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DOE OSTI2022

Vitrification of Hanford Tank 241-AP-101 Waste and Simulant

Hanford tank 241-AP-101 (referred to herein as AP-101) is the second Hanford radioactive tank waste planned to be processed and vitrified. A simulant version of AP 101 waste was formulated from the best-basis inventory (BBI) for the Hanford Tank 241-AP-101 liquid with an assumed target dilution of the waste from the BBI sodium molarity of 8.61 M to the desired 5.5 M Na. After the addition of glass-forming chemicals (GFCs), the simulant melter feed was processed in a non-radioactive, continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM) system. The AP-101 simulant melter feed was charged into the CLSM for 6.11 h of processing, which produced 6.55 kg of glass, for an average glass production rate of 2275 kg m 2 d -1 . Since there were no processing issues with the AP-101 simulant melter feed, AP-101 melter feed made with actual waste was then processed in a CLSM system built into a contamination area in a radioactive environment. The melting behavior characteristics appeared similar for both the simulant and waste melter feeds. The AP-101 waste melter feed was charged into the CLSM for 12.14 h of processing, which produced 8.75 kg of glass, for an average glass production rate of 1530 kg m 2 d -1 . During the AP-101 waste melter feed charging, the pump used to move the feed reached a maximum and it is believed that if the pump had a greater capacity, a greater average glass production rate could have been achieved. A constituent of interest present in low quantities in the AP-101 waste is 99 Tc or its non-radioactive surrogate, Re, added to the AP-101 simulant. Analysis for the quantities of 99 Tc and Re in the AP-101 glass product resulted in an average single-pass retention from the melter feed during relative chemical steady state of 55 ± 2 % for 99 Tc and 45 ± 2 % for Re. Compared to the processing of other melter feeds, the retention of 99 Tc in the AP-101 glass was greater than in both AP-107 and AP-105 glass, while the retention of Re in the AP-101 was less than in the AP-107 glass, but greater than in the AP-105 glass. A spike of I was added into the AP-101 melter feed that could be detected above the analysis detection limits. However, the iodine was only detectable above the ~6 ppm limit in one glass pour: the pour immediately following the burn off of the cold cap, where the I level reached ~30 ppm. This event was significant because the glass was poured immediately after burn off and thus it is presumed that the iodine had yet to volatilize from the glass melt while idling. It is recommended to perform future tests with I spikes at greater levels so that it can be detected in additional glass pours to determine if the expected 50 % retention of I used in the Kim et al. glass models can be confirmed. Offgas liquid samples were analyzed for acetonitrile, which was present at greater concentrations in CLSM liquids than in other scaled melter systems. This result was expected based on unique conditions with the CLSM system including a small plenum space leading to low residence time for offgas and the rapidity of offgas cooling upon exiting the CLSM vessel due to the location and environment. About 90 % of the total acetonitrile captured during both the AP-101 simulant and waste CLSM runs was found in the offgas condensate and demister liquids, thus it is recommended that only those liquids be sent for analysis if future testing to study the presence of acetonitrile in offgas products is desired.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Liquid Salt Combined-Cycle Pilot Plant Design

The work described in this report is responsive to the Office of Fossil Energy program ‘Energy Storage for Fossil Power Generation.’ This Phase I report has been prepared by Pintail Power LLC, with support from Nexant ECA, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Southern Company Services as a deliverable for the U.S. Department of Energy for NETL Award DE-FE-00320016. The Liquid Salt Combined Cycle™ (LSCC™) technology provides large-scale energy storage integrated with Fossil Electric Generating Units (FEGUs) to meet critical needs in the energy transition by providing: • the lowest cost large-scale storage for time-shifting of renewable energy, • superior fuel efficiency to reduce GHGs from dispatchable resources, • flexible capacity and ramping to balance variability of wind and solar resources, • essential grid stability services to assure reliability of a low-carbon grid. The LSCC approach: • employs equipment that has already been proven in utility service, • uses safe, non-toxic, non-degrading, perpetual-life storage medium, • leverages and repurposes existing FEGU assets, • expands the value stack of energy storage to reduce market, financing, and commodity risks. Pintail Power has developed the LSCC technology to meet the need for reliable, efficient, and cost-effective integration of Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) into a low-carbon electric grid by coupling proven thermal energy storage with proven gas turbines, steam turbines, and heat transfer equipment. This novel approach is intended to address the key issues facing the grid and operators of renewable and fossil generating units including: • Overgeneration and curtailment of renewables, • Need for fast ramping dispatchable resources, • Improved efficiency and flexibility of fossil units, • Additional peaking capacity to support electrification of transportation and heating, • Provision of reliability services to support high penetration of VRE, especially synchronous inertia and fast frequency response. A Technology Readiness assessment by EPRI confirmed that LSCC technology consists of commercially proven hardware used in industrial and utility applications. Although the novel LSCC approach has not yet been demonstrated as a complete system, interfaces between major components have been conservatively specified. A Phase III pilot is planned to demonstrate equipment integration and operation. The patented innovation is removal of the evaporator section from the exhaust heat recovery system, with the evaporation performed by stored energy in a separate steam generator. This arrangement couples renewable and fossil power generation via long-duration energy storage to deliver cost, performance, and operational synergies, including superior charging and discharging flexibility, reduced fuel consumption and lower CO 2 emissions compared to conventional Combined Cycle Power Plants, and low-cost, large-scale energy storage. The LSCC technology is composed of proven equipment integrated with gas turbine exhaust heat in a novel system. During charging, electric heaters raise the salt temperature as it flows from the Cold Salt Tank to the Hot Salt Tank. During discharging, hot salt produces steam from feedwater that is heated with gas turbine exhaust, which also superheats steam to drive a steam turbine. LSCC technology can be added to any combustion-turbine to integrate renewable energy, provide needed grid services, and increase the value of fossil electric generating units based on the technology’s following attributes: • Long-duration storage enables time-shifting of VRE to avoid curtailment and impairment of renewable assets. • Long storage duration combined with fast-charging capability increases arbitrage opportunities by storing more energy when the price is low and discharging more hours when the price is high. • Long storage duration allows resource adequacy to be supplied across multiple days to increase reliability and reduce risk. • The stored energy reduces fuel heat rate and GHG emissions, and increases merit, so the LSCC dispatches earlier and longer to increase the plant’s capacity factor and asset value. • The stored energy enables pre-heating and startup of the steam cycle, without operating the gas turbine, to enable fast startup and ramping when dispatched for discharge. • The steam turbine can operate without the gas turbine so it can provide valuable synchronous inertia during charging without consuming fuel. • Fast frequency response and regulation services can be provided during charging using solid-state heater and pump controls to vary the charge power input in response to grid signals. • The LSCC system can be configured for resilience including black start, islanded/micro-grid operation, and even self-recharging of storage using either gas turbine power or gas turbine exhaust heat. The commercialization plan is to add LSCC technology to existing simple cycle gas turbine power plants with the 50MW GE LM6000 aero-derivative gas turbine as the reference design basis. A Techno-economic assessment of the reference design evaluated the benefits (Levelized Avoided Cost of Energy) and costs (Levelized Cost of Energy). The plant definition included all major systems and budgetary vendor quotes. Pintail Power and NexantECA developed the overall cost estimate for the LSCC plant up to the total plant cost level, following the DOE-NETL cost estimate guidelines at AACE Class 3 (-20%/+30%). This includes the equipment cost, bulk material, direct and indirect labor costs to arrive at the bare erected cost. Engineering costs are factored from the BEC and added to it to arrive at the EPC cost. Process and project contingencies were then factored from the EPC cost and rolled-up to yield the total plant cost of $\$$184 million for 1746 MWh of discharge electricity. • At $\$$105/kWh, the reference plant costs less than any of the Energy Storage Systems evaluated by PNNL in 2020 for the Energy Storage Grand Challenge. Operations and Maintenance cost estimates were scaled from combined cycle practice, assuming that the LSCC unit was co-located with and sharing some labor expense with other units, to arrive at $\$$2.2 million per year. Plant economics were evaluated using prices from the ERCOT Day-Ahead Market for calendar year 2019 (excluding the market disruptions from the COVID pandemic and the February 2020 deep freeze event). Assuming economic dispatch in the ERCOT Day-Ahead market, the reference plant capacity factor would have discharged for 2777 hours at 91.9 MW, a 31.66% capacity factor, with a marginal cost of $\$$25.59/MWh, and a LACE of $\$$82.41/MWh. Fixed charges were calculated according to EIA guidelines to arrive at an LCOE of $\$$83.48. The benefit-to-cost ratio of 0.99 suggests that the reference plant would have been cost-effective and competitive in the market. EPRI interviewed selected utilities to gauge the need for, applicability of and interest in the LSCC system. Several utilities are currently managing increased load growth along with the inclusion of increasing levels of renewable generation, putting pressure on conventional generation by requiring increased turndown requirements and ultimately lower capacity factors. All of the utilities interviewed have CO 2 reduction targets in the 2030-2050 timeframe that will severely limit the participation of fossil generation and require better utilization of carbon free generation. While there is limited opportunity for storage in the current markets, the utilities interviewed stated that there will be a substantial need for long duration energy storage in the future given the expected trends. Utilizing an energy storage system will generally be preferred over new gas capacity in some cases, with the capabilities of the LSCC system being a potential option for retrofit to existing simple cycle gas turbine units, allowing them to deliver greater participation in the market with lower carbon intensity. A technology gap assessment and technology maturation plan identified a pilot-scale demonstration as the final step before commercialization. Key gaps to be addressed during the Phase II FEED (Front-End Engineering Design) are component selection and design, commissioning procedures, and operational procedures and the control system for LSCC charging and discharging. The project team has been expanded to include Wood Group PLC as EPC. The proposed Phase II work leads to a pilot-scale engineering demonstration (TRL 6) to be conducted at Southern Company’s Plant Rowan, where the prototype system will perform “all the functions that will be required of the operational system.” The proposed pilot will facilitate commercialization (TRL-9) by scale-up to utility-scale systems integrated with peaking GTs or directly to facility scale systems using industrial GTs. The conceptual design for the pilot plant focuses on the novel integration aspects of LSCC technology. A slipstream of gas turbine exhaust will feed a waste heat recovery unit coupled to a molten salt steam generator heated by stored energy. The pilot is intended to demonstrate all key operating modes of the LSCC technology during charging, discharging and standby. The pilot equipment will be approximately one-seventh scale of the LM6000 commercial target and is expected to have commercial off-ramp potential for facility-scale applications.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2020

BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Acquisition and Testing to Support DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project

The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) within the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) campaign to conduct research and development (R&D) activities related to the storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The SFWST program was created within SFWD to address issues of extended or long-term SNF storage and transportation. Some near-term objectives of SFWST are to use a science-based, engineering-driven approach to: Support the enhancement of the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure dry storage of SNF for extended periods; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for retrieving SNF after extended dry storage; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for transporting high burnup (HBU) fuel and transporting low burnup fuel and HBU fuel after dry storage DOE-NE, in partnership with the Electric Power Research Institute, developed the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project to perform a large-scale demonstration and laboratory-scale testing of HBU pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels (exceeding 45 gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium [GWd/MTU]). Under this project, 25 sister rods—which are rods that have the same design, power histories, and other characteristics—were removed from assemblies at the North Anna Nuclear Power Station and sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in January 2016. ORNL performed detailed nondestructive examination (NDE) on all 25 rods. The NDE consisted of visual examinations, gamma and neutron scanning, profilometry and rod length measurements, and eddy current examinations. After completing the NDE, 10 of the sister rods were delivered to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in a NAC International, Inc. legal-weight truck cask in September 2018 for destructive examination (DE). To date, SFWD work has focused on the PWR fuel that is part of the Sister Rod Test program. No boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel has been tested in the program, and the data needs that were identified for the PWR fuel have not been collected for BWR fuel. The goal to obtain six to nine BWR rods and test them at ORNL will support closing this important data gap. BWR fuel comprises approximately 56% of the total fuel assemblies currently in storage at nuclear power plants in the United States. BWR nuclear fuel and cladding designs and manufacturing are significantly different from PWRs. Differences include the following: BWR fuel pellets are larger than PWR pellets; Variations of Zircaloy-2 (including liners) are used instead of the Zircaloy-4 cladding materials used in PWRs; Clad manufacturing and stress-relief processes are different between PWRs and BWRs; The fuel rod dimensions are different because larger rod diameters and thicker cladding are used in BWRs; BWR fuel typically has lower internal rod pressures and sees vastly different operating conditions than PWR fuel (i.e., two-phase flow); BWR assemblies are “canned,” meaning each assembly is surrounded by a metal fuel channel; BWR cladding is often composed of an inner pure Zr liner that has widely different mechanical properties than the Zircaloy-2 alloy and exhibits a stronger affinity for hydrogen; The BWR SNF generally has more total hydrogen in the cladding/liner than typical PWR fuel; The construction of the PWR and BWR assemblies is vastly different; BWR rods are solidly attached to the assembly nozzles and experience a much different vibration and shock load than PWR rods, which are “floating” within a grid system attached to guide tubes, and the rods sit loosely on the bottom end plates. These numerous differences will affect the way the BWR SNF responds under dry storage preparation processes (e.g., vacuum drying) and during transportation. The results collected in the PWR experimental program must be compared with a subset of similar data collected on BWR SNF to establish a technical basis for whether the larger PWR database is sufficient to bound the BWR SNF end-of-life conditions as is currently assumed for several fuel/clad properties. Changes that occur in both fuel types at HBU could exacerbate any mechanical property differences. As the fuel burnup increases, several changes occur that might affect the performance of the fuel, cladding, and assembly hardware in storage and transportation. These changes include increased cladding corrosion layer thickness, increased cladding hydrogen content, increased cladding creep strains, increased fission gas release, and the formation of the HBU structure at the surface of the fuel pellets. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits the current maximum rod-averaged burnup to 62 GWd/MTU due to these changes and the lack of data at higher burnups.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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