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At least 919 records · Page 51
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1992

Postbuckling failure of composite plates with holes

This paper summarizes a study focused on understanding the failure mechanisms present in a plate with a centrally located circular hole loaded inplane into the postbuckling range of deflections. The study was numerical and experimental in nature and had as a goal the a priori prediction of failure using existing failure data from several sources, together with a stress analysis. The maximum stress failure criterion was used to predict failure and both intra- and interlaminar stresses were considered. Four laminates were considered. The phenomenon of modal interaction, or the jumping from one deformed configuration to another, is discussed. With this jumping, the plate configuration may change from one half-wave in the loading direction to two half-waves in the loading direction. The study concludes that the failure in (+/-45/0/90)2s and (+/-45/2(2))2s laminates is due to fiber compression failure and is predictable. The failure load is, for the most part, independent of response configuration. The (+/-45/0/(6))s laminate fails due to interlaminar shear along the simple support, while the response and failure of the (+/-45)4s laminate is governed to a large degree by material nonlinearities and progressive failure.

Lee, H. H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Test and Analysis Correlation of Standard and Hybrid Standard/Thin-ply Composite Notched Test Specimens

Hybrid composite laminates, a combination of standard-and thin-ply layers, are structurally efficient and can offer opportunities for weight savings over composite laminates composed of only standard-thickness plies. Three hybrid laminates and three standard laminates were tested and analyzed to provide a baseline comparison for not only weight savings and strength benefits of the hybrid stacking sequences, but also to provide fidelity for progressive failure modeling techniques using the two different laminate designs. The standard and hybrid composite specimens were designed to have the same thickness and in-plane stiffness properties, as closely as possible, and were loaded with axial tension and axial compression. Small notched specimens were tested under compression and tension loading, and larger intermediate specimens were tested under tension loading, only. The finite element modeling represented the as-designed panel dimensions as well as the real-life testing conditions through various boundary conditions. The progressive failure modeling and analysis technique described, exhibited very good correlation with the hybrid test specimens, and therefore is appropriate for use in future investigations into more appealing stacking sequences. The progressive failure modeling can also be used to determine the proper usage of thin-ply materials in order to determine the most ideal strength benefits over their standard-ply counterparts.

Alana Zahn↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem FMEA/CIL

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.

Brown, K. L.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the CCB/PRCB presentations and an informal criticality summary listing. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS hardware.

Saiidi, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Hubble Space Telescope meteoroid-debris protection analysis

A system level failure could occur if the Hubble Space Telescope's (ST) capability to operate as a facility on-orbit is critically reduced or when a significant reduction in the quality of science data is registered. Failure could occur if a meteoroid/debris impact damages a component of a major support subsystem or if a meteoroid/debris penetration causes straylight contamination in the light shield, forward shell, aft shroud, or through the aperture door. The ST was analyzed to find the probability of no critical penetration. This probability value was found to be 92.25% for a two-year service life. A straylight leakage repair technique was recommended for the aft shroud, the region found most likely to be critically penetrated. Fozar tape and multilayer insulation blankets are suggested as posible repair materials.

Horn, J.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗
NASA NTRS2007

CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) Connectors in Space Flight Applications

This report documents the current status of CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors in GSFC spaceflight applications. To the extent the information is known, this report summarizes to what component quality level each NASA contractor (referred to as OEM in this report) procured the parts, and what board level and system level testing was performed. The report also provides the current status of the reliability assessment for each GSFC project based on the results of testing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This report addresses how the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors came into existence, and how these became the connector style chosen by many designers of space flight hardware. It identifies the design philosophy and the lack of robustness which has led to several known failure modes. These failure modes include fretting of connector pins during vibration, shock and thermal cycling, exposure of underplating, and increased resistance, including brief excursions to very high resistance. Each of these are signs of aging, which becomes an increasing concern for long duration orbiting space flight applications. This report addresses the mitigation strategy to replace CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors with space qualified Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors. The Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors are pin-to-pin compatible with the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors and meet all of the same technical requirements, except the ability to hot mate, and to mate directly with a CompactPCI of the opposite gender. A detailed comparison of the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connector and the Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connector is provided to describe the ruggedness of Hypertronics connector for space flight applications. Finally, this report makes recommendations for flight hardware for the future missions where the hardware is yet to be built, as well as for the hardware which has already been built with CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors.

Williams, Richard↗
NASA NTRS1991

On-board fault management for autonomous spacecraft

The dynamic nature of the Cargo Transfer Vehicle's (CTV) mission and the high level of autonomy required mandate a complete fault management system capable of operating under uncertain conditions. Such a fault management system must take into account the current mission phase and the environment (including the target vehicle), as well as the CTV's state of health. This level of capability is beyond the scope of current on-board fault management systems. This presentation will discuss work in progress at TRW to apply artificial intelligence to the problem of on-board fault management. The goal of this work is to develop fault management systems. This presentation will discuss work in progress at TRW to apply artificial intelligence to the problem of on-board fault management. The goal of this work is to develop fault management systems that can meet the needs of spacecraft that have long-range autonomy requirements. We have implemented a model-based approach to fault detection and isolation that does not require explicit characterization of failures prior to launch. It is thus able to detect failures that were not considered in the failure and effects analysis. We have applied this technique to several different subsystems and tested our approach against both simulations and an electrical power system hardware testbed. We present findings from simulation and hardware tests which demonstrate the ability of our model-based system to detect and isolate failures, and describe our work in porting the Ada version of this system to a flight-qualified processor. We also discuss current research aimed at expanding our system to monitor the entire spacecraft.

Fesq, Lorraine M.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Purge, Vent and Drain (PV and D) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter PV and D hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET disconnect.

Bynum, M. C., III↗
NASA NTRS1999

Guidelines for Proof Test Analysis

These guidelines integrate state-of-the-art elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM) and proof test implementation issues into a comprehensive proof test analysis procedure in the form of a road map which identifies the types of data, fracture mechanics based parameters, and calculations needed to perform flaw screening and minimum proof load analyses of fracture critical components. Worked examples are presented to illustrate the application of the road map to proof test analysis. The state-of-the art fracture technology employed in these guidelines is based on the EPFM parameter, J, and a pictorial representation of a J fracture analysis, called the failure assessment diagram (FAD) approach. The recommended fracture technology is validated using finite element J results, and laboratory and hardware fracture test results on the nickel-based superalloy Inconel 718, the aluminum alloy 2024-T3511, and ferritic pressure vessel steels. In all cases the laboratory specimens and hardware failed by ductile mechanisms. Advanced proof test analyses involving probability analysis and multiple-cycle proof testing (MCPT) are addressed. Finally, recommendations are provided on how to account for the effects of the proof test overload on subsequent service fatigue and fracture behaviors.

Chell, G. G.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA Contractor Report: Guidelines for Proof Test Analysis

These Guidelines integrate state-of-the-art Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics (EPFM) and proof test implementation issues into a comprehensive proof test analysis procedure in the form of a Road Map which identifies the types of data, fracture mechanics based parameters, and calculations needed to perform flaw screening and minimum proof load analyses of fracture critical components. Worked examples are presented to illustrate the application of the Road Map to proof test analysis. The state-of-the-art fracture technology employed in these Guidelines is based on the EPFM parameter, J, and a pictorial representation of a J fracture analysis, called the Failure Assessment Diagram (FAD) approach. The recommended fracture technology is validated using finite element J results, and laboratory and hardware fracture test results on the nickel-based superalloy IN-718, the aluminum alloy 2024-T351 1, and ferritic pressure vessel steels. In all cases the laboratory specimens and hardware failed by ductile mechanisms. Advanced proof test analyses involving probability analysis and Multiple Cycle Proof Testing (MCPT) are addressed. Finally, recommendations are provided on to how to account for the effects of the proof test overload on subsequent service fatigue and fracture behaviors.

Chell, G. G.↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Launch System: CLVTOPS Toolchain for SLS Liftoff Separation Analysis

This presentation showcases the unique technical capabilities of the CLVTOPS multi-body flight dynamics tool chain developed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) for analyzing NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) liftoff events. The CLVTOPS tool chain integrates high-fidelity simulations, geometric algorithms, advanced data analytics, and post-flight telemetry to demonstrate positive clearance between separating bodies and inform design decisions that enhance mission reliability. Proper liftoff separation is crucial to the success of the launch vehicle’s mission; vehicle impacts with the launch tower and supporting components incur a heightened risk of mission failure. For liftoff analysis, the CLVTOPS tool chain enables the integration of vehicle, launch pad, and environmental input models for the investigation of key clearance effectors. Furthermore, a novel capability of the CLVTOPS tool chain allows for verification and validation of trajectory reconstruction via photogrammetric imagery analysis. The following sections will walk through the tool chain, SLS liftoff ground rules and assumptions, model integration, pre-flight verification, and post-flight validation of the Artemis I mission liftoff event.

CLVTOPS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The CLVTOPS Toolchain for NASA Space Launch System Liftoff Analysis and Post Flight Validation

This paper showcases the unique technical capabilities of the CLVTOPS multi-body flight dynamics toolchain developed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) for analyzing NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) liftoff events. The CLVTOPS toolchain integrates high-fidelity simulations, geometric algorithms, advanced data analytics, and post-flight telemetry to demonstrate positive clearance between separating bodies and inform design decisions that enhance mission reliability. Proper liftoff separation is crucial to the success of the launch vehicle’s mission; vehicle impacts with the launch tower and supporting components incur a heightened risk of mission failure. For liftoff analysis, the CLVTOPS toolchain enables the integration of vehicle, launch pad, and environmental input models for the investigation of key clearance effectors. Furthermore, recent enhancements to the CLVTOPS toolchain allow for validation via photogrammetric trajectory reconstruction and plume pressure impingement estimation on the tower. The following sections will walk through the tool-chain, SLS liftoff ground rules and assumptions, key models, standard analysis, recent enhancements, and post-flight validation of the Artemis I mission liftoff event.

CLVTOPS↗