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On-Site Disposition of Concrete During Decommissioning and Decontamination: A Data Quality Objective-Based Approach

On-site disposition of concrete derived during decommissioning and demolition (D and D) of buildings at industrial sites is a cost-effective, waste minimization alternative to off-site disposal. Because the concrete is to be left on-site it becomes part of the solid matrix of the site and is subject to the compositional constraints governing site soils. In addition, the concrete and its contained-in materials may be subject to physical constraints such as size and shape which do not apply to soils. When considering on-site disposition of concrete, the data quality objective (DQO) process should be used to determine the compositional and physical constraints on the concrete and for developing the characterization approach to determine whether those constraints have been met. The information inputs to the compositional and physical constraints on the concrete constitute the concrete acceptance criteria (CAC) which become the basis for developing decision rules - the yes/no statements that unequivocally state the compositional and physical conditions under which concrete may be left on site. An important DQO boundary concept is concrete classification. The cost of concrete characterization can be minimized with a thorough data gap assessment by focusing resources on the concrete most in need of characterization. Concrete for which a yes/no decision can be made with reasonable certainty based on a comparison of existing data to the CAC receives a lesser amount of characterization scrutiny than does concrete for which existing data is non-existent or ambiguous relative to the CAC. In conclusion: Developing acceptance criteria for the on-site disposition of concrete through the DQO process provides a systematic methodology for determining and documenting what decisions will be made and what information is necessary to support those decisions. At each step in the process, input from all individuals or organizations that have a role in making the ultimate decision must be invited. The primary goal of the DQO process is the development of a clear and defensible set of decision rules that are acceptable, unanimously agreed upon, and approved by all decision makers. By conducting the DQO process in an analytical and systematic manner, unexpected and, perhaps, costly changes to an operational program resulting from last minute second-guessing can be prevented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Opportunities for Cost Effective Disposal of Radioactively Contaminated Solid Waste on the Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, TN - 13045

Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for the release of non-real property, including solid waste, containing low levels of residual radioactive materials are specified in DOE Order 458.1 and associated guidance. Authorized limits have been approved under the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, predecessor to DOE Order 458.1, to permit disposal of solid waste containing low levels of residual radioactive materials at solid waste landfills located within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Specifically, volumetric concentration limits for disposal of solid waste at Industrial Landfill V and at Construction/Demolition Landfill VII were established in 2003 and 2007, respectively, based on the requirements in effect at that time, which included: an evaluation to ensure that radiation doses to the public would not exceed 25 mrem/year and would be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), with a goal of a few mrem/year or less (in fact, these authorized limits actually were derived to meet a dose constraint of 1 mrem/year); an evaluation of compliance with groundwater protection requirements; and reasonable assurance that the proposed disposal is not likely to result in a future requirement for remediation of the landfill. Prior to approval as DOE authorized limits, these volumetric concentration limits were coordinated with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and documented in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the TDEC Division of Radiological Health and the TDEC Division of Solid Waste Management. These limits apply to the disposal of soil and debris waste generated from construction, maintenance, environmental restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) activities on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. The approved site-specific authorized limits were incorporated in the URS/CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) waste profile system that authorizes disposal of special wastes at either of the RCRA Subtitle D landfills. However, a recent DOE assessment found that implementation of the site-specific authorized limits for volumetrically contaminated waste was potentially limited due in part to confusion regarding the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and/or surface activity limits to specific wastes. This paper describes recent efforts to update the authorized limits for Industrial Landfill V and Construction/Demolition Landfill VII and to improve the procedures for implementation of these criteria. The approved authorized limits have been evaluated and confirmed to meet the current requirements of DOE Order 458.1, which superseded DOE Order 5400.5 in February 2011. In addition, volumetric concentration limits have been developed for additional radionuclides, and site-specific authorized limits for wastes with surface contamination have been developed. Implementing procedures have been revised to clarify the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and surface activity limits, and to allow the use of non-destructive waste characterization methods. These changes have been designed to promote improved utilization of available disposal capacity of the onsite disposal facilities within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. In addition, these changes serve to bring the waste acceptance requirements at these DOE onsite landfills into greater consistency with the requirements for commercial/ public landfills under the TDEC Bulk Survey for Release (BSFR) program, including two public RCRA Subtitle D landfills in close proximity to the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. (authors)

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Automated Groundwater Monitoring of Uranium at the Hanford Site, Washington - 13116

An automated groundwater monitoring system for the detection of uranyl ion in groundwater was deployed at the 300 Area Industrial Complex, Hanford Site, Washington. The research was conducted to determine if at-site, automated monitoring of contaminant movement in the subsurface is a viable alternative to the baseline manual sampling and analytical laboratory assay methods currently employed. The monitoring system used Arsenazo III, a colorimetric chelating compound, for the detection of the uranyl ion. The analytical system had a limit of quantification of approximately 10 parts per billion (ppb, μg/L). The EPA's drinking water maximum contaminant level (MCL) is 30 ppb [1]. In addition to the uranyl ion assay, the system was capable of acquiring temperature, conductivity, and river level data. The system was fully automated and could be operated remotely. The system was capable of collecting water samples from four sampling sources, quantifying the uranyl ion, and periodically performing a calibration of the analytical cell. The system communications were accomplished by way of cellular data link with the information transmitted through the internet. Four water sample sources were selected for the investigation: one location provided samples of Columbia River water, and the remaining three sources provided groundwater from aquifer sampling tubes positioned in a vertical array at the Columbia River shoreline. The typical sampling schedule was to sample the four locations twice per day with one calibration check per day. This paper outlines the instrumentation employed, the operation of the instrumentation, and analytical results for a period of time between July and August, 2012. The presentation includes the uranyl ion concentration and conductivity results from the automated sampling/analysis system, along with a comparison between the automated monitor's analytical performance and an independent laboratory analysis. Benefits of using the automated system as an alternative to traditional sample collection and analysis includes the following: - Field observations that provide more characterization information than is possible using traditional monitoring methods. - Potentially significant reductions in labor and analytical costs if traditional methods are complemented by automated systems. - The reduced cost of acquiring samples will allow for more frequent collection of samples that may be automatically introduced into real-time graphical flux programs allowing site managers to observe the changes in contaminant concentrations during remediation projects and across discrete river stage events. (authors)

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Corrosion Control during Closure Activities at the Savannah River Site - 13514

Liquid radioactive wastes from the Savannah River Site (SRS) separation process are stored in large underground carbon steel tanks. Until the waste is removed from storage, transferred, and processed, the materials and structures of the tanks must maintain a confinement function by providing a barrier to the environment and by maintaining acceptable structural stability during normal service and design basis events (e.g., earthquake conditions). A corrosion control program is in place to ensure that degradation of the steel does not impact the structural and leak integrity functions of these waste tanks. The SRS is currently retrieving waste from older waste tanks and processing the waste through the vitrification for long term stabilization. The retrieval processes prepare the tanks for ultimate closure (i.e., grouting) by removing sludge by mechanical and/or sluicing methods, dissolving salt cake by adding water, and chemical cleaning of the residual sludge with oxalic acid. Each of these retrieval methods will result in waste chemistry that does not meet the requirements of the current corrosion control program. Given the short-term exposure and limited remaining service life for the tanks in which retrievals are being performed, an assessment of the need for corrosion controls in these tanks was performed. The assessment reviewed the corrosion rates in the more aggressive environments and the postulated loads on the structure during the closure activities. The assessment concluded that the current corrosion control program may be suspended for a short period of time while final retrieval of the waste is performed. (authors)

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Conceptual Design for a Short-Lived Low- and Intermediate-Level Waste Repository at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center, Baghdad, Iraq - 17189

The European Commission under their Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) has initiated a project supporting Iraq's efforts for the safe disposal of short lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (SL-LILW) arising from the decommissioning of Iraqi nuclear installations. The INSC project includes both the development of an initial conceptual level basic design and preliminary safety assessment (PSAR) report and the subsequent detailed engineering design and supporting intermediate safety assessment report (ISAR). The project is being executed by a Consortium led by NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and joined by DBE Technology GmbH of Germany; JAVYS a.s. of Slovakia and MCM Environmental Services Ltd of the United Kingdom. The current paper focuses on the development of the conceptual level basic design. In previous decades Iraq had a significant nuclear program which encompassed ten nuclear sites spread out across the country. The largest site was located at the Al-Tuwaitha site near Baghdad where 18 nuclear facilities were located. The facilities suffered significant damage from bombing and subsequent looting during the first Gulf War in 1991. Currently, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) is the radioactive waste management operator in Iraq and also the license holder for the ten Iraqi nuclear sites, all of them heavily damaged. Because of the ongoing security concerns in Iraq MoST has selected the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center as the preferred and best suited location for development of an SL-LILW repository. As an initial step in development of the conceptual design various repository design options for the site were examined and assessed. The assessment considered similar facilities that have been implemented internationally. At the conclusion of the assessment and in conjunction with the Iraqi Beneficiaries from MoST, a near-surface vault design was selected for the facility. The design of the facility relies on experience gained from existing low-level waste repositories at Centre de l'Aube in France and the El Cabril solid radioactive waste disposal facility in Spain as well as on more recent experience gained in the design of the Bulgaria National Disposal Facility (NDF) under construction near the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Similar to these reference designs, the concept for the Al Tuwaitha Disposal Facility (ATDF) will rely on a series of reinforced concrete vaults into which containerised waste will be placed. Each vault will consist of two chambers designed specifically to hold the waste. Central drainage points in each waste chamber will lead to an infiltration water collection system designed to detect any failures in the waste containment. Each disposal vault will be sealed after filling by installation of a reinforced concrete closure slab. Once all of the waste has been disposed of the site will be decommissioned and a multilayer protective cover will be installed over the sealed disposal vaults. The multilayer cover will act to further isolate the waste from the environment by limiting the access of water to the waste. Due in part to the presence of shallow groundwater at the site and to avoid potential damage to the facility by flooding from the nearby Tigris River the concept for the Al Tuwaitha Disposal Facility requires construction of the disposal vaults on a raised platform several meters above ground level. Construction of this platform will be integrated into the conceptual safety design and materials will be selected which further enhance the isolation function of the disposal system by hindering or delaying the release of radionuclides to the environment. The infiltration water collection system, which will be constructed in a specifically designed accessible gallery embedded and fully integrated into the platform, will provide access to inspection points located beneath each disposal chamber. The ATDF when completed will be a further demonstration of the adaptability of the disposal vault concept for use in isolating SL-LILW from the environment. (authors)

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Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Inspection Development - 19067

Double-Shell Tank (DST) integrity at Hanford is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods [1]. A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, WRPS has been unable to conduct inspections of the tank bottoms due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. The annulus region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to the lack of under-tank inspection technology, degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012 [2]. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. In total, two remote visual inspection tools were produced by two vendors. The first tool was designed to leverage existing ultrasonic testing magnetic wall crawler technology in use within the double-shell tank annuli at Hanford. This resulted in a cost savings, immediate familiarization with the equipment, and a more streamlined shop to field experience. The second tool was developed from the ground up, and represents a more tailored and purpose-built solution to the problem. While costlier and more complex, it is also more versatile and capable of future growth or adaptation. Initial design of both tools began in early FY17 with fabrication and testing completed in early FY18. The tools were designed to be deployed alongside existing inspection operations and expand coverage. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, continuously seeking to expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)

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Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report (Calendar Year 2014)

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractor-operated laboratory. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates SNL/NM for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. Sandia conducts two types of groundwater surveillance monitoring at SNL/NM: (1) on a site-wide basis as part of the SNL/NM Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program’s Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP) Groundwater Surveillance Task and (2) as site-specific groundwater monitoring at LTS/Environmental Restoration (ER) Operations sites with ongoing groundwater investigations. This Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report summarizes data collected during groundwater monitoring events conducted at GMP locations and at the following SNL/NM sites through December 31, 2014: Burn Site Groundwater Area of Concern (AOC); Chemical Waste Landfill; Mixed Waste Landfill; Solid Waste Management Units 8/58, 49, 68, 116, 149, and 154; Technical Area-V Groundwater AOC; and the Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater AOC. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and DOE Order 436.1, Departmental Sustainability , and DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting .

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Creating a Consortium to Increase minority and Low-Income Community Participation in Alternative Energy Development, Production and Management Melinda Downing, United States Department of Energy Geraldine Herring, United States Department of Agriculture John Rosenthall, Environmental Justice Conference, Inc

America's desire for energy independence places a new demand on alternative fuel production. Additional interest and emphasis are being placed on alternatives such as solar, wind, biofuels and nuclear energy. The nuclear fuel production option brings a new look at risk and residual waste management for a number of communities that have traditionally remained outside the energy debate. With the Federal requirements for environmental justice and public participation in energy and environmental decision-making, proponents of alternative energy production facilities will find themselves participating in discussions of risk, production, storage and disposal of hazardous materials and waste matters with low income and minority members in communities where these facilities are located or wish to locate. The fundamental principal of environmental justice is that all residents should have meaningful and intelligent participation in all aspects of environmental decision-making that could affect their community. Impacted communities must have the resources and ability to effectively marshall data and other information in order to make informed and intelligent decisions. Traditionally, many low-income and minority communities have lacked access to the required information, decision-makers and technical advisers to make informed decisions with respect to various risks that accompany alternative energy production, hazardous materials storage and nuclear waste management. In order to provide the necessary assistance to these communities, the Departments of Energy and Agriculture have teamed with others to cerate the Alternative Energy Consortium. The Alternative Energy Consortium is a collaboration of non-profit organizations, Federal agencies, Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority Serving Institutions (HBCU/MSIs), and private sector corporations (energy industry specialists) designed to explore and develop opportunities that empower minorities to own and work in all aspects of the field of alternative energy. The Consortium's primary objectives are to find ways to: - Include minorities in the development and ownership of infrastructure in the alternative energy industry; - Promote research and education programs to inform the public about risks and benefits of various forms of alternative energy; - Build a Mentor/Protege Program between HBCU/MSIs and industry leaders to enhance minority participation in ownership and career success in alternative energy production and distribution. The Consortium will work together to create a process whereby minorities and low income individuals will be recruited, educated, and mentored to maximize alternative energy ownership and job opportunities. Industry specialists and government representatives will work with academicians and others to: 1. research areas and methods where minorities and rural communities can engage in the industry; 2. invest in minorities by serving as mentors to minority serving institutions by offering hands-on experience through apprenticeships; 3. work to identify ownership opportunities for minorities; and 4. work to develop legislation that supports economic development and participation for minorities and rural communities in the industry. To accomplish this goal, the Consortium has set out a three-phase plan. Phase I organized a meeting of professionals to discuss the concept, explore the fundamentals, identify key players, and draft next steps. The group took a critical look at the energy industry: 1) trends, 2) economics, 3) limited number of minorities; and 4) infrastructure. Through that process the group identified four areas that would greatly impact economic development for minorities and rural communities: I Energy; II Broadband Communications; III Education; IV Labor Resources. Phase II presented a roundtable panel discussion that continued to refine the Consortium. The goal of these discussions is to produce a well-balanced Consortium committed to working together to produce effective solutions that bridge the gap between alternative energy and minorities and rural communities. Phase III is the implementation stage that will put the consortium plans into action. This will include the Mentor/Protege Program between HBCU/MSIs and industry leaders, and any additional actions that come from the Phase II roundtable discussion. Phase III will also include a panel discussion at the State of Environmental Justice in America 2008 Conference in Washington, DC in March, 2008. The Consortium's work should facilitate the siting and management of alternative energy production facilities in communities that include a significant number of minority and/or low income individuals. This effort should increase America's prospects for energy independence. (authors)

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper’s measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical inventories. Shipping arrangements included refurbishing a licensed cask to be reused over the duration of the termination process. An accompanying batching plan and shipping schedule were developed to accommodate multiple commercial shipments of Category III quantities of SNM in the selected cask, such that all canisters would be received at NTS prior to the expiration of the nonrenewable cask license.

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Neutron Residual Stress Mapping for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canister Weldment

Many radioactive materials within the nuclear fuel cycle present a significant hazard. Such materials include spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, legacy waste and other nuclear materials that have no current outlet than storage. These materials are often held in long-term storage as an interim stage within their lifecycle. Lifecycles can include reuse or disposal. Safety and security of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage installations are very important, due to a great concentration of fission products, actinides and activation products. Stress corrosion cracking of interim storage containers has been identified as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy. However, little has been done with regards to the canister weld material properties and their impact on stress corrosion, until recently from Sandia National Laboratory canister mockup program. Furthermore, because no post-weld heat treatment was required, the associated high tensile residual stress within these canister welds can drive the initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks. In this work, we carried out in-situ neutron residual stress mapping on a weld plate sectioned from Sandia mock-up canister wall. Significant residual stress profiles were identified from the received longitudinal weld sample. The details of the weldment residual stress program development at ORNL are presented in this progress report. The generated residual stress profile from neutron diffraction technique is similar to that of Sandia residual stress data obtained from the deep hole drilling approach.

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Overview of Requirements for Using Overweight Vehicles to Ship Spent Nuclear Fuel

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, considered a range of options for transportation. In evaluating the impacts of the mostly-legal weight truck scenario, DOE assumed that some shipments would use overweight trucks. The use of overweight trucks is also considered in the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, issued for public comment in Fall 2007. With the exception of permit requirements and operating restrictions, the vehicles for overweight shipments would be similar to legal-weight truck shipments but might weigh as much as 52,200 kilograms (115,000 pounds). The use of overweight trucks was determined to be acceptable for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) Program because the payload is not divisible and the packaging alone may make shipments overweight. Overweight truck shipments are common, and states routinely issue overweight permits, some for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight up to 58,500 kilograms (129,000 pounds). This paper will present an overview of state overweight truck permitting policies and national and regional approaches to promote safety and uniformity. In conclusion: Overweight truck shipments are made routinely by carriers throughout the country. State permits are obtained by the carriers or by companies that provide permitting services to the carriers. While varying state permit restrictions may add complexity to OCRWM's planning activities, the well-established experience of commercial carriers and efforts to bring uniformity to the permitting process should allow the overweight shipment of SNF to be a viable option. (authors)

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End of FY10 report - used fuel disposition technical bases and lessons learned : legal and regulatory framework for high-level waste disposition in the United States.

This report examines the current policy, legal, and regulatory framework pertaining to used nuclear fuel and high level waste management in the United States. The goal is to identify potential changes that if made could add flexibility and possibly improve the chances of successfully implementing technical aspects of a nuclear waste policy. Experience suggests that the regulatory framework should be established prior to initiating future repository development. Concerning specifics of the regulatory framework, reasonable expectation as the standard of proof was successfully implemented and could be retained in the future; yet, the current classification system for radioactive waste, including hazardous constituents, warrants reexamination. Whether or not consideration of multiple sites are considered simultaneously in the future, inclusion of mechanisms such as deliberate use of performance assessment to manage site characterization would be wise. Because of experience gained here and abroad, diversity of geologic media is not particularly necessary as a criterion in site selection guidelines for multiple sites. Stepwise development of the repository program that includes flexibility also warrants serious consideration. Furthermore, integration of the waste management system from storage, transportation, and disposition, should be examined and would be facilitated by integration of the legal and regulatory framework. Finally, in order to enhance acceptability of future repository development, the national policy should be cognizant of those policy and technical attributes that enhance initial acceptance, and those policy and technical attributes that maintain and broaden credibility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Inspection Technology Advancements for Hanford Double Shell Tank Integrity Verification - 16150

The Hanford double-shell tanks (DSTs) were constructed in southeastern Washington State between 1968 and 1986 to store nuclear waste. Most of the tank waste came from the Hanford nuclear weapons program, which has been stopped for more than 25 years. The tanks will be needed for many years to come until suitable vitrification and permanent storage solutions are developed. These tanks are nominally 45 ft. deep from the dome peak to the floor. The inner tank is nominally 75 ft. dia. and the outer tank is nominally 80 ft. dia., leaving a 2.5 ft. annulus between the two side tank walls. The waste management program (under direction of Washington River Protection Solutions, WRPS) manages inspections of these DSTs from the annulus to justify their continued safe service and to avoid the high cost of new replacement tanks. Over time, the Hanford Tank Farm contractors, currently WRPS, have increased their ultrasound inspections of these tanks. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has worked with the Hanford Tank Farm contractors for more than 15 years to advance applicable tank nondestructive inspection technology for improved performance and cost reduction. Past, present, and planned technology advancements are addressed in this paper, including tank wall ultrasonic testing examination, extreme value statistical analysis, phased array for the tank wall, transmit/receive tandem synthetic aperture focusing technique knuckle examination, and electromagnetic acoustic transducer screening of the tank wall including mill-scale compensation. (authors)

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Field Test to Evaluate Deep Borehole Disposal.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has embarked on the Deep Borehole Field Test (DBFT), which will investigate whether conditions suitable for disposal of radioactive waste can be found at a depth of up to 5 km in the earth’s crust. As planned, the DBFT will demonstrate drilling and construction of two boreholes, one for initial scientific characterization, and the other at a larger diameter such as could be appropriate for waste disposal (the DBFT will not involve radioactive waste). A wide range of geoscience activities is planned for the Characterization Borehole, and an engineering demonstration of test package emplacement and retrieval is planned for the larger Field Test Borehole. Characterization activities will focus on measurements and samples that are important for evaluating the long-term isolation capability of the Deep Borehole Disposal (DBD) concept. Engineering demonstration activities will focus on providing data to evaluate the concept’s operational safety and practicality. Procurement of a scientifically acceptable DBFT site and a site management contractor is now underway. The concept of deep borehole disposal (DBD) for radioactive wastes is not new. It was considered by the National Academy of Science (NAS 1957) for liquid waste, studied in the 1980’s in the U.S. (Woodward–Clyde 1983), and has been evaluated by European waste disposal R&D programs in the past few decades (for example, Grundfelt and Crawford 2014; Grundfelt 2010). Deep injection of wastewater including hazardous wastes is ongoing in the U.S. and regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2001). The DBFT is being conducted with a view to use the DBD concept for future disposal of smaller-quantity, DOE-managed wastes from nuclear weapons production (i.e., Cs/Sr capsules and granular solid wastes). However, the concept may also have broader applicability for nations that have a need to dispose of limited amounts of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. For such nations the cost for disposing of volumetrically limited waste streams could be lower than mined geologic repositories.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

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TRU waste inventory collection and work-off plans for the centralization of TRU waste characterization at INL - on your mark - get set - 9410

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) amended the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Waste Management Program: Treatment and Storage ofTransuranic Waste to centralize transuranic (TRU) waste characterization/certification from fourteen TRU waste sites. This centralization will allow for treatment, characterization and certification ofTRU waste from the fourteen sites, thirteen of which are sites with small quantities ofTRU waste, at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) prior to shipping the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. Centralization ofthis TRU waste will avoid the cost ofbuilding treatment, characterization, certification, and shipping capabilities at each ofthe small quantity sites that currently do not have existing facilities. Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) and Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) will provide centralized shipping facilities, to WIPP, for all ofthe small quantity sites. Hanford, the one large quantity site identified in the ROD, has a large number ofwaste in containers that are overpacked into larger containers which are inefficient for shipment to and disposal at WIPP. The AMWTP at the INL will reduce the volume ofmuch of the CH waste and make it much more efficient to ship and dispose of at WIPP. In addition, the INTEC has a certified remote handled (RH) TRU waste characterization/certification program at INL to disposition TRU waste from the sites identified in the ROD.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lessons Learned from Site Selection Efforts for Deep Geological Disposal

This report discusses international experiences from site selection of deep geological repositories (DGR) for radioactive waste disposal. Based on experiences from three countries with recent or ongoing site selections, the report describes different site selection approaches and summarizes lessons learned. The German and Swiss programs are two slightly different examples of one end of the spectrum of potential siting approaches: Starting with the entire country, a technically based downselection is performed to select the repository site. The Canadian program is an example of the other end of the spectrum: Here, the program started with an extensive engagement program with Canadians to collaboratively develop a socially acceptable and technically sound national approach for the long-term management of used nuclear fuel. This was followed by the launch of a collaboratively developed consent-based siting process designed to seek an informed and willing host with suitable sites, considering both technical and community well-being site requirements.

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Optimal management program for asbestos containing building materials to be available in the event of a disaster

Highlights: • The safe management of asbestos is a matter of considerable importance. • There is a lack of literature concerning the development of a program for ACBMs. •A management program for the optimal disposal of ACBMs has been developed. • This program is also available in the event of a post-disaster. - Abstract: The safe management and disposal of asbestos is a matter of considerable importance. A large number of studies have been undertaken to quantify the issue of waste management following a disaster. Nevertheless, there have been few (if any) studies concerning asbestos waste, covering the amount generated, the cost of disposal, and the degree of hazard incurred. Thus, the current study focuses on developing a program for the management of Asbestos Containing Building Materials (ACBMs), which form the source of asbestos waste in the event of a disaster. The study will also discuss a case study undertaken in a specific region in Korea in terms of: (1) the location of ACBM-containing buildings; (2) types and quantities of ACBMs; (3) the cost of ACBM disposal; (4) the amount of asbestos fiber present during normal times and during post-disaster periods; (5) the required order in which ACBM-containing buildings should be dismantled; and (6) additional greenhouse gases generated during ACBM removal. The case study will focus on a specific building, with an area of 35.34 m{sup 2}, and will analyze information concerning the abovementioned points. In addition, the case study will focus on a selected area (108 buildings) and the administrative district (21,063 buildings). The significance of the program can be established by the fact that it visibly transmits information concerning ACBM management. It is a highly promising program, with a widespread application for the safe management and optimal disposal of asbestos in terms of technology, policy, and methodology.

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