Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “probability of failure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 901 records · Page 50
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRS1989

A non-homogeneous Markov model for phased-mission reliability analysis

Three assumptions of Markov modeling for reliability of phased-mission systems that limit flexibility of representation are identified. The proposed generalization has the ability to represent state-dependent behavior, handle phases of random duration using globally time-dependent distributions of phase change time, and model globally time-dependent failure and repair rates. The approach is based on a single nonhomogeneous Markov model in which the concept of state transition is extended to include globally time-dependent phase changes. Phase change times are specified using nonoverlapping distributions with probability distribution functions that are zero outside assigned time intervals; the time intervals are ordered according to the phases. A comparison between a numerical solution of the model and simulation demonstrates that the numerical solution can be several times faster than simulation.

Smotherman, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2003

Coupled Multi-Disciplinary Optimization for Structural Reliability and Affordability

A computational simulation method is presented for Non-Deterministic Multidisciplinary Optimization of engine composite materials and structures. A hypothetical engine duct made with ceramic matrix composites (CMC) is evaluated probabilistically in the presence of combined thermo-mechanical loading. The structure is tailored by quantifying the uncertainties in all relevant design variables such as fabrication, material, and loading parameters. The probabilistic sensitivities are used to select critical design variables for optimization. In this paper, two approaches for non-deterministic optimization are presented. The non-deterministic minimization of combined failure stress criterion is carried out by: (1) performing probabilistic evaluation first and then optimization and (2) performing optimization first and then probabilistic evaluation. The first approach shows that the optimization feasible region can be bounded by a set of prescribed probability limits and that the optimization follows the cumulative distribution function between those limits. The second approach shows that the optimization feasible region is bounded by 0.50 and 0.999 probabilities.

Abumeri, Galib H.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

PRA methodology is one of the probabilistic analysis methods that NASA brought from the nuclear industry to assess the risk of LOM, LOV and LOC for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability and statistical data to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: What can go wrong? How likely is it? What is the severity of the degradation? Since 1986, NASA, along with industry partners, has conducted a number of PRA studies to predict the overall launch vehicles risks. Planning Research Corporation conducted the first of these studies in 1988. In 1995, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) conducted a comprehensive PRA study. In July 1996, NASA conducted a two-year study (October 1996 - September 1998) to develop a model that provided the overall Space Shuttle risk and estimates of risk changes due to proposed Space Shuttle upgrades. After the Columbia accident, NASA conducted a PRA on the Shuttle External Tank (ET) foam. This study was the most focused and extensive risk assessment that NASA has conducted in recent years. It used a dynamic, physics-based, integrated system analysis approach to understand the integrated system risk due to ET foam loss in flight. Most recently, a PRA for Ares I launch vehicle has been performed in support of the Constellation program. Reliability, on the other hand, addresses the loss of functions. In a broader sense, reliability engineering is a discipline that involves the application of engineering principles to the design and processing of products, both hardware and software, for meeting product reliability requirements or goals. It is a very broad design-support discipline. It has important interfaces with many other engineering disciplines. Reliability as a figure of merit (i.e. the metric) is the probability that an item will perform its intended function(s) for a specified mission profile. In general, the reliability metric can be calculated through the analyses using reliability demonstration and reliability prediction methodologies. Reliability analysis is very critical for understanding component failure mechanisms and in identifying reliability critical design and process drivers. The following sections discuss the PRA process and reliability engineering in detail and provide an application where reliability analysis and PRA were jointly used in a complementary manner to support a Space Shuttle flight risk assessment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Radiation Testing Electronics with Heavy Ions-The Best Way to Hit a Target Moving Ever Exponentially Faster

In 1972, when engineers at Hughes Aircraft Corporation discovered that errors in their satellite avionics were being caused by cosmic rays (so-called single-event effects, or SEE), Moore's Law was only 7 years old. Now, more than 45 years on, the scaling that drove Moore's Law for its first 35 years has reached its limits. However, electronics technology continues to evolve exponentially and SEE remain a formidable issue for use of electronics in space. SEE occur when a single ionizing particle passes through a sensitive volume in an active semiconductor device and generates sufficient charge to cause anomalous behavior or failure in the device. Because SEE can occur at any time during the mission, the emphasis of SEE risk management methodologies is ensuring that all SEE modes in a device under test are detected by the test. Because a particle's probability of causing an SEE generally increases as the particle becomes more ionizing, heavy-ion beams have been and remain the preferred tools for elucidating SEE vulnerabilities. In this talk we briefly discuss space radiation environments and SEE mechanisms, describe SEE test methodologies and discuss current and future challenges for use of heavy-ion beams for SEE testing in an era when the continued validity of Moore's law depends on innovation rather than CMOS scaling.

space radiation environments↗
NASA NTRS1992

Probabilistic evaluation of on-line checks in fault-tolerant multiprocessor systems

The analysis of fault-tolerant multiprocessor systems that use concurrent error detection (CED) schemes is much more difficult than the analysis of conventional fault-tolerant architectures. Various analytical techniques have been proposed to evaluate CED schemes deterministically. However, these approaches are based on worst-case assumptions related to the failure of system components. Often, the evaluation results do not reflect the actual fault tolerance capabilities of the system. A probabilistic approach to evaluate the fault detecting and locating capabilities of on-line checks in a system is developed. The various probabilities associated with the checking schemes are identified and used in the framework of the matrix-based model. Based on these probabilistic matrices, estimates for the fault tolerance capabilities of various systems are derived analytically.

Nair, V. S. S.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1995

An overview of engineering concepts and current design algorithms for probabilistic structural analysis

The article begins by examining the fundamentals of traditional deterministic design philosophy. The initial section outlines the concepts of failure criteria and limit state functions two traditional notions that are embedded in deterministic design philosophy. This is followed by a discussion regarding safety factors (a possible limit state function) and the common utilization of statistical concepts in deterministic engineering design approaches. Next the fundamental aspects of a probabilistic failure analysis are explored and it is shown that deterministic design concepts mentioned in the initial portion of the article are embedded in probabilistic design methods. For components fabricated from ceramic materials (and other similarly brittle materials) the probabilistic design approach yields the widely used Weibull analysis after suitable assumptions are incorporated. The authors point out that Weibull analysis provides the rare instance where closed form solutions are available for a probabilistic failure analysis. Since numerical methods are usually required to evaluate component reliabilities, a section on Monte Carlo methods is included to introduce the concept. The article concludes with a presentation of the technical aspects that support the numerical method known as fast probability integration (FPI). This includes a discussion of the Hasofer-Lind and Rackwitz-Fiessler approximations.

Duffy, S. F.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Fracture Probability of MEMS Optical Devices for Space Flight Applications

A bending fracture test specimen design is presented for thin elements used in optical devices for space flight applications. The specimen design is insensitive to load position, avoids end effect complications, and can be used to measure strength of membranes less than 2 microns thick. The theoretical equations predicting stress at failure are presented, and a detailed finite element model is developed to validate the equations for this application. An experimental procedure using a focused ion beam machine is outlined, and results from preliminary tests of 1.9 microns thick single crystal silicon are presented. These tests are placed in the context of a methodology for the design and evaluation of mission critical devices comprised of large arrays of cells.

Fettig, Rainer K.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Probability of Obstacle Collision for UAVs in Presence of Wind

For incorporation of unmanned aerial vehicles into the National Airspace, ensuring safety of the airspace including the vehicles, people, and property on the ground is of utmost importance. One of the safety-critical factors for unmanned aviation flights is the risk of deviating from a planned trajectory resulting in a variety of hazards, including potential loss of separation between vehicle and obstacles or unexpected battery energy consumption. Off-nominal conditions introduced by component failures, degraded controllability and environmental disturbances such as wind gusts can lead to unacceptable unexpected deviations from the flight trajectory. It is essential to accurately model such effects on the flight trajectory while computing safety thresholds such as minimum separation from surrounding obstacles, available battery resource to complete the mission or determining delay in the expected time of arrival of flights. In this paper, a tool is presented based on Gaussian Process Regression for wind representation over a pre-defined trajectory for fast, yet approximated, in-time evaluation of possible trajectory deviations caused by wind gusts. The deviation in the planned trajectory caused by wind is further simulated utilizing a 6 degrees-of-freedom (DOF) UAV trajectory simulator comprising of a rotorcraft lumped-mass model with LQRI controller. Both steady-state wind and wind gust effects are investigated. The probability of collision with obstacle is computed and demonstrated on real flight data from experimental flights of an octocopter at NASA Langley Research Center in the presence of simulated obstacles and wind conditions. Effect of varying wind conditions and varying UAV airspeed is further demonstrated on experimental flights in the presence of wind measured by ground based weather service stations. The proposed approach would eventually benefit timely mitigation of current and future safety-critical events in autonomous systems by enabling risk-informed decision making.

Portia Banerjee↗
NASA NTRS2003

Independent Review of the Failure Modes of F-1 Engine and Propellants System

The F-1 is the powerful engine, that hurdled the Saturn V launch vehicle from the Earth to the moon on July 16,1969. The force that lifted the rocket overcoming the gravitational force during the first stage of the flight was provided by a cluster of five F-1 rocket engines, each of them developing over 1.5 million pounds of thrust (MSFC-MAN-507). The F-1 Rocket engine used RP-1 (Rocket Propellant-1, commercially known as Kerosene), as fuel with lox (liquid Oxygen) as oxidizer. NASA terminated Saturn V activity and has focused on Space Shuttle since 1972. The interest in rocket system has been revived to meet the National Launch System (NLS) program and a directive from the President to return to the Moon and exploration of the space including Mars. The new program Space Launch Initiative (SLI) is directed to drastically reduce the cost of flight for payloads, and adopt a reusable launch vehicle (RLV). To achieve this goal it is essential to have the ability of lifting huge payloads into low earth orbit. Probably requiring powerful boosters as strap-ons to a core vehicle, as was done for the Saturn launch vehicle. The logic in favor of adopting Saturn system, a proven technology, to meet the SLI challenge is very strong. The F-1 engine was the largest and most powerful liquid rocket engine ever built, and had exceptional performance. This study reviews the failure modes of the F-1 engine and propellant system.

Ray, Paul↗
NASA NTRS1971

Apollo 15 mission main parachute failure

The failure of one of the three main parachutes of the Apollo 15 spacecraft was investigated by studying malfunctions in the forward heat shield, broken riser, and firing the fuel expelled from the command module reaction control system. It is concluded that the most probable cause was the burning of raw fuel being expelled during the latter portion of depletion firing. Recommended corrective actions are included.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1986

Hubble Space Telescope meteoroid-debris protection analysis

A system level failure could occur if the Hubble Space Telescope's (ST) capability to operate as a facility on-orbit is critically reduced or when a significant reduction in the quality of science data is registered. Failure could occur if a meteoroid/debris impact damages a component of a major support subsystem or if a meteoroid/debris penetration causes straylight contamination in the light shield, forward shell, aft shroud, or through the aperture door. The ST was analyzed to find the probability of no critical penetration. This probability value was found to be 92.25% for a two-year service life. A straylight leakage repair technique was recommended for the aft shroud, the region found most likely to be critically penetrated. Fozar tape and multilayer insulation blankets are suggested as posible repair materials.

Horn, J.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Figures of Merit for Aeronautics Programs and Addition to NASA LARC Fire Station

This report accounts details of two research projects for the Langley Aerospace Research Summer Scholars (LARSS) program. The first project, with the Office of Mission Assurance, involved subjectively predicting the probable success of two aeronautics programs by means of a tool called a Figure of Merit. The figure of merit bases program success on the quality and reliability of the following factors: parts, complexity of research, quality programs, hazards elimination, and single point failures elimination. The second project, for the Office of Safety and Facilities Assurance, required planning, layouts, and source seeking for an addition to the fire house. Forecasted changes in facility layout necessitate this addition which will serve as housing for the fire fighters.

Harper, Belinda M.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Flight test results for the F-8 digital fly-by-wire aircraft control sensor analytic redundancy management technique

This paper reviews the formulation and flight test results of an algorithm to detect and isolate the first failure of any one of twelve duplex control sensor signals being monitored. The technique uses like-signal differences for fault detection while relying upon analytic redundancy relationships among unlike quantities to isolate the faulty sensor. The fault isolation logic utilizes the modified sequential probability ratio test, which explicitly accommodates the inevitable irreducible low frequency errors present in the analytic redundancy residuals. In addition, the algorithm uses sensor output selftest, which takes advantage of the duplex sensor structure by immediately removing a highly erratic sensor from control calculations and analytic redundancy relationships while awaiting a definitive fault isolation decision via analytic redundancy. This study represents a proof of concept demonstration of a methodology that can be applied to duplex or higher flight control sensor configurations and, in addition, can monitor the health of one simplex signal per analytic redundancy relationship.

Deckert, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Methodology of design and analysis of external walls of space station for hypervelocity impacts by meteoroids and space debris

The development of criteria and methodology for the design and analysis of Space Station wall elements for collisions with meteoroids and space debris at hypervelocities is discussed. These collisions will occur at velocities of 10 km/s or more and can be damaging to the external wall elements of the Space Station. The wall elements need to be designed to protect the pressurized modules of the Space Station from functional or structural failure due to these collisions at hypervelocities for a given environment and population of meteoroids and space debris. The design and analysis approach and the associated computer program presented is to achieve this objective, including the optimization of the design for a required overall probability of no penetration. The approach is based on the presently available experimental and actual data on meteoroids and space debris flux and damage assessments and the empirical relationships resulting from the hypervelocity impact studies in laboratories.

Batla, F. A.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Evaluation of detectability and distinguishability of aircraft control element failures using flight test data

This paper examines the detectability and distinguishability of control element failures on the B-737 aircraft. The results of Weiss (1985) are used to define decentralized residuals from analytic redundancy relationships, and the results of Weiss et al. (1984) are used to define the probabilistic distance measures which provide bounds on the minimum achievable probabilities or error. The residual signals are then generated using data which were recorded during a landing approach of the NASA-Langley Advanced Transport Operations (ATOPS) transportation systems research vehicle (TSRV). The distance measures are computed using estimates of the statistics of these residual signals.

Weiss, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗