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At least 919 records · Page 51

EMERGING CYBER-PHYSICAL LANDSCAPE OF TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY

Technology is rapidly progressing in transportation and shipping industries across the globe, including the nuclear, radioactive and hazardous material transportation sectors. With this progress comes unprecedented opportunities for improved transparency, safety, and security in transportation, as well as novel threat surfaces and attack vectors. Therefore, the transport safety and security interface is affected through the application of these technologies. We provide an investigative overview of the developing fields of “trans-tech” or “freight- tech” with a look towards technology development and adoption over the next 3-5 years across three primary categories: Transportation IoT (Internet of Things), Smart Infrastructure, and digitization of transportation management. We also investigate the safety and security implications of utilizing these technologies. Each of these categories presents novel threats as well as opportunities. We examine the role of technology in each as an emerging cyber-physical threat to nuclear and radioactive material transportation security, and plausible mitigation considerations at both the state and operator levels in additional to opportunities for addressing the interface between safety and security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

From Count Rates to Quantifying Isotopic Activities – Field Analysis of Radiation Monitoring Data

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Hanford double-shell tank testing program - 15341

The corrosion testing program and Hanford regularly tests waste chemistries to analyze threats and develop new corrosion chemistry guidelines. Over the past few years, the focus of testing has been on the threat of leaked wastes in Tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102). From the tests conducted to date, it appears that the potential waste compositions in the annulus of tank AY-102 do not show a propensity for localized corrosion or stress corrosion cracking. The threat of exterior corrosion from the liquid and moisture in the leak detection pit (LDP) is a potential concern that will continue to be evaluated in the coming year. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reveal of Uranium Bioremediation Mechanisms by Bacillus Species through Proteomics Studies

Radionuclides, such as Uranium (U) and heavy metals continue to pose threats to the ecosystem health and processes at the Department of Energy (DOE) managed, Savannah River Site (SRS), located along the Savannah River near Aiken, SC. Such co-contaminated environments are difficult to remediate using conventional excavation and disposal or pump-and-treat approaches. Globally, more than 109 tons of uranium contaminated areas pose a long term threat to human and ecological health. Even with presented low concentrations in the brain, central nervous effects are still observed. Uranium and depleted uranium (DU) have long term effects on the kidneys. Some small general health effects include severe headaches and breathing problems. Uranus ions are toxic to living cells because they inhibit metabolism of carbohydrates by blocking ATP binding sites. Bioremediation by microorganisms represents an alternative solution, which is advantageous because of the possibility of biosorbent regeneration, cost-effectiveness, increased metal removal and easy recovery of some valuable metals. Bacillus sp. bacterium was previously used in the bioremediation of heavy metals in coal mine run off waters of SRS. However, its ability to bioremediate uranium was unknown so far. Hence, in the present study, uranium bioremediation by Bacillus sp. bacterium was investigated. The mechanism of bioremediation was also revealed through proteomics studies. Heavy metals contamination poses a serious threat to water, soil and human health. Soil and water are contaminated due to excessive exploitation of uranium mines for generation of nuclear energy and weaponry. It is not degradable easily and persist in soil and water for a long period of time due to its long half- life. Savannah river site (SRS) is one of the uranium contaminated sites. The physical or chemical remediation techniques are costly and complex. Microbial system approaches with competent bacteria has received increased attention due to its adaptability in various environmental matrices and cost effectiveness. However, even though there are multiple suggested pathways (F1), the specific mechanisms that drive this behavior are still unclear, especially with popular microorganisms such as Bacillus species. In a previous research (Ibeanusi et al, 2003) Bacillus sp. was shown to detoxify and precipitate a variety of heavy metals in coal pile runoff waters of SRS site. Additionally, genomic analysis demonstrated that this microorganism posses multiple attributes for chemical transport regulation and metabolic pathways. U remediation occurs during the first 20 hours of exposure. During this time period, Bacillus sp. may work primarily under two mechanisms - sorption and accumulation. These two mechanisms simultaneously work to protect the microorganism from high concentrations. Figure 10 demonstrates that certain proteins are up regulated and down regulated under extreme stressful conditions. Membrane fraction proteins were up regulated. Cytosolic fraction proteins were down regulated. This protein information coincides with the adsorption behavior. Bacillus sp. is a good candidate for U remediation at various concentrations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Risk assessment for Industrial Control Systems quantifying availability using mean failure cost (MFC)

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are commonly used in industries such as oil and natural gas, transportation, electric, water and wastewater, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, as well as discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. Originally, ICS implementations were susceptible primarily to local threats because most of their components were located in physically secure areas (i.e., ICS components were not connected to IT networks or systems). The trend toward integrating ICS systems with IT networks (e.g., efficiency and the Internet of Things) provides significantly less isolation for ICS from the outside world thus creating greater risk due to external threats. Albeit, the availability of ICS/SCADA systems is critical to assuring safety, security and profitability. Such systems form the backbone of our national cyber-physical infrastructure. We extend the concept of mean failure cost (MFC) to address quantifying availability to harmonize well with ICS security risk assessment. This new measure is based on the classic formulation of Availability combined with Mean Failure Cost (MFC). The metric offers a computational basis to estimate the availability of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of security violations or breakdowns (e.g., deliberate malicious failures).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Radiation Anomaly Detection and Classification with Bayes Model Selection

We present a new method for radiation anomaly detection that is based on Bayes Model Selection (BMS), together with models for gamma-radiation measurements from benign and threat sources. The method estimates the relative odds of pairs of such models, with the aim of supporting related hypotheses about the nature of the underlying source material. We also discuss partial optimization of the parameters in the models. The method allows measurements to be broadly categorized and screened for sources of interest in real time, a property that should improve the efficiency of mobile search or unattended monitoring operations.

Anomaly detection, Gamma-ray spectroscopy, Radiati↗

Power Sector Resilience Planning Guidebook: A Self-Guided Reference for Practitioners

The provision of reliable, secure, and affordable electricity is essential to power economic growth and development. The power system is at risk from an array of natural, human-caused, and technological threats, which can cause everything from power interruption to chronic undersupply of energy. It is critical for policymakers, planners, and system operators to safeguard their power systems from these threats by proactively planning for future needs and investing in resilient power systems. This guidebook is a reference for power sector resilience planning that introduces policymakers, power sector investors, planners, system operators, and other energy-sector stakeholders to the key concepts and steps involved in power sector resilience planning. Users can then apply this knowledge in the development of strategic, country-specific processes and identify actions that increase power sector resilience. This guidebook can be used as a stand-alone resource or shared with participants at stakeholder workshops to facilitate discussions and complete key steps of a resilience planning process.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Using Structured Intelligence Graph (STIG) to protect our critical infrastructure against cyber attacks [Poster]

STIG is a revolutionary cybersecurity tool developed by researchers at the U. S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory and it is a software that allows utility owners and operators to easily visualize, create, and edit cyberthreat intelligence information. STIG uses Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and converts complex data on cybersecurity vulnerabilities into a visualization that is easy to understand and act on. With STIG, utility owners and operators have a common system for sharing threat intelligence information, thus increasing the chances of detecting and mitigating cyber exploits before they lead to a cyberattack.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Cohort 1: Authentication and Authorization

In the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Biden-Harris Administration defines the need for a "defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them." The strategy cites the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) as an exemplary effort to bolster the security and resilience of clean energy generation. These efforts help "secure the clean energy grid of the future and [generate] security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors" and promise broad and far-reaching impacts to bridge the capabilities of private industry and the needs of energy production. Cohort 1 of CECA launched in the fall of 2022 with a focus on solutions that provide strong authentication and authorization for industrial control systems to mitigate attacks on the energy grid. Authentication and authorization verify that the identity (authentication) and permissions (authorization) of a user or device are aligned with their assigned roles. Weaknesses in either can have serious repercussions. To assess the strength of Cohort 1's solutions, CECA devised threat scenarios grounded in historical precedents: the CECA team reviewed exploits from real-world case studies of state-sponsored actors to match the assessment's attack paths and targets. Cohort 1 results provided the energy industry, product vendors, and related agencies valuable insights into the efficacy and applicability of solutions in common system configurations under realistic threat scenarios. The results of the assessment highlight points for interrogation and improvement in subsequent technology iterations. CECA's evaluations are part of an ongoing conversation and collaboration to bolster U.S. cyber resilience against adversaries today and in the future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Attack Surface of Wind Energy Technologies in the United States [Slides]

This slide deck presents an overview of the threat landscape for wind energy technologies. It highlights unique cybersecurity considerations for wind, the growing penetration and potential impact of an attack. Standard architectures are shared to highlight where vulnerabilities may exist and attack paths to reach critical infrastructure. We discuss threat actors and attack paths. Several recent events impacting wind assets or wind companies are explained.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) [Poster]

Cybersecurity companies such as CrowdStrike, Dragos, Microsoft and Unit 42 categorize Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using their own naming schemes. As a result, these APTs are mapped to different malware sources and campaigns, all from differing sources, leading to inconsistent mapping. Inconsistent mapping causes confusion and adds further obscurity around these groups, making it difficult to track and mitigate APT cyberattacks. The Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) tool remediates the mapping challenge by collecting, updating and converting adversary data and their sources into a valid, codified STIX v2.1 bundle which is then stored in a Neo4j graph database. It utilizes graph traversal methods and centrality analysis to generate actionable information as a Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG), based on user queries. EGRAM exists as Python code and a Jupyter Notebook that acts as a searchable, evidence-based, source of intelligence for APT groups’ artifacts and cyber campaigns.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

How Cooperative Engagement Programs Strengthen Sequencing Capabilities for Biosurveillance and Outbreak Response

The threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases continues to be a challenge to public and global health security. Cooperative biological engagement programs act to build partnerships and collaborations between scientists and health professionals to strengthen capabilities in biosurveillance. Biosurveillance is the systematic process of detecting, reporting, and responding to especially dangerous pathogens and pathogens of pandemic potential before they become outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics. One important tool in biosurveillance is next generation sequencing. Expensive sequencing machines, reagents, and supplies make it difficult for countries to adopt this technology. Cooperative engagement programs help by providing funding for technical assistance to strengthen sequencing capabilities. Through workshops and training, countries are able to learn sequencing and bioinformatics, and implement these tools in their biosurveillance programs. Cooperative programs have an important role in building and sustaining collaborations among institutions and countries. One of the most important pieces in fostering these collaborations is trust. Trust provides the confidence that a successful collaboration will benefit all parties involved. With sequencing, this enables the sharing of pathogen samples and sequences. Obtaining global sequencing data helps to identify unknown etiological agents, track pathogen evolution and infer transmission networks throughout the duration of a pandemic. Having sequencing technology in place for biosurveillance generates the capacity to provide real-time data to understand and respond to pandemics. We highlight the need for these programs to continue to strengthen sequencing in biosurveillance. By working together to strengthen sequencing capabilities, trust can be formed, benefitting global health in the face of biological threats.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems-Part 1: Identifying Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Determining Risk

Technology innovation, market demand, and the potential impacts of a changing climate are driving the marine renewable energy (MRE) industry to develop market-ready systems to provide low-carbon electricity for emerging, off-grid markets. The advanced operational and information technology devices used in MRE systems create a pathway for a cyber threat actor to gain unauthorized access to data or disrupt operation. To improve the resiliency of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy from oceans and rivers, guidance was developed for an end users' organization that describes a framework for identifying and managing cybersecurity risk. The development of the cybersecurity guidance is based on standards described in the Risk Management Framework and Cybersecurity Framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper is the first of a two-part series that describes an approach to determine the cybersecurity risk for MRE systems based on assessing potential cyber threats, identifying vulnerabilities (people, processes, and technology, including physical and operational environment), and evaluating the consequences a cyberattack would have on operation of the MRE system and impact on end users' mission and business objectives. MRE developers and stakeholders can use this approach to assess their current cybersecurity risk posture to incorporate appropriate cybersecurity controls to reduce the consequences and impacts from a cyberattack on MRE systems. This approach can be refined further as MRE systems are deployed and operational configurations are available.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Using Cybernomic Computational Models: Tailored for Industrial Control Systems

There are many influencing economic factors to weigh from the defender-practitioner stakeholder point-of-view that involve cost combined with development/deployment models. Some examples include the cost of countermeasures themselves, the cost of training and the cost of maintenance. Meanwhile, we must better anticipate the total cost from a compromise. The return on investment in countermeasures is essentially impact costs (i.e., the costs from violating availability, integrity and confidentiality / privacy requirements). The natural question arises about choosing the main risks that must be mitigated/controlled and monitored in deciding where to focus security investments. To answer this question, we have investigated the cost/benefits to the attacker/defender to better estimate risk exposure. In doing so, it s important to develop a sound basis for estimating the factors that derive risk exposure, such as likelihood that a threat will emerge and whether it will be thwarted. This impact assessment framework can provide key information for ranking cybersecurity threats and managing risk.

Algorithms↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering: The Need for a New Risk Informed and Design Methodology

Current engineering and risk management methodologies do not contain the foundational assumptions required to address the intelligent adversary’s capabilities in malevolent cyber attacks. Current methodologies focus on equipment failures or human error as initiating events for a hazard, while cyber attacks use the functionality of a trusted system to perform operations outside of the intended design and without the operator’s knowledge. These threats can by-pass or manipulate traditionally engineered safety barriers and present false information, invalidating the fundamental basis of a safety analysis. Cyber threats must be fundamentally analyzed from a completely new perspective where neither equipment nor human operation can be fully trusted. A new risk analysis and design methodology needs to be developed to address this rapidly evolving threatscape.

CCE↗

The Resilient Energy Platform

The provision of reliable, secure, and affordable electricity is essential to power economic growth and development. The power system is at risk from an array of natural, human-caused, and technological threats, which can cause everything from power interruption to chronic undersupply of energy. It is critical for policymakers, planners, and system operators to safeguard their power systems from these threats by proactively planning for future needs and investing in resilient power systems. Developed through the USAID-NREL Partnership, the Resilient Energy Platform is a website that provides expertly curated resources, training materials, data, tools, and direct technical assistance in planning resilient, sustainable, and secure power systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗