Compiling Adiabatic Quantum Programs
We develop a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the problem of graph minor-embedding to show that optimal compiling of adiabatic quantum programs in the sense of Nash equilibrium is possible.
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We develop a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the problem of graph minor-embedding to show that optimal compiling of adiabatic quantum programs in the sense of Nash equilibrium is possible.
Using millions of sensors in everyday objects, smart cities will generate petabytes of data, and it will be delivered to multiple users via networks. Multi-disciplinary inter-operability is essential. We propose system engineering management, with multidisciplinary teams as an effective way to deliver real change. Their goal is to develop intelligent and integrated services through the use of digital technologies and open collaboration. We also caution that the process cannot be entirely planned ahead of time, it must be allowed to evolve. New technology will change the game (where does a 3-D printer fit into a smart city?). Municipal planning means central planning – not known for its sensitivity to reality. A successful smart city will include lots of feedback mechanisms for the citizenry.
The performance of 3D rendering of Graphics Processing Unit that convents 3D vector stream into 2D frame with 3D image effects significantly impact users’ gaming experience on modern computer systems. Due to the high texture throughput in 3D rendering, main memory bandwidth becomes a critical obstacle for improving the overall rendering performance. 3D stacked memory systems such as Hybrid Memory Cube (HMC) provide opportunities to significantly overcome the memory wall by directly connecting logic controllers to DRAM dies. Based on the observation that texel fetches significantly impact off-chip memory traffic, we propose two architectural designs to enable Processing-In-Memory based GPU for efficient 3D rendering.
This paper proposes a cooperative game theory-based approach for reserve optimization to enable distributed energy resources (DERs) participate in tertiary frequency regulation. Tertiary frequency regulation schemes ensure that reserve requirements of primary and secondary frequency regulation are fulfilled with a minimum cost. While the available reserve from a single distribution system may not suffice tertiary frequency regulation, stacked reserve from several distribution systems can enable them participate in tertiary frequency regulation at scale. In this paper, a two-stage strategy is proposed to effectively and precisely allocate spinning reserve requirement from each DER in distribution systems. In the first stage, two types of characteristic functions are computed: worthiness index (WI) and power loss reduction (PLR). In the second stage, the equivalent Shapley values are computed based on the characteristic functions, which are used to determine distribution factors for reserve allocation among DERs. The effectiveness of the proposed method for allocating reserves among DERs is demonstrated through several case studies on modified versions of the IEEE 13-node and 33-node distribution systems.
The transformation of electricity systems into more sustainable configurations brought some new challenges. The uncertain, intermittent, and variable nature of renewable energy sources require a significant amount of load demand flexibility, in which grid-interactive buildings (GEBs) are important flexible assets for electricity systems. In this regard, many demand response (DR) tools have been developed to harness this demand flexibility. However, such tools are mostly simulation-based or deal with a single load, which may not be sufficient to demonstrate their effectiveness. Towards this end, this paper presents a real-world field implementation and testing of a hierarchical model-free transactive DR control approach on actual GEBs. The control implementation incorporates elements of virtual battery, game theory, and model-free control mechanisms. The proposed approach was tested using a total of five GEBs, each having three zones. The results show that the proposed approach can mostly achieve all intended objectives, including flexibility estimation, peak load reduction, power tracking, and controlling GEBs while maintaining occupants’ comfort.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a powerful tool that has shown promising results in many domains such as robotics and game-playing. Because RL algorithms learn optimal control policies by continuously interacting with their environments, these algorithms require a lot of data to learn, which limits their application to a wide range of domains. For this reason, there is an immense need for improving the training and data efficiency of RL. Towards addressing this research gap, this paper proposes a transfer learning (TL) approach to improve the efficiency of the RL algorithms by reducing data need and, thus, reducing training time. To demonstrate the proposed approach, a knowledge transfer from a set of buildings to another building was conducted. The results show that the proposed TL approach is a promising method that can efficiently harness the information from similar RL tasks and reduce the data needs of RL algorithms.
Facing direction detection plays a critical role in human-computer interaction and has a wide application in surveillance systems, driving awareness recognition, smart home appliances, computer games, and so on. Current detection methods are mainly focused on extracting specific patterns from user's optical images, which raises concerns on privacy invasion and these detection techniques do not usually work in a dark environment. To address these concerns, here this paper proposes an activity recognition system guided by an unobtrusive sensor (ARGUS). By using a low pixel infrared thermopile array sensor, ARGUS is capable of identifying five facing directions (left 45°/90°, right 45°/90°, and front) through the support vector machine classifier. Also two feature extraction methods are compared. One is manually-defined and the other is based on a pre-trained convolutional neural network (CNN) model. The facing direction detection accuracy resulting from manually-defined features reaches 85.3%, 90.6%, and 85.2% at detection distance of 0.6, 1.2, and 1.8 m, respectively. The level of accuracy resulted from using pre-trained CNN features demonstrates a much more reliable performance (89.1%, 95.3%, and 95.1% at distance of 0.6, 1.2, and 1.8 m, respectively). In addition, ARGUS has been successfully applied for occupancy tracking with a root mean square error of 0.19 m.
Coordinated optimization and control of distribution-level assets can enable a reliable and optimal integration of massive amount of distributed energy resources (DERs) and facilitate distribution system management (DSM). Accordingly, the objective is to coordinate the power injection at the DERs to maintain certain quantities across the network, e.g., voltage magnitude, line flows, or line losses, to be close to a desired profile. By and large, the performance of the DSM algorithms has been challenged by two factors: i) the possibly non-strongly connected communication network over DERs that hinders the coordination; ii) the dynamics of the real system caused by the DERs with heterogeneous capabilities, time-varying operating conditions, and real-time measurement mismatches. In this paper, we investigate the modeling and algorithm design and analysis with the consideration of these two factors. In particular, a game theoretic characterization is first proposed to account for a locally connected communication network over DERs, along with the analysis of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) therein. To achieve the equilibrium in a distributed fashion, a projected-gradient-based asynchronous DSM algorithm is then advocated. The algorithm performance, including the convergence speed and the tracking error, is analytically guaranteed under the dynamic setting. In conclusion, extensive numerical tests on both synthetic and realistic cases corroborate the analytical results derived.
We consider an infrastructure of networked systems with discrete components that can be reinforced at certain costs to guard against attacks. The communications network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity between the systems. We characterize the correlations within this infrastructure at two levels using (a) aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability giventhe failure of an individual system or network, and (b) first order differential conditions on system survival probabilities that characterize component-level correlations. We formulate an infrastructure survival game between an attacker and a provider, who attacks and reinforces individual components, respectively. They use the composite utility functions composed of a survival probability term and a cost term, and the previously studiedsum-form and product-form utility functions are their special cases. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for individual system survival probabilities and the expected total number of operational components. We apply and discuss these estimates for a simplified model of distributed cloud computing infrastructure
We propose a coordination algorithm for cooperative power allocation among a collection of commercial buildings within a campus. We introduced thermal and power models of a typical commercial building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system, and utilize model predictive control to characterize their power flexibility. The power allocation problem is formulated as a cooperative game using the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) concept, in which buildings collectively maximize the product of their utilities subject to their local flexibility constraints and a total power limit set by the campus coordinator. To solve the optimal allocation problem, a distributed protocol is designed using dual decomposition of the Nash bargaining problem. Numerical simulations are performed to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed allocation method
—The transition from the traditional power grid to the smart grid improves reliability, performance, and management, while simultaneously increasing its susceptibility to cyberattacks. One of the biggest weaknesses in grid security is the human agent responsible for its maintenance and operations. As such, it is crucial to embed hands-on understanding of grid operations and security, especially for students in the Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) fields. This paper presents a case study where ECE students from Temple University used an interactive microgrid simulator, "Grid Game", a program developed by Idaho National Laboratory. This case study offers insights into the ECE students’ understanding of key engineering principles (microgrid stability, generation control system, generator inertia, energy storage, and grid security) gained by using the simulator program. Furthermore, the human behavior (strategies to prepare for and respond to cyberattacks, and cooperation and conflict in decision-making) of defenders/ECE students as they experience cyberattacks are also discussed. The paper then offers some limitations and possible suggestions for future research.
This paper considers power distribution networks with distributed energy resources and designs an incentive-based algorithm that allows the network operator and customers to pursue given operational and economic objectives while concurrently ensuring that voltages are within prescribed limits. Heterogeneous DERs with continuous and discrete control commands are considered. We address four major challenges: discrete decision variables, non-convexity due to a Stackelberg game structure, unavailability of private information from customers, and asynchronous operation. Starting from a non-convex setting, we develop a distributed stochastic dual algorithm that solves a relaxed problem, and prove that the proposed algorithm achieves the global optimal solution of the original problem on average. Feasible values for discrete decision variables are also recovered. Stability of the algorithm is analytically established and numerically corroborated.
We consider a System of Systems (SoS) wherein each system Si, i = 1; 2; ... ;N, is composed of discrete cyber and physical components which can be attacked and reinforced. We characterize the disruptions using aggregate failure correlation functions given by the conditional failure probability of SoS given the failure of an individual system. We formulate the problem of ensuring the survival of SoS as a game between an attacker and a provider, each with a utility function composed of asurvival probability term and a cost term, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. The survival probabilities of systems satisfy simple product-form, first-order differential conditions, which simplify the Nash Equilibrium (NE) conditions. We derive the sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of SoS survival probability at NE on cost terms, correlation functions, and individual system survival probabilities.We apply these results to a simplified model of distributed cloud computing infrastructure.
The broader ambition of this article is to popularize an approach for the fair distribution of the quantity of a system's output to its subsystems while allowing for underlying complex subsystem level interactions. Particularly, we present the use of this framework on a very specific (but generalizable) application, interesting for a more general AI audience. Here, we detail a data-driven approach to vehicle price modeling and its component price estimation by leveraging a combination of concepts from machine learning and game theory. We show an alternative to common teardown methodologies and surveying approaches for component and vehicle price estimation at the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) level that has the advantage of bypassing uncertainties involved in gathering teardown data, the need to perform expensive and biased surveying, and the need to perform retail price equivalent or indirect cost multiplier adjustments to mark up direct manufacturing costs to MSRP. This novel exercise not only provides accurate pricing of the technologies at the customer level, but also shows the, a priori known, large gaps in pricing strategies between manufacturers, vehicle classes, market segments, etc. There is also clear interaction between the price of technologies and other specifications present in vehicles. Those results are indication that old methods of manufacturer-level component costing, aggregation, and application of flat and rigid adjustment factors should be carefully examined. The findings are based on a database developed by Argonne, which includes over 64,000 vehicles covering MY1990 to MY2020 with hundreds of vehicle specs.
Rare-earth barium copper oxide (REBCO) high-temperature superconducting (HTS) magnets are considered a game changer for the capability of generating magnetic fields exceeding 20 T at or above liquid helium temperature, combined with the potential for substantially reduced manufacturing and operational costs. Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory is dedicated to developing large-bore high-field superconducting magnet systems to support forefront physics research. Here, our current project focuses on a φ72-mm cold-bore REBCO insert comprising 21 dry-wound double-pancake coils, designed to generate at least 8 T when nested within a 12-T outsert magnet. A significant challenge for high-field REBCO magnets is the time-varying-magnetic-field-induced screening currents (SC) in the REBCO conductors, which can cause localized strain and stress concentrations. This paper presents a numerical study of the SC-induced strain in the REBCO insert magnet, confirming that the SC-induced strain can be substantially suppressed by energizing the REBCO insert before the outsert magnets. We discuss and reveal the mechanism behind this reduction. By applying this strategy, we expect to unleash the potential of the REBCO insert magnet to generate up to 12 T in a 12-T background field.
Representation and propagation of uncertainty in cyber attacker payoffs is a key aspect of security games. Past research has primarily focused on representing the defender’s beliefs about attacker payoffs as point utility estimates. More recently, within the physical security domain, attacker payoff uncertainties have been represented as Uniform and Gaussian probability distributions, and intervals. Within cyber-settings, continuous probability distributions may still be appropriate for addressing statistical (aleatory) uncertainties where the defender may assume that the attacker’s payoffs differ over time. However, systematic (epistemic) uncertainties may exist, where the defender may not have sufficient knowledge or there is insufficient information about the attacker’s payoff generation mechanism. Such epistemic uncertainties are more suitably represented as probability boxes with intervals. In this study, we explore the mathematical treatment of such mixed payoff uncertainties.
We present the issue of monetarily incentivized forwarding in a multi-hop mesh network architecture from an economic perspective. It is anticipated that credit-incentivized forwarding and relaying will be a simple method of exchanging transmission power and spectrum for connectivity. However, gateways and forwarding nodes, like any other free market, may create an oligopolistic market for the users they serve. In this study, a coalition scheme between buyers aims to address price control by gateways or nodes closer to gateways. In a Stackelberg competition game, buyer agents (users) and sellers (gateways) make decisions using reinforcement learning (RL), with decentralized Deep Q-Networks to buy and sell forwarding resources. We allow communication links between the buyers with a limited messaging space, without defining a collusion mechanism. The idea is to demonstrate that through messaging, and RL tacit collusion can emerge between agents in a decentralized setup. The multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) system is presented and analyzed from a machine-learning perspective. Moreover, MARL dynamics are discussed via mean field analysis to better understand divergence causes and make implementation recommendations for such systems. Finally, the simulation results show the results of coordination among the users.
Cooperation between network nodes is critical for supporting services in ad hoc networks. Cooperation, however, is an idealized assumption that may not always be present. This assumption can fail because of moral hazard, a scenario in part caused by misaligned incentives between the requesting node and supporting node. In this paper, we characterize a moral hazard that perversely incentivizes nodes to increase their routing payments by transmitting interference into the multi-hop network. We refer to this as the interference moral hazard (IMH) problem which is inherent to strategyproof mechanisms with low overpayments. We investigate IMH as a non-cooperative game played by network nodes on a random graph. For large networks, we show that IMH can be solved in the network design space. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions on the network distribution that guarantee an equilibrium path with interference-free play. This is achieved by 1) lower-bounding the number of nodes and 2) bounding the network density slightly above the 2-connectedness threshold and below a proposed upper-bound. Simulations suggest that density plays a fundamental role in IMH.