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Measurement-based analysis of error latency

This paper demonstrates a practical methodology for the study of error latency under a real workload. The method is illustrated with sampled data on the physical memory activity, gathered by hardware instrumentation on a VAX 11/780 during the normal workload cycle of the installation. These data are used to simulate fault occurrence and to reconstruct the error discovery process in the system. The technique provides a means to study the system under different workloads and for multiple days. An approach to determine the percentage of undiscovered errors is also developed and a verification of the entire methodology is performed. This study finds that the mean error latency, in the memory containing the operating system, varies by a factor of 10 to 1 (in hours) between the low and high workloads. It is found that of all errors occurring within a day, 70 percent are detected in the same day, 82 percent within the following day, and 91 percent within the third day. The increase in failure rate due to latency is not so much a function of remaining errors but is dependent on whether or not there is a latent error.

Chillarege, Ram↗

Chapter 12 - Flight Envelope

The term "flight envelope" is used to refer to the boundaries of aircraft loading and flight conditions within which operation of the aircraft is satisfactory, and beyond which some aspect becomes unacceptable. This flight envelope represents, in fact, the limiting conditions arising from a matrix of inter-related flight envelopes covering the appropriate variables. Thus, for each loading (i.e., external stores configuration and its associated range of weight and center of gravity (c.g.) position) and aircraft configuration (i.e., position of undercarriage (u/c), flaps, slats, etc.), the envelopes of airspeed versus altitude, airspeed versus load factor, angle of attack versus angle of sideslip, etc., must be investigated to establish the limits within which all aspects such as handling qualities, engine behavior, structural loads, etc., remain acceptable. Flight testing of new or derivative aircraft models is carried out with the initial purpose of defining a flight envelope which is, first and foremost, safe and secondarily, which enables the effective use of the vehicle for its intended purpose. Flight testing occurs only after numerous reviews of the design and review of results from ground tests and predictions of flight characteristics in such areas as structures, aerodynamics, stability and control, flight controls (particularly fly-by-wire control systems, propulsion, etc.). Accordingly, opening and expanding the envelope is a task that must be approached cautiously, systematically, and with coordination and cooperation of the many disciplines involved in the design and test of an airplane. (Sections 8 and 10 cover test planning and safety of flight considerations, respectively). The fundamental tenet in establishing a flight envelope via flight test is risk reduction. This is reflected in the typical sequence of events leading to initial flight test - design reviews (both hardware and software), then ground test involving singular disciplines (windtunnel tests for aerodynamics, structurally loading the wing/fuselage/nacelle on a ground test article with loads anticipated to occur in flight, flight control system control law checkout, propulsion test cell runs and/or flying test bed tests, etc.), and then ground tests involving multi-disciplines (See Section 9). Only after these have been accomplished will an initial, limited, low-risk, flight envelope be established. The limited envelope will typically be in the middle of the projected final flight envelope. Subsequent flight tests will then be devoted to expanding the initial envelope by operating the airplane at increasing ranges - representing increasing risk - of engine operation, airspeeds both fast and slow, altitude, load factor both above and below 1g, centers of gravity (fore and aft), and with system/subsystem failures. Whether flight tests are to define a flight envelope on a new model airplane with the attendant new airframe, new engine(s), and new subsystems (hydraulics, pressurization, etc.), or on an airplane involving only a few of these areas such as new engines in an old airframe, the fundamental approach to establishing an envelope is the same.

H Walgemoed↗

Seal testing of large diameter rocket motors

This investigative program examines leakage testing of elastomeric O-ring seals for a solid rocket casing and provides direction towards an improved nondestructive postassembly test. It also details test equipment for the Space Shuttle systems solid rocket boosters (SRB). The results are useful to designers of hardware for pressure containment vessels which use O-ring seals. Using several subscale seal and groove configuration test fixtures equipped with either two or three O-ring seals in series, seal integrity is investigated with both a pressure decay and flowmeter methods. Both types of test equipment adequately detect the practical range of expected seal leak rates of 1 to 0.0001 sccs. The flowmeter leak test equipment appears to reduce testing time substantially. Limited seal leakage testing is performed on full-sized rocket motor segment seals, a pre-Challenger short stack, providing comparison of bore seals to test specimen bore and face seals. The conclusions are that seal reliability, verified via a performance pressure test, can be affected by temperature, quantity of grease, test pressure, and seal pressure load direction. Potential seal failure scenarios including contamination, seal damage, and sealing surface damage are discussed. Recommendations are made for an improved test procedure.

Moore, N. B.↗

Using System Mass (SM), Equivalent Mass (EM), Equivalent System Mass (ESM) or Life Cycle Mass (LCM) in Advanced Life Support (ALS) Reporting

The Advanced Life Support (ALS) has used a single number, Equivalent System Mass (ESM), for both reporting progress and technology selection. ESM is the launch mass required to provide a space system. ESM indicates launch cost. ESM alone is inadequate for technology selection, which should include other metrics such as Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and also consider perfom.arxe 2nd risk. ESM has proven difficult to implement as a reporting metric, partly because it includes non-mass technology selection factors. Since it will not be used exclusively for technology selection, a new reporting metric can be made easier to compute and explain. Systems design trades-off performance, cost, and risk, but a risk weighted cost/benefit metric would be too complex to report. Since life support has fixed requirements, different systems usually have roughly equal performance. Risk is important since failure can harm the crew, but it is difficult to treat simply. Cost is not easy to estimate, but preliminary space system cost estimates are usually based on mass, which is better estimated than cost. Amass-based cost estimate, similar to ESM, would be a good single reporting metric. The paper defines and compares four mass-based cost estimates, Equivalent Mass (EM), Equivalent System Mass (ESM), Life Cycle Mass (LCM), and System Mass (SM). EM is traditional in life support and includes mass, volume, power, cooling and logistics. ESM is the specifically defined ALS metric, which adds crew time and possibly other cost factors to EM. LCM is a new metric, a mass-based estimate of LCC measured in mass units. SM includes only the factors of EM that are originally measured in mass, the hardware and logistics mass. All four mass-based metrics usually give similar comparisons. SM is by far the simplest to compute and easiest to explain.

Jones, Harry↗

NASA's Biomass Production Chamber: a testbed for bioregenerative life support studies

The Biomass Production Chamber (BPC) located at Kennedy Space Center, FL, USA provides a large (20 m2 area, 113 m3 vol.), closed environment for crop growth tests for NASA's Controlled Ecological Life Support System (CELSS) program. Since the summer of 1988, the chamber has operated on a near-continuous basis (over 1200 days) without any major failures (excluding temporary power losses). During this time, five crops of wheat (64-86 days each), three crops of soybean (90 to 97 days), five crops of lettuce (28-30 days), and four crops of potato (90 to 105 days were grown, producing 481 kg of dry plant biomass, 196 kg edible biomass, 540 kg of oxygen, 94,700 kg of condensed water, and fixing 739 kg of carbon dioxide. Results indicate that total biomass yields were close to expected values for the given light input, but edible biomass yields and harvest indices were slightly lower than expected. Stand photosynthesis, respiration, transpiration, and nutrient uptake rates were monitored throughout growth and development of the different crops, along with the build-up of ethylene and other volatile organic compounds in the atmosphere. Data were also gathered on system hardware maintenance and repair, as well as person-hours required for chamber operation. Future tests will include long-term crop production studies, tests in which nutrients from waste treatment systems will be used to grow new crops, and multi-species tests.

NASA Center KSC↗

Historical Aerospace Software Errors Categorized to Influence Fault Tolerance

Since the first use of computers in space and aircraft, software errors have occurred. These errors can manifest as loss-of-life or less catastrophically. As the demand for automation increases, software in mission or safety-critical systems should be designed to be tolerant to the most likely software faults. This paper categorizes a set of 55 historic aerospace software error incidents from 1962 to 2023 to determine trends of how and where automation is most likely to fail, behaving unexpectedly. A distinction between software producing unexpected (erroneous) output versus no output (failsilent) is introduced. Of the historical incidents analyzed, 85% were from software producing wrong output rather than simply stopping. Rebooting was found to be ineffective to clear erroneous behavior, and not reliable to recover from silent failures. Error origin was within the code/logic itself in 58% of cases, 16% from configurable data, 15% from unexpected sensor input, and 11% from command/operator input. A substantial forty percent (40%) of unexpected software behavior was indicated by the absence of code, arising from unanticipated situations and missing requirements, and 16% of incidents were subjectively deemed “unknown-unknowns”. No incidents were found to be the result of programming language, compiler, tool, or operating system; and only sixteen percent (16%) of all incidents were considered errors traditional computer science/programming in nature. These findings indicate that for fault tolerance, erroneous automation behavior must be a primary consideration especially at critical moments, and reboot recoverability may not be viable. Special care should be taken to validate configurable data and commands prior to use. “Test-like-you-fly”, including hardware-in-the-loop combined with robust off-nominal testing should be used to uncover missing logic arising from unanticipated situations not covered by requirements alone. This study uniquely focuses on manifestations of unexpected flight software behavior, independent of ultimate root cause. We characterize software error behavior and origin to improve software design, test, and operations for resilience to the most common manifestations, and provide a rich dataset for further study.

Aerospace↗

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗

X-57 Cockpit Interface Control Document (ICD-CEPT-006)

The Cockpit Interface Control Document defines the hardware interfaces between the X-57 cockpit and subsystems. It provides locational and operational information in support of ground and flight operations with details on controls and displays that include Modes of Operation, Start-Up and Shut- Down Sequence diagrams and captures the current state of the MOD II Avionics Power Architecture. There is also preliminary information of the MOD III and MOD IV configurations. Microsoft PowerPoint was chosen for the document as early development required frequent meetings with multiple customers including aircraft operators (pilots), ground operations, support contractors and power, instrumentation, and human systems integration engineers and PowerPoint enabled presentations that could be quickly modified based on customer and developer interaction. One of the driving requirements for the cockpit design was to keep the left side panel as close the stock Tecnam panel as possible to reduce the failure risk of flight critical indicators. The original annunciator panel in the left side panel was modified to alert the pilot to failures in critical X-57 subsystems and an operator audio alert capability was added for these subsystems. Power-Up switches for the aircraft low voltage 13.8 VDC systems are located at the bottom of the left side panel and center panel, the same location as the stock Tecnam 13.8 VDC switches. The switches for energizing the high voltage system were located in the overhead panel to reduce the risk of inadvertently energizing the high voltage system during the low voltage power-up sequence. The Cruise Motor ARM switches were also located in the overhead panel and correspond to the same location as the stock Tecnam ignition switches. The stock Tecnam throttle levers and prop pitch levers were retained for the X-57. The throttle levers were renamed torque levers since they controlled the commanded torque to the cruise motors. The prop pitch levers provide a commanded RPM signal to an electronic prop pitch controller. X-57 specific displays, located in the right-side panel, are driven by dedicated sensors that monitor right and left side cruise motor RPM, right and left high voltage “Traction Bus” A and B (voltage, current and power) and the Avionics Bus DC converters (A and B) voltage and current. An X-57 Multi-Function Display (MFD) located in the center panel displays CAN Bus parameters. CAN Bus architecture is not certified for flight so these displays could not be used for safety critical information but were designed to be used for test point information only.

Laura Kushner↗

Propulsion Controlled Aircraft design and development

This paper describes the design, development, and ground testing of the propulsion controlled aircraft (PCA) flight control system. A backup flight control system which uses only engine thrust, the PCA system utilizes collective and differential thrust changes to steer an aircraft that experiences partial or complete failure of the hydraulically actuated control surfaces. The objective of the program was to investigate, in flight, the throttles-only control capability of the F-15, using manual control, and also an augmented PCA mode in which computer-controlled thrust was used for flight control. The objective included PCA operation in up-and-away flight and, if performance was adequate, a secondary objective to make actual PCA landings. The PCA design began with a feasibility study which evaluated many control law designs. The study was done using off-line control analysis, simulation, and on-line manned flight simulator tests. Control laws, cockpit displays, and cockpit controls were evaluated by NASA test pilots. A flight test baseline configuration was selected based on projected flight performance, applicability to transport and fighter aircraft, and funding costs. During the PCA software and hardware development, the initial design was updated as data became available from throttle-only flight experiments conducted by NASA on the F-15. This information showed basic airframe characteristics that were not observed in the F-15 flight simulator and resulted in several design changes. After the primary objectives of the PCA flight testing were accomplished, additional PCA modes of operation were developed and implemented. The evolution of the PCA system from the initial feasibility study, control law design, simulation, hardware-in-the-loop tests, pilot-in-the-loop tests, and ground tests is presented.

Wells, Edward A.↗

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) Overview

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) launched on June 18, 2009 from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle and into a direct insertion trajectory to the oon. LRO, which was designed, built, and operated by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, MD, is gathering crucial data on the lunar environment that will help astronauts prepare for long-duration lunar expeditions. The mission has a nominal life of 1 year as its seven instruments find safe landing sites, locate potential resources, characterize the radiation environment, and test new technology. To date, LRO has been operating well within the bounds of its requirements and has been collecting excellent science data images taken from the LRO Camera Narrow Angle Camera of the Apollo landing sites appeared on cable news networks. A significant amount of information on LRO s science instruments is provided at the LRO mission webpage. LRO s Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) subsystem is made up of an onboard attitude control system (ACS) and a hardware suite of sensors and actuators. The LRO onboard ACS is a collection of algorithms based on high level and derived requirements, and reflect the science and operational events throughout the mission lifetime. The primary control mode is the Observing mode, which maintains the lunar pointing orientation and any offset pointing from this baseline. It is within this mode that all science instrument calibrations, slews and science data is collected. Because of a high accuracy requirement for knowledge and pointing, the Observing mode makes use of star tracker (ST) measurement data to determine an instantaneous attitude pointing. But even the star trackers alone do not meet the tight requirements, so a six-state Kalman Filter is employed to improve the noisy measurement data. The Observing mode obtains its rate information from an inertial reference unit (IRU) and in the event of an IRU failure, the rate data is be derived from the star tracker, but with degraded pointing performance. The Delta-V control mode responsibility is to maintain attitude pointing during the cruise trajectory, insertion burns and lunar orbit maintenance by adjustments made to the spacecraft s velocity magnitude and vector direction. The ACS also provides for a thruster based system momentum management algorithm (known as Delta-H) to maintain the system and wheel momentum to within acceptable levels. In the event an anomaly causes the LRO spacecraft to lose the ability to maintain its current attitude pointing, a Sun Safe mode is included in the ACS for the purpose of providing a known power and thermally safe coarse inertial sun attitude for an indefinite period of time, within the manageable limits of the reaction wheels. The Sun Safe mode is also the initial spacecraft control mode off of the launch vehicle and provides for a means to null tip-off rates immediately after separation. The nominal configuration is to use the IRU for rate information in the controller. In the event of a gyro failure a gyroless control mode was developed that computes rate information from the CSS data.

Garrick, Joseph↗

A Novel UAV Electric Propulsion Testbed for Diagnostics and Prognostics

This paper presents a novel hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for systems level diagnostics and prognostics of an electric propulsion system used in UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicle). Referencing the all electric, Edge 540T aircraft used in science and research by NASA Langley Flight Research Center, the HIL testbed includes an identical propulsion system, consisting of motors, speed controllers and batteries. Isolated under a controlled laboratory environment, the propulsion system has been instrumented for advanced diagnostics and prognostics. To produce flight like loading on the system a slave motor is coupled to the motor under test (MUT) and provides variable mechanical resistance, and the capability of introducing nondestructive mechanical wear-like frictional loads on the system. This testbed enables the verification of mathematical models of each component of the propulsion system, the repeatable generation of flight-like loads on the system for fault analysis, test-to-failure scenarios, and the development of advanced system level diagnostics and prognostics methods. The capabilities of the testbed are extended through the integration of a LabVIEW-based client for the Live Virtual Constructive Distributed Environment (LVCDC) Gateway which enables both the publishing of generated data for remotely located observers and prognosers and the synchronization the testbed propulsion system with vehicles in the air. The developed HIL testbed gives researchers easy access to a scientifically relevant portion of the aircraft without the overhead and dangers encountered during actual flight.

Gorospe, George E., Jr.↗

Advances in Space Transportation Technology Toward the NASA Goals

NASA has set goals to increase safety by one hundred times while reducing cost tenfold over the next decade. This dramatic increase in safety will come by departing from a past emphasis on cost and performance to a new paradigm of safety and reliability, which, in turn, will drive down cost. To accomplish this, vehicle systems must be inherently reliable, functionally redundant wherever practical and designed to minimize or eliminate catastrophic failure modes. Over the next twenty-five years, NASA has set goals to increase safety ten thousand times while reducing cost one hundred fold. Safety will increase towards today's airline safety and the low price per flight has the potential to enable a 15-fold increase in the size of the current projected space launch market. This level of improvement is comparable to the developments in the 1970s in the computer microprocessor when microchips went from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands of dollars - hailing the era of the personal computer. In order to achieve such ambitious cost goals, today's partial and fully expendable rockets must be replaced by fully reusable systems. A RLV can eliminate assembly and checkout of the large number of complex interfaces on today's Space Shuttle. Full reusability will eliminate the necessity to throw away expensive hardware and the need for on-going production. Systems in ten years will have to accommodate 50 to 100 missions per year and could be commercially certified for hundreds of flights. In twenty-five years, the number of flights per year could jump to over 1,000, which will require certification for thousands of flights. The large increase in flights per year will demand that current operations and maintenance procedures be revolutionized. Unlike the current shuttle, which requires several thousand personnel over five months to process, the next generation system must be turned around in one week with less than one hundred personnel. In contrast to the rigorous disassembly and inspections required for the Space Shuttle's subsystems, the next generation vehicle's on-board health monitoring systems will could tell the ground crews which systems need replacement before landing. In twenty-five years, vehicles will be re-flown within one with crews numbering less than one hundred. Fully automated ground processing systems must require only a handful of personnel to launch the vehicle. Due to the increased intelligence of on-board systems, only cursory walk-around inspections would be required between flights An assessment of the progress in breakthrough technologies toward these goals by the NASA Advanced Space Transportation Program is presented. These breakthrough technologies include combined rocket and air breathing propulsion, high strength lightweight structures, high temperature materials, vehicle health management, and flight operations.

Lyles, Garry M.↗

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance. A fully-instrumented burst test (recording a lower burst pressure than expected) on a flight-certified vessel provided critical understanding of the behavior of Orbiter COPVs. A more accurate model was based on a newly-compiled comprehensive database of Kevlar data from LLNL and elsewhere. Considering hardware changes, operational improvements and reliability model refinements, the mean reliability was determined to be 0.998 for the remainder of the Shuttle Program (from 2007, for STS- 118 thru STS-135). Since limited hardware resources precluded full model validation through multiple tests, additional model confidence was sought through the first-ever Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT) of a flown flight article. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to interpret possible test results. Since the lifetime observed in the ASRT exceeded initial estimates by one to two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle Program deemed there was significant conservatism in the model and accepted continued operation with existing flight hardware. Given the variability in tank-to-tank original prooftest response, a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure COPV residual stress state. Preliminary results showed that patterns of low fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface, together with measured permanent volume growth during proof, could be directly correlated to increased fiber stress ratios on the inside fibers adjacent to the liner, and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

Kennedy Space Center: Swamp Works

When I began my internship with the Granular Mechanics and Regolith Operations laboratory (GMRO), also known as Swamp Works, I was given the unique opportunity to shadow many teams working on various projects, and decide what projects I wanted to take part in. Before I go into details of my experiences at Swamp Works, I would like to take a moment to explain what I discovered Swamp Works to be. Swamp Works is a family of hardworking, dedicated, and driven people from various backgrounds and skill sets. These people all work to advance technologies and make science fiction science fact through means of rapid prototyping. They support and encourage failure as an option when learning new things, as long as lesson learned from said failure. In fact, their motto states "Fail, Fast, Forward." What this means is, not if but when one fails he or she must do so quickly and spring forward from the failure so that his or her progress is not delayed. With this acceptance, it provided me the confidence to dive into a multitude of projects working in various fields and with a wide range of skill sets. The first project I joined was Badger. My motivation for taking on this project was the opportunity I would have to obtain valuable experience working with 3D modeling and 3D printing technologies. Badger was a digging apparatus to be used in a highly dusty environment in a material known as Regolith. Regolith is a scientific term for the dirt or top soil found on planetary bodies. Regolith contains a large quantity of sediments less than lOppm and as a result poses a challenge of keeping it out of any cracks and crevices. Furthermore, regolith can create high levels of electrostatic energy, which can prove damaging to sensitive electrical hardware. With these characteristics in mind, I decided to take on the task of designing and manufacturing a dust proof cover for the sensitive electrical hardware. When I began this project, I did not have the slightest idea as to how to use 3D modeling software or a means of manufacturing a viable product. As I went along with variants of the design, I became very proficient with a 3D modeling program known as CREO 2.0. Upon completion of my 3D design, I then had the task of manufacturing and having, in my hands, a usable model. To do this I had to work with additive printing technologies also known as 3D printing. Through my experiences working with Badger, I realized that 3D modeling is the focal point in much of engineering. With this in mind, I have embraced this fact and decided to further my experience with this software so that I may become a more valuable asset to any firm later in my career. Mid-way through work with Badger, I picked up another project in which I found much interest. I ha~ the opportunity to work side by side with a materials and composites guru in manufacturing carbon composite coupons (test strips) for performing stress, strain, and sheer analysis on. Being from a surfing, kiteboarding, and other water sport background I have always been interested in board design. With this in mind, it is no wonder why I found interest in such a project. I had the opportunity to refine Mold preparatory, composite layup, and composite curing techniques. Following manufacturing of these composite strips, I then performed various stress tests and logged my results. With these results, future teams could create lighter, stronger, and more cost effective composite structures for use in varieties of applications. After my experiences with materials and composites testing, I have obtained crucial appreciation for detailed documentation and analysis that material sciences involve. However, as interesting as composite materials testing has been, I do not feel this is where my future career lies. Another, more on the side, project I have been involved in is building a 626 cubic foot regolith containment chamber for doing full scale testing of robotic systems. This chamber is built of high strength aluminum scaffold materials, 80/20, and massive panels of Lexan. Once the chamber is completed, it is be filled with 120 tons of regolith and dubbed the largest regolith test chamber in the world. Through my experiences with building "Big Bin" as we called it, I discovered my demand for engaging and hands on activities. Through all of my incredible experiences working with the Swamp Works at Kennedy Space Center; I have obtained crucial knowledge, insights, and experiences that have fuelled, shaped, and will continue to drive me toward my ultimate goal of obtaining not only a degree in Engineering, but obtaining a job that I can call a career. I want to give much thanks to all of those who mentored me along my journey, and to all who made this opportunity a reality.

DeFilippo, Anthony Robert↗

EVA Hazards due to TPS Inspection and Repair

Tile inspection and repair activities have implicit hazards associated with them. When an Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA) crewmember and associated hardware are added into the equation, additional hazards are introduced. Potential hazards to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), the Orbiter or the crew member themselves are created. In order to accurately assess the risk of performing a TPS inspection or repair, an accurate evaluation of potential hazards and how adequately these hazards are controlled is essential. The EMU could become damaged due to sharp edges, protrusions, thermal extremes, molten metal or impact with the Orbiter. Tools, tethers and the presence of a crew member in the vicinity of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) pose hazards to the Orbiter. Hazards such as additional tile or Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) damage from a loose tool, safety tethers, crewmember or arm impact are introduced. Additionally, there are hazards to the crew which should be addressed. Crew hazards include laser injury, electrical shock, inability to return to the airlock for EMU failures or Orbiter rapid safing scenarios, as well as the potential inadvertent release of a crew member from the arm/boom. The aforementioned hazards are controlled in various ways. Generally, these controls are addressed operationally versus by design, as the majority of the interfaces are to the Orbiter and the Orbiter design did not originally account for tile repair. The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS), for instance, was originally designed to deploy experiments, and therefore has insufficient design controls for retention of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS). Although multiple methods to repair the Orbiter TPS exist, the majority of the hazards are applicable no matter which specific repair method is being performed. TPS Inspection performed via EVA also presents some of the same hazards. Therefore, the hazards common to all TPS inspection or repair methods will be addressed.

Stewart, Christine E.↗

Bumper 3 Update for IADC Protection Manual

The Bumper code has been the standard in use by NASA and contractors to perform meteoroid/debris risk assessments since 1990. It has undergone extensive revisions and updates [NASA JSC HITF website; Christiansen et al., 1992, 1997]. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied BUMPER to risk assessments for Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU) space suits, and other spacecraft (e.g., LDEF, Iridium, TDRS, and Hubble Space Telescope). Bumper continues to be updated with changes in the ballistic limit equations describing failure threshold of various spacecraft components, as well as changes in the meteoroid and debris environment models. Significant efforts are expended to validate Bumper and benchmark it to other meteoroid/debris risk assessment codes. Bumper 3 is a refactored version of Bumper II. The structure of the code was extensively modified to improve maintenance, performance and flexibility. The architecture was changed to separate the frequently updated ballistic limit equations from the relatively stable common core functions of the program. These updates allow NASA to produce specific editions of the Bumper 3 that are tailored for specific customer requirements. The core consists of common code necessary to process the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) environment models, assess shadowing and calculate MMOD risk. The library of target response subroutines includes a board range of different types of MMOD shield ballistic limit equations as well as equations describing damage to various spacecraft subsystems or hardware (thermal protection materials, windows, radiators, solar arrays, cables, etc.). The core and library of ballistic response subroutines are maintained under configuration control. A change in the core will affect all editions of the code, whereas a change in one or more of the response subroutines will affect all editions of the code that contain the particular response subroutines which are modified. Note that the Bumper II program is no longer maintained or distributed by NASA.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator Engineering Unit 2 Anomaly Investigation

The Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG) Engineering Unit 2 (EU2) is the highest fidelity electrically heated Stirling radioisotope generator built to date. NASA Glenn Research Center completed the assembly of the ASRG EU2 in September 2014 using hardware from the now cancelled ASRG flight development project. The ASRG EU2 integrated the first pair of Sunpower's Advanced Stirling Convertors (ASC−E3 #1 and #2) in an aluminum generator housing with Lockheed Martin's (LM's) Engineering Development Unit (EDU) 4 controller. After just 179 hr of EU2 generator operation, the first power fluctuation occurred on ASC−E3 #1. The first power fluctuation occurred 175 hr later on ASC−E3 #2. Over time, the power fluctuations became more frequent on both convertors and larger in magnitude. Eventually the EU2 was shut down in January 2015. An anomaly investigation was chartered to determine root cause of the power fluctuations and other anomalous observations. A team with members from Glenn, Sunpower, and LM conducted a thorough investigation of the EU2 anomalies. Findings from the EU2 disassembly identified proximate causes of the anomalous observations. Discussion of the team's assessment of the primary possible failure theories, root cause, and conclusions is provided. Recommendations are made for future Stirling generator development to address the findings from the anomaly investigation. Additional findings from the investigation are also discussed.

Stirling convertors↗

Improving Interlaminar Shear Strength

To achieve NASA's mission of space exploration, innovative manufacturing processes are being applied to the fabrication of complex propulsion elements.1 Use of fiber-reinforced, polymeric composite tanks are known to reduce weight while increasing performance of propulsion vehicles. Maximizing the performance of these materials is needed to reduce the hardware weight to result in increased performance in support of NASA's missions. NASA has partnered with the Mississippi State University (MSU) to utilize a unique scalable approach of locally improving the critical properties needed for composite structures. MSU is responsible for the primary development of the concept with material and engineering support provided by NASA. The all-composite tank shown in figure 1 is fabricated using a prepreg system of IM7 carbon fiber/CYCOM 5320-1 epoxy resin. This is a resin system developed for out-of-autoclave applications. This new technology is needed to support the fabrication of large, all composite structures and is currently being evaluated on a joint project with Boeing for the Space Launch System (SLS) program. In initial efforts to form an all composite pressure vessel using this prepreg system, a 60% decrease in properties was observed in scarf joint regions. Inspection of these areas identified interlaminar failure in the adjacent laminated structure as the main failure mechanism. This project seeks to improve the interlaminar shear strength (ILSS) within the prepreg layup by locally modifying the interply region shown in figure 2.2

Jackson, Justin↗