforcement learning (ARRL) algorithm which can learn the desired optimal controller for the dynamic system, and at the same time, can inject sufficient misinformation in the estimation of system dynamics by the attacker. The algorithm is accompanied by theoretical guarantees and extensive numerical experiments on a consensus multi-agent system and on a benchmark power grid model.

Mukherjee, Sayak↗

Generative Vulnerability Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are highly susceptible to malicious attacks due to their complex dynamics and interconnectivity. A comprehensive understanding of their vulnerabilities is essential for designing effective resilience measures. This paper presents a data-driven attack generative system for evaluating the vulnerability of CPS. The proposed approach formulates the vulnerability assessment problem as determining the feasibility of a specific attack set based on two boundary functions that represent the effectiveness and stealthiness of attacks. The attack generative model is trained using a custom loss function, with two universal approximators designed to learn the effectiveness and stealthiness functions simultaneously. Theoretical results for successful generation and asymptotic convergence of the resulting training algorithm are given. As a result, the proposed approach is evaluated via numerical simulation of an IEEE 14-bus system and gas pipeline systems, demonstrating its viability in learning how to attack nonlinear CPS and identify potential vulnerabilities.

Computer systems organization↗

Integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering into Enterprise Risk Management

This document supports the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) within the context of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to enhance cyber-resilience. It highlights that many critical infrastructure organizations use ERM to manage business risks and emphasizes the importance of evaluating critical systems and assets. The proposed approach can be adopted independently of formal ERM processes and offers a starting point for integrating CIE alongside existing or new ERM practices. Both CIE and ERM are iterative, and their alignment fosters continuous improvement and supports the engineering and operations cultures of an organization.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Runtime Monitoring with R2U2 for Aircraft Systems with Neural Networks

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is a hardware-supported tool and framework for real-time system monitoring and software health management of cyber-physical systems. During system operation, R2U2 continuously monitors properties about safety, performance, and security of the vehicle and its vital components and can perform diagnostic reasoning. Efficient observers for past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, fast reasoners for Bayesian Networks, and model-based prognostics algorithms are key components of R2U2 and designed for minimal computational footprint. R2U2 has been implemented in software supporting ROS, NASA's cFS/cFE, and Simulink and as an FPGA configuration. The synergistic combination of monitors and observers in R2U2 makes it possible to design powerful models for system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, prognostics, and security monitoring. In this presentation, I will give a detailed overview of the R2U2 architecture and its features and will discuss the application of R2U2 for safety-monitoring of a neural-network based autonomous centerline tracking system (ACT) for autonomous aircraft.

Runtime Monitoring↗

OPNET/Simulink Based Testbed for Disturbance Detection in the Smart Grid

The important backbone of the smart grid is the cyber/information infrastructure, which is primarily used to communicate with different grid components. A smart grid is a complex cyber physical system containing a numerous and variety number of sources, devices, controllers and loads. Therefore, the smart grid is vulnerable to grid related disturbances. For such dynamic system, disturbance and intrusion detection is a paramount issue. This paper presents a Simulink and Opnet based co-simulated platform to carry out a cyber-intrusion in cyber network for modern power systems and the smart grid. The IEEE 30 bus power system model is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the simulated testbed. The experiments were performed by disturbing the circuit breakers reclosing time through a cyber-attack. Different disturbance situations in the considered test system are considered and the results indicate the effectiveness of the proposed co-simulated scheme.

Cyber Attacks↗