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Use of DRACS to Enhance HTGRs Passive Safety and Economy

This paper discusses the use of DRACS to Enhance HTGRs Passive Safety and Economy. One of the important requirements for Gen. IV High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors (HTGR) is passive safety. Currently all the HTGR designs use Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) for passive decay heat removal. [1] The decay heat first is transferred to core barrel by conduction and radiation, and then to reactor vessel by thermal radiation and convection; finally the decay heat is transferred to natural circulated air or water systems. RVACS can be characterized as a surface based decay heat removal system. Similar concepts have been widely used in sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) designs, advanced light water reactors like AP1000. The RVACS is especially suitable for smaller power reactors since small systems have relatively larger surface area. RVACS tends to be less expensive. However, it limits the largest achievable power level for modular HTGRs due to the mismatch between the reactor power (proportional to volume) and decay heat removal capability (proportional to surface). When the relative decay heat removal capability is reduced, the peak fuel temperature increases, even close to the design limit. Annual designs with internal reflector can mitigate this effect therefore further increase the power. Another way to increase power is to increase power density. However, it is also limited by the decay heat removal capability. Besides safety, HTGRs also need to be economical in order to compete with other reactor designs. The limit of decay heat removal capability set by using RVACS has affected the economy of HTGRs. Forsberg [2] pointed out other disadvantages of using RVACS such as conflicting functional requirements for the reactor vessel and scaling distortion for integral effect test of the system performance. A potential alternative solution is to use a volume based passive decay removal system, call Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Systems (DRACS), to remove or mitigate the limitation on decay heat removal capability. DRACS has been widely used in SFR designs and in liquid salt cooled high temperature reactors. The containment cooling system in BWR is another example of volume based decay removal systems. DRACS composes of natural circulation loops with two sets of heat exchangers, one in reactor side and another is in environment side. DRACS has the benefits of increasing the power as needed (scalability) and modularity. This paper introduces the concept of using DRACS to enhance HTGRs passive safety and economy.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Safer Nuclear Enterprise - Application to Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES)(U)

Activities and infrastructure that support nuclear weapons are facing significant challenges. Despite an admirable record and firm commitment to make safety a primary criterion in weapons design, production, handling, and deployment - there is growing apprehension about terrorist acquiring weapons or nuclear material. At the NES Workshop in May 2012, Scott Sagan, who is a proponent of the normal accident cycle, presented. Whether a proponent of the normal accident cycle or High Reliability Organizations - we have to be diligent about our safety record. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain our admirable safety record and commitment to Nuclear Explosive Safety.

ACCIDENTS↗

Institutional glovebox safety committee (IGSC) annual report FY2010

The Institutional Glovebox Safety Committee (IGSC) was chartered to minimize and/or prevent glovebox operational events. Highlights of the IGSC's third year are discussed. The focus of this working committee is to address glovebox operational and safety issues and to share Lessons Learned, best practices, training improvements, and glovebox glove breach and failure data. Highlights of the IGSC's third year are discussed. The results presented in this annual report are pivotal to the ultimate focus of the glovebox safety program, which is to minimize work-related injuries and illnesses. This effort contributes to the LANL Continuous Improvement Program by providing information that can be used to improve glovebox operational safety.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Hands-On Criticality Safety Training at Sandia National Laboratories.

The US Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has supported hands-on criticality safety training at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the past and more recently at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These courses have provided a practical understanding of the processes involved in nuclear criticality through laboratory exercises for a large number of students over many years. The NCSP sponsored the development of an expanded training course for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers that includes a one-week session of classroom training to be offered at LANL and two equivalent one-week hands-on training sessions at the critical experiment facility at the Nevada National Security Site and at the critical experiment facility at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) The class is now being offered as part of the training for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers. This paper describes the critical experiment training course offered at SNL.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Technology Solutions Case Study: Combustion Safety for Appliances Using Indoor Air

This case study describes how to assess and carry out the combustion safety procedures for appliances and heating equipment that uses indoor air for combustion in low-rise residential buildings. Only appliances installed in the living space, or in an area freely communicating with the living space, vented alone or in tandem with another appliance are considered here. This document is for inspectors, auditors, and technicians working in homes where energy upgrades are being conducted whether or not air infiltration control is included in the package of measures being applied. In the indoor combustion air case, guidelines summarized here are based on language provided in several of the codes to establish minimum requirements for the space using simplified prescriptive measures. In addition, building performance testing procedures are provided by testing agencies. The codes in combination with the test procedures offer comprehensive combustion safety coverage to address safety concerns, allowing inexperienced residential energy retrofit inspectors to effectively address combustion safety issues and allow energy retrofits to proceed.

Building America↗

Building America Case Study: Combustion Safety Simplified Test Protocol, Chicago Illinois, and Minneapolis, Minnesota

"9Combustion safety is an important step in the process of upgrading homes for energy efficiency. There are several approaches used by field practitioners, but researchers have indicated that the test procedures in use are complex to implement and provide too many false positives. Field failures often mean that the house is not upgraded until after remediation or not at all, if not include in the program. In this report the PARR and NorthernSTAR DOE Building America Teams provide a simplified test procedure that is easier to implement and should produce fewer false positives. A survey of state weatherization agencies on combustion safety issues, details of a field data collection instrumentation package, summary of data collected over seven months, data analysis and results are included. The project provides several key results. State weatherization agencies do not generally track combustion safety failures, the data from those that do suggest that there is little actual evidence that combustion safety failures due to spillage from non-dryer exhaust are common and that only a very small number of homes are subject to the failures. The project team collected field data on 11 houses in 2015. Of these homes, two houses that demonstrated prolonged and excessive spillage were also the only two with venting systems out of compliance with the National Fuel Gas Code. The remaining homes experienced spillage that only occasionally extended beyond the first minute of operation. Combustion zone depressurization, outdoor temperature, and operation of individual fans all provide statistically significant predictors of spillage.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Development of Criticality Safety Validation Guidance for NRC-Regulated Activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k eff calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1. Inappropriate critical experiment selection 2. Insufficient trending analysis 3. Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties 4. Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis 5. Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses 6. Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data 7. Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites 8. Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty 9. Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses 10. Inadequate validation analysis documentation the final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Differential and Integral Data Evaluation for Titanium: An Application to Criticality Safety

The intent of this work is to highlight the role of differential and integral data evaluation to address issues in connection with criticality safety applications. Demonstration is made by using, as an example, differential data measurements and evaluation, and the benchmark integral experiments for titanium. Energy differential data are measured analyzed and evaluated to produce nuclear data libraries for criticality safety applications. Alternatively, integral experiments are performed at critical facilities, small experimental reactors, and play an important part in the validation of the differential nuclear data. The demonstration provided here for titanium gives its importance to criticality safety. Titanium is an effective neutron absorber that serves as baseline material for chemical separation in high-activity waste solutions in US. Titanium has not been considered for use in nuclear applications such as reactor design and analysis. Rather, it appears as a structural material that may be present in fuel cycle facilities or canisters for transport and disposition of nuclear waste. Criticality safety evaluations of systems in which titanium is present require an understanding of the nuclear data and its uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary safety calculations to improve the design of Molten Salt Fast Reactor

Molten salt reactors are liquid fuel reactors so that they are flexible in operation but very different in the safety approach from solid fuel reactors. This study bears on the specific concept named Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR). Since this new nuclear technology is in development, safety is an essential point to be considered all along the R and D studies. This paper presents the first step of the safety approach: the systematic description of the MSFR, limited here to the main systems surrounding the core. This systematic description is the basis on which we will be able to devise accidental scenarios. Thanks to the negative reactivity feedback coefficient, most accidental scenarios lead to reactor shut down. Because of the decay heat generated in the fuel salt, it must be cooled. After the description of the tools developed to calculate the residual heat, the different contributions are discussed in this study. The decay heat of fission products in the MSFR is evaluated to be low (3% of nominal power), mainly due to the reprocessing that transfers the fission products to the gas reprocessing unit. As a result, the contribution of the actinides is significant (0.5% of nominal power). The unprotected loss of heat sink transients are studied in this paper. It appears that slow transients are favorable (> 1 min) to minimize the temperature increase of the fuel salt. This work will be the basis of further safety studies as well as an essential parameter for the design of the draining system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Renovated Korean nuclear safety and security system: A review and suggestions to successful settlement

Questions of whether past nuclear regulatory body of Korea is not a proper system to monitor and check the country's nuclear energy policy and utilization have been raised. Moreover, a feeling of insecurity regarding nuclear safety after the nuclear accident in Japan has spread across the public. This has stimulated a renovation of the nuclear safety regime in Korea. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) was launched on October 26, 2011 as a regulatory body directly under the President in charge of strengthening independence and nuclear safety. This was a meaningful event as the NSSC it is a much more independent regulatory system for Korea. However, the NSSC itself does not guarantee an enhanced public acceptance of the nuclear policy and stable use nuclear energy. This study introduces the new NSSC system and its details in terms of organization structure, appropriateness of specialty, budget stability, and management system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Continuous Improvement and the Safety Case for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Geologic Repository - 13467

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository 2150 feet (650 m) below the surface of the Chihuahuan desert near Carlsbad, New Mexico. WIPP permanently disposes of transuranic waste from national defense programs. Every five years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) submits an application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to request regulatory-compliance re-certification of the facility for another five years. Every ten years, DOE submits an application to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) for the renewal of its hazardous waste disposal permit. The content of the applications made by DOE to the EPA for re-certification, and to the NMED for permit-renewal, reflect any optimization changes made to the facility, with regulatory concurrence if warranted by the nature of the change. DOE points to such changes as evidence for its having taken seriously its 'continuous improvement' operations and management philosophy. Another opportunity for continuous improvement is to look at any delta that may exist between the re-certification and re-permitting cases for system safety and the consensus advice on the nature and content of a safety case as being developed and published by the Nuclear Energy Agency's Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) expert group. DOE at WIPP, with the aid of its Science Advisor and teammate, Sandia National Laboratories, is in the process of discerning what can be done, in a reasonably paced and cost-conscious manner, to continually improve the case for repository safety that is being made to the two primary regulators on a recurring basis. This paper will discuss some aspects of that delta and potential paths forward to addressing them. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Greening of a Plutonium Facility through Personnel Safety, Operational Efficiency, and Infrastructure Improvements - 12108

Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other hazardous materials account for most activities performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility (TA-55). Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from hazardous materials. These safety features serve to protect workers and provide defense in depth against the hazards associated with operations. Although not designed to specifically meet environmental requirements the safety-based design does meet or exceed the requirements of the environmental regulations enacted during and since its construction. TA-55's Waste Services Group supports this safety methodology by ensuring safe, efficient and compliant management of all radioactive and hazardous wastes generated at the TA-55. A key function of this group is the implementation of measures that lower the overall risk of radiological and hazardous material operations. Processes and procedures that reduce waste generation compared to current, prevalent processes or procedures used for the same purpose are identified. Some of these 'Best Practices' include implementation of a chemical control system, elimination of aerosol cans, reduction in hazardous waste, implementation of zero liquid discharge, and the re-cyclization of nitric acid. P2/WMin opportunities have been implemented in the areas of personnel and facility attributes, environmental compliance, energy conservation, and green focused infrastructure expansion with the overall objective of minimizing raw material and energy consumption and waste generation. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary Long-term Safety Assessment for the Planned LLW Disposal Facility at Al-Tuwaitha, Iraq - 18142

Before 1991, Iraq had a significant nuclear program which encompassed ten nuclear sites spread out across the country. The largest nuclear site was located at the Al-Tuwaitha site near Baghdad where 18 nuclear facilities were concentrated. During the first Gulf War in 1991, all sites suffered significant damage from bombing and subsequent looting. Currently, the Ministry of Science and Technology is responsible for the ten heavily damaged nuclear sites and for the management of radioactive waste in Iraq in general. The task of decommissioning the damaged nuclear facilities and managing the resulting waste is being supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission (EC), and the United States (US). In the framework of its Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), the EC has launched a cooperation project to support the planned construction of an engineered repository for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste for the safe disposal of radioactive waste resulting from the decommissioning activities, as well as for waste from the continuing use of radioisotopes in medicine and the oil and gas industry in the country. The main objectives of this project, which was awarded to a Consortium led by NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and joined by DBE Technology GmbH of Germany and JAVYS a.s. of Slovakia, are the development of an initial conceptual level basic design and preliminary safety assessment report (PSAR) and the subsequent detailed engineering design and supporting pre-construction safety assessment report (PCSAR). The current paper focuses on the development of the PSAR. Special focus is given to the long-term calculations and difficulties associated with the limited data base in regard to site characterization as well as the expected inventory for the future repository. Because of the ongoing security concerns in Iraq, the Ministry of Science and Technology had already selected the Al-Tuwaitha Site as the best suited location for the planned surface repository at the start of the project. Although some site characterization work had already been carried out prior to the start of the project, certain data for modelling the geology and hydrology of the site are still lacking. Missing data have been compensated by conservative assumptions and the assessment of alternative scenarios. Consequently, for the development of the simplified GoldSim{sup R} computer model used to carry out the long-term calculations supporting the PSAR, existing site information was used and, as appropriate, amended or replaced by conservative assumptions. Due to the nature of the waste, data on the expected inventory are associated with large uncertainties. Although certain estimates related to the future volume of the waste exist, little to no information is available on the expected radionuclide vector and respective activities. Therefore, the long-term calculations were carried out for a generic inventory including a broad range of radionuclides that are to be expected as being important considering the kind of waste to be disposed of in the facility. Based on the results of these calculations, the maximum total capacity of the facility was estimated and converted into activity limits for individual radionuclides that will be integrated into the existing general WAC for the facility. Compliance with these WAC will then guarantee the safety of the repository in regard to potential radionuclide releases via the groundwater pathway. In parallel to the determination of activity limits for the WAC, long-term calculations were carried using different estimates for the expected total activity to determine the general suitability of the proposed technical solution of the repository for receiving the total amount of Iraqi radioactive waste principally acceptable for surface disposal. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review of the Safety Analyses of the Konrad Repository - 20530

The Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE) is the license holder of all geological repository sites in Germany since 2017. Besides the construction of the Konrad repository for the emplacement of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the operation of the Asse II mine including the retrieval of the emplaced waste, and the preparation for the closure of the Morsleben repository, BGE is responsible to carry out the operative tasks of selecting a site for a high-level waste (HLW) repository. The Konrad repository is Germany's first repository for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation, which was fully licensed under atomic law within the scope of a plan approval procedure from the original application in 1982 until the license was granted in 2002 and finally confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court in 2007. The emplacement of LILW was licensed up to a volume of 303,000 m{sup 3} with a total β/γ-activity of 5 x 10{sup 18} Bq and a total α-activity of 1.5 x 10{sup 17} Bq. Currently, the former iron ore mine Konrad is being converted to a repository and is expected to come into operation in 2027. But what if there is no safety case in place nor a regulatory framework tailored for a change of documents in order to ensure the safety according to the state-of-the-art of science and technology during the evolution of a long-term project such as a geological repository? In this presentation, a review procedure of the safety analyses, that have been the basis of the plan approval decision for the Konrad repository at that time, will be described. Furthermore, the first results of this graduated review procedure for updating the safety analyses will be presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Secure environment establishment for FPGA-based safety-critical systems: quality management system context - 159

The paper discusses importance of secure development and operational environment establishment process, its particular stages, including security-oriented analysis and assessment of safety-critical instrumentation and control (I and C) systems. Two particular aspects are covered - security assessment and security assurance related to processes established by Quality Management System (QMS). One of the underlying ideas for the security assessment approach is in performance of gap analysis. Such analysis considers influence of all different factors within I and C system development process, and further application of Intrusion Modes and Effect Criticality Analysis (IMECA) technique. It makes the approach applicable to various safety-critical systems, considering underlying technologies (for example, Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). Nowadays FPGA technology is often used in wide spectrum of hardware devices - from personal devices to complex I and C systems for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The problem of cyber security assessment and assurance for FPGA technology in general and its application in safety-critical I and C systems in particular is not completely solved due to several reasons that cover regulations, QMS processes, implementation of development and verification activities, etc. The paper overviews existing regulations, which cover various aspects of NPP I and C systems development and operation, FPGA technology implementation, and secure development and operational environment establishment and assurance. The paper also emphasizes that complex approach should be used to identify and mitigate all specific vulnerabilities thorough the whole life cycle on the basis on Intrusion Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis technique. The paper also proposes approach to the development of safety-critical I and C systems in the scope of cyber security assurance process at developer site. Secure development environment is described as a key factor during the development process and the paper also discusses establishment and maintenance of such environment as a part of company's Nuclear Quality Assurance's QMS. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of programmable logic in a rapid, automated, and repeatable fashion for safety-related applications - 385

Digital safety platform considerations for power plant modernization or new build efforts involve a burdensome task of implementing a large number of software-based functions onto a designated platform to match the plant's architecture. This problem is not unique to any particular safety-related platform solution, but is prevalent across the landscape of current Qualified and Licensed Safety-related Instrumentation and Control (I and C) Solutions. As an example when implementing a RG 1.97 compliant Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) solution with the Lockheed Martin Nuclear Protection and Control (NuPAC) safety platform, 72 unique software loads are needed to configure the Qualified Display System (QDS). Large scale development and customization efforts to upgrade existing plant functions or systems require the licensee to assume the cost and technical risk necessary to undergo a digital based upgrade. Often the cost, schedule, and technical risk outweighed the benefit of modernization efforts due to the unknown hurdles and past projects that overran cost and schedule projections. Lockheed Martin's Engineering Production Suite (EPS) minimizes the licensee risk and expense associated with modernization efforts through a developer's toolkit for rapid, automated, and repeatable development of Programmable Logic used to implement plant functions and architectures for use on the Lockheed Martin NuPAC platform. This paper describes a use case where by EPS can create system level representations, simulate system functions, partition logic designs to accommodate hardware constraints through logic partitioning, automate the assembly of Application Specific Programmable Logic (ASPL), generate system test cases, program the NuPAC hardware, and perform testing throughout the design workflow. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An IRSN Project For Experimental Data Acquisition In The Frame Of Criticality Safety And Reactor Physics

In the frame of its research missions for criticality safety assessment support, IRSN performed various experimental programs related to criticality safety in the CEA Valduc facilities. Following the shutdown of these facilities and the cancellation of the MIDAS project, which aimed at refurbishing these facilities, IRSN has initiated a new project named PRINCESS for 'Project for IRSN Neutron physics and Criticality Experimental data Supporting Safety'. PRINCESS is the practical implementation of IRSN's international partnership strategy to build relations with organizations that are equipped with experimental facilities for criticality safety and reactor physics research. The aim is to analyze experimental data from programs already performed and to conduct joint research programs on topics of interest of both parties. This paper presents an overview of the status of the PRINCESS project. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Consideration for Implementing the Safety Regulation Plans on Permanent Shut-own NPP during Transition Period in Korea

Recently the Korean regulatory body has been reviewing the change of permission on permanent shutdown Kori NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) unit 1, since the licensee (KHNP, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. Ltd) decided the permanent shut-down in June 2015 and applied the amendment of its licensing basis documents in June 2016. Although our institute with technical authority, the KINS (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety), had performed the peer reviews for the construction permits of 3 NPPs and operating licenses of 25 NPPs, the safety control of permanent shut-down NPP and the transition activities including deactivation and decommissioning preparation are still in early stages and challenging fields. Currently the operation/only-possession system under defueled condition were defined through the peer review of fully revised documents and the major issues which concerned with the rearrangement of safety class or function based on new accident analysis results were produced. And also various transition activities were drawn as reflecting the decommissioning strategy on Kori unit 1. In this study, we described the status and problem of safety regulation based on our subordinate statute for permanent shut-down and transition activities. And then the detail implementation plans or the alternatives will be provided and discussed in order to solve the lack of regulatory experience and guide.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗