Doing development right: lessons learned from the development of the Cassini Saturn Mission Operations System
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
development↗
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “lessons learned”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Distributed ground systems for a large multi-instrument space mission: lessons learned from the Cassini Huygens Program
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Cassini↗
Thermal hardware lessons learned & preliminary system level test results for the Mars Exploration Rover
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
system thermal test↗
Lessons learned in design knowledge capture (DKC)
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
knowledge capture↗
Distributed operations as applied in a large multi-instrument space mission: lessons learned from the Cassini-Huygens Program
Launched in 1997, the Cassini-Huygens Mission sent the largest interplanetary spacecraft ever built in the service of science. Carrying a suite of 12 scientific instruments and an atmospheric entry probe, this complex spacecraft to explore the Saturn system may not have gotten off the ground without undergoing significant design changes and cost reductions.
distributed↗
Leadership Challenges in ISS Operations: Lessons Learned from Junior and Senior Mission Control Personnel
The International Space Station (ISS) is operated by a multi-national, multi-organizational team that is dispersed across multiple locations, time zones, and work schedules. At NASA, both junior and senior mission control personnel have had to find ways to address the leadership challenges inherent in such work, but neither have had systematic training in how to do so. The goals of this study were to examine the major leadership challenges faced by ISS mission control personnel and to highlight the approaches that they have found most effective to surmount them. We pay particular attention to the approaches successfully employed by the senior personnel and to the training needs identified by the junior personnel. We also evaluate the extent to which responses are consistent across the junior and senior samples. Further, we compare the issues identified by our interview survey to those identified by a standardized questionnaire survey of mission control personnel and a contrasting group of space station crewmembers. We studied a sample of 14 senior ISS flight controllers and a contrasting sample of 12 more junior ISS controllers. Data were collected using a semi-structured qualitative interview and content analyzed using an iterative process with multiple coders and consensus meetings to resolve discrepancies. To further explore the meaning of the interview findings, we also conducted new analyses of data from a previous questionnaire study of 13 American astronauts, 17 Russian cosmonauts, and 150 U.S. and 36 Russian mission control personnel supporting the ISS or Mir space stations. The interview data showed that the survey respondents had substantial consensus on several leadership challenges and on key strategies for dealing with them, and they offered a wide range of specific tactics for implementing these strategies. Interview data from the junior respondents will be presented for the first time at the meeting. The questionnaire data showed that the US mission control sample reported a level of support from their management that compared favorably to national norms. American mission control personnel and Russian crewmembers reported higher supervisor support than American crewmembers and Russian mission control personnel. We will present the specific issues underlying these findings and compare and contrast the results from the two datasets. Although specific to space station personnel, our results are consistent with recent management, cultural, and aerospace research. We aim to use our results to improve training for current and future mission control personnel.
Clement, James L.↗
The Apollo Experience Lessons Learned for Constellation Lunar Dust Management
Lunar dust will present significant challenges to NASA's Lunar Exploration Missions. The challenges can be overcome by using best practices in system engineering design. For successful lunar surface missions, all systems that come into contact with lunar dust must consider the effects throughout the entire design process. Interfaces between all these systems with other systems also must be considered. Incorporating dust management into Concept of Operations and Requirements development are the best place to begin to mitigate the risks presented by lunar dust. However, that is only the beginning. To be successful, every person who works on NASA's Constellation lunar missions must be mindful of this problem. Success will also require fiscal responsibility. NASA must learn from Apollo the root cause of problems caused by dust, and then find the most cost-effective solutions to address each challenge. This will require a combination of common sense existing technologies and promising, innovative technical solutions
Wagner, Sandra↗
Space Flight Requirements for Fiber Optic Components: Qualification Testing and Lessons Learned
This viewgraph presentation reviews the qualification testing requirements for Fiber Optic Components used during space flight. Since most components for space flight fiber optic components are now commercial of the shelf (COTS) products, and the changes at Goddard Space Flight Center, such as short term projects, and low budgets and other changes, have made full qualification of Fiber Optic Components not only too expensive also impossible. This presentation reviews the environmental parameters, the testing and or testing requirements of some optical components on board some NASA satellites.
Ott, Melanie N.↗
The X-43A Flight Research Program: Lessons Learned on the Road to Mach 10
During an aerospace engineer's undergraduate studies, he or she will attend classes in aerodynamics, thermodynamics, structures, stability and control, dynamics, design, propulsion, and computer science, along with the related courses in mathematics, physics, statistics, and chemistry required to understand the material. Upon graduation, the new engineer will have acquired a basic knowledge of how to build an aerospace vehicle. What only comes through experience, however, is the understanding of the inevitable imperfect process through which an aerospace vehicle is built. This is the adventure of turning a basic concept into functional hardware. Engineers working on a project must often deal with ambiguous situations. They are routinely asked by management to provide risk assessments of a project, yet even after careful analysis uncertainties remain. The project must be accomplished within finite limits of time and money. The question an engineer answers is whether the solution to potential problem is worth the cost and schedule delay, or if the solution might actually be worse than the problem it is meant to solve. Review protocols are established to ensure that an unknown has not been overlooked. But these cannot protect against an unknown unknown. Examples of these situations can be found in the history of the X-43A Hyper-X (Hypersonic Experiment) program. In this NASA project, a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engine was flight tested on a subscale vehicle. The X-43A Hyper-X Research Vehicle (HXRV) was launched from a B-52B mothership, then boosted to the test speed by a modified Pegasus rocket first stage, called the Hyper-X Launch Vehicle (HXLV). Once at the proper speed and altitude, the X-43A separated from the booster, stabilized itself, and then the engine test began. Although wind-tunnel scramjet engine tests had begun in the late 1950s, before the Hyper-X program there had never been an actual in-flight test of such an engine integrated with an appropriate airframe. Thus, while the scramjet had successfully operated in the artificial airflow of wind tunnels, the concept had yet to be proven in real air. These conditions meant changes in density and temperature, as well as changes in angle of attack and sideslip of a free-flying vehicle. A wind tunnel is limited in its ability to simulate these subtle factures, which have a major impact on almost any vehicle, but especially that of a scramjet's performance. The Hyper-X project was to provide a real-world benchmark of the ground test data. The full scale X-43A engine would be operated in the wind tunnel, and then flown, and the data from its operation would then be compared with projections. If these matched, the wind tunnel data would be considered a reliable design tool for future scramjet. If there were significant differences, the reasons for these would have to be identified. Until such information was available, scramjets would lack the technological maturity to be considered for future space launch or high-speed atmospheric flight vehicles.
Peebles, Curtis↗
Using Life-Cycle Human Factors Engineering to Avoid $2.4 Million in Costs: Lessons Learned from NASA's Requirements Verification Process for Space Payloads
The Human Factors Implementation Team (HFIT) process has been used to verify human factors requirements for NASA International Space Station (ISS) payloads since 2003, resulting in $2.4 million in avoided costs. This cost benefit has been realized by greatly reducing the need to process time-consuming formal waivers (exceptions) for individual requirements violations. The HFIT team, which includes astronauts and their technical staff, acts as the single source for human factors requirements integration of payloads. HFIT has the authority to provide inputs during early design phases, thus eliminating many potential requirements violations in a cost-effective manner. In those instances where it is not economically or technically feasible to meet the precise metric of a given requirement, HFIT can work with the payload engineers to develop common sense solutions and formally document that the resulting payload design does not materially affect the astronaut s ability to operate and interact with the payload. The HFIT process is fully ISO 9000 compliant and works concurrently with NASA s formal systems engineering work flow. Due to its success with payloads, the HFIT process is being adapted and extended to ISS systems hardware. Key aspects of this process are also being considered for NASA's Space Shuttle replacement, the Crew Exploration Vehicle.
Carr, Daniel↗
Cassini Camera Contamination Anomaly: Experiences and Lessons Learned
We discuss the contamination 'Haze' anomaly for the Cassini Narrow Angle Camera (NAC), one of two optical telescopes that comprise the Imaging Science Subsystem (ISS). Cassini is a Saturn Orbiter with a 4-year nominal mission. The incident occurred in 2001, five months after Jupiter encounter during the Cruise phase and ironically at the resumption of planned maintenance decontamination cycles. The degraded optical performance was first identified by the Instrument Operations Team with the first ISS Saturn imaging six weeks later. A distinct haze of varying size from image to image marred the images of Saturn. A photometric star calibration of the Pleiades, 4 days after the incident, showed stars with halos. Analysis showed that while the halo's intensity was only 1 - 2% of the intensity of the central peak of a star, the halo contained 30 - 70% of its integrated flux. This condition would impact science return. In a review of our experiences, we examine the contamination control plan, discuss the analysis of the limited data available and describe the one-year campaign to remove the haze from the camera. After several long conservative heating activities and interim analysis of their results, the contamination problem as measured by the camera's point spread function was essentially back to preanomaly size and at a point where there would be more risk to continue. We stress the importance of the flexibility of operations and instrument design, the need to do early infight instrument calibration and continual monitoring of instrument performance.
Cassini↗
Lessons Learned from the Aquarius Radiometer Engineering Model
The Aquarius instrument is a combination microwave radiometer and scatterometer operating in the L-band for the measurement of sea surface salinity (SSS) over the open-ocean. "The Aquarius science goals are to observe and model the processes that relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the global cycling of water and to understand how these variations influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring salinity globally and synoptically every month for 3 years, Aquarius will provide an unprecedented new view of the ocean's role in climate." (http://aquarius.asfc.nasa.gov on Jan. 4, 2007). To launch in 2009, Aquarius will provide 8-day global coverage and monthly-averaged salinity maps at approx.120-km spatial resolution. Because the microwave emissivity of the ocean surface is weakly dependent upon salinity, the Aquarius radiometer remain sufficiently stable to provide accurate salinity measurements. An engineering model (EM) of one radiometer receiver was developed and tested for functionality and performance at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. It was tested for long-term stability starting July 27,2006. Two discrepancies where found at the start of testing and a four-month correction process ensued. This paper covers the testing and debugging of the EM radiometer through resolution of the problems. The radiometer is required to have calibration stability of less than or equal to 0.15 K over 7 days. The radiometer is in a three-beam push-broom configuration with each beam being an independent three-state Dicke radiometer (antenna, reference load, and additive noise). Internal noise diodes and reference loads provide periodic and rapid calibration of the receiver. Front-end loss contributions must be corrected as the lossy components are outside the calibration loop. A key design feature for obtaining stability is active thermal control of the front-end lossy components and the RF receiver. The thermal stability is predicted to be about 0.1 C over an orbit and no more than 1 C over a year. The radiometric stability requirement is 0.13 K rms 1 7 days without using temperature corrections. Temperature corrections and post-launch calibration are expected to extend the stability period through the life of the mission.
Piepmeier, Jeffrey↗
Developing a NASA Lead-Free Policy for Electronics - Lessons Learned
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not required by United States or international law to use lead-free (Pb-free) electronic systems but international pressure in the world market is making it increasingly important that NASA have a Pb-free policy. In fact, given the international nature of the electronics market, all organizations need a Pb-free policy. This paper describes the factors which must be taken into account in formulating the policy, the tools to aid in structuring the policy and the unanticipated and difficult challenges encountered. NASA is participating in a number of forums and teams trying to develop effective approaches to controlling Pb-free adoption in high reliability systems. The activities and status of the work being done by these teams will be described. NASA also continues to gather information on metal whiskers, particularly tin based, and some recent examples will be shared. The current lack of a policy is resulting in "surprises" and the need to disposition undesirable conditions on a case-by-case basis. This is inefficient, costly and can result in sub-optimum outcomes.
Sampson, Michael J.↗
Qualification of Technologies and Lessons Learned from Satellite LIDAR and Altimeter Missions
Flight qualified laser transmitters for remote sensing applications from space have progressed significantly over the past decade. More laser-based missions are underway and several are recently launched and on route, under flight build, or being proposed. However, most of the progress made in the solid state laser field has not been solely in the technology front, but more in the design and implementation of existing technologies. Recent events in flight laser performance and delivery have resulted in a more conservative process in the selection of laser-based instruments for space. The result of these efforts will hopefully be an improved rate of success and more flight laser mission awards. An overview of these efforts and some results will be presented as well as current and future work at NASA.
Coyle, Donald B.↗
Helios Prototype Vehicle Mishap: Technical Findings, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned
Instability associated with the Helios Prototype HPO3-2 vehicle was a nonlinear stability and control problem involving complex interactions among the flexible structure, the unsteady aerodynamics, the flight control system, the environmental conditions, and vehicle flight dynamics. Analysis tools and solution techniques were constrained by conventional and segmented linear methodologies that did not provide the proper level of complexity to understand the technology interactions on the vehicle s stability and control characteristics. More advanced, multidisciplinary (structures, aeroelastic, aerodynamics, atmospheric, materials, propulsion, controls, etc) "time-domain" analysis methods appropriate to highly flexible, "morphing" vehicles are required. Ground-test procedures and techniques appropriate to this class of vehicle are needed to validate new analysis methods and predictions
DelFrate, John H.↗
Lessons Learned
This paper is organized around three themes that have interested me over my career: covariance analysis, constrained estimation, and angular momentum. Both analytical and numerical approaches to covariance analysis are discussed. The section on constraints begins with general considerations arising from the nature of the rotation group before moving to Wahba's Problem and quaternion Kalman filters. The discussion of angular momentum includes its use in attitude determination and control as well as in the detection and diagnosis of spacecraft anomalies. Relevant illustrative examples are included.
Markley, F. Landis↗
Proven and Robust Ground Support Systems - GSFC Success and Lessons Learned
Over the past fifteen years, Goddard Space Flight Center has developed several successful science missions in-house: the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP), the Imager for Magnetopause-to-Aurora Global Exploration (IMAGE), the Earth Observing 1 (EO-1) [1], and the Space Technology 5 (ST-5)[2] missions, several Small Explorers, and several balloon missions. Currently in development are the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) [3] and the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)[4]. What is not well known is that these missions have been supported during spacecraft and/or instrument integration and test, flight software development, and mission operations by two in house satellite Telemetry and Command (T & C) Systems, the Integrated Test and Operations System (ITOS) and the Advanced Spacecraft Integration and System Test (ASIST). The advantages of an in-house satellite Telemetry and Command system are primarily in the flexibility of management and maintenance - the developers are considered a part of the mission team, get involved early in the development process of the spacecraft and mission operations-control center, and provide on-site, on-call support that goes beyond Help Desk and simple software fixes. On the other hand, care must be taken to ensure that the system remains generic enough for cost effective re-use from one mission to the next. The software is designed such that many features are user-configurable. Where user-configurable options were impractical, features were designed so as to be easy for the development team to modify. Adding support for a new ground message header, for example, is a one-day effort because of the software framework on which that code rests. This paper will discuss the many features of the Goddard satellite Telemetry and Command systems that have contributed to the success of the missions listed above. These features include flexible user interfaces, distributed parallel commanding and telemetry decommutation, a procedure language, the interfaces and tools needed for a high degree of automation, and instantly accessible archives of spacecraft telemetry. It will discuss some of the problems overcome during development, including secure commanding over networks or the Internet, constellation support for the three satellites that comprise the ST-5 mission, and geographically distributed telemetry end users.
Pfarr, Barbara↗
In-Flight Anomalies and Radiation Performance of NASA Missions - Selected Lessons Learned
This presentation addresses in-flight electronic disturbances and radiation, specifically anomaly resolution. The process for anomaly review takes into account the environment, selected parts and design, existing and/or new radiation test data, risk probability and actions to be taken. Noise spikes and the meaning of upset in a fiber optic link are also discussed.
LaBel, Kenneth A.↗