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At least 955 records · Page 53
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

An Application of a Modified Beta Factor Method for the Analysis of Software Common Cause Failures

This paper presents an approach for modeling software common cause failures (CCFs) within digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. CCFs consist of a concurrent failure between two or more components due to a shared failure cause and coupling mechanism. This work emphasizes the importance of identifying software-centric attributes related to the coupling mechanisms necessary for simultaneous failures of redundant software components. The groups of components that share coupling mechanisms are called common cause component groups (CCCGs). Most CCF models rely on operational data as the basis for establishing CCCG parameters and predicting CCFs. This work is motivated by two primary concerns: (1) a lack of operational and CCF data for estimating software CCF model parameters; and (2) the need to model single components as part of multiple CCCGs simultaneously. A hybrid approach was developed to account for these concerns by leveraging existing techniques: a modified beta factor model allows single components to be placed within multiple CCCGs, while a second technique provides software-specific model parameters for each CCCG. This hybrid approach provides a means to overcome the limitations of conventional methods while offering support for design decisions under the limited data scenario.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD)

The Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD) is a collaborative project between the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the University of Maryland, and hydrogen stakeholders to improve safety reliability for hydrogen facilities by integrating risk reduction methodologies and component reliability data taxonomies that support hydrogen infrastructure failure rate analysis.

availability↗
DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Failures in Molten Salt Thermal Energy Storage Tank for Central Receiver Concentrating Solar Power Plants

The thermal energy storage (TES) system is a critical component in concentrated solar power (CSP) plants that increases the plant's capacity factor and economic competitiveness by reducing the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) while simultaneously increasing the value of the delivered energy. Failures including molten-salt leaks and diverse localized cracking after several months to a few years of operation have been reported in hot tanks for CSP plants operating around the world. A model of a molten salt thermal energy storage tank was developed and validated to analyze the impact of different tank design features on the temperature and stress distributions as a function of typical plant operation conditions. Design features included the floor plate thicknesses, friction coefficients between the tank floor and the foundation, and the sparger ring location. Maximum stresses in the tank floor frequently surpassed the yield point of the material during operation, leading to a detriment of the tank's lifetime. Recommendations on design features to improve the reliability of new molten salt tanks for CSP plants are provided.

concentrating solar power↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of instrumental subsystem FMEA/CIL

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware are documented. The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of 107 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 22 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the Pre 51-L NASA baseline with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs added, which consists of 96 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 25 FMEAs which caused differences in 5 CIL items.

Gardner, J. R.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Probabilistic Risk Assessment: A Bibliography

Probabilistic risk analysis is an integration of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis and other techniques to assess the potential for failure and to find ways to reduce risk. This bibliography references 160 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, probabilistic risk assessment, risk and probability theory, in the basic index or major subject terms, An abstract is included with most citations, followed by the applicable subject terms.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2021

Controlled Pyroshock Test Transients Can Be Used To Better Match Operational Shock Transients and Reduce Artificial Pyroshock Test Failures [Slides]

Shock analysis is typically done via SRS (shock response spectrum). Oftentimes shock analysis is not performed because most loads specifications only supply SRS requirements with no representative shock transients that can be used for analysis. SRS analysis is too conservative. There is no structural dynamics involved as all modes are assumed to have peak responses simultaneously and in-phase with each other. It is possible that all other loads and combination of loads show the design to be good, whereas SRS analysis (1000 g’s are involved) results may require redesign. Multiple shock transients can satisfy a SRS, yet most loads documents don’t provide a representative shock transient that could be used for shock analysis. Shock testing is less common than harmonic and random vibration testing. Engineers typically go into shock tests with very little knowledge of what to expect. A pass/fail type of approach with very little engineering done to prepare for the test or to control the type of shock transient is used. Most engineers will not model the shock test fixture due to lack of knowledge about the details of the test setup. Shock analysis and testing is often an open loop type situation with no test setup modeling, no test correlation, and no control over the test shock transient. In this work, if we can create applied test force transient that comes close to matching calculated force transient then a more reasonable acceleration transient will be created at the test reference accelerometer that better matches operational shocks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1964

Transor analysis

Reliability and failure modes of adaptive restoring circuit module Transor

LOGIC CIRCUIT↗
NASA NTRS2017

Lognormal Uncertainty Estimation for Failure Rates

"Uncertainty analysis itself is uncertain, therefore, you cannot evaluate it exactly," Source Uncertain. Quantitative results for aerospace engineering problems are influenced by many sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis aims to make a technical contribution to decision-making through the quantification of uncertainties in the relevant variables as well as through the propagation of these uncertainties up to the result. Uncertainty can be thought of as a measure of the 'goodness' of a result and is typically represented as statistical dispersion. This presentation will explain common measures of centrality and dispersion; and-with examples-will provide guidelines for how they may be estimated to ensure effective technical contributions to decision-making.

Britton, Paul T.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Progressive Failure And Life Prediction of Ceramic and Textile Composites

An engineering approach to predict the fatigue life and progressive failure of multilayered composite and textile laminates is presented. Analytical models which account for matrix cracking, statistical fiber failures and nonlinear stress-strain behavior have been developed for both composites and textiles. The analysis method is based on a combined micromechanics, fracture mechanics and failure statistics analysis. Experimentally derived empirical coefficients are used to account for the interface of fiber and matrix, fiber strength, and fiber-matrix stiffness reductions. Similar approaches were applied to textiles using Repeating Unit Cells. In composite fatigue analysis, Walker's equation is applied for matrix fatigue cracking and Heywood's formulation is used for fiber strength fatigue degradation. The analysis has been compared with experiment with good agreement. Comparisons were made with Graphite-Epoxy, C/SiC and Nicalon/CAS composite materials. For textile materials, comparisons were made with triaxial braided and plain weave materials under biaxial or uniaxial tension. Fatigue predictions were compared with test data obtained from plain weave C/SiC materials tested at AS&M. Computer codes were developed to perform the analysis. Composite Progressive Failure Analysis for Laminates is contained in the code CPFail. Micromechanics Analysis for Textile Composites is contained in the code MicroTex. Both codes were adapted to run as subroutines for the finite element code ABAQUS and CPFail-ABAQUS and MicroTex-ABAQUS. Graphic user interface (GUI) was developed to connect CPFail and MicroTex with ABAQUS.

Xue, David Y.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk Assessment of EIC Central Detector (ePIC) Solenoid Magnet (MARCO)

As part of the BNL-JLab-CEA Electron Ion Collider (EIC) collaboration, the design of a 2 T, 2.8 m bore diameter, 3.8 m long conduction cooled superconducting detector magnet design is completed. Such magnet will be employed at the interaction region of ePIC for physics experiment. The magnet is a passive shielded solenoidal magnet system consisting of 3 coils wound with specially designed conductor using NbTi Rutherford type cable in copper stabilized channel. This paper describes the risk analysis as the part of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that was carried out as a team to identify their various failure modes and risks associated with the magnets system. In conclusion, this FMEA is intended to become the content of the designed document as an integral part of the engineering assessment and the statement of work for the potential vendors towards design and built.

Ghoshal, Probir K. [Thomas Jefferson National Acce↗
NASA NTRS1994

Test and analysis of a stitched RFI graphite-epoxy panel with a fuel access door

A stitched RFI graphite-epoxy panel with a fuel access door was analyzed using a finite element analysis and loaded to failure in compression. The panel was initially 56-inches long and 36.75-inches wide and the oval access door was 18-inches long and 15-inches wide. The panel was impact damaged with impact energy of 100 ft-lb prior to compressive loading; however, no impact damage was detectable visually or by A-scan. The panel carried a failure load of 695,000 Ib and global failure strain of .00494 in/in. Analysis indicated the panel would fail due to collapse at a load of 688,100 Ib. The test data indicate that the maximum strain in a region near the access door was .0096 in/in and analysis indicates a local surface strain of .010 in/in at the panel's failure load. The panel did not fail through the impact damage, but instead failed through bolt holes for attachment of the access door in a region of high strain.

Jegley, Dawn C.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the landing/deceleration (LDG/DEC) subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing/Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware. The IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 124 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which caused differences in 51 CIL items.

Odonnell, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the elevon actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware. The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 17 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA FMEA/CIL, which consisted of 23 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.

Saxon, H.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Stress Analysis of B-52B and B-52H Air-Launching Systems Failure-Critical Structural Components

The operational life analysis of any airborne failure-critical structural component requires the stress-load equation, which relates the applied load to the maximum tangential tensile stress at the critical stress point. The failure-critical structural components identified are the B-52B Pegasus pylon adapter shackles, B-52B Pegasus pylon hooks, B-52H airplane pylon hooks, B-52H airplane front fittings, B-52H airplane rear pylon fitting, and the B-52H airplane pylon lower sway brace. Finite-element stress analysis was performed on the said structural components, and the critical stress point was located and the stress-load equation was established for each failure-critical structural component. The ultimate load, yield load, and proof load needed for operational life analysis were established for each failure-critical structural component.

Ko, William L.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Ground test experience with large composite structures for commercial transports

The initial ground test of each component resulted in structural failure at less than ultimate design loads. While such failures represent major program delays, the investigation and analysis of each failure revealed significant lessons for effective utilization of composites in primary structure. Foremost among these are secondary loads that produce through-the-thickness forces which may lead to serious weaknesses in an otherwise sound structural design. The sources, magnitude, and effects of secondary loads need to be thoroughly understood and accounted for by the designers of composite primary aircraft structures.

Bohon, H. L.↗