SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “commissioning”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 973 records · Page 54

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2020

Environmental Monitoring Report, Salmon, Mississippi, Site 2019

This report presents the monitoring results for groundwater and surface water samples collected in October 2019 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management for the Salmon, Mississippi, Site. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a predecessor agency to DOE, conducted a series of underground detonations in the Tatum Salt Dome beneath the Salmon site between 1964 and 1970 to study seismic signatures. Groundwater sampling at the site is conducted to monitor shallow groundwater that became contaminated during AEC use of the site, contamination within the shot cavity, and contamination in the Aquifer 5 injection well. Surface water sampling is conducted to ensure no contaminants are leaving the site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Space Strategy at a Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges for 21st Century Competition

In its November 2018 report to Congress, the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission applauded the main themes of the Trump administration’s 2017 National Defense Strategy. But it was also deeply critical of the strategic thought so far done by the U.S. defense community about the requirements, operational and otherwise, of securing U.S. and allied interests in the types of conflicts we now face. Indeed, it assessed these shortfalls as crippling to the exercise of American power and as dangerous in crisis and war. Is the U.S. military space community exempt from such criticism? Should it be?

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2020

An Overview of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Uncertainty Assessment Accident Progression Insights

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) have completed three uncertainty analyses (UAs) as part of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) program. The SOARCA UAs included an integrated evaluation of uncertainty in accident progression, radiological release, and offsite health consequence projections. The UA for Peach Bottom, a boiling-water reactor (BWR) with a Mark I containment located in the State of Pennsylvania, analyzed the unmitigated long-term station blackout SOARCA scenario. The UA for Sequoyah, a 4-loop Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) located in the State of Tennessee, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario, with a focus on issues unique to the ice condenser containment and the potential for early containment failure due to hydrogen deflagration. The UA for Surry, a 3-loop Westinghouse PWR with a sub-atmospheric large dry containment located in the State of Virginia, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario including the potential for thermally-induced steam-generator tube rupture. These three UAs are currently documented in three NUREG/CR reports. This report provides input to planned NRC documentation on the insights and findings from the SOARCA UA program. The purpose of the summary report is to provide a useful reference for regulatory applications that require the evaluation of offsite consequence risk from beyond design basis event severe accidents. This report focuses on the accident progression and source term insights developed from the MELCOR analyses. MELCOR is the NRC's best-estimate, severe accident computer code used in the SOARCA UAs. In anticipation of the SOARCA UA insights work, NRC and Sandia benchmarked the response of the Peach Bottom model to selected reference calculations from the Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. Peach Bottom was the first SOARCA UA performed and was completed in 2015 using the MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The PWR SOARCA UAs evolved the original methodology and utilized the updated MELCOR 2.2 computer code. The Peach Bottom model has been systematically updated for other NRC research efforts and has been updated to MELCOR 2.2. computer code. The findings from the new reference calculations using the updated model with the MELCOR 2.2 code are also integrated into the report. A second objective is an assessment of the applicability of the results to the other nuclear reactors in the U.S. As the key findings are reviewed, judgments are presented on the applicability of the results to other U.S. nuclear power plants. An important objective of the SOARCA program relied on high- fidelity plant-specific modeling. However, the nature of the insights and conclusions allowed judgements to be made on the applicability of the various insights to the same general classification of plant (i.e., BWR or PWR) or the entire fleet of plants. Finally, the results from the SOARCA UA accident progression calculations contain a wealth of information not previously documented in the NUREG/CRs. This report includes new but related information that can be used to benchmark past or support future regulatory decisions related to severe accidents. The new work includes a benchmark of the NUREG-1465 licensing source term definitions, the variability of key accident progression events and timing to radionuclide release, and an improved understanding of the timing and source terms from consequential steam generator tube ruptures. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Sandia authors gratefully acknowledge the significant technical and programmatic contributions from the NRC SOARCA team which are reflected throughout the report. Dr. Tina Ghosh has been involved throughout the SOARCA UAs, providing the primary managerial and technical oversight. The long lists of NRC and Sandia contributors from the SOARCA UAs are cited in the three NUREG/CRs and are also gratefully acknowledged by the small team of authors compiling the results of their efforts. Significant technical contributions, advice, and reviews were provided by Dr. Hossein Esmaili, Dr. Alfred Hathaway, and Dr. Edward Fuller (retired) of the NRC. Dr. Randal Gauntt (retired), Mr. Patrick Mattie, Mr. Joseph Jones (retired), and Dr. Doug Osborn from Sandia are recognized as the SOARCA UA managers guiding the past efforts. There is a comparable list of project managers at the NRC including Ms. Patricia Santiago, Dr. Salman Haq, and Mr. Jon Barr. Sadly, we have lost Mr. Charlie Tinkler and Mr. Robert Prato, who were important contributors to the original SOARCA project. Finally, Mr. Kyle Ross and Mr. Mark Leonard have also retired but were significant technical contributors. Mr. Kyle Ross was the technical lead on all three SOARCA UAs and the original pressurized water reactor SOARCA study. Mr. Leonard was the technical lead on the original boiling water reactor SOARCA study and a key contributor to the first Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. iv

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Multi-Mechanism Flood Hazard Assessment: Critical Review of Current Practice and Approaches

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Source Term Reduction for Advanced and Small Modular Boiling Water Reactors

The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) is currently supporting the development of various advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) designs. Several of these designs have commenced license application with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC). These reactors have improved safety features that may significantly reduce radiological source terms in the event of design and beyond-design basis accidents. Specifically, some reactors feature a smaller containment volume relative to the available fission product depositional surface area, which supports increased fission product retention in the containment vessel. Pressurized water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR) with this feature include the integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) and the BWRX-300 design by General Electric. A prior research program supported by the US DOE quantified the source term reduction associated with light water iPWRs and developed iPWR-specific theoretical models for fission product deposition rates. This program included a sequence of research projects that started with a feasibility study, development of theoretical models that predict higher deposition rates, and finally, development of empirical data for verification and validation of the theoretical models. The current project, which is a feasibility study, is the first step in a similar program to quantify the source term reduction associated with small and advanced light water BWRs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cross section measurements of deuteron electro-disintegration at very high recoil momenta and large 4-momentum transfers (Q^2)

The 2H(e,e'p)n cross sections have been measured at negative 4-momentum transfers of Q^2 = 4.5 +/- 0.5 (GeV/c)^2 and Q^2 = 3.5 +/- 0.5 (GeV/c)^2 reaching neutron recoil (missing) momenta up to p_r ?1.0 GeV/c. The data have been obtained at fixed neutron recoil angles 5 <= theta_nq <= 95 degrees with respect to the 3-momentum transfer q. The new data agree well with the previous data which reached p_r ?550 MeV/c. At theta_nq = 35 and 45 degrees, final state interactions (FSI), meson exchange currents (MEC) and isobar configurations (IC) are suppressed and the plane wave impulse approximation (PWIA) provides the dominant cross section contribution. The new data are compared to recent theoretical calculations, and a significant disagreement for recoil momenta p_r > 700 MeV/c is observed. The experiment was carried out in experimental Hall C at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (TJNAF) and formed part of a group of four experiments that were used to commission the new Super High Momentum Spectrometer (SHMS). The experiment consisted of a 10.6 GeV electron beam incident on a liquid deuterium target which resulted in the break-up of the deuteron into a proton and neutron. The scattered electrons were detected by the SHMS in coincidence with the knocked-out protons detected in the previously existing High Momentum Spectrometer (HMS) and the recoiling neutrons were reconstructed from energy-momentum conservation laws. To ensure that the 2H(e,e'p)n reaction channel was selected, we required the missing energy of the system to be the binding energy of the deuteron (?2.22 MeV). The spectrometers? central angles and momenta were set to measure three central missing momentum settings of the neutron corresponding to p_r = 80, 580 and 750 MeV/c, which required the SHMS central angle and momentum to be fixed and the HMS to be rotated from smaller to larger angles corresponding to the lower and higher missing momentum settings, respectively. The experiment was carried out in a time period of six days with typical electron beam currents of 45-60 uA at about 50% beam efficiency.

Yero, Carlos↗

DOE OSTI2020

Default Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Dose Conversion Factors (DCFs) and Weighting Factors and plutonium-239 equivalent Curie (PE-Ci) methodology for acceptance into the Waste Storage Facilities

DOE-STD-5506-2007 (Ref. 1) is the standard that provides the methodology for preparing hazard analysis and accident analysis for transuranic (TRU) waste facilities. The Waste Storage Facilities hazard and accident analysis for the DSA is developed in accordance with DOE-STD- 5506-2007. Two related issues need to be addressed when implementing DOE-STD-5506-2007 regarding the calculation of consequences from TRU waste releases in accident analysis: Consequences determined in accident analysis must be modeled using inhalation Dose Conversion Factors (DCFs) that are consistent with those from the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 72 (ICRP-72, Ref. 2).; The use of a statistical Material at Risk (MAR) representing the distribution of radiological loading of TRU waste containers based on the use of a plutonium-239 equivalent Curie (PE-Ci) methodology. The PE-Ci methodology simplifies accident analysis by allowing one to model releases based on the Curie value of one standard nuclide (e.g., Pu-239) instead of needing to model releases for every potential nuclide of interest. This is accomplished by normalizing the Curie value of all nuclides to a single Curie value of a standard nuclide by using a Weighting Factor that is a ratio of the DCFs associated with the nuclides and that of the standard nuclide. By using the ICRP-72 DCFs to calculate PE-Ci values used in the statistical MAR, the accident analysis that uses that statistical MAR will be consistent with the consequence methodology identified in DOE-STD- 5506-2007.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Applying Waveform Correlation to Mining Blasts Using a Global Sparse Network

Agencies that monitor for underground nuclear tests are interested in techniques that automatically characterize mining blasts to reduce the human analyst effort required to produce high-quality event bulletins. Waveform correlation is effective in finding similar waveforms from repeating seismic events, including mining blasts. We report the results of an experiment that uses waveform templates recorded by multiple International Monitoring System stations of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for up to 10 years prior to the time period of interest to detect and identify mining blasts that occur during single weeks of study. We discuss approaches for template selection, threshold setting, and event detection that are specialized for mining blasts and a sparse, global network. We apply the approaches to two different weeks of study for each of two geographic regions, Wyoming and Scandinavia, to evaluate the potential for establishing a set of standards for waveform correlation processing of mining blasts that can be effective for operational monitoring systems with a sparse network. We compare candidate events detected with our processing methods to the Reviewed Event Bulletin of the International Data Centre to develop an intuition about potential reduction in analyst workload.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Applicability of the ARCON96 Code to the Radiological Consequence Analysis of Releases from the Radioassay and Non-Destructive Testing (RANT) Facility

Establish technical justification to demonstrate that the horizontal diffusion parameter (σy) and vertical diffusion parameter (σz) that are embedded in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Atmospheric Relative CONcentrations (ARCON96) code are representative of the meteorological conditions at LANL. Compare the ARCON96 atmospheric diffusion factor ( X /Q) to the MACCS2-calculated X /Q for the determination of radiological consequences of ground releases from the Radioassay and Non-Destructive Testing (RANT) facility on the key receptors, the colocated worker (CW) and Maximally-Effected Offsite Individual (MEOI).

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2020

MSR Fuel Salt Qualification Methodology

This report documents the continuing activities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to develop an efficient, appropriate process for liquid fuel salt system qualification. Fuel qualification for salt-cooled molten salt reactors (MSRs) is part of the ongoing coated particle fuel qualification effort. Fuel qualification is a process which provides high confidence that physical and chemical behavior of fuel is sufficiently understood so that it can be adequately modeled for both normal and accident conditions, reflecting the role of the fuel design in the overall safety of the facility. Uncertainties are defined so that calculated fission product releases include the appropriate margins to ensure conservative calculation of radiological dose consequences. The initial phase of ORNL’s activities is documented in ORNL/LTR-2018/1045 Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Qualification Considerations and Challenges.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

The Relationship Between Dose Rate and Decay Heat for Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

Decay heat and dose rate are two important limits used for determining the allowable contents of spent fuel (SNF) in dry storage systems and transportation packages. While the decay heat limit is used to maintain fuel cladding integrity and ensure retrievability, dose rates are used to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements on radiation protection. Because both dose rate and decay heat result from decay of radioisotopes in SNF, this study is an attempt to examine the relationship between dose rate and decay heat for a given cask design. Dose rates were evaluated for 198 cask configurations, that include various SNF system designs (e.g., storage, transfer, transport), SNF characteristics (e.g., fuel types, burnup, cooling time), and loading maps (e.g., uniform loading, zone loading), while a constant decay heat was maintained. The decay heat was calculated using US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 3.54, Revision 2, and verified using ORIGEN sequence within SCALE code system. The ORIGEN outputs were used as source terms in the dose analysis using 198 different configurations. A computer script was developed to calculate the cooling time necessary to achieve a given decay heat for a given enrichment, assembly average burnup, assembly mass, and in-core history using a rootfinder algorithm. Initially the computer script was developed to provide cooling time and burnup calculations directly to the analysis of dose rates and decay heats, so a comparison between Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) results and RG3.54 data was made; results are included in the appendix to this document. However, an iterative approach was used to compute cooling time, and its accuracy did not depend on the results of the RG3.54r2 algorithm, although the algorithm was still used. The results of the evaluation presented herein clearly demonstrate that a given decay heat does not correspond to a unique dose rate for a variety of cask and package designs. There is no clear pattern to develop a correlation between decay heat and the source terms. Depending on burnup, enrichment, cask type, and loading pattern, dose rates varied for the exact same decay heat—in some cases by 400% for a given cask. For cases in which decay heat was held constant through selection of the appropriate cooling time, dose rates would decrease with increasing burnup, and in other cases, dose rates would increase. The large variation in dose rates for a constant decay heat indicates that casks loaded based on decay heat—that is allowing any burnup, cooling time, and enrichment combinations that yield the qualified decay heat limit(s) —cannot ensure that an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation or a spent fuel transportation package will meet the regulatory limits set forth by the respective regulations, i.e., 10 CFR 72 or 10 CFR 71.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Multi-Mechanism Flood Hazard Assessment: Critical Review of Current Practice and Approaches

This report documents the initial findings from the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)-sponsored research project Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.1 This research project is a part of NRC’s Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program and will aid the development of guidance on the use of PFHA methods to evaluate infrastructure safety for existing and proposed US nuclear power plants (NPPs). More specifically, this project intends to provide technical background for the development of flood hazard curves for multi-mechanism floods (MMFs). MMFs are flood events caused by more than one flooding mechanism (e.g., flood events due to the simultaneous occurrence of precipitation-induced river flooding and storm surge). Project activities include three main tasks: Task 1—Survey of current concepts and methods in assessing MMF hazards; Task 2—Critical assessment of selected methods and approaches for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk; Task 3—Development of example case studies to illustrate best practices for quantifying probabilistic MMF hazard risk The initial findings from Tasks 1 and 2 are documented in this report. Task 1 comprised a survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to understand and assess flood hazards due to MMFs. Task 2 involved a critical review of the selected approaches and methods. To that end, the scope of this report includes documentation of (1) a reconnaissance-level survey of the current state of concepts and practice for MMF hazard assessment; (2) a generalized MMF assessment framework to address the distinctions among various types of flood-forcing phenomena, flood mechanisms (grouped into three mechanism types), and flood severity metrics; (3) a wide-ranging survey of approaches and methods that have been applied to various flooding phenomena and settings; and (4) a critical assessment of MMF hazard assessment methods. Studies were identified involving MMFs related to coastal flooding mechanisms, fluvial (rivers/streams) flooding mechanisms, and associated combinations of coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms. Studies were also identified that address MMFs involving coastal and fluvial flooding mechanisms as well as coastal flooding mechanisms along with extreme precipitation (without specific attribution to fluvial or pluvial mechanisms). The studies identified for review in this report included assessments at varying spatial scales (from local to global) with differing geographic regions of focus using both observed and synthetic data. The majority of studies identified and reviewed were site-specific assessments focusing on relatively short return periods. Studies considered a range of flood severity metrics, made differing assumptions regarding the occurrence of extrema, and used multiple statistical techniques; the use of copulas for the development of joint distributions was a particularly popular analysis technique. The literature review highlighted the differences among existing studies relative to terminology used, means of presenting results, framework and techniques employed, and level of sophistication regarding the number and types of variables considered. Despite the significant diversity in existing studies, the review identified several promising techniques that will be considered in future work under this project, including the development of joint distributions for MMFs using copula and Bayesian-motivated approaches.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and has been tasked to update the facility’s PA. For operating the E-Area facility, a Waste Inventory Tracking System (e.g., WITS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility (to be buried in one of its many disposal units1) must be either directly or indirectly accounted for. Since there is a large number of radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP-107) has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the E-Area LLWF. The ICRP-107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides of 97 elements. This database is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system. The explicit measurement and tracking of all 1,252 ICRP-107 radionuclides can be reduced when process knowledge, burial history, and radiological aspects are factored into conservative groundwater and intruder screening processes. Across the DOE complex these screening processes have been historically performed using the methodology suggested by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) as presented in their original report (NCRP 1984) and then refined in a later report (NCRP 1996). In the recommended screening models employed within this report the traditional NCRP models are updated to better handle progeny and better reflect the known characteristics of E-Area. This improved screening process is referred to as the “NCRP-like” method. Various upgrades to the traditional NCRP methodology have been used by others (e.g., NRC funded effort by Kennedy and Strenge 1992). The more detailed models by Kennedy and Strenge (1992) were considered in this effort and are compared to the results from the more traditional NCRP-like models. The groundwater and inadvertent intruder screening analyses presented in this report start with this 1,252 radionuclide list and reduces it down to more manageable lists that are applicable to the various disposal unit types contained within E-Area. In order to reduce this starting list, some level of exposure risk must be considered acceptable. Historically, a dose (or concentration level) has been compared with a screening criterion set to 1% of a performance measure (e.g., a betagamma dose not to exceed the 4 mrem/yr beta-gamma performance measure x 0.01 = 0.04 mrem/yr). Thus, if a radionuclide produced a bounding or screening-level dose (or concentrations) less than the screening criterion, it could be safely removed from further consideration. Several tiers of screening and bounding level analyses have been considered in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Status Report on ASME Code Development for Nonmetallic Core Components in 2020

The purpose of this report is to provide a status update on the progress and ongoing activities of the current ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code Section III, Division 5, on nonmetallic core components and assemblies which includes the design rules for graphite and ceramic composite materials. Section III is concerned with the design and construction of nuclear reactor components and Division 5 focuses on high temperature reactors (HTR). The ASME Section III Committee’s function for nuclear items other than pressure-retaining components, is to establish rules of safety related to structural integrity. The term “construction” refers to the all-inclusive effort comprising of materials, design, fabrication, examination, inspection, testing, certification, and pressure relief. The Department of Energy (DOE) supports industry codes and standards development through focused research providing the technical basis for new or modified codes and standards and the participation of subject matter experts in codes and standards committees. The activities for the nonmetallic core components and assemblies committees are the pursuit of two working groups that meet quarterly during ASME BPV Code Week meetings. The two working groups are General Requirements for Graphite and Ceramic Composite Core Components and Assemblies (GR GCCCCA) and Nonmetallic Design and Materials (NDM). The rules on general requirements for nonmetallic core components are discussed in the articles of Subsection HA subpart B. Ceramic composites were recently incorporated within the rules, and the GR GCCCCA working group is now in the process of aligning the requirements with the subsections and articles of ASME BPV Code Section III NCA, the general requirements for Division 1 and 2 of the code. The NDM working group is concerned with the design rules for graphite and composite materials for core components and assemblies discussed in Subsection HH (Class SN Nonmetallic Core Components) subpart A and subpart B which reference graphite and composite materials respectively. The bulk of the progress and work is done within this working group. A significant undertaking, with discussion that started in 2015, is to gain endorsement of ASME Section III, Division 5, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In June 2018, ASME formally recommended endorsement to the NRC. The NRC has since initiated the endorsement review process, which is to be concluded early in 2021. ASME task groups on metallic structures and components, as well as non-metallic core support structures, have been formed to define potential pathways and schedules for NRC endorsement of Division 5. NRC determined to perform a review on the 2017 edition of Section III Division 5 as a baseline. As a result, the use of graphite as nonmetallic core components formed part of the review, but it excluded composite materials (which were first introduced in the 2019 edition). This report documents progress in FY 2020 directed toward ASME’s efforts to develop design codes for graphite and composites. Progress includes a major code review by NRC, the first code enquiry, and its solution, an overhaul of the treatment of Weibull Statistics, and the addition of Nonmandatory Appendices to the composites code relating to carbon-carbon composite materials.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Imagery Applications for Advanced Event Analytics (WBS 24.3.1.3.3-IDC FY202 Final Project Report)

Accurate event locations and replicability of location analyses are essential for assessing the nature of an event, its context, ambient site conditions, and proximity to relevant facilities and infrastructure. Additionally, accurate event locations provide valuable information that reduce uncertainties, improve confidence in event analyses, and inform in-field verification activities. However, event location/relocation and replicability are difficult due to a number of factors, including spatially-sparse network coverage in some areas of the globe and variability in seismic data processing. This team proposed that the incorporation of high-fidelity imagery as a data backbone to the analytical assessment of a suspected underground explosion and/or an advanced seismic event bulletin produced by the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) could reduce uncertainties and improve confidence in analyses. Specifically, temporally-separated images can reduce uncertainty by identifying areas where change has occurred (e.g., building construction or demolition, road or facilities improvements). The primary goal of this project was to develop an automated geospatial processing script for imagery change detection to better reflect needs of the technical community (including the IDC) and to make the use of such a tool accessible in a variety of settings across platforms. Technical experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory successfully built GAIA: the Geospatial Automated Imagery Analysis tool, to fill this need. GAIA combines five tool components to produce orthorectified time separated imagery and imagery change detection maps. Our toolkit (1) reduces error by providing a standardized workflow for image analyses and (2) significantly reduces processing time from between 7 and 24+ hours to approximately 5 minutes. Technical experts at Sandia National Laboratories supported GAIA via beta-testing and by introducing a web-based system approach for increased applicability. To test the function, performance, broad application, and ease-of-use of GAIA, we applied it to four separate test cases. The results of this preliminary investigation show promise in reducing uncertainty in seismic event locations: if satellite imagery can show regions where operations that produce seismic activity likely occurred, then pursuing imagery to locate epicenters of seismic nuclear events could reduce the time needed to find the true epicenter location.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

AniMACCS User Guide

AniMACCS is a utility code in the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) software suite that allows for certain MACCS output information to be visually displayed and overlaid onto a geospatial map background. AniMACCS was developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. MACCS is designed to calculate health and economic consequences following a release of radioactive material in the atmosphere. MACCS accomplishes this by modeling the atmospheric dispersion, deposition, and consequences of the release, which depend on several factors including the source term, weather, population, economic, and land-use characteristics of the impacted geographical area. From these inputs, MACCS determines the characteristics of the plume, as well as ground and air concentrations as a function of time and radionuclide.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗