Results for “ACCIDENTS - CAUSES” — Page 55

NASA NTRS2017

Emergency Locator Transmitter Survivability and Reliability Study

A comprehensive study of Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) performance was conducted over a three year period concluding in 2016 in support of the Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Office at National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The study began with a review of reported performance cited in a collection of works published as early as 1980 as well as analysis of a focused set of contemporary aviation crash reports. Based on initial research findings, a series of subscale and fullscale system tests were performed at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) with the goals of investigating ELT system failure modes and developing recommended improvements to the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS) that will result in improved system performance. Enhanced performance of ELT systems in aviation accidents will reduce unnecessary loss of human life and make SAR operations safer and less costly by reducing the amount of time required to locate accident sites.

Stimson, Chad M.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Assessment of a Conceptual Flap System Intended for Enhanced General Aviation Safety

A novel multielement trailing-edge flap system for light general aviation airplanes was conceived for enhanced safety during normal and emergency landings. The system is designed to significantly reduce stall speed, and thus approach speed, with the goal of reducing maneuveringflight accidents and enhancing pilot survivability in the event of an accident. The research objectives were to assess the aerodynamic performance characteristics of the system and to evaluate the extent to which it provided both increased lift and increased drag required for the low-speed landing goal. The flap system was applied to a model of a light general aviation, high-wing trainer and tested in the Langley 12- Foot Low-Speed Wind Tunnel. Data were obtained for several device deflection angles, and component combinations at a dynamic pressure of 4 pounds per square foot. The force and moment data supports the achievement of the desired increase in lift with substantially increased drag, all at relatively shallow angles of attack. The levels of lift and drag can be varied through device deflection angles and inboard/outboard differential deflections. As such, it appears that this flap system may provide an enabling technology to allow steep, controllable glide slopes for safe rapid descent to landing with reduced stall speed. However, a simple flat-plate lower surface spoiler (LSS) provided either similar or superior lift with little impact on pitch or drag as compared to the proposed system. Higher-fidelity studies are suggested prior to use of the proposed system.

Campbell, Bryan A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety during Hydraulic Systems Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to aircraft system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement (two-crew, reduced crew, single pilot) was used as the independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a hydraulic systems leak - one of 6 total non-normal events that were simulated in this experiment.

Kramer, Lynda J.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Flame Retardant Fibers for Human Space Exploration - Past, Present, and Future

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has led in the development of unique flame retardant fibers for human spaceflight since the beginning of the Apollo program. After the Apollo 1 fire which killed Command Pilot Virgil I 'Gus' Grissom, Senior Pilot Edward H. White II, and Pilot Roger B. Chaffee from cardiac arrest on January 27, 1967, the accident investigators found severe third degree burns and melted spacesuits on the astronauts bodies. NASA immediately initiated an extensive research program aimed at developing flame retardant and flame resistant fibers for the enriched oxygen atmosphere of the Apollo crew cabin. Fibers are flame retardant when they have been modified by chemical and thermal treatments. Fibers are flame resistant when they are made of inherently flame resistant materials (i.e. glass, ceramic, highly aromatic polymers). Immediately after this tragic accident, NASA funded extensive research in specifically developing flame retardant fibers and fabrics. The early developmental efforts for human spaceflight were for the outer layer of the Apollo spacesuit. It was imperative that non-flammable fabrics be used in a 100% oxygen environment. Owens-Corning thus developed the Beta fiber that was immediately used in the Apollo program and later in the Space Shuttle program. Aside from the urgent need for protective fabrics for the spacesuit, NASA also needed flame retardant fabrics for both clothing and equipment inside the spacecraft. From the mid-1960s to the early 1980's, NASA contracted with many companies to develop inherently flame retardant fibers and flame retardant finishes for existing fibers. Fluorocarbons and aromatic polyamides were the polymers of great interest for the development of new inherently flame retardant fibers for enriched oxygen environments. These enriched environments varied for different space programs. For example, the Apollo program requirements were for materials that would not support combustion in a 70%/30% oxygen/nitrogen environment at 6.3 pounds per square inch (psi). The Skylab program flammability requirements were set at 80%/20% oxygen/nitrogen ratios at 5 psi. While many fibers produced under several NASA contracts were never used, a few have become commercial products. The intent of this paper is to present the developmental history of some of these new or modified textile fibers. These developmental efforts are presented at various levels of details depending on the source of the historical records.

Orndoff, Evelyne↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety during Drive Shaft Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base simulation experiment specifically addressed this void by collecting data to quantify the human (pilot) contribution to safety-of-flight and the methods they use in today's National Airspace System. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using the FAA's Oklahoma City Flight Simulation Branch Level D-certified B-737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to aircraft system failures. These data are fundamental to and critical for the design and development of future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support the human in the cockpit. Eighteen U.S. airline crews flew various normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the human's contribution to safety of flight, crew complement was used as the experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. Pilot actions and performance during single pilot and reduced crew operations were measured for comparison against the normal two-crew complement during normal and non-normal situations. This paper details the crew's actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a drive shaft failure - one of 6 non-normal events that were simulated in this experiment.

Kramer, Lynda J.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During Dual Generator Failure

Accident statistics cite flight crew error in over 60% of accidents involving transport category aircraft. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. No data currently exists that quantifies the contribution of the flight crew in this role. Neither does data exist for how often the flight crew handles non-normal procedures or system failures on a daily basis in the National Airspace System. A pilot-in-the-loop high fidelity motion simulation study was conducted by the NASA Langley Research Center in partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to evaluate the pilot's contribution to flight safety during normal flight and in response to aircraft system failures. Eighteen crews flew various normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as the experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. Pilot actions and performance when one of the flight crew was unavailable were also recorded for comparison against the nominal two-crew operations. This paper details diversion decisions, perceived safety of flight, workload, time to complete pertinent checklists, and approach and landing results while dealing with a complete loss of electrical generators. Loss of electrical power requires pilots to complete the flight without automation support of autopilots, flight directors, or auto throttles. For reduced crew complements, the additional workload and perceived safety of flight was considered unacceptable.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Verification Testing: Meet User Needs Figure of Merit

Verification is the process through which Modeling and Simulation(M&S) software goes to ensure that it has been rigorously tested and debugged for its intended use. Validation confirms that said software accurately models and represents the real world system. Credibility gives an assessment of the development and testing effort that the software has gone through as well as how accurate and reliable test results are. Together, these three components form Verification, Validation, and Credibility(VV&C), the process by which all NASA modeling software is to be tested to ensure that it is ready for implementation. NASA created this process following the CAIB (Columbia Accident Investigation Board) report seeking to understand the reasons the Columbia space shuttle failed during reentry. The reports conclusion was that the accident was fully avoidable, however, among other issues, the necessary data to make an informed decision was not there and the result was complete loss of the shuttle and crew. In an effort to mitigate this problem, NASA put out their Standard for Models and Simulations, currently in version NASA-STD-7009A, in which they detailed their recommendations, requirements and rationale for the different components of VV&C. They did this with the intention that it would allow for people receiving MS software to clearly understand and have data from the past development effort. This in turn would allow the people who had not worked with the MS software before to move forward with greater confidence and efficiency in their work. This particular project looks to perform Verification on several MATLAB (Registered Trademark)(The MathWorks, Inc.) scripts that will be later implemented in a website interface. It seeks to take note and define the limits of operation, the units and significance, and the expected datatype and format of the inputs and outputs of each of the scripts. This is intended to prevent the code from attempting to make incorrect or impossible calculations. Additionally, this project will look at the coding generally and note inconsistencies, redundancies, and other aspects that may become problematic or slow down the codes run time. Certain scripts lacking in documentation also will be commented and cataloged.

validation↗

NASA NTRS2018

Measurements of Parachute Dynamics in the World's Largest Wind Tunnel by Stereo Photogrammetry

Between 2012 and 2017, parachutes for four NASA Projects were tested in the 80- by 120-Ft test section of the National Full-Scale Aerodynamic Complex (NFAC) at NASA Ames Research Center. These projects were: (1) Low-Density Supersonic Decelerator (LDSD); (2) Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS, for Orion); (3) Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy and Heat Transport (InSight, a Mars mission); and (4) Mars 2020. In all tests stereo photogrammetry was used to measure time-dependent positions of features on the canopies. For the LDSD and CPAS tests, where the purpose was to study the trade-off between stability and drag of different parachute designs, the pendulum motion of the canopies about the riser attachment point was measured by calibrated cameras in the diffuser. The CPAS test also included static measurements where the inflated parachutes were pulled to the side by a system of tethers. The Insight tests were structural qualification tests where each canopy was packed in a bag and launched from a mortar. Cameras in the diffuser measured the trajectory of the bag and the stripping of the bag from the canopy. The Mars 2020 test was a workmanship verification test where the canopies were either launched from a mortar or deployed from a sleeve stretched along the tunnel axis. The deployments were recorded from many directions by thirteen high-speed cameras distributed in the diffuser and test section. Photogrammetry was not planned; however, after a tunnel-related accident ended the test prematurely, photogrammetric measurements were bootstrapped from the images to support the accident investigations. This paper describes how the photogrammetry measurements were made in each test and presents typical results.

Schairer, Edward T.↗

NASA NTRS2018

NASA: 60 Years and Counting...

Sputnik launched on 4 Oct 1057. On July 29, 1958, Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act, the creation of NASA. The Soviets launched the first human into orbit, Yuri Gagarin, on April 12, 1961. On 5 May 1961, Alan Shepard's Freedom 7 Mercury capsule lifted off at 9:34 a.m. from Launch Complex 5 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, and flew a suborbital trajectory lasting 15 minutes and 22 seconds, America's first man in space. On 25 May 1961, Kennedy delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress. In that speech, he stated "I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth." The rest, as they say, is history. Project Mercury, the first U.S. program to put humans in space, made 25 flights, six of which carried astronauts between 1961 and 1963. The Gemini program primarily tested equipment and mission procedures and trained astronauts and ground crews for future Apollo missions to the Moon. Exactly eight years, one month and 26 days after President Kennedy challenged Americans to reach for the Moon, Project Apollo landed the first humans on the lunar surface and returned them safely to Earth. In 1973, Skylab expeditions paved the way for the International Space Station. Over 30 years, NASA's space shuttle fleet, ”Columbia, Challenger, Discovery, Atlantis and Endeavour,” flew 135 missions and carried 355 different people to space. The space shuttle carried people into orbit repeatedly; launched, recovered and repaired satellites; conducted cutting-edge research; and built the largest structure in space, the International Space Station. Tragically, NASA lost two crews of seven in the 1986 Challenger accident and the 2003 Columbia accident. The International Space Station is a model for global cooperation and scientific advancements that is enabling growth of private industry in low-Earth orbit and development of new technologies to advance human space exploration. Built between 1998 and 2011, the space station has housed humans continuously since Nov. 2, 2000. NASA has contracted with commercial companies SpaceX, Orbital ATK, and Sierra Nevada Corporation to deliver science investigations, cargo, and supplies to the crews living in space, and soon Boeing and SpaceX will transport astronauts to and from the station. Today, NASA is working on many fronts to advance man's presence in space. NASA's Exploration Campaign will establish U.S. preeminence in cislunar space through the operations and the deployment of a U.S.-led Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway (LOPG). Together with the Orion and SLS Programs, the LOPG is central to advancing and sustaining human space exploration goals, and is the unifying single stepping off point for human cislunar operations, lunar surface access and missions to Mars. As one might expect, EMC for all this activity is challenging, to say the least. In the next half-hour or so, I will talk about some of those challenges and how the different programs are meeting them.

Scully, Bob↗

NASA NTRS2016

Real-Time Early Warning Techniques

Contemporary approaches to aerospace vehicle system monitoring rely heavily on thresholds that represent a compromise between providing warning early enough to avert a mishap while simultaneously minimizing false alarms. While this reliance on thresholds has been in place for decades and has permeated both cockpits and control rooms, we often find it insufficient when retrospectively analyzing data from an accident. To modernize and enhance flight test safety, we introduce new methods of monitoring for anomalous patterns of interaction rather than for thresholds exceedance. For systems with a well characterized baseline we show how the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), utilized by NASA in the aftermath of the Columbia accident, might be implemented in real-time to provide earlier warning than currently employed techniques. For systems without such a baseline, we introduce new developments in statistical methods relating to critical slowing down, first applied in medicine and physics, which show promise for adaptation to flight test. Finally, the familiar resource constrained environment leads to a reliance on increased instrumentation that is challenging the limits of the current one-sensor, one-indicator threshold paradigm. Existing methods thus fail to accurately reflect the true complexity of a vehicle rich with interdependent interacting systems. We highlight these concepts in a brief summary of the 2001 Air Transat Flight 236 deadstick landing in the Azores. We then suggest control room and cockpit modifications to better display the information gleaned using these novel monitoring methods.

Javorsek, Dan↗

NASA NTRS2016

Enhancing Flight Test Safety with Real-Time Early Warning Techniques

Contemporary approaches to aerospace vehicle system monitoring rely heavily on thresholds that represent a compromise between providing warning early enough to avert a mishap while simultaneously minimizing false alarms. While this reliance on thresholds has been in place for decades and has permeated both cockpits and control rooms, we often find it insufficient when retrospectively analyzing data from an accident. To modernize and enhance flight test safety, we introduce new methods of monitoring for anomalous patterns of interaction rather than for thresholds exceedance. For systems with a well characterized baseline we show how the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), utilized by NASA in the aftermath of the Columbia accident, might be implemented in real-time to provide earlier warning than currently employed techniques. For systems without such a baseline, we introduce new developments in statistical methods relating to critical slowing down, first applied in medicine and physics, which show promise for adaptation to flight test. Finally, the familiar resource constrained environment leads to a reliance on increased instrumentation that is challenging the limits of the current "one-sensor, one-indicator" threshold paradigm. Existing methods thus fail to accurately reflect the true complexity of a vehicle rich with interdependent interacting systems. We highlight these concepts in a brief summary of the 2001 Air Transat Flight 236 deadstick landing in the Azores. We then suggest control room and cockpit modifications to better display the information gleaned using these novel monitoring methods.

Javorsek, Daniel, II↗

NASA NTRS2020

Honeywell Enhancing Airplane State Awareness (EASA) Project: Final Report on Refinement and Evaluation of Candidate Solutions for Airplane System State Awareness

The loss of pilot airplane state awareness (ASA) has been implicated as a factor in several aviation accidents identified by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST). These accidents were investigated to identify precursors to the loss of ASA and develop technologies to address the loss of ASA. Based on a gap analysis, two technologies were prototyped and assessed with a formative pilot-in-the-loop evaluation in NASA Langley’s full-motion Research Flight Deck. The technologies address: 1) data source anomaly detection in real-time, and 2) intelligent monitoring aids to provide nominal and predictive awareness of situations to be monitored and a mission timeline to visualize events of interest. The evaluation results indicated favorable impressions of both technologies for mitigating the loss of ASA in terms of operational utility, workload, acceptability, complexity, and usability. The team concludes that there is a feasible retrofit solution for improving ASA that would minimize certification risk, integration costs, and training impact.

Whitlow, Stephen D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Is "Sleepy Supervision" the New "Drowsy Driving"?

Human error has been implicated as a causal factor in a large proportion of road accidents. Automated driving systems purport to mitigate this risk, but self-driving systems that allow a driver to entirely disengage from the driving task also require the driver to monitor the environment and take control when necessary. Given that sleep loss impairs monitoring performance and there is a high prevalence of sleep deficiency in modern society, we hypothesized that supervising a self-driving vehicle would unmask latent sleepiness compared to manually controlled driving among individuals following their typical sleep schedules. We found that participants felt sleepier, had more involuntary transitions to sleep, had slower reaction times and more attentional failures, and showed substantial modifications in brain synchronization during and following an autonomous drive compared to a manually controlled drive. Our findings suggest that the introduction of partial self-driving capabilities in vehicles has the potential to paradoxically increase accident risk.

sleepiness↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Anti-Criticality Methods for Nuclear Thermal Rocket Launches and Their Associated Assembly / Disassembly in Space

When launching a nuclear reactor into space for use in a nuclear thermal rocket (NTR), safety to the public is of the outmost importance. Ensuring that the reactor will not go critical in an accident scenario is the biggest risk that must be overcome to protect the public. Use of anti-criticality devices and methods, such as the use of poison materials in the core or loading a select portion of the fuel on orbit, can prevent the reactor from going critical in any accident scenario. However, both methods (unpoisoning / loading fuel into the reactor core on orbit) will likely require the use of In Space Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM) technology to remove the safeguards and ensure the reactor is fully operational before use. This paper discusses the use of ISAMs to help with the unpackaging of anti-criticality devices on orbit along with ISAMs ability to help verify and preform maintenance and inspection checks of the reactor system before operation and in between engine burns.

nuclear thermal propulsion↗

DOE OSTI2020

AGR-5/6/7 Post-Irradiation Examination Plan

This plan describes the PIE activities to be carried out on AGR-5/6/7 fuel and the non-fuel components of the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation test train. PIE of AGR-5/6/7 fuel and test train components will provide data on fuel performance over a range of irradiation conditions (e.g., burnup, neutron fluence, and temperature), test fuel under postulated accident conditions, and support development of fuel performance and fission product transport models. Examination of the non-fuel test train components will give information on TRISO fuel and compact performance and information on releases of radioactive fission products from the fuel compacts. PIE of the fuel compacts is used for many purposes including, but not limited to: updating the irradiation thermal calculations, measuring burnup, determining retention/release of fission products from the compacts and the TRISO particles, determining TRISO layer failure rates, determining fuel performance at elevated accident temperatures, determining fuel performance under oxidizing atmospheres, determining the distribution of fission products within the compact and fuel particles, and observing compact and particle morphology to explain mechanisms of TRISO layer failure and/or fission product release/retention.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗