Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Lessons Learned”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 955 records · Page 53
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Design and Development of the Blackbird: Challenges and Lessons Learned

The Lockheed Blackbirds hold a unique place in the development of aeronautics. In their day, the A-12, YF-12, M-21, D-21, and SR-71 variants outperformed all other jet airplanes in terms of altitude and speed. Now retired, they remain the only production aircraft capable of sustained Mach 3 cruise and operational altitudes above 80,000 feet. In this paper the author describes the design evolution of the Blackbird from Lockheed's early Archangel studies for the Central Intelligence Agency through Senior Crown, production of the Air Force's SR-71. He describes the construction and materials challenges faced by Lockheed, the Blackbird's performance characteristics and capabilities, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's role in using the aircraft as a flying laboratory to collect data on materials, structures, loads, heating, aerodynamics, and performance for high-speed aircraft.

Merlin, Peter W.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Lessons Learned from Numerical Simulations of the F-16XL Aircraft at Flight Conditions

Nine groups participating in the Cranked Arrow Wing Aerodynamics Project International (CAWAPI) project have contributed steady and unsteady viscous simulations of a full-scale, semi-span model of the F-16XL aircraft. Three different categories of flight Reynolds/Mach number combinations were computed and compared with flight-test measurements for the purpose of code validation and improved understanding of the flight physics. Steady-state simulations are done with several turbulence models of different complexity with no topology information required and which overcome Boussinesq-assumption problems in vortical flows. Detached-eddy simulation (DES) and its successor delayed detached-eddy simulation (DDES) have been used to compute the time accurate flow development. Common structured and unstructured grids as well as individually-adapted unstructured grids were used. Although discrepancies are observed in the comparisons, overall reasonable agreement is demonstrated for surface pressure distribution, local skin friction and boundary velocity profiles at subsonic speeds. The physical modeling, steady or unsteady, and the grid resolution both contribute to the discrepancies observed in the comparisons with flight data, but at this time it cannot be determined how much each part contributes to the whole. Overall it can be said that the technology readiness of CFD-simulation technology for the study of vehicle performance has matured since 2001 such that it can be used today with a reasonable level of confidence for complex configurations.

Rizzi, Arthur↗
NASA NTRS2005

Optical Design and Engineering: Lessons Learned

This paper contains some recommendations for the optics curricula that seek to serve students intent on a career in optical engineering, as well as suggestions for the young professional embarking on such a career. It also illustrates the suggestions with some examples of actual optical systems.

optics education↗
NASA NTRS2009

Employing Earned Value Management in Government Research and Design - Lessons Learned from the Trenches

To effectively manage a project, the project manager must have a plan, understand the current conditions, and be able to take action to correct the course when challenges arise. Research and design projects face technical, schedule, and budget challenges that make it difficult to utilize project management tools developed for projects based on previously demonstrated technologies. Projects developing new technologies by their inherent nature are trying something new and thus have little to no data to support estimates for schedule and cost, let alone the technical outcome. Projects with a vision for the outcome but little confidence in the exact tasks to accomplish in order to achieve the vision incur cost and schedule penalties when conceptual solutions require unexpected iterations or even a reinvention of the plan. This presentation will share the project management methodology and tools developed through trial and error for a NASA research and design project combining industry, academia, and NASA inhouse work in which Earned Value Management principles were employed but adapted for the reality of the government financial system and the reality of challenging technology development. The priorities of the presented methodology are flexibility, accountability, and simplicity to give the manager tools to help deliver to the customer while not using up valuable time and resources on extensive planning and analysis. This presentation will share the methodology, tools, and work through failed and successful examples from the three years of process evolution.

Simon, Tom↗
NASA NTRS2009

Results and Lessons Learned from Performance Testing of Humans in Spacesuits in Simulated Reduced Gravity

NASA's Constellation Program has plans to return to the Moon within the next 10 years. Although reaching the Moon during the Apollo Program was a remarkable human engineering achievement, fewer than 20 extravehicular activities (EVAs) were performed. Current projections indicate that the next lunar exploration program will require thousands of EVAs, which will require spacesuits that are better optimized for human performance. Limited mobility and dexterity, and the position of the center of gravity (CG) are a few of many features of the Apollo suit that required significant crew compensation to accomplish the objectives. Development of a new EVA suit system will ideally result in performance close to or better than that in shirtsleeves at 1 G, i.e., in "a suit that is a pleasure to work in, one that you would want to go out and explore in on your day off." Unlike the Shuttle program, in which only a fraction of the crew perform EVA, the Constellation program will require that all crewmembers be able to perform EVA. As a result, suits must be built to accommodate and optimize performance for a larger range of crew anthropometry, strength, and endurance. To address these concerns, NASA has begun a series of tests to better understand the factors affecting human performance and how to utilize various lunar gravity simulation environments available for testing.

Chappell, Steven P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Results and Lessons Learned from Performance Testing of Humans in Spacesuits in Simulated Reduced Gravity

The Apollo lunar EVA experience revealed challenges with suit stability and control-likely a combination of mass, mobility, and center of gravity (CG) factors. The EVA Physiology, Systems and Performence (EPSP) Project is systematically working with other NASA projects, labs, and facilities to lead a series of studies to understand the role of suit mass, weight, CG, and other parameters on astronaut performance in partial gravity environments.

Chappell, Steven P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA's Earth Science Data Systems - Lessons Learned and Future Directions

In order to meet the increasing demand for Earth Science data, NASA has significantly improved the Earth Science Data Systems over the last two decades. This improvement is reviewed in this slide presentation. Many Earth Science disciplines have been able to access the data that is held in the Earth Observing System (EOS) Data and Information System (EOSDIS) at the Distributed Active Archive Centers (DAACs) that forms the core of the data system.

Ramapriyan, Hampapuram K.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air Insulation Redesign Lessons Learned

The Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air Insulation redesign was required to prevent the reoccurance of the STS-111 High Pressure Speed Sensor In-Flight Anomaly. The STS-111 In-Flight Anomaly Failure Investigation Team's initial redesign of the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Pump End Ball Bearing Liquid Air Insulation failed the certification test by producing Liquid Air. The certification test failure indicated not only the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Liquid Air Insulation, but all other Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air Insulation. This paper will document the original Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air STS-111 In-Flight Anomaly investigation, the heritage Space Shuttle Main Engine Insulation certification testing faults, the techniques and instrumentation used to accurately test the Liquid Air Insulation systems on the Stennis Space Center SSME test stand, the analysis techniques used to identify the Liquid Air Insulation problem areas and the analytical verification of the redesign before entering certification testing, Trade study down selected to three potential design solutions, the results of the development testing which down selected the final Liquid Air Redesign are also documented within this paper.

Darrell Gaddy↗
NASA NTRS2010

JANNAF Lessons Learned Panel Discussion

The difference between the AS-510 observed and predicted separation distance is attributed to a greater F-1 engine "tail off" impulse than that used in the separation distance prediction. . The F-1 thrust decay was normal and not appreciably different from previous (AS-505 through 509) flights. . Analysis indicates that with an S-IC stage having only four retro motors, failure of one retro motor to ignite would result in marginal separation distances and, in the 3-sigma case, re-contact of the two stages. . S-IC-11 and subsequent flight stages were equipped with eight retro motors rather than the planned four.

Richards, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2010

JANNAF Lessons Learned Panel: Selected Saturn V History

Pogo occurs when the natural frequency of a propellant feed line comes close to a readily excited rocket longitudinal structural vibration natural frequency. Maximum Pogo response corresponds to close tuning of the structural and hydraulic frequencies. On Saturn V, accelerations up to 17 g's (Zero To Peak) at the Launch Vehicle/Payload Interface and up to 34 g's at an Engine have been observed. Nicknamed Pogo because it causes the Rocket to stretch and compress like a Pogo stick. First recognized with the Titan II in 1962, Pogo remains a prime consideration in design of launch vehicles today

Urquhart, Skip↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Program Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) Success Legacy - Major Accomplishments and Lessons Learned Detail Historical Timeline Analysis

This presentation focuses on the Space Shuttle Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) and the people who developed and maintained this system. One theme is to provide quantitative data on software quality and reliability over a 30 year period. Consistent data relates to code break discrepancies. Requirements were supplied from external sources. Requirement inspections and measurements not implemented until later, beginning in 1985. Second theme is to focus on the people and organization of PASS. Many individuals have supported the PASS project over the entire period while transitioning from company to company and contract to contract. Major events and transitions have impacted morale (both positively and negatively) across the life of the project.

Orr, James K.↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Gravity of LBNP Exercise: Lessons Learned from Identical Twins in Bed for 30 Days

Microgravity leads to cardiovascular deconditioning in humans, which is manifested by post-flight reduction of orthostatic tolerance and upright exercise capacity. During upright posture on Earth, blood pressures are greater in the feet than at heart or head levels due to gravity's effects on columns of blood in the body. During exposure to Microgravity, all gravitational blood pressures disappear. Presently, there is no exercise hardware available for space flight to provide gravitational blood pressures to tissues of the lower body. We hypothesized that 40 minutes of supine treadmill running per day in a LBNP chamber at 1.0 to 1.2 body weight (approximately 50 - 60 mm Hg LBNP) with a 5 min resting, nonexercise LBNP exposure at 50 mm Hg after the exercise session will maintain aerobic fitness orthostatic tolerance, and selected parameters of musculoskeletal function during 30 days of bed rest (simulated microgravity). This paper is an interim report of some of our findings on 16 subjects.

Hargens, Alan R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Solar Dynamics Observatory Lessons Learned

Mission is to study how solar activity is created and how space weather results from that activity. Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA): High Resolution Images of 10 wavelengths every 10 seconds. Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE): Measure Sun's brightness in EUV. Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager (HMI): Measures Doppler shift to study waves of the Sun. Launched February 11, 2010.

Rivera, Rachel↗
NASA NTRS2010

Implementation and Qualifications Lessons Learned for Space Flight Photonic Components

This slide presentation reviews the process for implementation and qualification of space flight photonic components. It discusses the causes for most common anomalies for the space flight components, design compatibility, a specific failure analysis of optical fiber that occurred in a cable in 1999-2000, and another ExPCA connector anomaly involving pins that broke off. It reviews issues around material selection, quality processes and documentation, and current projects that the Photonics group is involved in. The importance of good documentation is stressed.

Ott, Melanie N.↗
NASA NTRS2010

International Space Station Common Cabin Air Assembly Condensing Heat Exchanger Hydrophilic Coating Failures and Lessons Learned

The ability to control the temperature and humidity of an environment or habitat is critical for human survival. These factors are important to maintaining human health and comfort, as well as maintaining mechanical and electrical equipment in good working order to support the human and to accomplish mission objectives. The temperature and humidity of the International Space Station (ISS) United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) cabin air is controlled by the Common Cabin Air Assembly (CCAA). The CCAA consists of a fan, a condensing heat exchanger (CHX), an air/water separator, temperature and liquid sensors, and electrical controlling hardware and software. The CHX is the primary component responsible for control of temperature and humidity. The CCAA CHX contains a chemical coating that was developed to be hydrophilic and thus attract water from the humid influent air. This attraction forms the basis for water removal and therefore cabin humidity control. However, there have been several instances of CHX coatings becoming hydrophobic and repelling water. When this behavior is observed in an operational CHX, the unit s ability to remove moisture from the air is compromised and the result is liquid water carryover into downstream ducting and systems. This water carryover can have detrimental effects on the cabin atmosphere quality and on the health of downstream hardware. If the water carryover is severe and widespread, this behavior can result in an inability to maintain humidity levels in the USOS. This paper will describe the operation of the five CCAAs within in the USOS, the potential causes of the hydrophobic condition, and the impacts of the resulting water carryover to downstream systems. It will describe the history of this behavior and the actual observed impacts to the ISS USOS. Information on mitigation steps to protect the health of future CHX hydrophilic coatings and potential remediation techniques will also be discussed.

Balistreri, Steven F.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Space Missions

Use of heritage and new technology is necessary/enabling to implementing small, low cost missions, yet overruns decrease the ability to sustain future mission flight rates The majority of the cost growth drivers seen in the D&NF study were embedded early during formulation phase and later realized during the development and I&T phases Cost drivers can be avoided or significantly decreased by project management and SE emphasis on early identification of risks and realistic analyses SE processes that emphasize an assessment of technology within the mission system to identify technical issues in the design or operational use of the technology. Realistic assessment of new and heritage spacecraft technology assumptions , identification of risks and mitigation strategies. Realistic estimates of effort required to inherit existing or qualify new technology, identification of risks to estimates and develop mitigation strategies. Allocation of project reserves for risk-based mitigation strategies of each individual area of heritage or new technology. Careful tailoring of inheritance processes to ensure due diligence.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design Process: Evolution and Lessons Learned

The Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design team is responsible for defining a launch to orbit trajectory profile that satisfies all programmatic mission objectives and defines the ground and onboard reconfiguration requirements for this high-speed and demanding flight phase. This design, verification and reconfiguration process ensures that all applicable mission scenarios are enveloped within integrated vehicle and spacecraft certification constraints and criteria, and includes the design of the nominal ascent profile and trajectory profiles for both uphill and ground-to-ground aborts. The team also develops a wide array of associated training, avionics flight software verification, onboard crew and operations facility products. These key ground and onboard products provide the ultimate users and operators the necessary insight and situational awareness for trajectory dynamics, performance and event sequences, abort mode boundaries and moding, flight performance and impact predictions for launch vehicle stages for use in range safety, and flight software performance. These products also provide the necessary insight to or reconfiguration of communications and tracking systems, launch collision avoidance requirements, and day of launch crew targeting and onboard guidance, navigation and flight control updates that incorporate the final vehicle configuration and environment conditions for the mission. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, ascent trajectory design and mission planning has evolved in order to improve program flexibility and reduce cost, while maintaining outstanding data quality. Along the way, the team has implemented innovative solutions and technologies in order to overcome significant challenges. A number of these solutions may have applicability to future human spaceflight programs.

Picka, Bret A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Operational Lessons Learned from NASA Analog Missions

National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) efforts in human space flight are currently focused on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs, with efforts beginning on the future exploration opportunities. Both the Space Shuttle and ISS programs are important to the development of a capability for human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The ISS provides extensive research capabilities to determine how the human body reacts to long duration stays in space. Also, the ISS and Shuttle can serve as a limited testbed for equipment or entire systems that may be used on missions to the Moon, Mars, or to a near-Earth asteroid. It has been nearly 35 years since the Apollo astronauts visited the Moon. Future space explorers will have to re-learn how to work and live on planetary surfaces, and how to do that for extended periods of time. Exploration crews will perform a wide assortment of scientific tasks, including material sampling and emplacement of automated instruments. Surface mission operations include the activities of the crew living and working, mission support from the Earth, and the operation of robotic and other remotely commanded equipment on the surface and in planetary orbit. Other surface activities will include the following: exploring areas surrounding a habitat; using rovers to collect rock and soil samples; setting up experiments on the surface to monitor the radiation environment and any seismic or thermal activity; and conducting scientific analyses and experiments inside a habitat laboratory. Of course, the astronauts will also have to spend some of their surface time "doing chores" and maintaining their habitat and other systems. In preparation for future planetary exploration, NASA must design the answers to many operational questions. What will the astronauts do on the surface? How will they accomplish this? What tools will they require for their tasks? How will robots and astronauts work together? What vehicle and system capabilities are required to support the activities? How will the crew and the Earth-based mission control team interact? During the initial phases of manned planetary exploration, one challenge in particular is virtually the same as during the Apollo program: How can scientific return be maximized during a relatively short surface mission? Today, NASA is investigating solutions to these challenges by conducting analog missions. These Earth-based missions possess characteristics that are analogous to missions on the Moon or Mars. These missions are excellent for testing operational concepts, and the design, configuration, and functionality of spacesuits, robots, rovers, and habitats. Analog mission crews test specific techniques and procedures for surface field geology, biological sample collection, and planetary protection. The process of actually working an analog mission reveals a myriad of small details, which either contribute to or impede efficient operations, many of which would never have been thought about otherwise. It also helps to define the suite of tools, containers, and other small equipment that surface explorers will use. This paper focuses on how analog missions have addressed selected operational considerations for future planetary missions.

Arnold, Larissa S.↗