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At least 901 records · Page 50

Simulating Ordinary Chondrite (Tamdakht) Ablation at the Hypersonic Materials Environmental Test System (HyMETS) Facility.

NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD) created the Asteroid Threat Assessment Project (ATAP) to inform decision-makers of risks associated with Potentially Hazardous Objects (PHOs), which may pose an existential threat to human civilization. ATAP assesses risk, in part, by developing analytical physics-based damage models which draw upon data collected during material property characterization efforts, entry simulations, hazard simulations, and ground-based arc-jet testing. Therefore, a pathfinder test campaign was con-ducted at the Hypersonic Materials Environmental Test System (HyMETS) at the NASA Langley Re-search Center to investigate the ablation mechanisms of an ordinary chondrite (Tamdakht H5) and a terrestrial analog (basalt). The HyMETS facility is a 400 kW constricted arc heater used to screen material performance under simulated aerothermal conditions of hypersonic flow.1 Facility conditions were chosen to simulate Earth entry conditions be-tween the upper-mesosphere and the lower thermo-sphere. The ablation mechanisms of Tamdakht and bas-alt are illustrated with still images collected from high-speed video cameras (fig. 1, Tamdakht). Tamdakht produces a relatively stable melt flow, as evidenced by the perpetual growth of a flange at the sidewall and the exiguous detachment of molten material into the flow. Furthermore, an inspection of high-speed video and chemical analysis of the post-test melt layer suggests that the dominant mode of mass loss for Tamdakht, at these test conditions, is expressed through the vaporization of volatiles (e.g., iron, potassium, sodium, phosphorus, and sulfur). The vaporization rates of Tamdakht are greater than basalt under the most extreme test conditions, which leads to an enhanced blowing layer, in-creased thermal shielding, and reduced recession. The ablation mechanisms of basalt are markedly different from Tamdakht and are attributed to the presence of hydrated minerals dispersed at irregular intervals throughout the silicate matrix. Rapid de-composition of secondary minerals and the subsequent formation of water lead to the ejection of the subsurface and overlying melt layer. Furthermore, the presence of water is suspected of lowering the viscosity of the melt layer resulting in increased mass loss near the edge of the test article where drag forces overcome rheological properties (fig. 1, bas-alt). Finally, the results will be discussed in the broader context of meteorite-based material response model development and the potential impact on the Asteroid Threat Assessment Project (ATAP).

Brody K. Bessire↗

Aviation 2072: Scenario Planning for Wicked Problems

The world is changing rapidly. And with it, so are the potential futures for humanity. Many of these potential futures pose hidden threats, while others offer new opportunities for aviation and the broader aerospace community. To mitigate these risks and capitalize on opportunities, organizations must work to deeply understand these potential future scenarios and uncover any underlying drivers. Organizations will be more equipped and informed when making strategic investment decisions by better understanding these threats, opportunities, and drivers . The future scenarios and their threats and opportunities described in this paper were identified through a series of extensive brainstorming workshops, collectively titled MADNESS (Mapping for Aviation Driven by Needs Emergence and Satiating Society). These workshops engaged NASA civil servants and contractors with diverse backgrounds through a facilitated process of future scenario development and critique. The participants were led through exercises focused on a time horizon spanning from 2022 to 2072 and on problems that aviation might solve and or create during this period. From the broad results, two patterns of critical uncertainty emerged: “availability” (scarcity versus abundance) and “transparency” (openness versus security and privacy). The successful iteration and ideation across the MADNESS workshops also suggests a repeatable mechanism for strategic risk exploration across a variety of NASA and industry stakeholders.

Mapping↗

Limiting Future Proliferation and Security Risks

A major new technical tool for evaluation of proliferation and security risks has emerged over the past decade as part the activities of the Generation IV International Forum. The tool has been developed by a consensus group from participating countries and organizations and is termed the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Evaluation Methodology. The methodology defines a set of challenges, analyzes system response to these challenges, and assesses outcomes. The challenges are the threats posed by potential actors (proliferant states or sub-national adversaries). It is of paramount importance in an evaluation to establish the objectives, capabilities, resources, and strategies of the adversary as well as the design and protection contexts. Technical and institutional characteristics are both used to evaluate the response of the system and to determine its resistance against proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and terrorism threats. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of a set of measures, which thereby define the PR&PP characteristics of the system. This paper summarizes results of applications of the methodology to nuclear energy systems including reprocessing facilities and large and small modular reactors. The use of the methodology in the design phase a facility will be discussed as it applies to future safeguards concepts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Methodology Development and Applications of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation.

We present an overview of the program on the evaluation methodology for proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) of advanced nuclear energy systems (NESs) sponsored by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). For a proposed NES design, the methodology defines a set of challenges, analyzes system response to these challenges, and assesses outcomes. The challenges to the NES are the threats posed by potential actors (proliferant States or sub-national adversaries). The characteristics of Generation IV systems, both technical and institutional, are used to evaluate the response of the system and to determine its resistance against proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and terrorism threats. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of a set of measures, which are the high-level PR&PP characteristics of the NES. The methodology is organized to allow evaluations to be performed at the earliest stages of system design and to become more detailed and more representative as the design progresses. It can thus be used to enable a program in safeguards by design or to enhance the conceptual design process of an NES with regard to intrinsic features for PR&PP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Data Analysis

Analysis of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. A self-appraisal helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) fault tree was developed to depict the failure of the MPC&A system as a result of poor practices and random failures in the MC&A system. It can also be employed as a basis for assessing deliberate threats against a facility. MSET uses fault tree analysis, which is a top-down approach to examining system failure. The analysis starts with identifying a potential undesirable event called a 'top event' and then determining the ways it can occur (e.g., 'Fail To Maintain Nuclear Materials Under The Purview Of The MC&A System'). The analysis proceeds by determining how the top event can be caused by individual or combined lower level faults or failures. These faults, which are the causes of the top event, are 'connected' through logic gates. The MSET model uses AND-gates and OR-gates and propagates the effect of event failure using Boolean algebra. To enable the fault tree analysis calculations, the basic events in the fault tree are populated with probability risk values derived by conversion of questionnaire data to numeric values. The basic events are treated as independent variables. This assumption affects the Boolean algebraic calculations used to calculate results. All the necessary calculations are built into the fault tree codes, but it is often useful to estimate the probabilities manually as a check on code functioning. The probability of failure of a given basic event is the probability that the basic event primary question fails to meet the performance metric for that question. The failure probability is related to how well the facility performs the task identified in that basic event over time (not just one performance or exercise). Fault tree calculations provide a failure probability for the top event in the fault tree. The basic fault tree calculations establish a baseline relative risk value for the system. This probability depicts relative risk, not absolute risk. Subsequent calculations are made to evaluate the change in relative risk that would occur if system performance is improved or degraded. During the development effort of MSET, the fault tree analysis program used was SAPHIRE. SAPHIRE is an acronym for 'Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations.' Version 1 of the SAPHIRE code was sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1987 as an innovative way to draw, edit, and analyze graphical fault trees primarily for safe operation of nuclear power reactors. When the fault tree calculations are performed, the fault tree analysis program will produce several reports that can be used to analyze the MPC&A system. SAPHIRE produces reports showing risk importance factors for all basic events in the operational MC&A system. The risk importance information is used to examine the potential impacts when performance of certain basic events increases or decreases. The initial results produced by the SAPHIRE program are considered relative risk values. None of the results can be interpreted as absolute risk values since the basic event probability values represent estimates of risk associated with the performance of MPC&A tasks throughout the material balance area (MBA). The RRR for a basic event represents the decrease in total system risk that would result from improvement of that one event to a perfect performance level. Improvement of the basic event with the greatest RRR value produces a greater decrease in total system risk than improvement of any other basic event. Basic events with the greatest potential for system risk reduction are assigned performance improvement values, and new fault tree calculations show the improvement in total system risk. The operational impact or cost-effectiveness from implementing the performance improvements can then be evaluated. The improvements being evaluated can be system performance improvements, or they can be potential, or actual, upgrades to the system. The RIR for a basic event represents the increase in total system risk that would result from failure of that one event. Failure of the basic event with the greatest RIR value produces a greater increase in total system risk than failure of any other basic event. Basic events with the greatest potential for system risk increase are assigned failure performance values, and new fault tree calculations show the increase in total system risk. This evaluation shows the importance of preventing performance degradation of the basic events. SAPHIRE identifies combinations of basic events where concurrent failure of the events results in failure of the top event.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Summary

An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system. The MSET process is divided into four distinct and separate parts: (1) Completion of the questionnaire that assembles information about the operations of every aspect of the MPC&A system; (2) Conversion of questionnaire data into numeric values associated with risk; (3) Analysis of the numeric data utilizing the MPC&A fault tree and the SAPHIRE computer software; and (4) Self-assessment using the MSET reports to perform the effectiveness evaluation of the facility's MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. If the need for system improvements or upgrades is indicated when the system is analyzed, MSET provides the capability to evaluate potential or actual system improvements or upgrades. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time. The system can be reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential system improvement can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance and reveals where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk. The functional model, the system risk assessment tool, and the facility evaluation questionnaire are valuable educational tools for MPC&A personnel. These educational tools provide a framework for ongoing dialogue between organizations regarding the design, development, implementation, operation, assessment, and sustainability of MPC&A systems. An organization considering the use of MSET as an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of its MPC&A system will benefit from conducting a complete MSET exercise at an existing nuclear facility.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Detecting insider activity using enhanced directory virtualization.

Insider threats often target authentication and access control systems, which are frequently based on directory services. Detecting these threats is challenging, because malicious users with the technical ability to modify these structures often have sufficient knowledge and expertise to conceal unauthorized activity. The use of directory virtualization to monitor various systems across an enterprise can be a valuable tool for detecting insider activity. The addition of a policy engine to directory virtualization services enhances monitoring capabilities by allowing greater flexibility in analyzing changes for malicious intent. The resulting architecture is a system-based approach, where the relationships and dependencies between data sources and directory services are used to detect an insider threat, rather than simply relying on point solutions. This paper presents such an architecture in detail, including a description of implementation results.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Promoting Improved Ballistic Resistance of Transparent Armor

Transparent armor is a material or system of materials designed to be optically transparent, yet protect from fragmentation or ballistic impacts. Although engineered to defeat specific threats, or a range of threats, there are general requirements common to all of these designs. The primary requirement for a transparent armor system is to not only defeat the designated threat but also provide a multi-hit capability with minimized distortion of surrounding areas. Ground platforms have several parameters that must be optimized, such as weight, space efficiency, and cost versus performance. Glass exhibits tensile failure stress that is very much dependent on the amount of material being stressed, the side being tensile-stressed (i.e., air-versus tin-side if a float glass), and where it is being tensile stressed (i.e., in the middle or near an edge). An axiom arising from those effects is a greater amount of allowable deflection (i.e., higher failure stress) of a ballistically impacted transparent armor will result in improved ballistic resistance. Therefore, the interpretation and management of those tensile-failure-stress dependencies shall ultimately improve ballistic resistance and its predictability of transparent armor. Each of those three dependencies (size, side, and location) in a soda-lime silicate glass is described.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The emerging multi-polar world and China's grand game

This talk outlines a scenario describing an emerging multipolar world that is aligned with geographical regions. The stability and security of this multipolar world is examined with respect to demographics, trade (economics), resource constraints, and development. In particular I focus on Asia which has two large countries, China and India, competing for resources and markets and examine the emerging regional relations, opportunities and threats. These relationships must overcome many hurdles - the Subcontinent is in a weak position politically and strategically and faces many threats, and China's growing power could help stabilize it or create new threats. Since the fate of 1.5 billion (2.4 billion by 2050) people depends on how the Subcontinent evolves, this talk is meant to initiates a discussion of what China and India can do to help the region develop and stabilize.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Evaluation of Machine Learning Methods to Detect Malicious SCADA Communications

Critical infrastructure Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were designed to operate on closed, proprietary networks where a malicious insider posed the greatest threat potential. The centralization of control and the movement towards open systems and standards has improved the efficiency of industrial control, but has also exposed legacy SCADA systems to security threats that they were not designed to mitigate. This work explores the viability of machine learning methods in detecting the new threat scenarios of command and data injection. Similar to network intrusion detection systems in the cyber security domain, the command and control communications in a critical infrastructure setting are monitored, and vetted against examples of benign and malicious command traffic, in order to identify potential attack events. Multiple learning methods are evaluated using a dataset of Remote Terminal Unit communications, which included both normal operations and instances of command and data injection attack scenarios.

critical infrastructure protection↗

Human Reliability Program Workshop

A Human Reliability Program (HRP) is designed to protect national security as well as worker and public safety by continuously evaluating the reliability of those who have access to sensitive materials, facilities, and programs. Some elements of a site HRP include systematic (1) supervisory reviews, (2) medical and psychological assessments, (3) management evaluations, (4) personnel security reviews, and (4) training of HRP staff and critical positions. Over the years of implementing an HRP, the Department of Energy (DOE) has faced various challenges and overcome obstacles. During this 4-day activity, participants will examine programs that mitigate threats to nuclear security and the insider threat to include HRP, Nuclear Security Culture (NSC) Enhancement, and Employee Assistance Programs. The focus will be to develop an understanding of the need for a systematic HRP and to discuss challenges and best practices associated with mitigating the insider threat.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Home Ignition Assessment Model Applied to Structures in the Wildland-Urban Interface

The issue of exterior fire threat to buildings, from either wildfires in the wildland-urban interface or neighboring structure fires, is critically important. To address this, theWildfire Ignition Resistant Home Design (WIRHD) program was initiated. The WIRHD program developed a tool, theWildFIREWizard, that will allow homeowners to estimate the external fire threat to their homes based on specific features and characteristics of the homes and yards. The software then makes recommendations to reduce the threat. The inputs include the structural and material features of the home and information about any ignition sources or flammable objects in its immediate vicinity, known as the home ignition zone. The tool comprises an ignition assessment model that performs explicit calculations of the radiant and convective heating of the building envelope from the potential ignition sources. This article describes a series of material ignition and flammability tests that were performed to calibrate and/or validate the ignition assessment model. The tests involved exposing test walls with different external siding types to radiant heating and/or direct flame contact.The responses of the test walls were used to determine the conditions leading to melting, ignition, or any other mode of failure of the walls. Temperature data were used to verify the model predictions of temperature rises and ignition times of the test walls.

Biswas, Kaushik↗

ARAM-W Automated Risk Assessment Methodology for Water and Wastewater

The Automated Risk Assessment Methodology for Water and Wastewater Utilities, ARAM-W, is a systematic, risk-based approach used to evaluate water and wastewater utilities from a range of threats that could cause an undesired event. It leverages the automated RAM-CI (critical infrastructure) prototype tool completed in September 2008, the manual RC RAM-W (RAMCAP compliant) approach completed in September 2007, the manual RAM-W, version 2, approach completed in 2002, and the requirements and needs of the Water Sector, EPA and DHS. The ARAM-W tool is a user-friendly tool which provides a sound scientific and technical framework to look at the total protection system. The ARAM-W tool provides the user the ability to determine a relative risk based on the threat, consequences and protection system effectiveness/vulnerability. It is a stand-alone PC-based tool which is compatible with the NIPP risk assessment methodology criteria as well as RAMPCAP. The ARAM-W process provides through a series of steps the ability to plan for the risk assessment; characterize the utility, facilities and assets; define the threat; identify undesired events and consequences; evaluate protection system effectiveness; determine risk; propose and evaluate upgrades if the risk is not acceptable and report on the assessment results.

Dang, Tam↗

A Methodology for Dynamic Security Risk Quantification and Optimal Resource Allocation of Security Assets

In this presentation we overview a methodology for dynamic security risk quantification and optimal resource allocation of security assets for high profile venues. This methodology is especially applicable to venues that require security screening operations such as mass transit (e.g., train or airport terminals), critical infrastructure protection (e.g., government buildings), and largescale public events (e.g., concerts or professional sports). The method starts by decomposing the three core components of risk -- threat, vulnerability, and consequence -- into their various subcomponents. For instance, vulnerability can be decomposed into availability, accessibility, organic security, and target hardness and each of these can be evaluated against the potential threats of interest for the given venue. Once evaluated, these subcomponents are rolled back up to compute the specific value for the vulnerability core risk component. Likewise, the same is done for consequence and threat, and then risk is computed as the product of these three components. A key aspect of our methodology is dynamically quantifying risk. That is, we incorporate the ability to uniquely allow the subcomponents and core components, and in turn, risk, to be quantified as a continuous function of time throughout the day, week, month, or year as appropriate.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

IMPLEMENTING CYBERSECURITY INTO AN EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMME – A CASE STUDY

Cyber threat profiling and risk mitigation is critical to any nuclear state organization and should be considered as part of any comprehensive nuclear security programme. Defining and evaluating the impact of the cyber threat to mission can be challenging. An existing national nuclear non-proliferation organization undertook an effort to incorporate computer security activities into its programme to address cyber risk. One of the primary goals of this endeavour was to develop a set of prioritised recommendations for organizational follow-through. The organization dedicated subject matter expert resources in the form of a cyber task force to support this goal. Opportunities were identified where computer security could be built into each programme including office-level strategies and tools. Of course, no new identified threat vector is easily considered and incorporated into existing programmes without impact. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Technically literate subject matter experts are difficult to find, management has comparatively less experience applying computer security into its programmes, and trying to change the culture to consider computer security risk at policy and programmatic levels takes time and management attention. As an outcome of this process, a roadmap for program integration was developed, including the establishment of a cyber support team. This paper will discuss the challenges and successes associated with establishing such a team.

Cyber Security, Nuclear, Non-proliferation↗

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

Source record↗

Development and Examination of a Proliferation Trade Risk Metric

A Proliferation Trade Risk metric has been calculated for each country represented in a publicly-available trade dataset. This metric, comprising both direct and indirect proliferation trade risk components, represents the risk that each country’s proliferation-relevant exports will go to a designated set of proliferation threat countries. This metric can serve to prioritize nonproliferation export control capacity building engagement. Further, within such engagement, the decomposition of the proliferation trade risk metric can identify specific industrial sectors and trade relationships of greatest importance for outreach and enforcement measures. Finally, these supply-side perspectives can be complemented by threat-based profiles identifying the most important suppliers to each threat country.

export control, trade analysis↗