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At least 973 records · Page 54

Report on Department of Homeland Security Sponsored Research Project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on Preparation for an Improvised Nuclear Device Event

Following the events of September 11th, a litany of imaginable horribles was trotted out before an anxious and concerned public. To date, government agencies and academics are still grappling with how to best respond to such catastrophes, and as Senator Lieberman's quote says above, now is the time to plan and prepare for such events. One of the nation's worst fears is that terrorists might detonate an improvised nuclear device (IND) in an American city. With 9/11 serving as the catalyst, the government and many NGOs have invested money into research and development of response capabilities throughout the country. Yet, there is still much to learn about how to best respond to an IND event. My summer 2008 internship at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory afforded me the opportunity to look in depth at the preparedness process and the research that has been conducted on this issue. While at the laboratory I was tasked to collect, combine, and process research on how cities and the federal government can best prepare for the horrific prospect of an IND event. Specific projects that I was involved with were meeting reports, research reviews, and a full project report. Working directly with Brooke Buddemeier and his support team at the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center, I was able to witness first hand, preparation for meetings with response planners to inform them of the challenges that an IND event would pose to the affected communities. In addition, I supported the Homeland Security Institute team (HSI), which was looking at IND preparation and preparing a Congressional report. I participated in meetings at which local responders expressed their concerns and contributed valuable information to the response plan. I specialized in the psycho-social aspects of an IND event and served as a technical advisor to some of the research groups. Alongside attending and supporting these meetings, I worked on an independent research project which collected information from across disciplines to outline where the state of knowledge on IND response is. In addition, the report looked at meetings that were held over the summer in various cities. The meetings were attended by both federal responders and local responders. The meetings explored issues regarding IND preparation and how to mitigate the effects of an IND detonation. Looking at the research and current preparation activity the report found that the state of knowledge in responding and communicating is a mixed bag. Some aspects of an IND attack are well understood, some are not, but much is left to synthesize. The effects of an IND would be devastating, yet much can be done to mitigate those effects through education, preparation, and research. A major gap in current knowledge is how to effectively communicate with the public before an attack. Little research on the effectiveness of public education has been done, but it is likely that educating the public about the effects of an IND and how to best protect oneself could save many lives.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Final Technical Report

The work done with DOE support during this 15 year period was extensive and successful. It is best summarized by the list of 58 publications (below) which reported progress made with DOE support. These are from the grant period and a few more recent reporting on grant research. Mostly these are primary research reports in reviewed journals. There are also, however, many summary reviews in review journals and in scientific monographs, as they also are key places for reporting research progress. What we did during this grant period (and much longer) was to characterize genetic determinants for bacterial resistances to additional toxic heavy metals of DOE concern, through starting with phenotypic properties of the resistant bacteria to DNA sequence determination and characterization of the genes involved. Over the years (and as shown in the list of publications), the toxic metal-forming elements we have studied included Ag, As, Cd, Cr, and Hg. In each case, we started with basically nothing (or very little) known, progressed through quite detailed understanding, until other laboratory groups also became strongly involved in related studies. More recently, with DOE support, we were the first laboratory group in the world to identify genes for bacterial resistance to silver salts (sil genes) and the closely related silver-and-copper resistance genes cus. This was initially reported in detail in Gupta et al. (1999; see publications list below). We also identified the first toxic metal 'gene island' (multiple transcripts and perhaps 25 genes each in need of detailed study) which encodes the subunits of arsenite oxidase (which we called aso; Silver and Phung, 2005; but most other researchers have subsequently settled on aox for the gene mnemonic). Both of these systems were firsts. Now a few years later, a search on GenBank shows that each is now represented by gene families with more than a dozen examples that have been identified and sequenced. Most of the additional representative systems are from total bacterial genomes without specific gene characterization.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Coeur d'Alene Tribe Fisheries Program : Implementation of Fisheries Enhancement Opportunities on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation : 2006 Annual Report.

This annual report summarizes previously unreported data collected to fulfill the contractual obligations for BPA project No.1990-044-00, 'Coeur d'Alene Subbasin Fisheries Habitat Enhancement', during the 2006 calendar year. Even though the contract performance period for this project crosses fiscal and calendar years, the timing of data collection and analysis, as well as implementation of restoration projects, lends itself to this reporting schedule. The 2006 performance period marked the first year that BPA implemented its Process Improvement Initiative with the Pisces system serving as the vehicle for developing statements of work and tracking project performance. This document attempts to provide some consistency between the project objectives, around which past reports have been structured, and the new work element format adopted for use in Pisces. The report is formatted into three primary sections that respectively provide results and discussion of: (1) monitoring and evaluation of biological and physical habitat indicators; (2) implementation of restoration and enhancement projects; and (3) education and outreach work performed during 2006. The relevant work elements and/or milestones found in the statement of work are listed under these section headings and described in the body of the report.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Audit Report on "Protection of the Department of Energy's Unclassified Sensitive Electronic Information"

The Department of Energy and its contractors store and process massive quantities of sensitive information to accomplish national security, energy, science, and environmental missions. Sensitive unclassified data, such as personally identifiable information (PII), official use only, and unclassified controlled nuclear information require special handling and protection to prevent misuse of the information for inappropriate purposes. Industry experts have reported that more than 203 million personal privacy records have been lost or stolen over the past three years, including information maintained by corporations, educational institutions, and Federal agencies. The loss of personal and other sensitive information can result in substantial financial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and organizations. Therefore, strong protective measures, including data encryption, help protect against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Prior reports involving the loss of sensitive information have highlighted weaknesses in the Department's ability to protect sensitive data. Our report on Security Over Personally Identifiable Information (DOE/IG-0771, July 2007) disclosed that the Department had not fully implemented all measures recommended by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and required by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to protect PII, including failures to identify and encrypt PII maintained on information systems. Similarly, the Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Department had not yet installed encryption technology to protect sensitive data on the vast majority of laptop computers and handheld devices. Because of the potential for harm, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors adequately safeguarded sensitive electronic information. The Department had taken a number of steps to improve protection of PII. Our review, however, identified opportunities to strengthen the protection of all types of sensitive unclassified electronic information and reduce the risk that such data could fall into the hands of individuals with malicious intent. In particular, for the seven sites we reviewed: (1) Four sites had either not ensured that sensitive information maintained on mobile devices was encrypted. Or, they had improperly permitted sensitive unclassified information to be transmitted unencrypted through email or to offsite backup storage facilities; (2) One site had not ensured that laptops taken on foreign travel, including travel to sensitive countries, were protected against security threats; and, (3) Although required by the OMB since 2003, we learned that programs and sites were still working to complete Privacy Impact Assessments - analyses designed to examine the risks and ramifications of using information systems to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information. Our testing revealed that the weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to Headquarters programs and field sites that had not implemented existing policies and procedures requiring protection of sensitive electronic information. In addition, a lack of performance monitoring contributed to the inability of the Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that measures were in place to fully protect sensitive information. As demonstrated by previous computer intrusion-related data losses throughout the Department, without improvements, the risk or vulnerability for future losses remains unacceptably high. In conducting this audit, we recognized that data encryption and related techniques do not provide absolute assurance that sensitive data is fully protected. For example, encryption will not necessarily protect data in circumstances where organizational access controls are weak or are circumvented through phishing or other malicious techniques. However, as noted by NIST, when used appropriately, encryption is an effective tool that can, as part of an overall risk-management strategy, enhance security over critical personal and other sensitive information. The audit disclosed that Sandia National Laboratories had instituted a comprehensive program to protect laptops taken on foreign travel. In addition, the Department issued policy after our field work was completed that should standardize the Privacy Impact Assessment process, and, in so doing, provide increased accountability. While these actions are positive steps, additional effort is needed to help ensure that the privacy of individuals is adequately protected and that sensitive operational data is not compromised. To that end, our report contains several recommendations to implement a risk-based protection scheme for the protection of sensitive electronic information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Atmospheric Radiation Measurement program climate research facilities quarterly report April 1 - June 30, 2009.

Individual raw data streams from instrumentation at the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Program Climate Research Facility (ACRF) fixed and mobile sites are collected and sent to the Data Management Facility (DMF) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for processing in near-real time. Raw and processed data are then sent approximately daily to the ACRF Archive, where they are made available to users. For each instrument, we calculate the ratio of the actual number of data records received daily at the archive to the expected number of data records. The results are tabulated by (1) individual data stream, site, and month for the current year and (2) site and fiscal year (FY) dating back to 1998. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requires national user facilities to report time-based operating data. The requirements concern the actual hours of operation (ACTUAL); the estimated maximum operation or uptime goal (OPSMAX), which accounts for planned downtime; and the VARIANCE [1 - (ACTUAL/OPSMAX)], which accounts for unplanned downtime. The OPSMAX time for the third quarter of FY 2009 for the Southern Great Plains (SGP) site is 2,074.80 hours (0.95 x 2,184 hours this quarter); for the North Slope Alaska (NSA) locale it is 1,965.60 hours (0.90 x 2,184); and for the Tropical Western Pacific (TWP) locale it is 1,856.40 hours (0.85 x 2,184). The ARM Mobile Facility (AMF) was officially operational May 1 in Graciosa Island, the Azores, Portugal, so the OPSMAX time this quarter is 1390.80 hours (0.95 x 1464). The differences in OPSMAX performance reflect the complexity of local logistics and the frequency of extreme weather events. It is impractical to measure OPSMAX for each instrument or data stream. Data availability reported here refers to the average of the individual, continuous data streams that have been received by the Archive. Data not at the Archive are caused by downtime (scheduled or unplanned) of the individual instruments. Therefore, data availability is directly related to individual instrument uptime. Thus, the average percentage of data in the Archive represents the average percentage of the time (24 hours per day, 91 days for this quarter) the instruments were operating this quarter. Table 1 shows the accumulated maximum operation time (planned uptime), actual hours of operation, and variance (unplanned downtime) for April 1 - June 30, 2009, for the fixed sites. Because the AMF operates episodically, the AMF statistics are reported separately and are not included in the aggregate average with the fixed sites. The AMF statistics for this reporting period were not available at the time of this report. The third quarter comprises a total of 2,184 hours for the fixed sites. The average well exceeded our goal this quarter.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 percent of existing corrective action milestones had missed estimated remediation dates, with many exceeding planned completion dates by at least one year. As a consequence, the risk of compromise to the Department's information and systems remained higher than necessary. To assist the continuing efforts to improve, we made several recommendations designed to help the Department's managers to strengthen the unclassified cyber security program and, thereby, protect its computer resources from unauthorized modification, loss, or disclosure of information. Due to security considerations, information on specific vulnerabilities and locations has been omitted from this report. Management officials at the sites evaluated were provided with detailed information regarding identified vulnerabilities, and, in many instances, initiated corrective actions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

National SCADA Test Bed Substation Automation Evaluation Report

Increased awareness of the potential for cyber attack has recently resulted in improved cyber security practices associated with the electrical power grid. However, the level of practical understanding and deployment of cyber security practices has not been evenly applied across all business sectors. Much of the focus has been centered on information technology business centers and control rooms. This report explores the current level of substation automation, communication, and cyber security protection deployed in electrical substations throughout existing utilities in the United States. This report documents the evaluation of substation automation implementation and associated vulnerabilities. This evaluation used research conducted by Newton-Evans Research Company for some of its observations and results. The Newton Evans Report aided in the determination of what is the state of substation automation in North American electric utilities. Idaho National Laboratory cyber security experts aided in the determination of what cyber vulnerabilities may pose a threat to electrical substations. This report includes cyber vulnerabilities as well as recommended mitigations. It also describes specific cyber issues found in typical substation automation configurations within the electric utility industry. The evaluation report was performed over a 5-month period starting in October 2008

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Audit Report on "The Office of Science's Management of Information Technology Resources"

The Department of Energy's Office of Science (Science) and its facility contractors are aggressive users of information technology (IT) to support fundamental research in areas such as energy, environmental remediation and computational sciences. Of its $4 billion Fiscal Year 2008 budget, Science spent about $287 million to manage its IT program. This included cyber security activities, acquisition of hardware and software, and support service costs used to maintain the operating environments necessary to support the missions of the program. Prior Office of Inspector General reports have identified various issues with Science's management of its IT programs and resources. For instance, our report on Facility Contractor Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Hardware (DOE/IG-0768, June 2007) noted that the Science sites reviewed spent more than necessary when acquiring IT hardware. In another example, our review of The Department's Efforts to Implement Common Information Technology Services at Headquarters (DOE/IG-0763, March 2007) disclosed that Science's reluctance to adopt the Department of Energy Common Operating Environment (DOE-COE) at Headquarters contributed to the Department's inability to fully realize potential cost savings through consolidation and economies of scale. In light of the magnitude of the Office of Science IT program and previously identified program weaknesses, we initiated this audit to determine whether Science adequately managed its IT resources. Science had taken a number of actions to improve its cyber security posture and align its program to Federal requirements. Yet, our review disclosed that it had not taken some basic steps to enhance security and reduce costs. In particular, we found that: (1) For their non-scientific computing environments, all seven of the field sites reviewed (two Federal, five contractor) had implemented security configurations that were less stringent than those included in the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. This configuration was designed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and its use was mandated by the Office of Management and Budget; (2) Although we previously highlighted weaknesses and recommended corrective actions, Science still had not fully established or enforced IT hardware standards for acquiring hardware such as desktop and laptop computers or related peripherals, contributing to significant unnecessary expenditures; and (3) While we have noted in a series of past reports that significant savings could be realized from aggregating demand for IT services and products across the enterprise, Science had not implemented a common infrastructure for users at its Federal sites and continued to maintain an IT environment independent of the Department's Common IT Operating Environment. The weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to a lack of adequate policies and procedures for ensuring effective cyber security and hardware acquisition practices. In addition, Science had not effectively monitored the performance of its field sites to ensure that previously reported internal control weaknesses were addressed and had not implemented an appropriate mechanism to track its IT-related costs. Without improvements, Science may be unable to realize the benefits of improved security over its information systems, reduce costs associated with hardware acquisition, and lower IT support costs through consolidation of services. In particular, we determined that Science could potentially realize savings of more than $3.3 million over the next three years by better controlling hardware costs and implementing standards for certain equipment. Furthermore, Science could continue to pay for duplicative IT support services and fail to take advantage of opportunities to lower costs and apply potential savings to mission-related work. During the course of our audit work, we learned from Science officials that they had initiated the process of revising the Program Cyber Security Plan to better clarify its policy for implementing Federal cyber security requirements. In addition, we noted that the Oak Ridge National Laboratory had taken action to establish and enforce hardware standards on both its administrative and scientific workforce. Although these actions are positive steps, additional action is needed to strengthen Science's IT program. To that end, our report contains several recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help Science improve the management of its IT resources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, for Fiscal Year 2009

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): · CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment · CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well · CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility · CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater · CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches This report covers fiscal year 2009 (October 2008–September 2009). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0021 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the site inspections are included in Appendix C.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report - 2008 (Rev. 0)

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) opened on March 26, 1999, becoming the nation’s first deep geologic repository for the permanent disposal of defense-generated transuranic (TRU) waste. TRU waste generation has occurred at 39 sites across the country (seven large-quantity and 32 small-quantity sites). Sixteen of these sites (one large site and 15 small quantity sites) have emplaced their waste at WIPP, found other disposition pathways for the waste, or have transferred the waste to other sites for further disposition (LANL-CO, 2007a). Babcock and Wilcox (BL) [this site did not pursue a defense determination and was considered deinventoried], United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC), Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory – Nuclear Fuels Service (KAPL-NFS), and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) have been de-inventoried once, but have identified additional waste after the originally identified waste was removed from the site. TRU waste is currently retrievably stored at 23 sites throughout the DOE complex. As of December 31, 2007, there have been 6340 shipments of TRU waste to WIPP for emplacement since WIPP’s opening (DOE 2008a). Since 1994, DOE complex-wide TRU waste inventory information has been collected, analyzed, and published for WIPP certification urposes in several reports. The WIPP Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (WTWBIR), Revision 0, published in June 1994 (DOE 1994), was the first attempt made by the DOE complex to report all of its TRU waste at the waste-stream level. The TRU waste data reported in Revision 0 were considered preliminary until the TRU waste sites completed quality checks of the data. Data changes resulting from the quality checks were contained in the WTWBIR, Revision 1 (DOE 1995a). The Transuranic Waste Baseline Inventory Report (TWBIR), Revisions 2 and 3, included WIPP and potential TRU waste streams, along with waste stream characteristic information. Data from Revisions 2 and 3 provided the TRU waste inventory that Sandia National Laboratories–Carlsbad Programs Group (SNL-CPG) used to perform the necessary modeling calculations for the performance assessment (PA) for the initial certification of the WIPP (Compliance Certification Application [CCA]).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Change Report 2008-2009

In meeting the requirement, the DOE provides an annual report each November of all applicable changes under the above requirement. This annual report informs the EPA of changes to information in the most recent compliance application (the 2004 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA)). Significant planned changes must be reported to the EPA prior to implementation by the DOE. In addition, Title 40 CFR, Section 194.4(b)(3) requires that significant unplanned changes be reported to the EPA within 24 hours or ten days, depending on the severity of the activity or condition. Planned changes are submitted on an individual basis. All other changes are reported annually.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual report of monitoring at Morrill, Kansas, in 2009 .

In September 2005, the Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) initiated periodic sampling of groundwater in the vicinity of a grain storage facility formerly operated by the CCC/USDA at Morrill, Kansas. The sampling at Morrill is being performed on behalf of the CCC/USDA by Argonne National Laboratory, in accord with a monitoring program approved by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE 2005), to monitor levels of carbon tetrachloride contamination identified in the groundwater at this site (Argonne 2004, 2005a). This report provides results for monitoring events in April and September 2009. Under the KDHE-approved monitoring plan (Argonne 2005b), groundwater was initially sampled twice yearly for a period of two years (in fall 2005, in spring and fall 2006, and in spring and fall 2007). The samples were analyzed for volatile organic compounds (VOCs), as well as for selected geochemical parameters to aid in the evaluation of possible natural contaminant degradation (reductive dechlorination) processes in the subsurface environment. The analytical results for groundwater sampling events at Morrill from September 2005 to October 2008 were documented previously (Argonne 2006a,b, 2007, 2008a,b, 2009). Those results consistently demonstrated the presence of carbon tetrachloride contamination, at levels exceeding the KDHE Tier 2 risk-based screening level of 5.0 {micro}g/L for this compound, in a groundwater plume extending generally south-southeastward from the former CCC/USDA facility, toward Terrapin Creek at the south edge of the town. Low levels ({le} 1.3 {micro}g/L) of carbon tetrachloride were persistently detected at monitoring well MW8S, on the bank of an intermittent tributary to Terrapin Creek. This observation suggested a possible risk of contamination of the surface waters of the creek. That concern is the regulatory driver for ongoing monitoring. In light of the early findings, in 2006 the CCC/USDA recommended expansion of the approved monitoring program to include the collection and analysis of surface water samples along Terrapin Creek (Argonne 2006a). At the request of the KDHE (2007a), locations for both surface water and shallow sediment sampling were discussed with the KDHE in January 2007. An addendum to the existing monitoring plan (Appendix A) and a standard operating procedure (SOP AGEM-15; Appendix B) for sediment sampling were submitted to the KDHE on the basis of these discussions and were subsequently approved (KDHE 2008b). Results of sediment sampling prior to 2009 were reported previously (Argonne 2008a,b; 2009). To supplement the original scope of the monitoring, Argonne also sampled natural vegetation along Terrapin Creek in October 2006, April 2007, and July 2007 for analyses for VOCs. The results of these plant tissue analyses were reported previously (Argonne 2008a, 2009). The April and September 2009 sampling events reported here represent a continuation of the two-year monitoring program, as requested by the KDHE (2007b). The groundwater sampling is presently conducted, in accord with the monitoring plan (Argonne 2005b) and the addendum to that plan (Appendix A in this report), in a network of 12 monitoring wells and 3 private wells (Figure 1.1), at locations approved by the KDHE (2008b). The findings of the April and September 2009 monitoring events at Morrill support the following conclusions: (1) Groundwater flow during the early spring and the later part of this review period was predominantly to the south-southeast, from the vicinity of the former CCC/USDA facility toward Terrapin Creek. In late spring, a slight shift occurred toward more southerly groundwater flow (possibly southwesterly in the immediate vicinity of the intermittent tributary that flows into Terrapin Creek). This shift in the late spring reflected transient seasonal precipitation and recharge that resulted in higher groundwater levels at this time. (2) No significant changes were observed in the levels or distribution of carbon tetrachloride in the groundwater at Morrill during the current review period, or in comparison to the results of the spring and fall 2008 monitoring events. A maximum carbon tetrachloride concentration of 28-30 {micro}g/L was identified in groundwater - at well MW3S - during both the April and September 2009 sampling events. (3) No carbon tetrachloride contamination was detected in surface waters or shallow streambed sediments sampled at five locations along Terrapin Creek, downgradient from the former CCC/USDA facility. (4) Sampling of tree branch tissues from existing trees for VOCs analyses can be an indicator of shallow subsurface groundwater contamination. Detections of carbon tetrachloride in vegetation at the Morrill site to date have been generally consistent with the documented location of the groundwater plume.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Site environmental report for 2009 : Sandia National Laboratories, California.

Sandia National Laboratories, California (SNL/CA) is a government-owned/contractor-operated laboratory. Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, operates the laboratory for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA Sandia Site Office oversees operations at the site, using Sandia Corporation as a management and operating contractor. This Site Environmental Report for 2009 was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A (DOE 2004a). The report provides a summary of environmental monitoring information and compliance activities that occurred at SNL/CA during calendar year 2009. General site and environmental program information is also included. The Site Environmental Report is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1, the Executive Summary, highlights compliance and monitoring results obtained in 2009. Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to SNL/CA and the existing environment found on site. Chapter 3 summarizes SNL/CA's compliance activities with the major environmental requirements applicable to site operations. Chapter 4 presents information on environmental management, performance measures, and environmental programs. Chapter 5 presents the results of monitoring and surveillance activities in 2009. Chapter 6 discusses quality assurance. Chapters 7 through 9 provide supporting information for the report and Chapter 10 is the report distribution list.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Apollo 12 Mission Report

The Apollo 12 mission was the twelfth in a series of flights using Apollo flight hardware and was the second lunar landing. The purpose of the mission was to perform a precise lunar landing and to conduct a specific scientific exploration of a designated landing site in the Ocean of Storms. Since the performance of the entire spacecraft was excellent, this report discusses only the systems performance that significantly differed from that of previous missions. Because they were unique to Apollo 12, the lunar surface experiments, the precision landing operation, and lunar dust contamination are reported in sections 3, 4, and 6, respectively. A complete analysis of all flight data is not possible within the time allowed for preparation of this report. Therefore, report supple­ments will be published for certain Apollo 12 systems analyses, as shown in appendix E. This appendix also lists the current status of all Apollo mission supplements, either published or in preparation. Other supplements will be published as the need is identified. In this report, all actual times prior to earth landing are elapsed time from range zero, established as the integral second before lift-off. Range zero for this mission was 16:22:00 G.m.t., November 14, 1969. Greenwich mean time is used for all times after earth landing as well as for the discussions of the experiments left on the lunar surface. All references to mileage distance are in nautical miles.

Source record↗

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

This is the fourteenth in a series of reports based on safety-related incidents submitted to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System by pilots, controllers, and, occasionally, other participants in the National Aviation System (refs. 1-13). ASRS operates under a memorandum of agreement between the National Aviation and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration. The report contains, first, a special study prepared by the ASRS Office Staff, of pilot- and controller-submitted reports related to the perceived operation of the ATC system since the 1981 walkout of the controllers' labor organization. Next is a research paper analyzing incidents occurring while single-pilot crews were conducting IFR flights. A third section presents a selection of Alert Bulletins issued by ASRS, with the responses they have elicited from FAA and others concerned. Finally, the report contains a list of publications produced by ASRS with instructions for obtaining them.

Source record↗

Analysis of general aviation single-pilot IFR incident data obtained from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

An analysis of incident data obtained from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has been made to determine the problem areas in general aviation single-pilot IFR (SPIFR) operations. The Aviation Safety Reporting System data base is a compilation of voluntary reports of incidents from any person who has observed or been involved in an occurrence which was believed to have posed a threat to flight safety. This paper examines only those reported incidents specifically related to general aviation single-pilot IFR operations. The frequency of occurrence of factors related to the incidents was the criterion used to define significant problem areas and, hence, to suggest where research is needed. The data was cataloged into one of five major problem areas: (1) controller judgment and response problems, (2) pilot judgment and response problems, (3) air traffic control (ATC) intrafacility and interfacility conflicts, (4) ATC and pilot communication problems, and (5) IFR-VFR conflicts. In addition, several points common to all or most of the problems were observed and reported. These included human error, communications, procedures and rules, and work load.

Bergeron, H. P.↗

The Telecommunications and Data Acquisition Report

Archival reports on developments in programs managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL's) Office of Telecommunications and Data Acquisition (TDA) are published in the TDA Progress Report. In the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI), the TDA Progress Report reports on implementation and operations for searching the microwave spectrum. In solar system radar, it reports on the uses of the Goldstone Solar System Radar for scientific exploration of the planets, their rings and satellites, asteroids, and comets. In radio astronomy, the areas of support include spectroscopy, very long baseline interferometry, and astrometry. These three programs are performed for NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), with the Office of Space Operations funding DSN operational support.

Posner, Edward C.↗

NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project. Report 13: Source selection and information use by US aerospace engineers and scientists: Results of a telephone survey

A telephone survey of U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists belonging to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) was conducted between December 4, 1991 and January 5, 1992. The survey was undertaken to (1) validate the telephone survey as an appropriate technique for collecting data from U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists; (2) collect information about how the results of NASA/DoD aerospace research are used in the R&D process; (3) identify those selection criteria which affect the use of federally-funded aerospace R&D; and (4) obtain information that could be used to develop a self-administered mail questionnaire for use with the same population. The average rating of importance of U.S. government technical reports was 2.5 (on a 4-point scale); The mean/median number of times U.S. government technical reports were used per 6 months was 8/2. Factors scoring highest for U.S. government technical reports were technical accuracy (2.9), reliable data and technical information (2.8), and contains comprehensive data and information (2.7) on a 4-point system. The factors scoring highest for influencing the use of U.S. government technical reports were relevance (3.1), technical accuracy (3.06), and reliable data/information (3.02). Ease of use, familiarity, technical accuracy, and relevance correlated with use of U.S. government technical reports. Survey demographics, survey questionnaire, and the NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project publications list are included.

Pinelli, Thomas E.↗