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The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world less safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Security of Mobile Radiological Sources: Overview of Industry Applied Technologies

Small radiological sources used in industrial settings recurrently require transit between job sites. Securing these sources, while stationary, can be addressed with standard security approaches and equipment. Transport of these sources increases the risk and complexity of managing and maintaining control of these sources. Implementing methodologies to securely monitor and locate sources improves response and resolution of anomalous events during transit. The Mobile Source Transit Security (MSTS) system was developed to improve security and provide situational awareness of these mobile sources throughout their job cycle. The MSTS development effort focused on creating a set of systems that could be successfully implemented in industrial radiography and well-logging applications. The MSTS team worked to address source presence and location through use and storage. The MSTS system monitors radiological sources as they move from the base of operations to the job site and back. The system provides near-real-time monitoring of the mobile source location and status and early notification of source loss or theft by transmitting operational status and alerting anomalous conditions over telematic links worldwide. The MSTS system can trigger an armed response or initiation of search and recovery operations and will automatically alert management and responsible staff if a radioactive source is lost or stolen whether it is on-site, in transport, or in storage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Materials at LANL

Exploring the physics, chemistry, and metallurgy of materials has been a primary focus of Los Alamos National Laboratory since its inception. In the early 1940s, very little was known or understood about plutonium, uranium, or their alloys. In addition, several new ionic, polymeric, and energetic materials with unique properties were needed in the development of nuclear weapons. As the Laboratory has evolved, and as missions in threat reduction, defense, energy, and meeting other emerging national challenges have been added, the role of materials science has expanded with the need for continued improvement in our understanding of the structure and properties of materials and in our ability to synthesize and process materials with unique characteristics. Materials science and engineering continues to be central to this Laboratory's success, and the materials capability truly spans the entire laboratory - touching upon numerous divisions and directorates and estimated to include >1/3 of the lab's technical staff. In 2006, Los Alamos and LANS LLC began to redefine our future, building upon the laboratory's established strengths and promoted by strongly interdependent science, technology and engineering capabilities. Eight Grand Challenges for Science were set forth as a technical framework for bridging across capabilities. Two of these grand challenges, Fundamental Understanding of Materials and Superconductivity and Actinide Science. were clearly materials-centric and were led out of our organizations. The complexity of these scientific thrusts was fleshed out through workshops involving cross-disciplinary teams. These teams refined the grand challenge concepts into actionable descriptions to be used as guidance for decisions like our LDRD strategic investment strategies and as the organizing basis for our external review process. In 2008, the Laboratory published 'Building the Future of Los Alamos. The Premier National Security Science Laboratory,' LA-UR-08-1541. This document introduced three strategic thrusts that crosscut the Grand Challenges and define future laboratory directions and facilities: (1) Information Science and Technology enabl ing integrative and predictive science; (2) Experimental science focused on materials for the future; and (3) Fundamental forensic science for nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. The next step for the Materials Capability was to develop a strategic plan for the second thrust, Materials for the Future. within the context of a capabilities-based Laboratory. This work has involved extending our 2006-2007 Grand Challenge workshops, integrating materials fundamental challenges into the MaRIE definition, and capitalizing on the emerging materials-centric national security missions. Strategic planning workshops with broad leadership and staff participation continued to hone our scientific directions and reinforce our strength through interdependence. By the Fall of 2008, these workshops promoted our primary strength as the delivery of Predictive Performance in applications where Extreme Environments dominate and where the discovery of Emergent Phenomena is a critical. These planning efforts were put into action through the development of our FY10 LDRD Strategic Investment Plan where the Materials Category was defined to incorporate three central thrusts: Prediction and Control of Performance, Extreme Environments and Emergent Phenomena. As with all strategic planning, much of the benefit is in the dialogue and cross-fertilization of ideas that occurs during the process. By winter of 2008/09, there was much agreement on the evolving focus for the Materials Strategy, but there was some lingering doubt over Prediction and Control of Performance as one of the three central thrusts, because it overarches all we do and is, truly, the end goal for materials science and engineering. Therefore, we elevated this thrust within the overarching vision/mission and introduce the concept of Defects and Interfaces as a central thrust that had previously been implied but not clearly articulated. The Materials Strategy was then developed over the course of the next six months and is articulated in the next section.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Towards Reliable Cross Sections for National Security Applications

Stockpile stewardship requires the description of weapons performance without resorting to underground nuclear testing. In the earlier tests, selected isotopes were used as detectors, and recovered after irradiation. Aspects of nuclear device performance were inferred by comparing the measured isotopic ratios to those predicted from simulations. The reaction flows that produce the final isotopic distributions proceed through regions of the nuclear chart that include unstable nuclei. Presently, improved nuclear data input is required to reanalyze prior tests and to certify the stockpile's reliability and safety. Many important cross sections are unknown, as is shown in the example of the Yttrium reaction network (Figure 1). The relevant reactions include (n,2n), (n,n'), (n,gamma), (n,p) and other charged-particle emitting reactions. The cross sections have to be calculated or inferred from indirect measurements. In both cases, reliable optical models that are valid a few nucleons away from stability are needed. The UNEDF Nuclear Reaction activities address this need by combining nuclear-structure input from UNEDF structure calculations with modern reaction theory and large-scale computational capabilities to develop microscopic nucleon-nucleus optical potentials that can be extrapolated to unstable nuclei. In addition, the reaction calculation tools and optical models developed in this context are proving valuable for planning and interpreting indirect (surrogate) measurements of the required cross sections.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Decoy-state quantum key distribution using homodyne detection

In this paper, we propose to use the decoy-state technique to improve the security of the quantum key distribution (QKD) systems based on homodyne detection against the photon number splitting attack. The decoy-state technique is a powerful tool that can significantly boost the secure transmission range of the QKD systems. However, it has not yet been applied to the systems that use homodyne detection. After adapting this theory to the systems based on homodyne detection, we quantify the secure performance and transmission range of the resulting system.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

The Urban Deployment Model: A Toolset for the Simulation and Performance Characterization of Radiation Detector Deployments in Urban Environments

Static and mobile radiation detectors can be deployed in urban environments for a range of nuclear security applications, including radiological source search-and-tracking scenarios. Modeling detector performance for such applications is challenging, as it does not depend solely on the detector capabilities themselves. Many factors must be taken into consideration, including specific source and background signatures, the topology and constraints of the deployment environment, the presence of nuisance sources, and whether detectors are mobile or static. When considering the simultaneous deployment of multiple, heterogeneous detectors, assessment of the system-wide performance requires the simulation of the individual detectors, and a system-level analysis of the detection performance. In radiological source search-and-tracking scenarios, performance is mostly dominated by the probability of encounter, which depends on the specifics of a given deployment, e.g., static vs. mobile detectors or a combination of both modalities, the number of detectors deployed, the dynamic vs. static setting of false alarm rates, and individual vs. networked operation. The Urban Deployment Model (UDM) toolset was specifically developed to cover the gap in the available generic frameworks for the simulation of radiation detector deployments at city scales. UDM provides a unified and modular framework to support the simulation and performance characterization of heterogeneous detector deployments in urban environments. This paper presents the key components along the UDM workflow.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Primer: Physical Factors of Agricultural Production & Climate Change

This white paper is a primer on physical factors that influence agricultural production and associated touchpoints to climate change. Agricultural production (which includes both crop and livestock production) is critical for food security and supports other economic products, such as textiles and generation of fuels for energy. Various physical factors influence agricultural production, including the crop types being cultivated and livestock being raised; land area and quality; water access and control; fertilizers, pesticides, and antibiotics; labor; and infrastructure associated with processing, storage, and transportation. These factors are impacted by climate change in both chronic and acute ways, from changing temperatures and precipitation patterns to increased prevalence of extreme events and diseases. We draw on examples from around the world to show the complex ways that agricultural production factors and climate interact with local capacities to influence regions around the world.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Obama Signs New START Treaty With Russians

Prague, Czech Republic President Obama: Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia -- the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons -- to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global non-proliferation. While the New START treaty is an important first step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense. But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia -- they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere -- from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security -- raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America’s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America’s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international recognition. That includes accountability for those that break the rules -- otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That’s why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the United Nations Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security. While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, as well as technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year, because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it’s easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union’s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world. It’s easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Once again, President Medvedev, thank you for your extraordinary leadership.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Russian University Education in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

As safeguards and security (S&S) systems are installed and upgraded in nuclear facilities throughout Russia, it becomes increasingly important to develop mechanisms for educating future Russian nuclear scientists and engineers in the technologies and methodologies of physical protection (PP) and nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A). As part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) program to secure nuclear materials in Russia, the Education Project supports technical S&S degree programs at key Russian universities and nonproliferation education initiatives throughout the Russian Federation that are necessary to achieve the overall objective of fostering qualified and vigilant Russian S&S personnel. The Education Project supports major educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU). The S&S Graduate Program is available only at MEPhI and is the world’s first S&S degree program. Ten classes of students have graduated with a total of 79 Masters Degrees as of early 2009. At least 84% of the graduates over the ten years are still working in the S&S field. Most work at government agencies or research organizations, and some are pursuing their PhD. A 5½ year Engineering Degree Program (EDP) in S&S is currently under development at MEPhI and TPU. The EDP is more tailored to the needs of nuclear facilities. The program’s first students (14) graduated from MEPhI in February 2007. Similar-sized classes are graduating from MEPhI each February. All of the EDP graduates are working in the S&S field, many at nuclear facilities. TPU also established an EDP and graduated its first class of approximately 18 students in February 2009. For each of these degree programs, the American project team works with MEPhI and TPU to develop appropriate curriculum, identify and acquire various training aids, develop and publish textbooks, and strengthen instructor skills. The project has also supported the instruction of policy-oriented nonproliferation courses at various Russian universities. These courses are targeted towards future workers in the nuclear field to help build an effective nonproliferation awareness within the nuclear complex. A long-range goal of this project is to assist the educational programs at MEPhI and TPU in becoming self-sustainable and therefore able to maintain the three degree programs without DOE support. This paper describes current development of these education programs and new initiatives. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical S&S degree programs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Calibration strategy of the PROSPECT-II detector with external and intrinsic sources

This paper presents an energy calibration scheme for an upgraded reactor antineutrino detector for the Precision Reactor Oscillation and Spectrum Experiment (PROSPECT). The PROSPECT collaboration is preparing an upgraded detector, PROSPECT-II (P-II), to advance capabilities for the investigation of fundamental neutrino physics, fission processes and associated reactor neutrino flux, and nuclear security applications. P-II will expand the statistical power of the original PROSPECT (P-I) dataset by at least an order of magnitude. The new design builds upon previous P-I design and focuses on improving the detector robustness and long-term stability to enable multi-year operation at one or more sites. The new design optimizes the fiducial volume by elimination of dead space previously occupied by internal calibration channels, which in turn necessitates the external deployment. In this paper, we describe a calibration strategy for P-II. Here, the expected performance of externally deployed calibration sources is evaluated using P-I data and a well-benchmarked simulation package by varying detector segmentation configurations in the analysis. The proposed external calibration scheme delivers a compatible energy scale model and achieves comparable performance with the inclusion of an additional AmBe neutron source, in comparison to the previous internal arrangement. Most importantly, the estimated uncertainty contribution from the external energy scale calibration model meets the precision requirements of the P-II experiment.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Topology-Dependent Performance of Free-Space Photonic Quantum Networks Under Noise

Photonic quantum communication enables secure and high-fidelity information transfer beyond classical limits, with direct relevance to emerging quantum networks operating in free-space environments. While physical-layer models of depolarizing noise, Gamma–Gamma turbulence statistics, entanglement swapping, and decoy-state QKD security bounds are individually well established, prior work typically treats these components in isolation or under fixed network assumptions. In this work, we develop a unified topology-aware analytical framework that simultaneously integrates free-space optical link budgets, turbulence-induced visibility degradation, depolarizing qubit noise, multi-hop entanglement cascade dynamics, teleportation fidelity thresholds, CHSH nonlocality certification, and asymptotic decoy-state secret key rate bounds across star, mesh, and ring graph structures. Rather than introducing new physical channel models, we demonstrate that identical physical links exhibit fundamentally different end-to-end performance once embedded within different network topologies. Mesh architectures minimize visibility cascade through hop-count reduction but incur quadratic hardware scaling. Star topologies minimize link count but concentrate noise and synchronization overhead at the hub. Ring configurations offer linear hardware scaling with multiplicative fidelity degradation. The results establish topology as a first-order design parameter in near-term free-space quantum networks operating without full quantum repeater infrastructures. While motivated by distributed multi-agent architectures, the framework applies broadly to terrestrial, airborne, and satellite-assisted photonic quantum communication systems.

QKD↗

Inspection Report on "Internal Controls over Accountable Classified Removable Electronic Media at Oak Ridge National Laboratory"

The Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) conducts cutting edge scientific research. ORNL utilizes removable electronic media, such as computer hard drives, compact disks, data tapes, etc., to store vast amounts of classified information. Incidents involving breakdowns in controls over classified removable electronic media have been a continuous challenge for the Department. The loss of even one piece of such media can have serious national security implications. In 2004, the Department had a complex-wide 'stand-down' of all activities using classified removable electronic media, and such media containing Secret/Restricted Data or higher classified data was designated 'Accountable Classified Removable Electronic Media' (ACREM). As part of the stand-down, sites were required to conduct a 100 percent physical inventory of all ACREM; enter it all into accountability; and conduct security procedure reviews and training. Further, the Department implemented a series of controls, including conducting periodic inventories, utilizing tamper proof devices on ACREM safes, and appointing trained custodians to be responsible for the material. After performance testing and validation that the required accountability systems were in place, ACREM operations at ORNL were approved for restart on August 10, 2004. We conducted a review at ORNL and associated facilities to determine whether ACREM is managed, protected, and controlled consistent with applicable requirements. We found that: (1) Eight pieces of Secret/Restricted Data media had not been identified as ACREM and placed into a system of accountability. Consequently, the items were not subject to all required protections and controls, such as periodic accountability inventories, oversight by a trained custodian, or storage in a designated ACREM safe. (However, the items were secured in safes approved for classified material.) (2) Other required ACREM protections and controls were not implemented as follows: a tamper indicating device was not being used on an ACREM safe; records documenting when a certain safe was opened did not support that a purported inventory had been conducted; and a safe inventory had not been completed in a timely manner. (3) A Personal Digital Assistant and a thumb drive, both capable of recording or transmitting data, were stored in a security area without an analysis to identify vulnerabilities and compensatory measures having been conducted, as required. We also found that an ORNL Cooperative Research and Development Agreement partner had not disabled classified computer ports at the partner's site that were capable of writing classified information to external or removable media, as required. We made several recommendations designed to enhance the security of ACREM, security areas, and computers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cyber Security and Resilient Systems

The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has become a center of excellence for critical infrastructure protection, particularly in the field of cyber security. It is one of only a few national laboratories that have enhanced the nation’s cyber security posture by performing industrial control system (ICS) vendor assessments as well as user on-site assessments. Not only are vulnerabilities discovered, but described actions for enhancing security are suggested – both on a system-specific basis and from a general perspective of identifying common weaknesses and their corresponding corrective actions. These cyber security programs have performed over 40 assessments to date which have led to more robust, secure, and resilient monitoring and control systems for the US electrical grid, oil and gas, chemical, transportation, and many other sectors. In addition to cyber assessments themselves, the INL has been engaged in outreach to the ICS community through vendor forums, technical conferences, vendor user groups, and other special engagements as requested. Training programs have been created to help educate all levels of management and worker alike with an emphasis towards real everyday cyber hacking methods and techniques including typical exploits that are used. The asset owner or end user has many products available for its use created from these programs. One outstanding product is the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems document that provides insight to the user when specifying a new monitoring and control system, particularly concerning security requirements. Employing some of the top cyber researchers in the nation, the INL can leverage this talent towards many applications other than critical infrastructure. Monitoring and control systems are used throughout the world to perform simple tasks such as cooking in a microwave to complex ones such as the monitoring and control of the next generation fighter jets or nuclear material safeguards systems in complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is the intent of this paper to describe the cyber security programs that are currently in place, the experiences and successes achieved in industry including outreach and training, and suggestions about how other sectors and organizations can leverage this national expertise to help their monitoring and control systems become more secure.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Bisphenol A degradation by manganese oxides at circumneutral pH: Quantitative evaluation of dissolved Mn(III) species with pyrophosphate

Although trivalent manganese (Mn(III)) species have been recognized as crucial intermediates in the degradation of organic contaminants by Mn oxides, quantitative research on their specific roles remains scarce. Here, our study investigated the degradation processes of an organic pollutant, Bisphenol A (BPA), by dissolved Mn(III) and Mn(III)-bearing oxides, and elucidated the differences of the underlying mechanisms and reaction pathways between several Mn oxides and dissolved Mn(III). Our results indicated that BPA degradation rates with Mn(III)-bearing oxides alone follow the order: δ-MnO 2 >> γ-MnOOH > Mn 3 O 4 . Adding pyrophosphate (PP) significantly enhanced BPA degradation by promoting the formation of Mn(III)-PP complexes and exposing more reactive sites, achieved through destabilizing the crystal structure and mitigating of Mn(II) readsorption, particularly in γ-MnOOH and Mn 3 O 4 . Our kinetic model revealed that heterogeneous degradation by Mn oxides is the predominant reaction pathway, accounting for 61.4 %, 87.8 %, and 73.8 % of the total degraded BPA for δ-MnO 2 , γ-MnOOH, and Mn 3 O 4 , respectively, even in the presence of significant amount of dissolved Mn(III) intermediates due to high PP concentrations. These results offer mechanistic details on BPA degradation by Mn oxides and the influence of ligand concentration, providing helpful insights for optimizing degradation strategies of organic pollutants.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Verifying the INF and START treaties

The INF and START Treaties form the basis for constraints on nuclear weapons. Their verification provisions are one of the great success stories of modern arms control and will be an important part of the foundation upon which the verification regime for further constraints on nuclear weapons will be constructed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗