RTG/science instrument radiation interactions for deep space probes Final technical report, 4 Feb. - 30 Jun. 1969
Interference effects of radiation from plutonium dioxide fueled radioisotope thermoelectric generator
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Interference effects of radiation from plutonium dioxide fueled radioisotope thermoelectric generator
Abundance of uranium, thorium, and plutonium isotopes in Apollo 12 soil and breccia samples
Nuclear characteristics of plutonium fuel for thermoelectric generators and required shield thicknesses for sensitive radiation experiment in outer planet spacecraft
The results obtained from mass-spectrometry analyses of the noble gases He, Ne, Ar, Kr, and Xe in a 182-mg chip of the largest Apollo 15 rock 15555 are presented. The spallation krypton data indicate a well-shielded location through most of the time during which the rock was exposed to cosmic rays. Gas retention ages are estimated. No evidence for the presence of products from plutonium-244 or iodine-129 was found.
The degradation in performance of lithium-compensated silicon nuclear particle detectors induced by irradiation at room temperature with 0.6-MeV and 1.5-MeV electrons, 1.9-MeV protons, and fast neutrons from a plutonium-beryllium source has been investigated. With increasing fluence, the irradiations produced an increase of detector leakage current, noise, capacitance, and a degradation in the performance of the detector as a charged-particle energy spectrometer. Following the irradiations, annealing effects were observed when the detectors were reverse-biased at their recommended operating voltages. Upon removal of bias, a continuous degradation of detector performance characteristics occurred. Detectors which had been damaged by electrons and protons exhibited a stabilization in their characteristics within two weeks after irradiation, whereas detectors damaged by neutrons had a continuous degradation of performance over a period of several months.
An investigation was conducted to determine minimum dimensions and minimum weight obtainable in a design for a reactor using uranium-233 nitride or plutonium-239 nitride as fuel. Such a reactor had been considered by Krasner et al. (1971). Present space power status is discussed, together with questions of reactor design and power distribution in the reactor. The characteristics of various reactor types are compared, giving attention also to a zirconium hydride reactor.
Xenon extracted in step-wise heating of lunar breccia 14,301 contains a fission-like component in excess of that attributable to uranium decay during the age of the solar system. There seems to be no adequate source for this component other than Pu-244. Verification that this component is in fact due to the spontaneous fission of extinct Pu-244 comes from the derived spectrum which is similar to that observed from artificially produced Pu-244. It thus appears that Pu-244 was extant at the time lunar crustal material cooled sufficiently to arrest the thermal diffusion of xenon. Subsequent history has apparently maintained the isotopic integrity of plutonium fission xenon. Of major importance are details of the storage itself. Either the fission component is the result of in situ fission of Pu-244 and subsequent storage in 14,301 material, or the fission xenon was stored in an intermediate reservoir before incorporation into 14,301.
The Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) measures lunar physical and environmental characteristics and transmits the data to receiving stations on earth. The data are used to derive information on the composition and structure of the moon. The electrical power subsystem generates and conditions all the electrical power for operations of the ALSEP system. The power source for the ALSEP is the Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). The generator produces electricity by thermoelectric conversion. The radioactive isotope plutonium 238 is used as the energy source for the SNAP-27. By April 1, 1970, the SNAP-27 RTG had produced more than 230 kWh of continuous and stable power for the ALSEP.-
At the present time, there exists no known power source that will satisfy the power, weight, lifetime, and other stringent requirements of an extended outer-planet mission. Exploratory studies indicate the need for a solar-independent power source capable of supplying approximately 500 W of power over mission lifetimes of up to 12 years. The only known power source which can possibly meet these requirements, in the 1975 to 1979 time period, is a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG). In 1969 a program began to develop a long-life, plutonium-fueled radioisotope thermoelectric power system. Aspects of spacecraft configuration are discussed together with power source requirements, RTG/spacecraft integration, operational details, and problems of safety.
Rare gases in meteorites and lunar samples are discussed stimulating the discovery of the solar wind. Radioactive isotopes are examined, making a correlation to the origin of the solar system. It is shown that the heights of the peaks above the horizontal lines represent the spectrum of the fissiogenic sample. Nuclear tracks of iodine, xenon, and plutonium detected in lunar rocks are also explained.
Materials and design considerations are discussed for a low-cost, reliable radio-isotope-fueled thermoelectric generator for use in an undersea application. Plutonium has been selected as fuel, and the generator has to meet design goals of 2 watts after 20 years with a direct output voltage of 6-8 volts. The pressed and sintered form of Bi2Te3 appears to be the most appropriate thermoelectric material. Both fibrous and multilayer foil insulation could be used with proper processing and quality control, but there is less risk with fibrous type insulation. Min-K 1400 is recommended with a nitrogen cover gas. The heat source recommended is a three-layer capsule using T-111 for both the liner and strength member with an outer liner of Hastelloy-C.
The programs and plans of the U.S. government for the "back end of the nuclear fuel cycle" were examined to determine if there were any significant technological or regulatory gaps and inconsistencies. Particular emphasis was placed on analysis of high-level nuclear waste management plans, since the permanent disposal of radioactive waste has emerged as a major factor in the public acceptance of nuclear power. The implications of various light water reactor fuel cycle options were examined including throwaway, stowaway, uranium recycle, and plutonium plus uranium recycle. The results of this study indicate that the U.S. program for high-level waste management has significant gaps and inconsistencies. Areas of greatest concern include: the adequacy of the scientific data base for geological disposal; programs for the the disposal of spent fuel rods; interagency coordination; and uncertainties in NRC regulatory requirements for disposal of both commercial and military high-level waste.
Various concepts for the space disposal of nuclear waste are discussed, with attention given to the destinations now being considered (high earth orbit, lunar orbit, lunar surface, solar orbit, solar system escape, sun). Waste mixes are considered in the context of the 'Purex' (Plutonium and Uranium extraction) process and the potential forms for nuclear waste disposal (ORNL cermet, Boro-silicate glass, Metal matrix, Hot-pressed supercalcine) are described. Preliminary estimates of the energy required and the cost surcharge needed to support the space disposal of nuclear waste are presented (8 metric tons/year, requiring three Shuttle launches). When Purex is employed, the generated electrical energy needed to support the Shuttle launches is shown to be less than 1%, and the projected surcharge to electrical users is shown to be slightly more than two mills/kW-hour.
Xenon produced by fission of uranium, thorium and plutonium has repeatedly been observed in lunar rocks and soils. In two basaltic rocks and in two soils Xe was found originating from fission of U-235 induced by neutrons which are due to the interactions of cosmic ray particles with lunar matter. Two facts lead to this conclusion: (1) fission Xe is present in excess of that expected for the U, Th, and Pu concentrations and for the gas retention age of the samples; and (2) the Xe-134/Xe-136 ratio of excess fission Xe is close to 1.25 as expected for neutron induced fission of U-235. Information on the duration of the exposure to cosmic rays was obtained from the Kr-81-Kr systematics whereas the effective shielding conditions were derived from the depth sensitive cosmogenic ratio Xe-131/Xe-126. For the four samples the exposure to cosmic rays in the lunar regolith is described by a two stage exposure model. The history of the four samples was derived in terms of duration and shielding depth of the two stages.
The present difficulties experienced by the United States in launching payloads into space has suggested a number of problems which are associated with the handling of hazardous materials in spacecraft. The question has arisen as to the safety of launching highly radioactive material such as plutonium-238, related to the possibility of its dispersion into the atmosphere during a launch vehicle explosion. An alternative is the use of a small nuclear reactor which is not started until it is in space and contains little or no radioactivity at launch. A first order assessment of six small reactor concepts with power levels up to 100 MWe was performed. Both the nuclear feasibility of these concepts to operate at their rated power levels between 7 and 10 years and the capability of these concepts to remain subcritical both before and during launch and also in the case of water immersion during a potential launch failure or abort were investigated.
This Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by the preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The launch configuration will use the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special(PAM-S) combination. The Tier 1 EIS included a delay alternative which considered the Titan 4 launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. However, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan 4 for NASA, could not provide a Titan 4 vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal Shuttle launch operations. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects have been judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. In the event of (1) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the spacecraft from earth orbit, there are potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium dioxide from the spacecraft's radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). The potential effects considered in this EIS include risks of air and water quality impacts, local land area contamination, adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, impacts on wetland areas or areas containing historical sites, and socioeconomic impacts. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the proposed action are underway and preliminary results indicate small health or environmental risks. The results of a Final Safety Analysis Report will be available for inclusion into the final EIS.
This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the proposed action of completing the preparation and operation of the Galileo spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1989, and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation, and are treated in published National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle (NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC Environmental Resources Document (NASA 1986) and the Galileo Tier 1 EIS (NASA 1988a). The environmental impacts of a normal launch were deemed insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations. Environmental impacts may also result from launch or mission accidents that could release plutonium fuel used in the Galileo power system. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the proposed action reveal small health or environmental risks. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative. The remote possibility of environmental impacts of the proposed action must be weighed against the large adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts inherent in the no-action alternative.
This Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by the preparation and operation of the Galileo spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The launch configuration will use the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) combination. The Tier 1 EIS included a delay alternative which considered the Titan 4 launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. However, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan 4 for NASA, could not provide a Titan 4 vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal Shuttle launch operations. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects have been judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. In the event of: (1) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the spacecraft from earth orbit, there are potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium dioxide from the spacecraft's radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG).