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NASA NTRS2015

Simulation of Liquid Rocket Engine Failure Propagation Using Self-Evolving Scenarios

Traditional probabilistic risk assessment approaches often require failure scenarios to be explicitly defined through event sequences that are then quantified as part of the integrated analysis. This approach becomes difficult when failure propagation paths change as a function of the system operation. Additionally, if the propagation paths represent interactions among even a modest number of components, the scenario count becomes combinatorially intractable. This paper presents an alternate approach for quantifying the probability of failure propagation in such a case. Rather than explicitly defining scenario sequences, simple physical models are created for each of the components. In this way, only the physical states and rules of component interactions must be defined, rather than event sequences for each individual scenario. Initiating failures are introduced into the system, either randomly or as defined by relative likelihood, and the failures cascade through the system via the interaction rules. This process is repeated using Monte Carlo methods and, as a result, the most probable scenarios “self-evolve” in terms of both sequence path and frequency. This approach was applied to failures occurring in the engine compartment of a space launch vehicle with four liquid rocket engines and four high-pressure helium tanks. Each engine was modeled with key components, such as turbomachinery, combustion chamber, propellant lines, and additional support systems. Three test cases were conducted with different high-energy engine failures. End results of interest included an additional engine-out failure and tank burst, which represent the loss-of-mission (LOM) and loss-of-crew (LOC) failure environments, respectively. Observations show that almost every scenario outcome is unique and that many scenarios involve complex chain reactions that are difficult to predict. This validates the usefulness of the modeling approach in assessing the overall risks to the crew during a launch vehicle abort.

Rocket Engine↗

NASA NTRS2019

European Service Module - Structural Test Article (E-STA) Building Block Test Approach and Model Correlation Observations

The Orion European Service Module - Structural Test Article (E-STA) underwent sine vibration testing in 2016 using the Mechanical Vibration Facility (MVF) multi-axis shaker system at NASA Glenn Research Center’s (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Space Power Facility (SPF). The main objective was to verify the structural integrity of the European Service Module (ESM) under sine sweep dynamic qualification vibration testing. A secondary objective was to perform a fixed-base modal survey, while E-STA was still mounted to MVF, in order to achieve a test correlate the finite element model (FEM). To facilitate the E-STA system level correlation effort, a building block test approach was implemented. Modal tests were performed on two major subassemblies, the crew module/launch abort structure (CM/LAS) and the crew module adapter (CMA) mass simulators. These subassembly FEMs were individually correlated and then integrated into the E-STA FEM prior to the start of the E-STA sine vibration test. This paper summarizes the modal testing and model correlation efforts of both of these subassemblies and how the building block approach assisted in the overall correlation of the E-STA FEM. This paper will also cover modeling practices that should be avoided, recommended instrumentation positioning on complex structures, and the importance of the FEM geometrically matching CAD in sufficient detail in order to adequately replicate internal load paths. The goal of this paper is to inform the reader of the hard earned lessons learned and pitfalls to avoid when applying a building block test approach.

Winkel, James P.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Revision of Paschen's Law Relating to the ESD of Aerospace Vehicle Surfaces

The purpose of this work is to develop a form of Paschen's law that takes into account the flow of gas past electrode surfaces. This work was performed under a NASA Science Innovation Fund (SIF) project at the Kennedy Space Center in collaboration with the University of Central Florida. In 2010 the Electrostatics and Surface Physics Laboratory (ESPL) at the Kennedy Space Center performed an electrostatic safety analysis on the flight termination system (FTS) antenna for the Ares I rocket. Paschen's law, derived by Friedrich Paschen in 1889 to relate sparking voltage to gas pressure and electrode separation, does not take into account the effect of flowing gas between the electrodes. The safety of the FTS housing to triboelectric charging was shown only after extensive laboratory testing. Potential benefits are of a form of Paschen's law that considers gas velocity. This work is applicable to current and planned rockets and aerospace vehicles and could lead to possible relaxation of electrostatic launch criteria. Launch aborts can cost up to about a million US dollars depending on the vehicle. [ElectroStatic Discharge (ESD)]

Paschen↗

NASA NTRS2014

MARGInS: Model-Based Analysis of Realizable Goals in Systems

Under NASAs Constellation effort, the Exploration Technology Development Program funded research toward a system validation capability that applied machine learning and test-case generation techniques to the analysis of black-box system behavior. The behavior analysis capability scaled to spaces of hundreds of input parameters and tens of thousands of test cases. Aerospace systems at the vehicle level, especially those systems which contain some level of autonomy, are best described by hybrid and non-linear mathematics. Even simplified models of such systems need parameter dimensionalities in the hundreds or thousands of parameters in order to capture sufficient fidelity. The System Safety Assessments (such as those described in the SAE ARP 4761A Safety Assessment Process guidelines) for these systems are prone to errorinteractions between the vehicles subsystems are complex, and can display emergent behaviors. NASA captured this new analysis in the Model-based Analysis of Realizable Goals in Systems (MARGInS) tool and applied it to the Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) simulation as part of the independent validation and verification cycle before the PA-1 flight test in May of 2010. MARGInS evaluated the adherence of the high-fidelity simulation to its requirements, and deter- mined the margins to failure from the expected nominal input conditions. Following the PA-1 test, the capabilities within the MARGInS framework have been extended with sophisticated statistical and white-box test case generation techniques and applied to other NASA missions. The frame- work now includes a critical factors analysis that was applied to NASAs Orion simulation and design. NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) leveraged the existing MARGInS framework for work on aviation safety for civil transport vehicles and for research on autonomy issues. The NASA ARMD effort created a time series output prediction capability that has been used to characterize trajectories for a plane with an adaptive control system, and a safety boundary detection capability that has been applied to an air traffic control concept of operation for the Federal Aviation Administration. The statistical and machine- learning based techniques within MARGInS have been successfully combined with concolic execution to improve the coverage of a critical unit by driving system-level inputs. The use case driving the concolic execution and MARGInS integration was inspired by the Air France 447 disaster in which the loss of a critical functionality (the airspeed calculation from the pitot tubes) led to loss of the entire plane with the people aboard. To illustrate capabilities and limitations, we will highlight the analyses for the applications listed above. We will then discuss the future plans for MARGInS and its interfaces with other tools.

Validation↗

NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Evolution and Impact of Saturn V on Space Launch System from a Guidance, Navigation, and Mission Analysis Perspective

The Saturn V launch vehicle represented a jump in capability for heavy lift launch vehicles, enabling the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous approach to planetary exploration employed by the Apollo program 50 years ago. Following Apollo, and the development of the Space Transportation System, the NASA space exploration program shifted focus from lunar exploration to long-term, sustained, re-usable access to Low Earth Orbit. With the recent focus of NASA on the Artemis program and continued exploration of cislunar space as a precursor to Martian exploration, the shift has swung back to heavy lift capability. To meet this need, NASA has developed the Space Launch System. While the vehicle is a new design, it is heavily influenced by the engineering solutions and approach used on the Saturn V while taking advantage of the state of the art of launch vehicle design. The approach to abort, for example, shares many familiarities with the triggers and concept of operations used on Saturn V. Analysis approaches to dispersed trajectory performance are also very similar, but advances in computing technology have enabled a much more expanded set of inputs that can be modelled and assessed in a rapid manner. Additionally, guided flight algorithms share similar first principles but have expanded to include day of launch wind information. Trajectory optimization has also advanced significantly due to the availability of computing resources, but similar maneuvers and profiles are flown across both vehicles. Also, while the approach of onboard inertial navigation has been maintained between the two programs, the shift from platform to strapdown systems enables reduced complexity in the system design while maintaining required performance. As described, the Space Launch System is the evolution of NASA launch vehicle designs, owing a large heritage to the Saturn vehicle program and incorporating advances in propulsion systems, avionics, computing, and sensor technology over the past 50 years.

Ahmad, Naeem↗

NASA NTRS2019

Software Tool for Tracking & Mapping the NASA Orion AA-2 Test Flight Ejectable Data Recorders in Real Time

On 2 July 2019, the NASA Ascent Abort 2 flight took place off the Florida coast to test the emergency systems to separate the Orion Crew Module (CM) from the future Space Launch System rocket in the event of a malfunction. During this high-altitude test, instrumentation data was recorded on twelve customized buoyant Ejectable Data Recorders (EDRs) and subsequently jettisoned from the CM in mid-air. Upon release, the EDRs activated their GPS-Iridium beacon systems and began transmitting Short Burst Data (SBD) messages via the Iridium satellite network to relay their individual location and system health information. To locate, track and retrieve each EDR from the ocean surface in real-time, multiple open-source programming tools (Python and Linux shells) were developed for parsing the incoming Iridium binary SBD messages. For this, a Linux laptop was used to receive the Iridium-generated emails containing the SBD messages and autonomously execute the parsing tools. The received SBD data contained location, timestamp and health status information that was translated, saved, and subsequently used for simultaneously generating a continuously updated color-coded tabular display summary and unique KML files used with Google Earth to track their locations. Once their locations were known, dedicated recovery vessels retrieved all EDRs from the ocean. An additional tool was also developed in order to generate 5- and 10-minute geolocation predictions for each EDR by deriving the displacement distance, elapsed time, displacement heading and velocity based on the latest known information available. The recovery vessels were also tracked with the use of a separate commercial GPS beacon system. After jettison, 67% of the EDRs transmitted valid data by the time they were retrieved from the ocean. However, the real-time information presented by the plotting tool allowed for the ready depiction of EDR dispersal patterns and reference drift trajectories, which contributed to the recovery of all twelve EDRs and the AA-2 flight data. Lastly, the available data showed that the distance between the software’s reported drift/predicted locations and the recovery locations did not exceed 38 meters, therefore demonstrating the advantages of this software tool for supporting real-time tracking and recovery efforts of beacon devices.

Moxey, Lucas↗

NASA NTRS2019

How Much Testing is Needed to Manage Supportability Risks for Beyond-LEO Missions?

Supportability will be a significantly greater driver of cost and risk for future deep-space crewed missions than it has been in the past. Spares requirements and maintenance risk mitigation in particular present an unprecedented challenge for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), since, for the first time in human spaceflight history, crews will be weeks or months away from resupply or a safe return to Earth in the event of an abort. Under these conditions, failure rates are a critical parameter that must be well-understood in order to manage logistics and risk effectively. However, failure rates cannot be measured directly, and can only be estimated based on past experience and test results. Previous research has shown that International Space Station (ISS) operational experience has provided significant benefits to future missions by reducing uncertainty and improving accuracy in failure rate estimates, resulting in significant reductions in mass and risk for beyond-LEO missions. This paper updates and expands on that research and quantifies the potential value of continued testing for future mission supportability. Frequentist and Bayesian models for evaluating, validating, and updating failure rate estimates are described, and are combined with supportability models to examine potential impacts of additional operating experience for future missions in terms of logistics mass reduction. The implications of these results for technology development, system design, and program planning are discussed along with lessons learned and recommendations for future system development. In the end, there is no simple answer to the question of how much testing is required, but the models described in this paper provide a way to evaluate the potential impacts of testing in order to inform test planning.

Andrew C Owens↗

NASA NTRS2020

Lessons Learned from Recent Space Flight Assessments

This paper highlights four space flight assessments, each with an important lesson. The first assessment points to the challenge of material substitution for weight saving. Space Shuttle’s external tank stringers were changed from Al 2024 to Al 2090 without comprehensive analysis. Lack of understanding the low Short-Transverse (S-T) strength associated with Al 2090 led to widespread cracking. The second assessment addresses the failure to understand that time-dependent relationships and loading interactions of multiple disciplines can lead to non-conservative results. An aerodynamic test article of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Launch Abort System (LAS) was analyzed for worst-case single discipline loads, showing positive structural margins. When disciplines were combined with time dependent loading, the analysis resulted in negative margins. The third assessment highlights the pitfalls of putting blind trust in historical architecture. The MPCV re-entry heat shield adopted the Apollo design approach despite fundamental differences between the two designs (e.g., the underlying substructure design, material differences, scale, and geometry). Manufacturing resulted in cracking along seams of the cured MPCV heat shield and produced lower mechanical properties of the Avcoat witness panels. Subsequently, the design was changed to a block architecture, which introduced unperceived technical, cost, and schedule risk. The fourth assessment shows how the lack of a comprehensive investigation of design modifications and inappropriate Finite Element Analyses (FEA) can lead to trouble. A mass reduction campaign eliminated highly critical internal struts on the ISS Node-1 pressurized module based on inadequate and uncorrelated FEA. High strains were noted and ignored as a modeling aberration. A system level high fidelity FEA discovered large plastic strains in the gussets of all four radial ports. These findings initiated a full-scale test campaign, new test correlated assembly-level FEA, and significant design modifications.

James P Smith↗

NASA NTRS2020

Wind Tunnel Investigation of the Supersonic Stage Separation Aerodynamics of a Generic 0.0175-Scale Bimese Two-Stage-to-Orbit Reusable Launch Vehicle Configuration

A wind tunnel investigation was conducted of the supersonic stage separation aerodynamics of a generic two-stage-to-orbit bimese wingbody configuration in the NASA Langley Research Center Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel. Proximity and isolated model testing was conducted at Mach numbers of 2.3, 3.0, and 4.5 and a unit Reynolds number of 2.0 million per foot using 0.0175-scale models of the Langley Glide-Back Booster concept designated as the orbiter and booster in belly-to-belly and back-to-belly configurations. Longitudinal forces and moments were obtained on both models and surface static pressure measurements were obtained on the orbiter model at 328 relative proximity locations and at relative angles of attack of 0 degrees and 5 degrees. The test results supported a larger effort to develop and validate experimental and computational tools applicable to the design and simulation of stage separation and abort procedures for reusable launch vehicles composed of multiple bodies, including winged bodies. An initial proof-of-concept experiment featuring low-cost uninstrumented models was conducted to verify an emerging automated model control system and new support system hardware, and to identify potential model and support system blockage and unsteady aerodynamics/model dynamics prior to committing to higher-fidelity instrumented models. This investigation led to upgrades in the facility stage separation hardware, calibration and testing techniques and capabilities, and data analysis and documentation methodologies that have been extended to the more recent NASA Constellation and Space Launch System crew and cargo launch vehicle programs. A virtual diagnostics interface methodology was used to facilitate the design of the stage separation support hardware, to position the models in the test section, and to define the experimental test space. Advances in the facility automated model positioning system established a foundation for the development of a continuous-sweep data acquisition technique that is responsible for significant productivity improvements to the current NASA Space Launch System test program. The automated model positioning capability was leveraged to conduct a companion statistically-designed stage separation experiment requiring randomization of the relative proximity positions of the orbiter and booster models. The respective zones of influence and interference effects of the orbiter and booster were identified from three-dimensional scatter plots, contour and influence maps, and two-dimensional plotting methods. The highly-nonlinear, shock-dominated aerodynamic characteristics of the orbiter and booster in the Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel exhibited good agreement with independent test data obtained in a NASA Marshall Space Flight Center wind tunnel and with computational fluid dynamics predictions using a compressible, three-dimensional flow solver and an inviscid, unstructured Cartesian method.

Erickson, Gary E.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Major Design Choices and Challenges that Enabled the Success of the Ejectable Data Recorder System

The Ejectable Data Recorder (EDR) subsystem was added to the Crew Module (CM) of the Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight due to a risk that the communications architecture would be insufficient to downlink all the data to the ground during the test flight. Since the EDR subsystem was a secondary system for data collection, AA-2 management enabled the team to take a different approach to hardware development that was more agile-like. This paper discusses key design decisions, technical challenges, and lessons learned that enabled the success of the EDR system during its flight on July 2, 2019.

Jeff Hagen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

More Data Needed for Failure Rate Estimation, Validation, and Uncertainty Reduction

Current Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) development and test activities are not generating data fast enough to provide statistically-supportable precise Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) failure rate estimates for future missions. Accurate and precise failure rate estimates are critical for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) because current risk mitigation approaches – namely regular resupply and rapid abort capabilities – will not be available. Safe operations will depend on mission planners’ ability to accurately forecast spares demand and efficiently provide the necessary resources. However, even after more than a decade of operations on board the International Space Station (ISS), a significant amount of uncertainty remains in failure rate estimates. Uncertain or inaccurate failure rates result in increased risk and spares mass for future missions. A Bayesian failure rate estimation approach, such as the one currently implemented by the ISS Program, can help reduce uncertainty by incorporating engineering judgement into failure rate estimates. However, experience on the ISS and with other complex systems shows that these prior failure rate estimates are often inaccurate. In addition, prior failure rate estimates are typically point values; some level of uncertainty must be added to convert these into probability distributions for Bayesian updating, and there are several potential methods for doing so. Due to the low rate of data collection, these subjective (and often inaccurate) prior estimates currently have a strong influence on the end result. This paper examines the challenges associated with failure rate estimation, validation, and uncertainty reduction in the context of ECLSS development for beyond-LEO missions. A variety of techniques for generating and updating Bayesian priors are discussed and evaluated using both real-world and simulated data. Potential solutions for improving failure rate estimation, including testing additional units, are analyzed and discussed, and a set of recommendations are provided for next-generation system development activities.

Supportability↗

NASA NTRS2020

A Flexible Lunar Architecture for Exploration (FLARE) Supporting NASA’s Artemis Program

The Flexible Lunar Architecture for Exploration (FLARE) is a concept to deliver four crew to the lunar surface for a minimum of seven days and then return them safely to Earth. FLARE can be implemented whenever the component vehicles are operational. FLARE was developed as an alternative to NASA’s Human Landing System (HLS) reference architecture from the Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) #2 created in 2019. The DAC2 guidelines required utilization of the Gateway vehicle in a Near- Rectilinear Halo Orbit (NRHO). Instead, FLARE chooses a Low Lunar Frozen Polar Orbit (LLFPO) for lunar rendezvous of components, and an optional Gateway vehicle. The LLFPO provides a stable orbit that overflies the south pole every 2 h, ensuring easy access to the lunar surface for surface aborts with a much lower propellant requirement than NRHO. The minimum FLARE concept uses one Space Launch System (SLS) launch, one Orion, one European Service Module (ESM), and one human lander (launched on commercial vehicle(s)). FLARE adds the SpaceTug, based upon the mature and successful ULA “Common” Centaur Upper Stage vehicle, with modifications to create an Earth-Moon transfer vehicle. In the FLARE baseline mission, the SpaceTug provides propulsion needed to return the Orion + ESM from LLFPO to Earth. The SpaceTug also provides propulsion to deliver the separate human lander components – the Descent Element (DE) and the Ascent Element (AE) - from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to LLFPO. The SLS Block 1 then launches the Orion + ESM and completes a rendezvous with the mated DE + AE components in LLFPO. FLARE offers optional phases beyond the baseline mission. The SpaceTug can deliver components of the planned Gateway, including the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE) and the Habitable and Logistics Outpost (HALO), to LLFPO. FLARE provides an option to deliver precursor equipment to the lunar surface to enhance and extend the human mission. With these components, including an inflatable habitation module and airlock, individual crew mobility vehicle(s), an In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) demonstration, and science and technology experiments, the crew can explore and conduct science on the lunar surface for up to 14 days.

Moon 2024↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis I Trajectory Design and Optimization

This paper presents the overall trajectory design and optimization process for NASA’s Artemis I mission to send an uncrewed Orion vehicle to a lunar Distant Retrograde Orbit (DRO). The on-orbit trajectory begins at the Space Launch System (SLS) core separation and ends at the Orion service module Earth Entry Interface (EI) point. The details of the trajectory optimization process are presented, including design of nominal and extended mission options, launch windows, and abort options. Novel design techniques are also discussed to account for contingencies, such as using auxiliary thrusters to protect against main engine failure and applying trajectory shaping to mitigate or reduce eclipse durations.

Artemis I↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modal Test and Model Correlation of NASA Plum Brook Station Mechanical Vibration Facility Head Expander –Lessons Learned from the Perspective of an Early-Career Engineer

In preparation for the Sierra Nevada Corporation’s (SNC) Dream Chaser spacecraft vibration test campaign at the Mechanical Vibration Facility (MVF) at NASA Plum Brook Station (PBS) in Sandusky, Ohio, a test-verified model of MVF is needed in order to be able to perform accurate pretest analysis used for determining response limits and abort levels. MVF was designed to vibration test MPCV Orion and was used to perform the system level vibration test of the European Service Module Structural Test Article (E-STA) in 2016. MVF is comprised of an 18 ft diameter annulus table that is driven with sixteen hydraulic vertical actuator assemblies and four hydraulic horizontal actuator assemblies, which allow it to perform single axis vibration testing in the vertical axis and in each of the two orthogonal horizontal axes without the need for reconfiguring the test article. A head expander for the MVF Table has been designed and built that fills in the center opening providing a continuous flat mounting surface with a maximum diameter of 16.25feet that expands the vibration testing capabilities of MVF. The MVF Table with this head expander will be used during the SNC Dream Chaser spacecraft vibration test campaign. Therefore, a critical element in a test-verified model of the MVF will be a test correlated finite element model (FEM) of the head expander. To obtain this, engineers from the Structural Dynamics Lab (SDL) at NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) in Cleveland, Ohio performed a modal pretest analysis, conducted a modal test in July 2019, and most recently correlated the head expander finite element model to the modal test data up to 300 Hz. From the initial test preparations to the final delivery of a correlated finite element model, all efforts mentioned were led by the same early-career engineers at NASA GRC. From the viewpoint of an early-career engineer, lessons learned about modal pretest analysis, modal testing, and finite element model correlation of the MVF Table expander head will be presented and discussed. This will include the importance of understanding the limitations of using uncorrelated finite element models in the modal pretest analysis and planning, the importance of orthogonality metrics in judging adequacy and accuracy of test mode shapes, and the importance of having the FEM match the as built hardware in the model correlation effort.

Emma L Pierson↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Short Circuiting the Controller – Missteps in Maintenance and Inspection of Process and Wiring in STS-93

The primary objective of the Space Transportation System mission 93 (STS-93) was to deploy the Chandra X-Ray Observatory. Chandra, the world's most powerful X-Ray telescope, allowed scientists from around the world to study some of the most distant and dynamic objects in the universe. Stripped of nearly 7,000 pounds of its own gear to make room for the payload, the orbiter assigned to this mission was Space Shuttle Columbia. Prior to STS-93, Columbia had flown 25 flights and was NASA's oldest and heaviest orbiter. On July 23, 1999, after two prior launch scrubs, Eileen Collins and her crew of four launched from Kennedy Space Center. About five seconds after launch, Mission Control at Johnson Space Center detected a voltage drop on one of Columbia's electrical buses. As a result of this power fluctuation, a primary and back-up Main Engine controller dropped offline. Given design redundancy, the two remaining controllers supported all three engines. If there had been any other AC bus issues, one engine of the three on the Orbiter would have shut down. The redundant set of digital computer units in each engine controller saved Columbia and her crew from a very risky contingency abort. Post-flight inspection revealed soot on a screw head and a hole in an adjacent Kapton insulated wire. The single strand of polyimide wire was located nearly half-way down the payload bay. The Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) reported that the wire had rubbed and chaffed against a burred screw head. The burr was later determined to be the result of overtightening of the screw by a technician during a maintenance refurbishment. Alone, the burr may not have been problematic, but later, during another ground processing event, possibly years after, someone inadvertently stepped on the wiring harness. With the pressure and motion of unintended contact, some of the Kapton insulation rubbed off against the burred screw head. The SIAT suspected the wire damage was pre-existing and was caused 4 or 5 years prior to the flight. Finally, the intense vibrations during the launch sequence allowed contact between the exposed conductor and exposed metal area on the burred screw head, resulting in the arcing and shorting of the wire. Due to the quick turnaround times of Space Shuttle Orbiters, wiring issues caused from multiple maintenance events were often overlooked. Additionally, failing to incorporate thorough and early inclusion of human systems integration (HSI) applications as a crucial part of the decision process can result in these types of misshaps. In order to reduce human error associated with integrated manufacturing, maintenance, refurbishment and flight preparations, wire inspection criteria should be refined and standardized, visual inspection processes should be quantified, and technicians should be certified by specially trained instructors. This case, among many others, unveils why human error management and development of safety metrics is a vital piece in the development of complex systems, and why it should be supported aggressively and implemented program wide.

Human Systems Integration↗

NASA NTRS2021

Performance Assessment of the Eastern Range Titusville-Cocoa 915-MHz Doppler Radar Wind Profiler

The United States Space Force (USSF) is responsible for space vehicle launches at its Eastern Range (ER), which includes the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS). Multiple systems are used to measure the atmosphere at the ER, including suites of Doppler Radar Wind Profilers (DRWPs)that operate at 915MHz and measure winds within the lowest few kilometers of the atmosphere. Observations of boundary layer winds can be used for multiple applications, including serving as input to toxic dispersion models and characterizing winds for low-level aborts. The USSF upgraded the Titusville-Cocoa(TICO)DRWP, which collected data during the spring and summer of 2020. The USSF also requested NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (NE) to evaluate wind output from this DRWP system. This report describes the system and the analyses that MSFC NE conducted to demonstrate the system’s wind accuracy relative to balloons from the Automated Meteorological Profiling System (AMPS), data availability, and effective vertical resolution (EVR).

B. J. Barbre↗