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NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

Pre-Mission Input Requirements to Enable Successful Sample Collection by a Remote Field/EVA Team

This paper is intended to evaluate the sample collection process with respect to sample characterization and decision making. In some cases, it may be sufficient to know whether a given outcrop or hand sample is the same as or different from previous sampling localities or samples. In other cases, it may be important to have more in-depth characterization of the sample, such as basic composition, mineralogy, and petrology, in order to effectively identify the best sample. Contextual field observations, in situ/handheld analysis, and backroom evaluation may all play a role in understanding field lithologies and their importance for return. For example, whether a rock is a breccia or a clast-laden impact melt may be difficult based on a single sample, but becomes clear as exploration of a field site puts it into context. The FINESSE (Field Investigations to Enable Solar System Science and Exploration) team is a new activity focused on a science and exploration field based research program aimed at generating strategic knowledge in preparation for the human and robotic exploration of the Moon, near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) and Phobos and Deimos. We used the FINESSE field excursion to the West Clearwater Lake Impact structure (WCIS) as an opportunity to test factors related to sampling decisions. In contract to other technology-driven NASA analog studies, The FINESSE WCIS activity is science-focused, and moreover, is sampling-focused, with the explicit intent to return the best samples for geochronology studies in the laboratory. This specific objective effectively reduces the number of variables in the goals of the field test and enables a more controlled investigation of the role of the crewmember in selecting samples. We formulated one hypothesis to test: that providing details regarding the analytical fate of the samples (e.g. geochronology, XRF/XRD, etc.) to the crew prior to their traverse will result in samples that are more likely to meet specific analytical objectives than samples collected in the absence of this premission information. We conducted three tests of this hypothesis. Our investigation was designed to document processes, tools and procedures for crew sampling of planetary targets. This is not meant to be a blind, controlled test of crew efficacy, but rather an effort to recognize the relevant variables that enter into sampling protocol and to develop recommendations for crew and backroom training in future endeavors. Methods: One of the primary FINESSE field deployment objectives was to collect impact melt rocks and impact melt-bearing breccias from a number of locations around the WCIS structure to enable high precision geochronology of the crater to be performed [1]. We conducted three tests at WCIS after two full days of team participation in field site activities, including using remote sensing data and geologic maps, hiking overland to become familiar with the terrain, and examining previously-collected samples from other islands. In addition, the team members shared their projects and techniques with the entire team. We chose our "crew members" as volunteers from the team, all of whom had had moderate training in geologic fieldwork and became familiar with the general field setting. The first two tests were short, focused tests of our hypothesis. Test A was to obtain hydrothermal vugs; Test B was to obtain impact melt and intrusive rock as well as the contact between the two to check for contact metamorphism and age differences. In both cases, the test director had prior knowledge of the site geology and had developed a study-specific objective for sampling prior to deployment. Prior to the field deployment, the crewmember was briefed on the sampling objective and the laboratory techniques that would be used on the samples. At the field sites (Fig. 2), the crewmember was given 30 minutes to survey a small section of outcrop (10-15 m) and acquire a suite of three samples. The crewmember talked through his process and the test director kept track of the timeline in verbal cues to the crewmember. At the conclusion, the team member conducting the scientific study appraised the samples and train of thought. Test C was a 90-minute EVA simulation using two crewmembers working out of line-of-sight in communication with a science backroom. The science objectives were determined by the science backroom team in advance using a Gigapan image of the outcrop (Fig. 1). The science team formulated hypotheses for the outcrop units and created sampling objectives for impact-melt lithologies; the science team turned these into a science plan, which they communicated to the crew in camp prior to crew deployment. As part of the science plan, the science team also discussed their sample needs in depth with the crewmembers, including laboratory methods, objectives, and samples sizes needed. During the deployment, the two crewmembers relayed real-time information to the science backroom by radio with no time delay. Both the crew and science team re-evaluated their hypotheses and science plans in real-time. Discussion: Upon evaluation, we found that the focused tests (Tests A and B) were successful in meeting their scientific objectives. The crewmember used their knowledge of how the samples were to be used in further study (technique, sample size, and scientific need) to focus on the sampling task. The crewmember was comfortable spending minimal time describing and mapping the outcrop. The crewmember used all available time to get a good sample. The larger test was unsuccessful in meeting the sampling objectives. When the crewmembers began describing the lithologies, it was quickly apparent that the lithologies were not as the backroom expected and had communicated to the crew. When the outcrop wasn't as expected, the crew members instinctively switched to field characterization mode, taking significant time to characterize and map the outcrop. One crew member admitted that he "kind of lost track" of the sampling strategy as he focused on the basic outcrop characterization. This is the logical first step in a field geology campaign, that a significant amount of time must be spent by the crew and backroom to understand the outcrop and its significance. Basic field characterization of an outcrop is a focused activity that takes significant time and training [2, 3]. Sampling of representational lithologies can be added to this activity for little cost [4]. However, we have shown that identification of unusual or specific samples for laboratory study also takes significant time and knowledge. We suggest that sampling of this type be considered a separate activity from field characterization, and that crewmembers be trained in sampling needs for different kinds of studies (representative lithologies vs. specialized samples) to acquire a mindset for sampling similar to field mapping. Sampling activities should be given a significant amount of specifically allocated time in scheduling EVA activities; and in the better case, that sampling be done as a second activity to a previously studied outcrop where both crew and backroom are comfortable with its context and characteristics. Our hypothesis posited that crewmember knowledge of how the samples would be used upon return would aid them in choosing relevant samples. Our testing bore this hypothesis out to some extent. We therefore recommend that crewmember training should include exposure to the laboratory techniques and analyses that will be used on the samples to foster this knowledge. There is also the potential for increasing crewmember contextual knowledge real-time in the field through the introduction of in situ geochemical technologies such as field portable XRF. The presence of field portable geochemical technology could enable the astronauts to interrogate the samples for K abundance real-time, ensuring they could collect valuable and dateable samples [5]. Though simulations such as these can teach us a fair bit about decision making processes and timeline building, one EVA participant noted that when he wasn't collecting "real" samples, he wasn't at his best. This effect suggests that higher-fidelity studies involving truly remote participants conducting actual scientific studies merit further attention to capture lessons for application to future crew situations.

sample collection↗

Mode Transitions in Glass Cockpit Aircraft: Results of a Field Study

One consequence of increased levels of automation in complex control systems is the presence of modes. A mode is a particular configuration of a control system that defines how human command inputs are interpreted. In complex systems, modes also often determine a specific allocation of control authority between the human and automated systems. Even in simple static devices (e.g., electronic watches, word processors), the presence of modes has been found to cause problems in either-the acquisition or production of skilled performance. Many of these problems arise due to the fact that the selection of a mode causes device behavior to be mediated by hidden internal state information. For these simple systems, many of these interaction problems can be solved by the design of appropriate feedback to communicate internal state information to the human operator. In complex dynamic systems, however, the design issues associated with modes seem to trancend the problem of merely communicating internal state information via displayed feedback. In complex supervisory control systems (e.g., aircraft, spacecraft, military command and control), a key function of modes is the selection of a particular configuration of control authority between the human operator and automated control systems. One mode may result in full manual control, another may result in a mix of manual and automatic control, while a third may result in full automatic control over the entire system. The human operator selects an appropriate mode as a function of current goals, operating conditions, and operating procedures. Thus, the operator is put in a position of essentially trying to control two coupled dynamic systems: the target system itself, and also a highly complex suite of automation controlling the target system. From a historical perspective, it should probably not come as a surprise that very little information is available to guide the design of mode-oriented control systems. The topic of function allocation (i.e., the proper division of control authority among human and computer) has a long history in human-machine systems research. Although this research has produced some relevant guidelines, a design approach capable of defining appropriate allocations of control function between the human and automation is not yet available. As a result, the function allocation decision itself has been allocated to the operator, to be performed in real-time, in the operation of mode-oriented control systems. A variety of documented aircraft accidents and incidents suggest that the real-time selection and monitoring of control modes is a weak link in the effective operation of complex supervisory control systems. Research in human-machine systems and human-computer interaction has barely scraped the surface of the problem of understanding how operators manage this task.The purpose of this paper is to present the results of a field study which examined how operators manage mode selection in a complex supervisory control system. Data on mode engagements using the Boeing B757/767 auto-flight system were collected during approach and descent into four major airports in the East Coast of the United States. Protocols documenting mode selection, automatic mode changes, pilot actions, quantitative records of flight-path variables, and verbal reports during and after mode engagements were collected by an observer from the jumpseat. Observations were conducted on two typical trips between three airports. Each trip was be replicated 11 times, which yielded a total of 22 trips and 66 legs on which data were collected. All data collected concerned the same flight numbers, and therefore, the same time of day, same type of aircraft, and identical operational environments (e.g., ATC facilities, weather patterns, traffic flow etc.)

Degani, Asaf↗

ACTS Ka-Band Earth Stations: Technology, Performance, and Lessons Learned

The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) Project invested heavily in prototype Ka-band satellite ground terminals to conduct an experiments program with the ACTS satellite. The ACTS experiment's program proposed to validate Ka-band satellite and ground station technology. demonstrate future telecommunication services. demonstrate commercial viability and market acceptability of these new services, evaluate system networking and processing technology, and characterize Ka-band propagation effects, including development of techniques to mitigate signal fading. This paper will present a summary of the fixed ground terminals developed by the NASA Glenn Research Center and its industry partners, emphasizing the technology and performance of the terminals (Part 1) and the lessons learned throughout their six year operation including the inclined orbit phase of operations (Full Report). An overview of the Ka-band technology and components developed for the ACTS ground stations is presented. Next. the performance of the ground station technology and its evolution during the ACTS campaign are discussed to illustrate the technical tradeoffs made during the program and highlight technical advances by industry to support the ACTS experiments program and terminal operations. Finally. lessons learned during development and operation of the user terminals are discussed for consideration of commercial adoption into future Ka-band systems. The fixed ground stations used for experiments by government, academic, and commercial entities used reflector based offset-fed antenna systems ranging in size from 0.35m to 3.4m antenna diameter. Gateway earth stations included two systems, referred to as the NASA Ground Station (NGS) and the Link Evaluation Terminal (LET). The NGS provides tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) network control functions. The LET supports technology verification and high data rate experiments. The ground stations successfully demonstrated many services and applications at Ka-band in three different modes of operation: circuit switched TDMA using the satellite on-board processor, satellite switched SS-TDMA applications using the on-board Microwave Switch Matrix (MSM), and conventional transponder (bent-pipe) operation. Data rates ranged from 4.8 kbps up to 622 Mbps. Experiments included: 1) low rate (4.8- 1 00's kbps) remote data acquisition and control using small earth stations, 2) moderate rate (1-45 Mbps) experiments included full duplex voice and video conferencing and both full duplex and asymmetric data rate protocol and network evaluation using mid-size ground stations, and 3) link characterization experiments and high data rate (155-622 Mbps) terrestrial and satellite interoperability application experiments conducted by a consortium of experimenters using the large transportable ground stations.

Reinhart, Richard C.↗

Testing of Advanced Capabilities to Enable In-time Safety Management and Assurance for Future Flight Operations

In order to refine an initial Concept of Operations, explore Concepts of Use, and expose/validate requirements for future In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS), testing architectures were created, along with a set of capabilities and underlying information exchange protocols. These systems were conceived and developed based on hazards associated with two envisioned urban area flight domains: (1) highly autonomous small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) operating at low altitudes, and (2) highly autonomous air taxis. The initial scope of this development is described in [1]; this report provides an update, focusing on the subsequent developments and test activities. As stated in [1], it is important to note that there are many capabilities already in use by the industry (or soon to be in use) that will play critical roles in future IASMS designs. Those reported here were developed to address a gap in the current state-of-the-art regarding specific hazards/risks, and/or to allow for investigation of the interplay between and across hazard types — particularly regarding how overall safety risk can be reduced or managed effectively. Results of testing and development activities are organized by the operational phase wherein a particular capability would be employed (i.e., preflight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line). Pre-flight: A set of capabilities were developed to help mitigate safety risk prior to flight (e.g., during flight and mission planning). Results of testing summarize (1) validation activities to raise the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and (2) evaluation activities where the capabilities were applied to flight/mission planning procedures and used by operators/pilots. For the latter, flight plans were automatically assessed, and operators/pilots were notified of hazardous flight segments so as to enable adjustment of the flight plan and re-evaluation, and/or to better inform go/no-go decisions. Capabilities addressed hazards associated with power consumption, third-party risk, wind, navigation system performance, radiofrequency interference, and proximity to geo-spatial threats (e.g., buildings, trees, and no-fly zones). In-flight: Flight experiments tested capabilities that detect and respond to hazards encountered during flight. In the first series, safety hazards were monitored and assessed onboard, and system-generated mitigation maneuvers were recorded (but not acted upon by the vehicle). In the second series, mitigation maneuver commands directed the aircraft in response to safety hazards (i.e., auto-mitigation). The sUAS used for testing is described in full, as is the test architecture, which included commercial avionics, research avionics, and onboard software designed to detect, assess, and respond to hazards. The onboard system was designed as a run-time assurance framework, consistent with [2] and supportive of both supervisory and automated modes. The primary functions included: real-time risk assessment (RTRA), auto-pilot monitoring, constraint monitoring, and contingency select/triggering. RTRA performs integrated risk assessment considering data from several hazard-related monitors (e.g., battery, motors, navigation, communications, population density, and loss-of-control). Post-flight/off-line: Data monitored and recorded during flights can enable IASMS capabilities that execute after flights have completed (or “off-line”). These include: (1) the ability to identify anomalies and trends that may only be observable when comparing data spanning a number of similar flights; (2) the ability to update and validate pre-flight and in-flight capabilities and any underlying models to improve their performance; (3) the ability to report anomalies/off-nominals that may indicate design changes or maintenance actions are needed; and (4) the ability for humans involved in operations to report safety-relevant observations to help in understanding the flight data and/or the operational context of a flight. Progress on three such capabilities is summarized; the first investigates anomaly detection given a limited set of flight logs and applies an approach previously used for space operations. The second explores what could be identified using a larger set of flight logs, including from web-based forums where flight logs are posted by sUAS autopilot users. The third creates a new means of collecting information on UAS incidents and accidents via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).

sUAS↗

Intelligent Integrated Health Management for a System of Systems

An intelligent integrated health management system (IIHMS) incorporates major improvements over prior such systems. The particular IIHMS is implemented for any system defined as a hierarchical distributed network of intelligent elements (HDNIE), comprising primarily: (1) an architecture (Figure 1), (2) intelligent elements, (3) a conceptual framework and taxonomy (Figure 2), and (4) and ontology that defines standards and protocols. Some definitions of terms are prerequisite to a further brief description of this innovation: A system-of-systems (SoS) is an engineering system that comprises multiple subsystems (e.g., a system of multiple possibly interacting flow subsystems that include pumps, valves, tanks, ducts, sensors, and the like); 'Intelligent' is used here in the sense of artificial intelligence. An intelligent element may be physical or virtual, it is network enabled, and it is able to manage data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) focused on determining its condition in the context of the entire SoS; As used here, 'health' signifies the functionality and/or structural integrity of an engineering system, subsystem, or process (leading to determination of the health of components); 'Process' can signify either a physical process in the usual sense of the word or an element into which functionally related sensors are grouped; 'Element' can signify a component (e.g., an actuator, a valve), a process, a controller, an actuator, a subsystem, or a system; The term Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) is used to describe a capability that focuses on determining the condition (health) of every element in a complex system (detect anomalies, diagnose causes, prognosis of future anomalies), and provide data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) not just data to control systems for safe and effective operation. A major novel aspect of the present development is the concept of intelligent integration. The purpose of intelligent integration, as defined and implemented in the present IIHMS, is to enable automated analysis of physical phenomena in imitation of human reasoning, including the use of qualitative methods. Intelligent integration is said to occur in a system in which all elements are intelligent and can acquire, maintain, and share knowledge and information. In the HDNIE of the present IIHMS, an SoS is represented as being operationally organized in a hierarchical-distributed format. The elements of the SoS are considered to be intelligent in that they determine their own conditions within an integrated scheme that involves consideration of data, information, knowledge bases, and methods that reside in all elements of the system. The conceptual framework of the HDNIE and the methodologies of implementing it enable the flow of information and knowledge among the elements so as to make possible the determination of the condition of each element. The necessary information and knowledge is made available to each affected element at the desired time, satisfying a need to prevent information overload while providing context-sensitive information at the proper level of detail. Provision of high-quality data is a central goal in designing this or any IIHMS. In pursuit of this goal, functionally related sensors are logically assigned to groups denoted processes. An aggregate of processes is considered to form a system. Alternatively or in addition to what has been said thus far, the HDNIE of this IIHMS can be regarded as consisting of a framework containing object models that encapsulate all elements of the system, their individual and relational knowledge bases, generic methods and procedures based on models of the applicable physics, and communication processes (Figure 2). The framework enables implementation of a paradigm inspired by how expert operators monitor the health of systems with the help of (1) DIaK from various sources, (2) software tools that assist in rapid visualization of the condition of the system, (3) analical software tools that assist in reasoning about the condition, (4) sharing of information via network communication hardware and software, and (5) software tools that aid in making decisions to remedy unacceptable conditions or improve performance.

Smith, Harvey↗