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The Bondarenko method for resonance self-shielding was recently implemented in the PARTISN multigroup discrete ordinates code. This report derives the sensitivities of self-shielded cross sections with respect to nuclide densities and the subsequent sensitivities of k eff with respect to nuclide densities. Numerical results are presented for two test problems.
Tritium confinement is performed using different barriers to minimize releases to the environment. Primary confinement is usually performed by process piping and components, secondary confinement typically by inerted gloveboxes connected to a continuously operating tritium stripper system. Some facility designs employ tertiary tritium confinement by using process room confinement with a tritium stripper system activated after an accident to further mitigate tritium releases to the environment. Secondary confinement of some tritium systems such as radiation-hardened or shielded-cell enclosures are not easily achieved using designs for inerted glovebox. These enclosures can be challenging to seal for secondary tritium confinement due to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) needs for temperature control, as well as feedthroughs for equipment and instrumentation, are potential pathways for tritium leaks or loses. Additional tritium leak paths can be created in secondary confinement enclosures due to a Design Basis Accident (DBA) seismic event. These new, larger tritium leak rates from the DBA event are usually not part of the stripper system design basis so all tritium released to the secondary confinement enclosure is assumed released to the environment. Detritiation strategies for shielded enclosures and/or gloveboxes with significant leak rates are necessary to minimize off-site radiological dose consequences. To address this, the relationship between the confinement system leak rate and stripper system (recirculating) flow rate was evaluated to meet prescribed maximum allowable environmental tritium emissions from the event. The simple analysis described assumes a constant leak rate from the confinement system (i.e. shielded enclosure or glovebox) while a recirculating stripper system strips tritium from the system– a competition between tritium release and tritium recovery. At a high level, the resulting expression summarizes the relationship between system leak rate (F L ) and stripper flow rate (F S ) relative to allowable tritium release (Q A ) and initial tritium release (Q 0 ): $\frac{F_L}{F_s}$ ≈ $\frac{Q_A}{Q_0}$. This report derives the relationship between these parameters, examines the impact of finite stripping times followed by purging of the stripped volume. The analysis provides example results for up to 30 gram tritium releases: the maximum tritium inventory of a Hazard Category III (Department of Energy) Nuclear Facility. The detritiation model presented represents a high-level analysis of tritium recovery versus losses for “leaky” confinement enclosures such as shielded cells after large tritium releases. Key parameters for doing the analyses are the system leak rate, stripper flow rate, initial tritium release, and allowable tritium release values. The analyses show a proportional decrease in releases with reduction in initial tritium release but a non-linear increase in tritium recovery with increased stripper flow rate or reduced leak-rate. The analyses also apply to glovebox confinement systems which could have significant increases in leak rates after a DBA. The analysis recognizes but does not include tritium absorption followed by re-emission from the walls of the confinement volume – an analysis which could be pursued in future studies.
Advanced sensor capabilities for the simultaneous on-site detection of specific chemical, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) threats is important to significantly limit the risk of exposure to personnel and allow the rapid collection of essential scientific data and critical evidence. Commercially available sensor capabilities are generally complex, and/or require highly specific and ultra-sensitive methods that are often power demanding or require offsite post-analysis for positive detection, leaving personnel vulnerable. The goal of this project is to develop a portable sensor capable of simultaneously detecting CBRN signatures using a multiplexed Förster Resonance Energy Transfer (FRET) based sensor. FRET sensors are tailorable, specific, and highly dependent on the donor-acceptor distance. In this project, nanoparticles were functionalized with aptamers that were designed for the detection of methylphosphonate, a sarin metabolite. FRET was measured between quantum dot donors and dye and metal nanoparticle acceptors using optical spectroscopy.
High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are widely employed by nuclear facilities to remove radiological particulate matter from their effluent exhaust streams. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the relationships between the 10-year HEPA filter lifespan and its other performance indicators. The 10-year-long endeavor to collect and analyze data regarding the lifetime of HEPA filters at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory began in 2010. Forty-nine HEPA filters were selected and have been surveyed and analyzed at least annually to verify compliance with permit conditions. The study suggests the frequency of filter replacement should be based on the actual operational requirements, such as fume hood face velocity and/or efficiency test results, instead of on the prescribed filter “age limit” of 10 years from the date of manufacture (e.g., birth date) when operating under dry conditions. Over the past decade, the study has now been completed, and all forty-nine HEPA filters have been replaced, due to either technical issues listed in this report, or the previously recommended filter “age limit” of 10 years.
This document is a summary of the full 2019 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER.
Objectives of this presentation are: 1. Explain the difference between radiation safety vs. criticality safety, 2. Define criticality, 3. Explain the three types of chain reactions, 4. Define two terms scientists use to characterize criticality, 5. Explain what occurs during a criticality accident, 6. Identify prevention measures for avoiding a criticality accident, and 7. Identify the parameters that effect criticality of a system.
This data package summarizes the exposure assumptions, equations, and methods used to calculate radionuclide-specific unit dose factors and the radiological doses for both groundwater and atmospheric pathways as a part of the updated Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA). An All Pathways Representative Person exposure scenario is considered to evaluate exposure via both groundwater and atmospheric transport pathways. The radiological dose assessments for both groundwater and atmospheric pathways are included in the performance assessments (PAs) for various Waste Management Areas at the Hanford Site. This data package calculates exposure route-specific and total unit dose factors for CA-specific radionuclides of concern based on the exposure assumptions used in the CA and PAs. This data package also presents the results and comparison of the radionuclide-specific unit dose factors based on the exposure assumptions used in the revised Hanford Site Composite Analysis and Hanford Site performance assessments for low-level waste disposal facilities.
The presentation discusses what is involved in having radiation control as a career.
This report documents the findings of an assessment of the Turbo FRMAC software's ability to implement International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance for calculating Operational Intervention Levels (OIL) 1 & 2 for nuclear and radiological emergencies. The IAEA OIL and U.S. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Derived Response Level methodology and implementation in respective tools were compared, as demonstrated through benchmarking activities for a nuclear power plant source term and potential radionuclides of concern for radiological dispersal devices. This comparison revealed some shortcomings in Turbo FRMACs ability to perform IAEA OIL calculations and resulted in recommended software modifications to be considered for future development.
In support of the E-Area Performance Assessment, a two-dimensional model of water flow and radionuclide transport through the E-Area Intermediate Level Vault (ILV) and local vadose zone has been developed using the PORFLOWTM software. The purpose of the model is to calculate flux to the water table for radionuclides eluted from the ILV during its operational life, the period of institutional control, and times following site closure. Results of model calculations will be used by a three-dimensional PORFLOW model of transport through the aquifer to determine radionuclide concentrations at a hypothetical 100 meter well and at the site boundary where contaminated groundwater could be assessed by members of the public following site closure. While newly developed, the model structure closely follows that used in the 2008 PA while incorporating a refined computational mesh, updated material properties for the vadose zone soil and vault concrete, revised infiltration rates, and new solid-liquid distribution coefficients. The model also addresses degradation of concrete hydraulic properties by blending soil and concrete water retention curves over a 500 year period. That is, the hydraulic properties of ILV concrete start out as fresh concrete at the time of site closure and degrade to soil properties over a 500 year time period. This approach has not been used previously in E-Area PA’s. The model has been used to calculate water flow through the ILV vadose zone and, on a trial basis, transport of a limited number of radionuclides from the waste region inside the ILV to the water table. Figure ES-1 provides a view of the model and an example of water flow after the concrete has substantially degraded. Figure dimensions are in centimeters. The red area in the left hand side figure is the waste disposal region within the ILV. Colored bands in the figures indicate different soil and concrete regions. Figure ES-2 shows a calculation of flux to the water table (mol/yr) for U-234 and its one-year half-life decay chain (U-234 → Th-230 → Ra-226 → Pb-210). Pb-210 flux is too small to show on the same scale used for Th-230 and Ra-226 in Figure ES-2. The model has also been used to make a preliminary evaluation of the release of tritium from TPBAR disposal containers that will be place in the ILV. A separately calculated tritium release rate as a function of time was used as a source in the PORFLOW model. The TPBAR disposal schedule and tritium release rate differ from the values used in the 2008 PA. Results from these initial trial runs are compared to calculations made for the 2008 PA ILV analysis. In brief, a new PORFLOW model of flow and transport through the ILV vadose zone has been developed and tested. The model is ready to be used for PA calculations.
The Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission (AERC) and the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) co-hosted the 6th Regional Review Meeting on Radiological Security involving representatives from over 20 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security. The purpose of the event was to discuss the implementation of, and plans for, high-activity radioactive source security (RSS). The U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) fully sponsored this review meeting. Participants were welcomed to Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the meeting was formally opened by Nirmali Karunarathna of the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulator Council who emphasized the strong partnerships among the participants. The opening Ceremony and Lamp Lighting included dignitaries from the sponsoring countries. Robert Hilton, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, and Kristin Hirsch of the ORS gave other opening remarks that highlighted the social benefit from radiological sources in medicine, industry, and agriculture, while stressing the importance of addressing the risks associated with the malicious use of radiological sources. Emphasis was placed on the importance of partnerships among all the participants to help ensure the success of securing radiological materials throughout the world and the opportunity to share information and experiences. AERC was acknowledged with special thanks for hosting this event. A participant list is included as Attachment A, and the meeting agenda is provided as Attachment B. All presentations were made available to participants. The following sections summarize the meeting’s presentations, discussions, issues, suggestions, and recommendations.
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) shutdown dose rate (SDDR) code suite calculates gamma dose rates at a location of interest due to activation of materials. The code suite is based on the rigorous two-step (R2S) method that involves two radiation transport calculations: (1) neutron radiation transport to determine neutron fluxes in the material for which activation calculations will be performed and (2) gamma radiation transport to determine dose rates at a location of interest, due to material activation. The ORNL SDDR code suite is used to determine an importance function that characterizes the neutron’s importance to the final SDDR when the Monte Carlo radiation transport method is used. This report demonstrates how the ORNL SDDR code suite is implemented through the following codes: Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code Version 5-1.60, Oak Ridge Isotope Generator (ORIGEN), MSX suite of utilities, Neutron Activation Gamma Source Sampler (NAGSS), and Automated Variance Reduction Generator (ADVANTG). For this demonstration, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) SDDR benchmark problem is used and the dose rate result is compared to previously published work.
The objective of this research is to design a portable neutron detector that is lightweight and responds to neutrons with energies of 20 MeV and greater. The instrument will be used as a ‘sniffer’ probe for identifying shielding weaknesses at high-energy particle accelerators and be paired with a plastic scintillator to quantify the high-energy neutron dose equivalent. The sniffer probes are two different sizes and comprised of either cesium iodide or sodium iodide, all doped with thallium, making a total of four detectors. The probes were calibrated to respond only to radiations with 8 MeV electron equivalent energy or higher, vastly reducing detector response from background and lower energy radiations. The sniffer probes were tested using californium- 252 and americium-beryllium sources, followed by high-energy (up to 800 MeV) neutron exposures at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Weapons Neutron Research (WNR) facility. The sniffer probes were then used to identify areas around the accelerator facility where elevated levels of high-energy radiation was present and the plastic scintillators were placed in these locations to determine the high-energy neutron dose equivalent. The dose equivalent is calculated by measuring the 12 C(n,2n) 11 C reaction, which has a 20.4 MeV neutron threshold. Two locations behind the WNR facility were identified with the probes and the dose equivalent rates from neutron energies above 20 MeV were calculated to be 1.24 mrem/h behind flightpath 30-left and 1.53 behind flightpath 30-right. Of the four sniffer probes, the 2-inch x 2-inch cesium iodide is the recommended probe for performing high-energy shielding surveys. The larger crystal size yields higher sensitivity at lower count rates and the more dense material increases the likelihood of interaction within the crystal.
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Abstract not provided.
Reports are included on the follow topics: gamma spectroscopy, whole body counter, Bioassay Laboratory, and Radiological Measurements Laboratory.
This study evaluated gamma irradiation for sterilization and reuse of two models of N95 respirators after gamma radiation sterilization as a method to increase availability of N95 respirators during a shortage. The Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility was used to irradiate two different models of N95 filtering facepiece respirators at doses ranging from 0 kGy(tissue) to 50 kGy(tissue). The following tests were used to determine the efficacy of the respirator after irradiation sterilization: Ambient Aerosol Condensation Nuclei Counter Quantitative Fit Test, tensile test, strain cycling, oscillatory dynamic mechanical analysis, microscopic image analysis of fiber layers, and electrostatic field measurements. Both of the respirator models exhibited statistically significant changes after gamma irradiation as shown by the Quantitative Fit Test, electrostatic testing and the aerosol testing. The change in electrostatic capability of the filter reduced the efficiency of challenging particles near the 200 nm size by approximately 40-50%. Both tested respirators showed statistically significant changes associated with gamma sterilization. However, our results indicate that choices in materials and manufacturing methods to achieve N95 filtration lead to different magnitudes of damage when exposed to gamma radiation at sterilization relevant doses. This damage results in lower filtration performance. While our sample size (2 different types of respirators) was small, we did observe a change in electrostatic properties on a filter layer that coincided with the failure on the Quantitative Fit Test.
This study evaluated gamma irradiation for sterilization and reuse of two models of N95 respirators after gamma radiation sterilization as a method to increase availability of N95 respirators during a shortage. The Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility was used to irradiate two different models of N95 filtering facepiece respirators at doses ranging from 0 kGy(tissue) to 50 kGy(tissue). The following tests were used to determine the efficacy of the respirator after irradiation sterilization: Ambient Aerosol Condensation Nuclei Counter Quantitative Fit Test, tensile test, strain cycling, oscillatory dynamic mechanical analysis, microscopic image analysis of fiber layers, and electrostatic field measurements. Both of the respirator models exhibited statistically significant changes after gamma irradiation as shown by the Quantitative Fit Test, electrostatic testing and the aerosol testing. The change in electrostatic charge of the filter was correlated with a reduction in capturing particles near the 200 nm size by approximately 40-50%. Both tested respirators showed statistically significant changes associated with gamma sterilization. However, our results indicate that choices in materials and manufacturing methods to achieve N95 filtration lead to different magnitudes of damage when exposed to gamma radiation at sterilization relevant doses. This damage results in lower filtration performance. While our sample size (2 different types of respirators) was small, we did observe a change in electrostatic properties on a filter layer that coincided with the failure on the Quantitative Fit Test and reduction in aerosol filtering efficiency. Key Words: N95 respirators, respirators, airborne transmission, pandemic prevention, COVID-19, gamma sterilization