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At least 973 records · Page 54

Human Factors Process Task Analysis Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure for the Advanced Technology Development Center

A process task analysis effort was undertaken by Dynacs Inc. commencing in June 2002 under contract from NASA YA-D6. Funding was provided through NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC), Code M/HQ, and Industrial Engineering and Safety (IES). The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering Development Contract (EDC) Task Order was 5SMA768. The scope of the effort was to conduct a Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA) of a hazardous activity and provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of errors caused by human factors. The Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Pump Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) was selected for this analysis. The HF PFMEA table (see appendix A) provides an analysis of six major categories evaluated for this study. These categories include Personnel Certification, Test Procedure Format, Test Procedure Safety Controls, Test Article Data, Instrumentation, and Voice Communication. For each specific requirement listed in appendix A, the following topics were addressed: Requirement, Potential Human Error, Performance-Shaping Factors, Potential Effects of the Error, Barriers and Controls, Risk Priority Numbers, and Recommended Actions. This report summarizes findings and gives recommendations as determined by the data contained in appendix A. It also includes a discussion of technology barriers and challenges to performing task analyses, as well as lessons learned. The HF PFMEA table in appendix A recommends the use of accepted and required safety criteria in order to reduce the risk of human error. The items with the highest risk priority numbers should receive the greatest amount of consideration. Implementation of the recommendations will result in a safer operation for all personnel.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Three

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAIB) independent investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia produced a six volume report. This is Volume III of the report. Volume III contains other technical documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the CAIB in support of its inquiry into the tragedy. Technical documents included in the report are: Appendix E.1 CoFR Endorsements; Appendix E.2 STS-107 Image Analysis Team Final Report; Appendix E.3 An Assessment of Potential Material Candidates for the 'Flight Day 2', Radar Object Observed during the NASA Mission STS-107; Appendix E.4 Columbia Early Sighting Assessment Team Final Report.

STS-107↗

Further Assessment of MVD Effects in SLD Applications

The study reported here is part of an effort to develop scaling methods for super cooled large droplet (SLD) conditions. Previously reported results showed that SLD main ice shapes can be simulated quite successfully by appendix C conditions using scaling methods developed for appendix C. However, when the velocity was higher than 100 kt, the feather size and density for SLD tests at MVDs well above 100 m was not well represented by the scaled appendix C conditions. This paper reports additional results of a study of the feather region with the objective of identifying differences between SLD and appendix C feathers. Both the feather appearance and the angle at which feathers grow from the airfoil surface were recorded over a range of MVD from 20 to 190 m for airspeeds of 100 and 200 kt and stagnation freezing fractions of 0.3 to 1.0. Tests were performed in the NASA Glenn Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) using a 91-cm-chord NACA0012 airfoil model mounted at 0 degrees AOA. Photographs are presented to illustrate details of feather appearance. Appearance was noticeably affected by the stagnation freezing fraction of the test, but not by velocity or MVD. The angle of feather growth relative to the chord line decreased with increasing stagnation freezing fraction. For a velocity of 100 kt, no significant effect of MVD on feather angle was apparent, but at 200 kt, feather angle tended to increase with MVD for glaze conditions, but not rime. This finding is based on limited data, and its significance with respect to icing physics has not been determined.

Tsao, Jen-Ching↗

Validation of Multi-Dimensional Stirling Engine Design Codes: Measurements in the 90-Degree Turn Test Section

The work to be presented herein was motivated largely by a desire to improve the understanding of oscillatory fluid mechanics inside a Stirling engine. To this end, a CFD project was undertaken at Cleveland State University with the goal of accurately predicting the fluid dynamics within an engine or engine component. Along with the CFD efforts, a code validation project was undertaken at the University of Minnesota. The material covered herein consists of four main parts. In section 1, an experimental investigation of a small aspect ratio impinging jet is discussed. Included in this discussion is a description of the test facilities and instrumentation. A presentation of the collected data is given and comments are made. Next, in section 2, a parallel experimental investigation is presented in which the same geometry as that of section 1 is used, but the flow conditions are changed from steady unidirectional flow to sinusoidally oscillating flow. In section Two, collected data are presented and comments are made. In section 3, a comparison is made between the results of sections 1 and 2, namely, sinusoidally oscillating flow results are compared to steady, unidirectional flow results from the same geometry. Finally, in section 4, a comparison is made between experimentally collected data (the main subject of this work) and CFD generated results. Furthermore, in appendix A, an introductory description of the primary measurement tool used in the experimental process the hot wire anemometer is given for the unfamiliar. The anemometer calibration procedure is described in appendix B. A portfolio of data reduction and data processing codes is provided in appendix C and lastly, a DVD and a roadmap of its contents is provided in an appendix D. 1.0 Unidirectional Flow Investigations 1.1 Introduction This unidirectional experimental program was undertaken to complement an oscillatory flow investigation conducted at the University of Minnesota. The oscillatory investigation is discussed thoroughly in section 2. We defer the description of the motivation behind these experiments until the introduction of section 2. The work that is discussed in this thesis began (chronologically) with oscillatory flow visualization experiments. It was decided that it would be valuable and important to investigate the flow under unidirectional conditions in the same geometry as that of the oscillatory experiments. The thought was that the unidirectional case would be less complicated to model with a CFD program (a moving boundary would be replaced with a steady state boundary condition). Thus, a series of unidirectional experiments were carried out to capture the important features of the flow within the test section. The purpose of these experiments was to provide a data set for comparison to CFD generated velocity fields. Hot-wire anemometry data were taken and flow visualization was conducted as a standard for code validation. The flow geometry was simple, such that it could be easily gridded in a CFD program. However, the geometry provided separation and transition zones, shear layers and recirculation zones. These characteristics made the flow complex and challenging for CFD computation. We comment that the order of experiments that produced this report is as follows: experimental flow visualization under oscillatory flow conditions was carried out; this was followed by unidirectional flow visualization and hot wire anemometry; finally, oscillatory hot wire anemometry was conducted. We present the results out of chronological order for the following reason: the unidirectional results are easier

Simon, Terrence W.↗

Rocketdyne - SE-7 and SE-8 Engines

The 70-pound SE-7 engine is very similar with its two valves, ablative material, a silicon carbide liner, a silicon carbide throat, and overall configuration. There were different wraps. One had a ninety-degree ablative material orientation. That is important because it caused problems with the SE-8, but not for this application. It was not overly stressed. It was a validation of the off-the-shelf application approach. There were two SE-7 engines located on the stage near the bottom. They had their own propellant tanks. That was the application. All it did was give a little bit of gravity by firing to push the propellants to the bottom of the tanks for start or restart. It was not a particularly complicated setup. (See Slides 6 and 7, Appendix F) What had we learned? This was a proven engine in a space environment. There weren't any development issues. Off-the-shelf seemed to work. There were no operational issues, which made the SE-7 very cost-effective. Besides NASA, the customer for this application was the Douglas Aircraft Company. Douglas decided the off-the-shelf idea was cost-effective. With the Gemini Program, the company was McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, which was part of the reason the off-the-shelf idea was applied to the Apollo. (See Slide 8, Appendix F) However, here are some differences between Apollo and Gemini vehicles. For one thing, the Apollo vehicle was really moving at high speed when it re-entered the atmosphere. Instead of a mere 17,000 miles per hour, it was going 24,000 miles per hour. That meant the heat load was four times as high on the Apollo vehicle as on the Gemini craft. Things were vibrating a little more. We had two redundant systems. Apollo was redundant where it could be as much as possible. That was really a keystone or maybe an anchor point for Apollo. We decided to pursue the off-the-shelf approach. However, the prime contractor was a different entity - the North American Space Division. They thought they ought to tune up this off-the-shelf setup. It was a similar off-the-shelf application, but at a higher speed. They wanted to improve it. What they wanted to improve was the material performance of silicon carbide. They were uncomfortable with the cracks they were seeing. They were uncomfortable with the cracks in the throat, and feeling that the environment was a little tougher, that maybe it was going to rattle, perhaps something would fall out, and they would have a problem. They wanted to eliminate the ceramic liner, and they wanted a different throat material. (See Slides 9 and 10, Appendix F) The Rocketdyne solutions were to replace silicon carbide material with a more forgiving ceramic material. Also, due to the multiple locations within the vehicle, the shape of the nozzles varied. Some nozzles were long, and some nozzles were short. We came up with a single engine design with variable nozzle extensions and configurations to fit particular vehicle locations. (See Slides 10 and 11, Appendix F)

Harmon, Tim↗

Re-Computation of Numerical Results Contained in NACA Report No. 496

An extensive examination of NACA Report No. 496 (NACA 496), "General Theory of Aerodynamic Instability and the Mechanism of Flutter," by Theodore Theodorsen, is described. The examination included checking equations and solution methods and re‐computing interim quantities and all numerical examples in NACA 496. The checks revealed that NACA 496 contains computational shortcuts (time‐ and effort‐saving devices for engineers of the time) and clever artifices (employed in its solution methods), but, unfortunately, also contains numerous tripping points (aspects of NACA 496 that have the potential to cause confusion) and some errors. The re‐computations were performed employing the methods and procedures described in NACA 496, but using modern computational tools. With some exceptions, the magnitudes and trends of the original results were in fair‐to‐very‐good agreement with the re‐computed results. The exceptions included what are speculated to be computational errors in the original in some instances and transcription errors in the original in others. Independent flutter calculations were performed and, in all cases, including those where the original and re‐computed results differed significantly, were in excellent agreement with the re‐computed results. Appendix A contains NACA 496; Appendix B contains a Matlab(Reistered) program that performs the re‐computation of results; Appendix C presents three alternate solution methods, with examples, for the two‐degree‐of-freedom solution method of NACA 496; Appendix D contains the three‐degree‐of‐freedom solution method (outlined in NACA 496 but never implemented), with examples.

Perry, Boyd, III↗

Skylab Operations Handbook: Orbital Workshop (OWS), Airlock Module (AM), Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA): Systems Descriptions - Volume 1

The Skylab Program consists of three low-earth-orbit missions of the Orbital Assembly (OA) (figure 1.0-1), extending over.an a-month period. The OA consists of the CSM docked to the Saturn Workshop.(SWS). This handbook describes the systems for three of the four major components of the SWS (OWS, AM, and MDA), and also discusses significant interfaces with the Instrument Unit (IU), ATM, and CSM. The other major component of the SWS, the ATM, is treated separately in its own handbook. The OWS, AM, MDA, ATM Deployment Assembly (ATM-DA), Fixed Airlock Shroud (FAS), Payload Shroud (PS), and IU are addressed throughout this document as individual modules from a structural standpoint only. Although normally considered a part of the launch vehicle, the IU is treated in this document as part of the SWS because of its function in preparing the SWS for orbital operation. Section 1.0 describes vehicle and mission configurations of the Skylab program and provides general descriptions of the various systems. Section 2.0 provides detailed systems data covering system interfaces, functional description, subsystems and major components description, component operation, failure modes, performance and design data, operational limitations and restrictions, and instrumentation, and briefly outlines the experiments. Section 3.0 contains illustrations of all panels and identifies the controls and displays, panels, reference designators, nomenclature, functions, circuit breakers, and power sources. The Table of Contents lists in order of appearance all sections, subsections, major paragraphs, illustrations, and tables and provides their respective page locations. Appendix A defines the abbreviations and acronyms employed throughout this handbook, and Appendix B explains the symbols used. Appendix C is a locator index that references component controls contained in Section 3.0. Appendix D is an alphabetical index of paragraph headings, illustrations, and tables, according to the key word, with applicable page numbers. Additional items of significance to the user have been included in the index. The technical level to which this document is written assumes the reader to have general knowledge of engineering terms and principles.

West, W. D.↗

Integrated Icing Analysis of the D8 "Double Bubble" and the Hybrid Wing Body

A computational icing analysis utilizing LEWICE3D was performed for two next generational aircraft, the D8 “Double Bubble” and the Hybrid Wing Body (HWB). These two geometries were exposed to a variety of simulated clouds spanning the Appendix C and O regimes. Integrated results indicate that the Appendix O clouds generate a significantly higher water catch rate than Appendix C clouds as large radius of curvature components are susceptible to the highly ballistic large droplets found in Appendix O. Classically unprotected components, such as the nose/fuselage, may require anti-icing protection in configurations such as the D8 and HWB that generate lift from these components, dramatically increasing the size, extent, and power requirements of ice protection systems. Integrated results also indicate inclusion of the splashing model can significantly affect predicted water catch rates.

Computational,Icing,Integrated↗

Lunar Dust Mitigation: A Guide and Reference: First Edition (2021)

On the surface of the Moon, lunar dust specifically presents unique challenges to operations long-term due to regolith particles’ ubiquitous presence in the lunar environment, potential to electrostatically charge and possible chemical reactivity. Whether to avoid exposure, try to remove or simply to tolerate lunar dust infiltrating a system becomes a complex question involving length of required service life, dust effects and critical risks, mass and complexity trades for the entire system. This publication provides a snapshot of advice from topical experts for specific areas of concern to systems targeted for deployment on the lunar surface. Following introductory overview commentary, dust mitigation approaches appropriate to the lunar surface are first addressed for typically static structures such as optical surfaces, radiators, and other thermal control surfaces, followed by regolith exposure concerns for communications equipment and non-optical sensors. The broad topic of mechanisms and mechanical assemblies is broken down to address relevant component level concerns, such as for bearings and for seals. “Soft goods” components of space suits (fabric) specific concerns are discussed, followed finally by brief coverage of human health issues and concerns, though the emphasis of this publication remains with components directly exposed to the harsh lunar surface environment. A description of some lunar surface hazard details, in particular characteristics of lunar surface dust, follows in Appendix A, and more detailed explanations of quantification issues for particulates are in Appendix B. The simple inertial removal of particles from a surface is discussed in Appendix C, followed by a summary of terrestrial best practices for dust mitigation recommended within select industries in Appendix D. The aggregated bibliography of references, while extensive and very useful, should not be construed to be exhaustive and can serve as a constructive start.

dust↗

NASA’s Human Landing System: A Sustaining Presence on the Moon

For more than a decade, efforts have been ongoing at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, to land humans and cargo on planetary bodies like the Moon and Mars and today this work continues under the Center’s Lander Programs (LP) office. In August of 2019, NASA stood up the Human Landing System (HLS) program to be responsible for spacecrafts that will land astronauts on the Moon under Artemis. Work is well underway with the historic Artemis III mission to land the first Americans on the lunar surface in more than 50 years through the Appendix H Option A [1] contract with SpaceX. In November, NASA awarded SpaceX an Option B modification to its existing HLS Appendix H contract, which will further develop its Starship HLS to meet NASA’s sustaining lander requirements for lunar missions beyond Artemis III. In September of 2022, NASA issued an HLS Sustaining Lunar Development solicitation under the NextSTEP-2 Appendix P Broad Agency Announcement [2] asking a second provider, in addition to SpaceX, to develop and demonstrate a lander that meets the program’s extended set of requirements for missions beyond Artemis III. Under the umbrella of Sustaining Lunar Development [3], these requirements will meet NASA’s needs for recurring, long-term access to the lunar surface. Proposals were received from industry late last year and NASA is planning to award an Appendix P contract in the summer of 2023. This paper will provide an update of the Lander Program office’s progress and will discuss how the program is bridging from the initial demonstration phase of development for the Human Landing System program to the Sustaining Lunar Development phase. The paper will include publicly available information on SpaceX’s Starship HLS design as well as near-term and future milestones for HLS and the Artemis program.

Lisa Watson-Morgan↗

Density waves in the Calogero model - revisited

The Calogero model bears, in the continuum limit, collective excitations in the form of density waves and solitary modulations of the density of particles. This sector of the spectrum of the model was investigated, mostly within the framework of collective-field theory, by several authors, over the past 15 years or so. In this work we shall concentrate on periodic solutions of the collective BPS-equation (also known as 'finite amplitude density waves'), as well as on periodic solutions of the full static variational equations which vanish periodically (also known as 'large amplitude density waves'). While these solutions are not new, we feel that our analysis and presentation add to the existing literature, as we explain in the text. In addition, we show that these solutions also occur in a certain two-family generalization of the Calogero model, at special points in parameter space. A compendium of useful identities associated with Hilbert transforms, including our own proofs of these identities, appears in Appendix A. In Appendix B we also elucidate in the present paper some fine points having to do with manipulating Hilbert-transforms, which appear ubiquitously in the collective field formalism. Finally, in order to make this paper self-contained, we briefly summarize in Appendix C basic facts about the collective field formulation of the Calogero model.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

International code of nomenclature of prokaryotes

Here, this volume contains the edition of the International Code of Nomenclature of Prokaryotes that was presented in draft form and available for comment at the Plenary Session of the Fourteenth International Congress of Bacteriology and Applied Microbiology (BAM), Montréal, 2014, together with updated lists of conserved and rejected bacterial names and of Opinions issued by the Judicial Commission. As in the past it brings together those changes accepted, published and documented by the ICSP and the Judicial Commission since the last revision was published. Several new appendices have been added to this edition. Appendix 11 addresses the appropriate application of the Candidatus concept, Appendix 12 contains the history of the van Niel Prize, and Appendix 13 contains the summaries of Congresses.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Fiscal Year 2010

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): (1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; (2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; (3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; (4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; and (5) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure 1. This report covers fiscal year 2010 (October 2009-September 2010). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0021 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the site inspections are included in Appendix C.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Fiscal Year 2011 (October 2010-September 2011)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): • CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; • CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; • CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; • CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; and • CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers fiscal year 2011 (October 2010-September 2011). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the inspections are included in Appendix C. It is recommended to continue semiannual inspections at CAUs 90 and 91; quarterly inspections at CAUs 92, 110, and 112; and additional inspections at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. At CAU 92, it is recommended to remove the wave barriers, as they have not proven to be necessary to protect the cover. At CAU 110, it is recommended to continue annual vegetation monitoring and soil moisture monitoring, and to reduce the frequency of subsidence surveys from twice per year to once every other year (biennially).

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Closure Report for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Neptune' and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); and (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of CAU 574 according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]) and the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 574 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The following activities were performed to support closure of CAU 574: (1) In situ external dose rate measurements were collected using thermoluminescent dosimeters at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). (2) Total effective dose rates were determined at both sites by summing the internal and external dose rate components. (3) A use restriction (UR) was implemented at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune). Areas that exceed the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per year (mrem/yr) based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario are within the existing use restricted area for CAU 551. The 25-mrem/yr FAL is not exceeded outside the existing CAU 551 UR for any of the exposure scenarios (Industrial Area, Remote Work Area, and Occasional Use Area). Therefore, the existing UR for CAU 551 is sufficient to bound contamination that exceeds the FAL. (4) An administrative UR was implemented at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca) as a best management practice (BMP). The 25-mrem/yr FAL was not exceeded for the Remote Work Area or Occasional Use Area exposure scenarios; therefore, a UR is not required. However, because the 25-mrem/yr FAL was exceeded for the Industrial Area exposure scenario, an administrative UR was established as a BMP. UR documentation is included as Appendix B. The UR at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune), is within the existing UR for CAU 551. Additional postings were not installed, and annual post-closure inspections will be performed in conjunction with the inspections performed for CAU 551. At CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca), the administrative UR does not require postings or inspections. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 574; and (2) The transfer of CAU 574 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO

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MCNP5 Calculations Replicating ARH-600 Nitrate Data

This report serves to extend the previous document: "MCNP Calculations Replicating ARH-600 Data" by replicating the nitrate curves found in ARH-600. This report includes the MCNP models used, the calculated critical dimension for each analyzed parameter set, and the resulting data libraries for use with the CritView code. As with the ARH-600 data, this report is not meant to replace the analysis of the fissile systems by qualified criticality personnel. The MCNP data is presented without accounting for the statistical uncertainty (although this is typically less than 0.001) or bias and, as such, the application of a reasonable safety margin is required. The data that follows pertains to the uranyl nitrate and plutonium nitrate spheres, infinite cylinders, and infinite slabs of varying isotopic composition, reflector thickness, and molarity. Each of the cases was modeled in MCNP (version 5.1.40), using the ENDF/B-VI cross section set. Given a molarity, isotopic composition, and reflector thickness, the fissile concentration and diameter (or thicknesses in the case of the slab geometries) were varied. The diameter for which k-effective equals 1.00 for a given concentration could then be calculated and graphed. These graphs are included in this report. The pages that follow describe the regions modeled, formulas for calculating the various parameters, a list of cross-sections used in the calculations, a description of the automation routine and data, and finally the data output. The data of most interest are the critical dimensions of the various systems analyzed. This is presented graphically, and in table format, in Appendix B. Appendix C provides a text listing of the same data in a format that is compatible with the CritView code. Appendices D and E provide listing of example Template files and MCNP input files (these are discussed further in Section 4). Appendix F is a complete listing of all of the output data (i.e., all of the analyzed dimensions and the resulting k eff values).

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