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Excitations of static isolated fermions in the Higgs phase of gauge Higgs theory

A spectrum of localized excitations of isolated static fermions has been discovered in several different gauge Higgs theories. In lattice numerical simulations, we show that the charged elementary particles can have the spectrum of excitations in the Higgs phase of SU(3) gauge Higgs theory, q=2 Abelian Higgs theory, Landau-Ginzburg theory, and in chiral U(1) gauge Higgs theory. Possibly these excited states of the isolated fermions can be observed in ARPES studies of conventional superconductors. Also, we consider that similar kinds of excitations could exist in other gauge Higgs theories, such as the electroweak sector of the Standard Model.

Matsuyama, Kazue↗

Simulant Development for Hanford Tank Farms Double Valve Isolation (DVI) Valves Testing

Leakage testing of a representative sample of the safety-significant isolation valves for Double Valve Isolation (DVI) in an environment that simulates the abrasive characteristics of the Hanford Tank Farms Waste Transfer System during waste feed delivery to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is to be conducted. The testing will consist of periodic leak performed on the DVI valves after prescribed numbers of valve cycles (open and close) in a simulated environment representative of the abrasive properties of the waste and the Waste Transfer System. The valve operations include exposure to cycling conditions that include gravity drain and flush operation following slurry transfer. The simulant test will establish the performance characteristics and verify compliance with the Documented Safety Analysis. Proper simulant development is essential to ensure that the critical process streams characteristics are represented, National Research Council report “Advice on the Department of Energy's Cleanup Technology Roadmap: Gaps and Bridges”

DVI Simulant↗

WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP): THE NATIONS' SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL ISSUES

In the southeastern portion of my home state of New Mexico lies the Chihuahauan desert, where a transuranic (TRU), underground disposal site known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) occupies 16 square miles. Full operation status began in March 1999, the year I graduated from Los Alamos High School, in Los Alamos, NM, the birthplace of the atomic bomb and one of the nation’s main TRU waste generator sites. During the time of its development and until recently, I did not have a full grasp on the role Los Alamos was playing in regards to WIPP. WIPP is used to store and dispose of TRU waste that has been generated since the 1940s because of nuclear weapons research and testing operations that have occurred in Los Alamos, NM and at other sites throughout the United States (U.S.). TRU waste consists of items that are contaminated with artificial, man-made radioactive elements that have atomic numbers greater than uranium, or are trans-uranic, on the periodic table of elements and it has longevity characteristics that may be hazardous to human health and the environment. Therefore, WIPP has underground rooms that have been carved out of 2,000 square foot thick salt formations approximately 2,150 feet underground so that the TRU waste can be isolated and disposed of. WIPP has operated safely and successfully until this year, when two unrelated events occurred in February 2014. With these events, the safety precautions and measures that have been operating at WIPP for the last 15 years are being revised and improved to ensure that other such events do not occur again.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Hazards Associated with Legacy Nitrate Salt Waste Drums Managed under the Container Isolation Plan

At present, there are 29 drums of nitrate waste salts (oxidizers with potentially acidic liquid bearing RCRA characteristics D001 and D002) that are awaiting processing, specifically to eliminate these characteristics and to allow for ultimate disposition at WIPP. As a result of the Feb. 14th, 2014 drum breach at WIPP, and the subsequent identification of the breached drum as a product ofLANL TRU waste disposition on May 15th, 2014, these 29 containers were moved into the Perrnacon in Dome 231 at TA-54 Area G, as part of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) approved container isolation plan. The plan is designed to mitigate hazards associated with the nitrate salt bearing waste stream. The purpose of this document is to articulate the hazards associated with un-remediated nitrate salts while in storage at LANL. These hazards are distinctly different from the Swheat-remediated nitrate salt bearing drums, and this document is intended to support the request to remove the un-remediated drums from management under the container isolation plan. Plans to remediate and/or treat both of these waste types are being developed separately, and are beyond the scope of this document.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Seismic Isolation Working Meeting Gap Analysis Report

The ultimate goal in nuclear facility and nuclear power plant operations is operating safety during normal operations and maintaining core cooling capabilities during off-normal events including external hazards. Understanding the impact external hazards, such as flooding and earthquakes, have on nuclear facilities and NPPs is critical to deciding how to manage these hazards to expectable levels of risk. From a seismic risk perspective the goal is to manage seismic risk. Seismic risk is determined by convolving the seismic hazard with seismic fragilities (capacity of systems, structures, and components (SSCs)). There are large uncertainties associated with evolving nature of the seismic hazard curves. Additionally there are requirements within DOE and potential requirements within NRC to reconsider updated seismic hazard curves every 10 years. Therefore opportunity exists for engineered solutions to manage this seismic uncertainty. One engineered solution is seismic isolation. Current seismic isolation (SI) designs (used in commercial industry) reduce horizontal earthquake loads and protect critical infrastructure from the potentially destructive effects of large earthquakes. The benefit of SI application in the nuclear industry is being recognized and SI systems have been proposed, in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 4 standard, to be released in 2014, for Light Water Reactors (LWR) facilities using commercially available technology. However, there is a lack of industry application to the nuclear industry and uncertainty with implementing the procedures outlined in ASCE-4. Opportunity exists to determine barriers associated with implementation of current ASCE-4 standard language.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Isolator fragmentation and explosive initiation tests

Three tests were conducted to evaluate the effects of firing an isolator in proximity to a barrier or explosive charge. The tests with explosive were conducted without barrier, on the basis that since any barrier will reduce the shock transmitted to the explosive, bare explosive represents the worst-case from an inadvertent initiation perspective. No reaction was observed. The shock caused by the impact of a representative plastic material on both bare and cased PBX9501 is calculated in the worst-case, 1-D limit, and the known shock response of the HE is used to estimate minimum run-to-detonation lengths. The estimates demonstrate that even 1-D impacts would not be of concern and that, accordingly, the divergent shocks due to isolator fragment impact are of no concern as initiating stimuli.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Isolator fragmentation and explosive initiation tests

Three tests were conducted to evaluate the effects of firing an isolator in proximity to a barrier or explosive charge. The tests with explosive were conducted without a barrier, on the basis that since any barrier will reduce the shock transmitted to the explosive, bare explosive represents the worst-case from an inadvertent initiation perspective. No reaction was observed. The shock caused by the impact of a representative plastic material on both bare and cased PBX 9501 is calculated in the worst-case, 1-D limit, and the known shock response of the HE is used to estimate minimum run-to-detonation lengths. The estimates demonstrate that even 1-D impacts would not be of concern and that, accordingly, the divergent shocks due to isolator fragment impact are of no concern as initiating stimuli.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Reinvestigation into Closure Predictions of Room D at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Room D was an in-situ, isothermal, underground experiment conducted at theWaste Isolation Pilot Plant between 1984 and 1991. The room was carefully instrumented to measure the horizontal and vertical closure immediately upon excavation and for several years thereafter. Early finite element simulations of salt creep around Room D under predicted the vertical closure by 4.5×, causing investigators to explore a series of changes to the way Room D was modeled. Discrepancies between simulations and measurements were resolved through a series of adjustments to model parameters, which were openly acknowledged in published reports. Interest in Room D has been rekindled recently by the U.S./German Joint Project III and Project WEIMOS, which seek to improve the predictions of rock salt constitutive models. Joint Project participants calibrate their models solely against laboratory tests, and benchmark the models against underground experiments, such as room D. This report describes updating legacy Room D simulations to today’s computational standards by rectifying several numerical issues. Subsequently, the constitutive model used in previous modeling is recalibrated two different ways against a suite of new laboratory creep experiments on salt extracted from the repository horizon of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Simulations with the new, laboratory-based, calibrations under predict Room D vertical closure by 3.1×. A list of potential improvements is discussed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reinvestigation into Closure Predictions of Room D at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Room D was an in-situ, isothermal, underground experiment conducted at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant between 1984 and 1991. The room was carefully instrumented to measure the horizontal and vertical closure immediately upon excavation and for several years thereafter. Early finite element simulations of salt creep around Room D under-predicted the vertical closure by 4.5×, causing investigators to explore a series of changes to the way Room D was modeled. Discrepancies between simulations and measurements were resolved through a series of adjustments to model parameters, which were openly acknowledged in published reports. Interest in Room D has been rekindled recently by the U.S./German Joint Project III and Project WEIMOS, which seek to improve the predictions of rock salt constitutive models. Joint Project participants calibrate their models solely against laboratory tests, and benchmark the models against underground experiments, such as room D. This report describes updating legacy Room D simulations to today’s computational standards by rectifying several numerical issues. Subsequently, the constitutive model used in previous modeling is recalibrated two different ways against a suite of new laboratory creep experiments on salt extracted from the repository horizon of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Simulations with the new, laboratory-based, calibrations under-predict Room D vertical closure by 3.1×. A list of potential improvements is discussed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Isolating GaSb membranes grown metamorphically on GaAs substrates using highly selective substrate removal etch processes

The etch rates of NH 4 OH:H 2 O 2 and C 6 H 8 O 7 :H 2 O 2 for GaAs and GaSb have been investigated to develop a selective etch for GaAs substrates and to isolate GaSb epilayers grown on GaAs. The NH 4 OH:H 2 O 2 solution has a greater etch rate differential for the GaSb/GaAs material system than C 6 H 8 O 7 :H 2 O 2 solution. The selectivity of NH 4 OH:H 2 O 2 for GaAs/GaSb under optimized etch conditions has been observed to be as high as 11471 ± 1691 whereas that of C 6 H 8 O 7 :H 2 O 2 has been measured up to 143 ± 2. The etch contrast has been verified by isolating 2 μm thick GaSb epi-layers that were grown on GaAs substrates. GaSb membranes were tested and characterized with high-resolution X-Ray diffraction (HR-XRD) and atomic force microscopy (AFM).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Department of Energy Operational Readiness Review for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has completed an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the restart of Contact Handled (CH) waste emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The ORR team assessed the readiness of Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (NWP) to manage and perform receipt through CH waste emplacement, and associated waste handling and management activities, including the ability of the National TRU Program (NTP) to evaluate the waste currently stored at the WIPP site against the revised and enhanced Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). Field work for this review began on November 14, 2015 and was completed on November 30, 2016. The DOE ORR was conducted in accordance with the Department of Energy Operational Readiness Review Implementation Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, dated November 8, 2016, and DOE Order 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities. The review activities included personnel interviews, record reviews, direct observation of operations and maintenance demonstrations, and observation of multiple operational and emergency drills/exercises. The DOE ORR also evaluated the adequacy of the contractor’s ORR (CORR) and the readiness of the DOE Carlsbad field Office (CBFO) to oversee the startup and execution of CH waste emplacement activities at the WIPP facility. The WIPP facility is categorized as a Hazard Category 2 DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facility for all surface and Underground (UG) operations per DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. In addition, the WIPP experienced two events in February, 2014 that resulted in Accident Investigations being performed in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 225.1B, Accident Investigations. Based upon the results of the accident investigations and hazard categorization of the facility, the team placed significant emphasis on the following areas: fire protection, emergency preparedness, radiological protection, nuclear safety, and operations. The identification of specific focus areas was not intended to diminish the importance of other areas of the review, but to ensure that these areas received a particularly thorough and in-depth evaluation due to their significance with respect to the safe operation of the facility.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Assessment for the Above Ground Storage Capability at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Draft

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the nation’s only approved repository for the disposal of defense related/defense generated transuranic (TRU) and mixed hazardous TRU waste (henceforth called TRU waste). The mission of the WIPP Project is to realize the safe disposal of TRU waste from TRU waste generator sites in the Department of Energy waste complex. The WIPP Project was authorized by Title II, Section 213(a) of Public Law 96-164 (U. S. Congress 1979). Congress designated the WIPP facility “for the express purpose of providing a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States exempted from regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).” The WIPP facility is operated by the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE). Transuranic waste that is disposed in the WIPP facility is defined by Section 2(18) the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act of 1992 (LWA) (U. S. Congress, 1992) as: “waste containing more than 100 nanocuries of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes per gram of waste, with half-lives greater than 20 years, except for: (A) high-level radioactive waste; (B) waste that the Secretary has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator, does not need the degree of isolation required by the disposal regulations; or (C) waste that the NRC has approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis in accordance with part 61 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).

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Initial Simulations of Empty Room Collapse and Reconsolidation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository for defense-related nuclear waste. If left undisturbed, the virtually impermeable rock salt surrounding the repository will isolate the nuclear waste from the biosphere. If humans accidentally intrude into the repository in the future, then the likelihood of a radionuclide release to the biosphere will depend significantly on the porosity and permeability of the repository itself. Room ceilings and walls at the WIPP tend to collapse over time, causing rubble piles to form on floors of empty rooms. The surrounding rock formation will gradually compact these rubble piles until they eventually become solid salt, but the length of time for a rubble pile to reach a certain porosity and permeability is unknown. This report details the first efforts to build models to predict the porosity and permeability evolution of an empty room as it closes. Conventional geomechanical numerical methods would struggle to model empty room collapse and rubble pile consolidation, so three different meshless methods, the Immersed Isogeometric Analysis Meshfree, Reproducing Kernel Particle Method (RKPM), and the Conformal Reproducing Kernel method, were assessed. First, the meshless methods and the finite element method each simulated gradual room closure, without ceiling or wall collapse. All three methods produced equivalent room closure predictions with comparable computational speed. Second, the Immersed Isogeometric Analysis Meshfree method and RKPM simulated two-dimensional empty room collapse and rubble pile consolidation. Both methods successfully simulated large viscoplastic deformations, fracture, and rubble pile rearrangement to produce qualitatively realistic results. In addition to geomechanical simulations, the flow channels in damaged salt and crushed salt were measured using micro-computed tomography, and input into a computational fluid dynamics simulation to predict the salt's permeability. Although room for improvement exists, the current simulation approaches appear promising.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ZIPPER: Zonal isolation with plug and perf in enhanced reservoirs (Final Technical Report)

Modern multistage hydraulic stimulation treatments in cased wellbores require an effective method of isolating stages between treatments. A commonly used method in the oil and gas industry, plug and perf, is not currently viable for Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS) due to limitations of a critical component of the system – the ball drop (flow through) frac plug. Commercially available ball drop frac plugs do not meet the temperature or wellbore diameter requirements needed for use in EGS stimulations. For example, one particular drillable bridge and frac plug line from a large tool developer is only rated to 175 °C, while another is only available up to casing sizes of 5 ½” and rated up to 204 °C. We developed, prototyped, and field tested an upgraded ball drop frac plug to meet the requirements of EGS stimulations, including high-temperature (225+ °C), differential pressure (6000+ psi), and wellbore diameters ranging from 6 5/8” to 10 5/8”. We focused on designs and materials to optimize drillability, a key cost driver in plug and perf systems. The primary objective was to upgrade a drillable frac plug (currently rated to a temperature of 175°C and a pressure of 10,000 psi in 7” casing) to withstand temperatures of 225+°C. The upgraded frac plug was tested in the laboratory as well as in a field trial at a geothermal field. Engineering design and fabrication of the new plug was completed in 2019. Lab testing, validation, and qualification of the plug was completed in 2020. Ultimately the plug was successfully run during a multistage stimulation treatment in a fully horizontal EGS well in 2022. Prior to this project, a ball-drop, flow-through stimulation plug had never been used in a geothermal well. At the conclusion of this project, three different types of zonal isolation plugs were evaluated under full-scale operating conditions across 16 stimulation treatment stages in a first-of-a-kind EGS project called Project Red. This trial included the newly designed high-temperature, large-diameter plug. The plugs met all of 5 the technical requirements for commercial viability. Project Red has since been fully commissioned and is generating electricity on the Nevada grid - the first EGS project to successfully deliver power to the grid in the US.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗