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Phase Characteristics of a U-20Pu-3Am-2Np-15Zr Metallic Alloy Containing Rare Earths

Metallic fuel alloys consisting of uranium, plutonium, and zirconium with minor additions of americium and neptunium are under evaluation for potential use to transmute long-lived transuranic actinide isotopes in fast reactors. The current irradiation test series design, designated AFC2, includes minor additions of rare earth elements to simulate expected fission product carry-over from the electrochemical molten salt reprocessing technique. The metal fuel alloys have been fabricated by an arc casting technique. The as-cast fuel alloys have been investigated for phase and thermal properties, specifically, enthalpies of transition, transition temperatures, and room temperature phase characteristics. Results and observations related to these characteristics for the “fresh” fuel alloys are provided. The alloy compositions are based on a U-20Pu-3Am-2Np-15Zr alloy, along with additions of 1 and 1.5 wt% RE (at the expense of U) where RE denotes rare earth alloy of cerium, lanthanum, praseodymium and neodymium). Phase behavior and associated transitions have been compared to available U-Pu-Zr ternary diagrams with acceptable agreement. Enthalpies of transition were deconvoluted from heating and cooling thermal traces for relatively reliable values. The rare earth additions to the base alloy have a minimal influence on the room temperature phases present, but the room temperature phases present slightly impacted the enthalpies of transition and transition temperatures.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fast Reactor Fuel Type and Reactor Safety Performance

Fast Reactor Fuel Type and Reactor Safety Performance R. Wigeland , Idaho National Laboratory J. Cahalan, Argonne National Laboratory The sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor is currently being evaluated for the efficient transmutation of the highly-hazardous, long-lived, transuranic elements that are present in spent nuclear fuel. One of the fundamental choices that will be made is the selection of the fuel type for the fast reactor, whether oxide, metal, carbide, nitride, etc. It is likely that a decision on the fuel type will need to be made before many of the related technologies and facilities can be selected, from fuel fabrication to spent fuel reprocessing. A decision on fuel type should consider all impacts on the fast reactor system, including safety. Past work has demonstrated that the choice of fuel type may have a significant impact on the severity of consequences arising from accidents, especially for severe accidents of low probability. In this paper, the response of sodium-cooled fast reactors is discussed for both oxide and metal fuel types, highlighting the similarities and differences in reactor response and accident consequences. Any fast reactor facility must be designed to be able to successfully prevent, mitigate, or accommodate all consequences of potential events, including accidents. This is typically accomplished by using multiple barriers to the release of radiation, including the cladding on the fuel, the intact primary cooling system, and most visibly the reactor containment building. More recently, this has also included the use of ‘inherent safety’ concepts to reduce or eliminate the potential for serious damage in some cases. Past experience with oxide and metal fuel has demonstrated that both fuel types are suitable for use as fuel in a sodium-cooled fast reactor. However, safety analyses for these two fuel types have also shown that there can be substantial differences in accident consequences due to the neutronic and thermophysical properties of the fuel and their compatibility with the reactor coolant, with corresponding differences in the challenges presented to the reactor developers. Accident phenomena are discussed for the sodium-cooled fast reactor based on the mechanistic progression of conditions from accident initiation to accident termination, whether a benign state is achieved or more severe consequences are expected. General principles connecting accident phenomena and fuel properties are developed from the oxide and metal fuel safety analyses, providing guidelines that can be used as part of the evaluation for selection of fuel type for the sodium-cooled fast reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

CETE R&D at Oak Ridge National Laboratory Supporting Management of Nuclear Waste - 9227

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is conducting a complete, coupled end-to-end (CETE) demonstration of advanced nuclear fuel reprocessing to support the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Research and Development Program. The CETE project under way at ORNL is focused on (1) the demonstration of separations technology that would significantly reduce the quantity of nuclear waste that would require long-term geologic disposal and (2) providing products and waste streams for further treatment and testing to develop suitable forms for recycle or disposal. Equipment for the CETE research and development (R&D) capability has been installed to provide all primary processing operations, ranging from spent fuel receipt to production of products and waste forms. The head-end treatment and off-gas recovery as well as the various solvent extraction processes separate the spent fuel into a number of discrete product streams, each with unique properties. As part of the CETE project demonstrations at ORNL, each of these product streams is recovered to serve as the feed to other critical process and waste management research, development, and demonstration activities. These include the production of recycle MOX fuel, transmutation fuels, recycle cladding, and new waste forms. The paper discusses the separation and recovery processes used in the CETE demo and the resulting products from the first campaign.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CONTROL TESTING OF THE UK NATIONAL NUCLEAR LABORATORY'S RADBALL TECHNOLOGY AT SAVANNAH RIVER NATIONAL LABORATORY

The UK National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) has developed a remote, non-electrical, radiation-mapping device known as RadBall (patent pending), which offers a means to locate and quantify radiation hazards and sources within contaminated areas of the nuclear industry. To date, the RadBall has been deployed in a number of technology trials in nuclear waste reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the UK. The trials have demonstrated the successful ability of the RadBall technology to be deployed and retrieved from active areas. The positive results from these initial deployment trials and the anticipated future potential of RadBall have led to the NNL partnering with the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to further underpin and strengthen the technical performance of the technology. RadBall consists of a colander-like outer shell that houses a radiation-sensitive polymer sphere. It has no power requirements and can be positioned in tight or hard-to reach places. The outer shell works to collimate radiation sources and those areas of the polymer sphere that are exposed react, becoming increasingly less transparent, in proportion to the absorbed dose. The polymer sphere is imaged in an optical-CT scanner which produces a high resolution 3D map of optical attenuation coefficients. Subsequent analysis of the optical attenuation maps provides information on the spatial distribution and strength of the sources in a given area forming a 3D characterization of the area of interest. This study completed at SRNL addresses key aspects of the testing of the RadBall technology. The first set of tests was performed at Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Health Physics Instrument Calibration Laboratory (HPICL) using various gamma-ray sources and an x-ray machine with known radiological characteristics. The objective of these preliminary tests was to identify the optimal dose and collimator thickness. The second set of tests involved a highly contaminated hot cell. The objective of this part of the testing was to characterize a hot cell with unknown radiation sources. The RadBall calibration experiments and hot cell deployment completed at SRNL were successful in that for each trial, the technology was able to locate the radiation sources. The NNL believe that the ability of RadBall to be remotely deployed with no electrical supplies into difficult to access areas of plant and locate and quantify radiation hazards is a unique radiation mapping service. The NNL consider there to be significant business potential associated with this innovative technology.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT TO SUPPORT CLOSURE OF SINGLE-SHELL TANK WASTE MANAGEMENT AREA C AT THE HANFORD SITE

Current proposed regulatory agreements (Consent Decree) at the Hanford Site call for closure of the Single-Shell Tank (SST) Waste Management Area (WMA) C in the year 2019. WMA C is part of the SST system in 200 East area ofthe Hanford Site and is one of the first tank farm areas built in mid-1940s. In order to close WMA C, both tank and facility closure activities and corrective actions associated with existing soil and groundwater contamination must be performed. Remedial activities for WMA C and corrective actions for soils and groundwater within that system will be supported by various types of risk assessments and interim performance assessments (PA). The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection (DOE-ORP) and the State ofWashington Department of Ecology (Ecology) are sponsoring a series of working sessions with regulators and stakeholders to solicit input and to obtain a common understanding concerning the scope, methods, and data to be used in the planned risk assessments and PAs to support closure of WMA C. In addition to DOE-ORP and Ecology staff and contractors, working session members include representatives from the U.S. Enviromnental Protection Agency, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), interested tribal nations, other stakeholders groups, and members of the interested public. NRC staff involvement in the working sessions is as a technical resource to assess whether required waste determinations by DOE for waste incidental to reprocessing are based on sound technical assumptions, analyses, and conclusions relative to applicable incidental waste criteria.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay

There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel such as independently verifying the Pu content declared by a regulated facility, making shipper/receiver mass declarations, and quantifying the input mass at a reprocessing facility. As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, NA-241 has recently funded a multilab/university collaboration to determine the elemental Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies. This research effort is anticipated to be a five year effort: the first part of which is a two years Monte Carlo modeling effort to integrate and down-select among 13 nondestructive assay (NDA) technologies, followed by one year for fabricating instruments and then two years for measuring spent fuel. This paper gives a brief overview of the approach being taken for the Monte Carlo research effort. In addition, preliminary results for the first NDA instrument studied in detail, delayed neutron detection, will be presented. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of several NDA techniques, an"assembly library" was created that contains a diverse range of pressurized water reactor spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future, diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options, spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. Integration is being designed into this study from the beginning since it is expected that the best performance will be obtained by combining a few NDA techniques. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library in three different media: air, water and borated water. In this paper the preliminary capability of delayed neutron detection will be quantified for the spent fuel library for all three media. The 13 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, 252Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay Techniques -- Preliminary Modeling Results Emphasizing Integration among Techniques

There are a variety of motivations for quantifying Pu in spent (used) fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthen the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies to safeguards nuclear facilities, quantifying shipper/receiver difference, determining the input accountability value at reprocessing facilities and providing quantitative input to burnup credit determination for repositories. For the purpose of determining the Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies, twelve NDA techniques were identified that provide information about the composition of an assembly. A key point motivating the present research path is the realization that none of these techniques, in isolation, is capable of both (1) quantifying the elemental Pu mass of an assembly and (2) detecting the diversion of a significant number of pins. As such, the focus of this work is determining how to best integrate 2 or 3 techniques into a system that can quantify elemental Pu and to assess how well this system can detect material diversion. Furthermore, it is important economically to down-select among the various techniques before advancing to the experimental phase. In order to achieve this dual goal of integration and down-selection, a Monte Carlo library of PWR assemblies was created and is described in another paper at Global 2009 (Fensin et al.). The research presented here emphasizes integration among techniques. An overview of a five year research plan starting in 2009 is given. Preliminary modeling results for the Monte Carlo assembly library are presented for 3 NDA techniques: Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, and Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence. As part of the focus on integration, the concept of"Pu isotopic correlation" is discussed and the role of cooling time determination.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Experiment Isotopic Data Compiled by the OECD/NEA Expert Group on Assay Data for Spent Nuclear Fuel

An essential component of computational modeling and simulation is the availability of well-qualified experimental benchmark data against which calculation systems can be validated and the bias and uncertainty associated with the codes and data can be evaluated. The validation process is extremely important for safety and licensing to demonstrate that adequate margins for uncertainty have been included in the calculations. For safety evaluations involving spent nuclear fuel, the isotopic compositions and resulting activities calculated using depletion and decay codes must be validated against experimental determinations of the spent fuel content. In this process the isotopic concentrations predicted by the codes should be compared with corresponding measurements of spent fuel made by destructive analysis as a fundamental part of any code performance evaluation. In recent years there has been growing international interest in acquiring high-quality assay data that can be used to validate code calculations, particularly for modern fuel designs and high burnup fuels and for a wider range of nuclides important to nuclear criticality safety, radiological safety assessments, and decay heat. Assay data are required to validate a broad range of reactor and fuel-cycle applications, including reactor core simulation, postulated severe accident analysis, spent fuel handling, spent fuel transportation and interim storage, reprocessing, nuclear safeguards, and final fuel repository evaluations. In some cases researchers working on depletion code development have noted a general lack of available assay measurements that can be used to benchmark and validate their code calculations for spent fuel compositions. This perception is due in part to the fact that data have been reported in diverse publications over many years, many experimental reports are difficult to access, and there has not been a concerted and funded effort to compile and consolidate available measurements that can be easily accessed by code developers and analysts for validation. In response to the increased interest in fuel isotopic measurements and needs for consolidation and documentation of available data, an Expert Group on Assay Data for Spent Nuclear Fuel (EGADSNF) was formed in 2007 as a working group of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS). Although the group was formed by the Expert Group on Burnup Credit to coordinate isotopic assay data activities and facilitate collaboration between countries developing or implementing burnup credit in their nuclear criticality safety methodologies, the group recognized the need and value of assay data for a broad range of spent fuel applications, and the EGADSNF includes members representing not only the WPNCS, but also members from the standing technical Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations and the Integration Group for the Safety Case of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee. Member countries currently active in the EGADSNF include Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The experimental database of spent fuel measurements maintained by the OECD/NEA is web-accessible. SFCOMPO (database of Spent Fuel Compositions) contains measured isotopic data, mostly for light water reactor (LWR) fuels, for about 250 fuel samples. This paper summarizes the status of SFCOMPO and current activities to expand and improve the database.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nondestructive Spent Fuel Assay Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

Quantifying the isotopic composition of spent fuel is an important challenge and essential for many nuclear safeguards applications, such as independent verification of the Pu content declared by a regulated facility, shipper/receiver measurements, and quantifying isotopic input masses at a reprocessing facility. As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, NA-241 has recently funded a multilab/university collaboration to investigate a variety of nondestructive methods for determining the elemental Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is one of the methods being investigated. First modeling studies have been performed to investigate the feasibility of assaying a single fuel pin using a bremsstrahlung photon source. MCNPX modeling results indicate that NRF signals are significantly more intense than the background due to scattered interrogation photons even for isotopes with concentrations below 1percent. However, the studies revealed that the dominant contribution to the background is elastic scattering, which is currently not simulated by MCNPX. Critical to this effort, we have added existing NRF data to the MCNPX photonuclear data files and are now able to incorporate NRF physics into MCNPX simulations. Addition of the non-resonant elastic scattering data to MCNPX is in progress. Assaying fuel assemblies with NRF poses additional challenges: photon penetration through the assembly is small and the spent fuel radioactive decay and neutron activity lead to significantly higher backgrounds. First modeling studies to evaluate the efficacy of NRF for assaying assemblies have been initiated using the spent fuel assembly library created at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Review of Technical Studies in the United States in Support of Burnup Credit Regulatory Guidance

Taking credit for the reduction in reactivity associated with fuel depletion can enable more cost-effective, higher-density storage, transport, disposal, and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) while maintaining sufficient subcritical margin to establish an adequate safety basis. Consequently, there continues to be considerable interest in the United States (U.S.), as well as internationally, in the increased use of burnup credit in SNF operations, particularly related to storage, transport, and disposal of commercial SNF. This interest has motivated numerous technical studies related to the application of burnup credit, both domestically and internationally, as well as the design of SNF storage, transport and disposal systems that rely on burnup credit for maintaining subcriticality. Responding to industry requests and needs, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated a burnup credit research program in 1999, with support from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), to develop regulatory guidance and the supporting technical bases for allowing and expanding the use of burnup credit in pressurized-water reactor SNF storage and transport applications. Although this NRC research program has not been continuous since its inception, considerable progress has been achieved in many key areas in terms of increased understanding of relevant phenomena and issues, availability of relevant information and data, and subsequently updated regulatory guidance for expanded use of burnup credit. This paper reviews technical studies performed by ORNL for the U.S. NRC burnup credit research program. Examples of topics include reactivity effects associated with reactor operating characteristics, fuel assembly characteristics, burnable absorbers, control rods, spatial burnup distributions, cooling time, and assembly misloading; methods and data for validation of isotopic composition predictions; methods and data for validation of criticality calculations; and operational issues and data related to assembly burnup confirmation. The objective of this paper is to summarize the work and significant accomplishments, with references to the technical reports and publications for complete details and provide a useful resource to others in the burnup credit community.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

APPLICATION OF ABSORPTION SPECTROSCOPY TO ACTINIDE PROCESS ANALYSIS AND MONITORING

The characteristic strong colors of aqueous actinide solutions form the basis of analytical techniques for actinides based on absorption spectroscopy. Colorimetric measurements of samples from processing activities have been used for at least half a century. This seemingly mature technology has been recently revitalized by developments in chemometric data analysis. Where reliable measurements could formerly only be obtained under well-defined conditions, modern methods are robust with respect to variations in acidity, concentration of complexants and spectral interferents, and temperature. This paper describes two examples of the use of process absorption spectroscopy for Pu analysis at the Savannah River Site, in Aiken, SC. In one example, custom optical filters allow accurate colorimetric measurements of Pu in a stream with rapid nitric acid variation. The second example demonstrates simultaneous measurement of Pu and U by chemometric treatment of absorption spectra. The paper concludes with a description of the use of these analyzers to supplement existing technologies in nuclear materials monitoring in processing, reprocessing, and storage facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

RADBALLTECHNOLOGY TESTING AND MCNP MODELING OF THE TUNGSTEN COLLIMATOR

The United Kingdom's National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) has developed a remote, non-electrical, radiation-mapping device known as RadBall{trademark}, which can locate and quantify radioactive hazards within contaminated areas of the nuclear industry. RadBall{trademark} consists of a colander-like outer shell that houses a radiation-sensitive polymer sphere. The outer shell works to collimate radiation sources and those areas of the polymer sphere that are exposed react, becoming increasingly more opaque, in proportion to the absorbed dose. The polymer sphere is imaged in an optical-CT scanner, which produces a high resolution 3D map of optical attenuation coefficients. Subsequent analysis of the optical attenuation matrix provides information on the spatial distribution of sources in a given area forming a 3D characterization of the area of interest. RadBall{trademark} has no power requirements and can be positioned in tight or hard-to reach locations. The RadBall{trademark} technology has been deployed in a number of technology trials in nuclear waste reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the United Kingdom and facilities of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This study focuses on the RadBall{trademark} testing and modeling accomplished at SRNL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

RADBALL TECHNOLOGY TESTING IN THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE HEALTH PHYSICS INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION LABORATORY

The United Kingdom's National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) has developed a radiation-mapping device that can locate and quantify radioactive hazards within contaminated areas of the nuclear industry. The device, known as RadBall{trademark}, consists of a colander-like outer collimator that houses a radiation-sensitive polymer sphere. The collimator has over two hundred small holes; thus, specific areas of the polymer sphere are exposed to radiation becoming increasingly more opaque in proportion to the absorbed dose. The polymer sphere is imaged in an optical-CT scanner that produces a high resolution 3D map of optical attenuation coefficients. Subsequent analysis of the optical attenuation data provides information on the spatial distribution of sources in a given area forming a 3D characterization of the area of interest. The RadBallTM technology has been deployed in a number of technology trials in nuclear waste reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the United Kingdom and facilities of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This paper summarizes the tests completed at SRNL Health Physics Instrument Calibration Laboratory (HPICL).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as outlined in the NGSI will be discussed.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Development of self-interrogation neutron resonance densitometry (SINRD) to measure U-235 and Pu-239 content in a PWR spent fuel assembly

The use of Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) to measure the {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu content in a PWR spent fuel assembly was investigated via Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. The sensitivity of SINRD is based on using the same fissile materials in the fission chambers as are present in the fuel because the effect of resonance absorption lines in the transmitted flux is amplified by the corresponding (n, f) reaction peaks in fission chamber. These simulations utilize the {sup 244}Cm spontaneous fission neutrons to self-interrogate the fuel pins. The amount of resonance absorption of these neutrons in the fuel can be measured using {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu fission chambers placed adjacent to the assembly. We used ratios of different fission chambers to reduce the sensitivity of the measurements to extraneous material present in fuel. The development of SINRD to measure the fissile content in spent fuel is of great importance to the improvement of nuclear safeguards and material accountability. Future work includes the use of this technique to measure the fissile content in FBR spent fuel and heavy metal product from reprocessing methods.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗