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Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Visual Inspection Results - 20025

A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program at Hanford is of the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, inspections of the tank bottoms have been able to be conducted due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and portions of the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. This region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to this lack of technology, the degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. Throughout the FY16-FY18 years, vendors from nondestructive examination community were solicited for ideas to meet the tank bottom inspection challenge. Two tank bottom visual inspection solutions were then pursued to meet that challenge. Both tools were successfully deployed at Tank AP-107, and provided valuable visuals, never before obtained from the under tank environment of a double-shell tank. While there are minor opportunities for improvement identified with each system, general outcomes were overwhelmingly positive. Both systems were successfully able to navigate the refractory air slot pattern from the outer edge to the tank center and record video footage. The micro-crawler provided high quality and very stable footage through the air slot pattern, but took longer to deploy into the slots and traverse through them than the alternative system. The push-pull tethered camera was able to navigate all seven of its target air slots in a matter of a few hours, which included deployment, movement between slot entrances, and complete removal of the system from the annulus environment. Through these air slots, new information was gained about the tank bottom and refractory pad condition of tank AP-107, AP-106, AP-108, and AN-102. While some debris was noted in the air slots, including sand, chipped refractory, and construction materials, the refractory was found to be structurally stable and adequately supporting the primary tank bottom through the full diameter of the tank. Primary tank bottom steel exterior was found to be in good condition, free of ongoing or aggressive corrosion conditions. Looking toward the future, robotic access to and visual inspection of refractory air slots and the primary tank bottom steel has now proven viable. Incorporating periodic air slot inspections as a regular practice within the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the next step, allowing trending of any changes in condition. As ultrasonic testing infrastructure was leveraged to complete the initial system deployments described in this report, it makes sense to adopt that same strategy for ongoing periodic examinations and deploy these primary tank bottom inspection tools alongside ultrasonic testing operations. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, seeking to continuously expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)

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Panel Session 55: US DOE Savannah River Operations Office: Liquid Waste Progress

This panel provided an overview of the SRS HLW Liquid Waste Program (history, challenges, opportunities, and future) including discussions of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), Tank Closures, Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit, Tank Closure Cesium Removal, and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Panelists with presentations: SRS Liquid Waste Program (James Folk); SRS Liquid Waste Progress (Mark Schmitz); Salt Waste Processing Facility (Frank Sheppard)

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Nuclear Material Management Database Development at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (NMM&S) program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility for the life-cycle management of accountable nuclear materials (NM) in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials” and for ensuring workers are protected from exposure to nuclear materials stored outside of an authorized shipping package under DOE Manual 441.1-1. To ensure these responsibilities were addressed in an effective, concise, and secure manner the development of NMM&S databases was undertaken. Using the existing database server structure and data acquired from the official Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) accounting program development of two separate applications, one for O 410.2 inventory requirements (NMIA) and one for M441, were begun in September 2015. The databases were deployed onto the production server in January 2017. The inventory database allows for entering NM characterization data, production of O 410.2 reports, and the ability to retain history files. The M441 database screens NM to determine if it is subject to the manual's requirements, ability to pull in unclassified RadCon materials, and provide reports as required by NMM&S, NM owners, and headquarters programs. These two databases provide NMM&S the ability to better ensure safe and secure packaging, storage, stabilization, consolidation, or disposition of NM and achieve life-cycle management goals.

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The Office of Groundwater & Soil Remediation Fiscal Year 2011 Research & Development Program

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Groundwater and Soil Remediation supports technology development and technical assistance for the remediation of environments contaminated by legacy nuclear waste. The core of the program is centered on delivering proactive, responsive expertise and technologies with highly-leveraged, carefully selected investments that maximum impact on life-cycle cleanup costs and risks across the DOE complex. The program currently focuses on four main priorities: improved sampling and characterization strategies, advanced predictive capabilities, enhanced remediation methods, and improved long-term performance evaluation and monitoring. In FY 2010, the program developed a detailed research and development (R and D) plan in support of a larger initiative to integrate R and D efforts across EM. This paper provides an overview of the priority action areas and the program's near-term technical direction.

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Public perception of hazardousness caused by current trends of municipal solid waste management

Highlights: • Contribution to the scientific literature by examining the relationship between concern for the environment and waste disposal in the frame of household waste treatment mechanism specifically in developing countries. • The awareness of the citizens satisfaction level and the local existing capacities in developing countries significantly contribute to decision making on MSW management sustainability in Palestine and other developing countries when applied. • Identification of the differences and similarities among DC resulting to failures or success in WM field. - Abstract: Municipal solid waste (MSW) piling up is becoming a serious problem in all developing countries (DC) as a result of inequitable waste collection and treatment. Citizens’ collaboration is partly based on understanding their views and their active involvement in MSW planning; on the other hand the assessment of the perception of hazardousness related with MSW is considered rather important as well since the identification of the weak points of the applied MWM strategy is eased and the level of required training is determined. Researchers implemented a case study in the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS) regions of Palestine, taking into consideration previous researches in other developing countries. They reached to safe and useful conclusions regarding the parameters which mean the greatest in the waste management field as far as DC are concerned. Lack of skilled manpower, irregular collection services, inadequate equipment used for waste collection, inadequate legal provisions, and resource constraints are additional factors that are confirmed to be challenging the waste management scenarios in all DCs today. The research takes those factors under consideration but focuses on the educational gap and the results revealed interesting trends a significant relationship between respondent’s educational attainment and their awareness of hazardous waste (hazard perception); the results will indicate the measure taking required to avoid accidents occurred in those regions (burns from toxics, cuts from sharps, etc). National policy and legislation development based on the research outcomes will ensure equitable and accessible services are in place in order to move towards a healthier environment. Specialized health education and training programs on national scale are also needed to enhance awareness on hazardous waste.

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The Effect of Congress' Mandate to Create Greater Efficiencies in the Characterization of Transuranic Waste through the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit

Effective December 1, 2003, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to file a permit modification request with the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) to amend the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (hereinafter 'the Permit') at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This legislation, Section 311 of the 2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, was designed to increase efficiencies in Transuranic (TRU) waste characterization processes by focusing on only those activities necessary to characterize waste streams, while continuing to protect human health and the environment. Congressionally prescribed changes would impact DOE generator site waste characterization programs and waste disposal operations at WIPP. With this legislative impetus, in early 2004 the DOE and Washington TRU Solutions (WTS), co-permittee under the Permit, submitted a permit modification request to the NMED pursuant to Section 311. After a lengthy process, including extensive public and other stakeholder input, the NMED granted the Permittees' request in October 2006, as part of a modification authorizing disposal of Remote-Handled (RH) TRU waste at WIPP. In conclusion: Implementation of the Permit under the revised Section 311 provisions is still in its early stages. Data are limited, as noted above. In view of these limited data and fluctuations in waste feed due to varying factors, at the current time it is difficult to determine with accuracy the impacts of Section 311 on the costs of characterizing TRU waste. It is safe to say, however, that the there have been many positive impacts flowing from Section 311. The generator sites now have more flexibility in characterizing waste. Also, RH TRU waste is now being disposed at WIPP - which was not possible before the 2006 Permit modification. As previously noted, the RH modification was approved at the same time as the Section 311 modification. Had the Section 311 changes not been implemented, RH TRU waste may not have been successfully permitted for disposal at WIPP. Changes made pursuant to Section 311 helped to facilitate approval of the proposed RH TRU modifications. For example, the three scenarios for use in AK Sufficiency Determination Requests, described herein, are essential to securing approval of some RH TRU waste streams for eventual disposal at WIPP. Thus, even if characterization rates do not increase significantly, options for disposal of RH TRU waste, which may not have been possible without Section 311, are now available and the TRU waste disposal mission is being accomplished as mandated by Congress in the LWA. Also, with the Section 311 modification, the Permittees commenced room-based VOC monitoring in the WIPP repository, which is also a positive impact of Section 311. Permit changes pursuant to Section 311 were a good beginning, but much more is need to encourage more efficient methodologies in waste characterization activities for TRU mixed waste destined for WIPP. Although the Permittees now have more flexibility in characterizing waste for disposal at WIPP, the processes are still lengthy, cumbersome, and paper-intensive. As the generator sites continue to characterize waste under Section 311, more data will likely be compiled and evaluated to assess the longer term cost and technical impacts of Section 311. Also, further refinements in TRU waste characterization requirements through Permit modifications are likely in future years to eliminate, improve, and clarify remaining unnecessary and redundant Permit provisions. Continuous improvements to the TRU waste characterization program are bound to occur, resulting in even greater efficiencies in the characterization and ultimate disposal of TRU waste. (authors)

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The Study of TRR Radial Thermal Shielding Dismantling Process - 20063

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities has become an important worldwide topic because many nuclear power facilities will permanently cease operation in the foreseeable future. Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) has stepped into the decommissioning phase in 2004, and the dismantling processes will start in 2022. TRR is a heavy water reactor designed by Canatom Company with output thermal power 40 MW. On January 3, 1973, it reaches criticality. TRR had been operated for 15 years and was permanently shut down in early 1988. The decommissioning plan of TRR was approved in 2004. According to the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act in Taiwan, a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after stepping into the decommissioning phase. Therefore, TRR decommissioning must be completed before 2029. One of the most important tasks of TRR decommissioning is to dismantle reactor body. In the task of TRR decommissioning, mechanical cutting with remote handling is used to dismantle radial thermal shielding, which are the internal components of the TRR. This study outlines the internal components of the TRR and explains the difficulties encountered during the dismantling processes. Considering the structure and radiation dose rate of TRR and its internal components, the dismantling method and packaging method are properly arranged to complete the TRR dismantling task. This study describes the process of dismantling the radial thermal shielding during the dismantling processes and considers the impact of the radiation dose on the staff during the operation. The calculation of the radiation dose rate for the personnel during the segmentation process is based on the evaluation result by using VRdose. If the calculation of personnel working dose rate is too high, we will increase the shielding or use remote handling to reduce the operator's exposure dose in the dismantling processes to comply with the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle. In this study, the latest developments in the TRR decommissioning program are described. It also provides usable experience and information regarding the future decommissioning of other nuclear facilities or nuclear power plants in Taiwan. (authors)

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Nuclear Global Talent Development Program (Final Report)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) have developed sorption database named as L-SCIE (LLNL Surface Complexation/Ion Exchange). This framework (L-SCIE) includes not only a community database of sorption data but also a fitting workflow to produce optimized surface complexation reaction constants. Through this fellowship program we have updated the L-SCIE database for selenium (Se) sorption and potentiometric titration data of iron oxides. In addition, the relevant surface complexation models (SCMs) have been updated and details in model construction are given in the following section.

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Research Needs for Fusion-Fission Hybrid Systems. Report of the Research Needs Workshop (ReNeW) Gaithersburg, Maryland, September 30 - October 2, 2009

Largely in anticipation of a possible nuclear renaissance, there has been an enthusiastic renewal of interest in the fusion-fission hybrid concept, driven primarily by some members of the fusion community. A fusion-fission hybrid consists of a neutron-producing fusion core surrounded by a fission blanket. Hybrids are of interest because of their potential to address the main long-term sustainability issues related to nuclear power: fuel supply, energy production, and waste management. As a result of this renewed interest, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), with the participation of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences (OFES), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), organized a three-day workshop in Gaithersburg, Maryland, from September 30 through October 2, 2009. Participants identified several goals. At the highest level, it was recognized that DOE does not currently support any R&D in the area of fusion-fission hybrids. The question to be addressed was whether or not hybrids offer sufficient promise to motivate DOE to initiate an R&D program in this area. At the next level, the workshop participants were asked to define the research needs and resources required to move the fusion-fission concept forward. The answer to the high-level question was given in two ways. On the one hand, when viewed as a standalone concept, the fusion-fission hybrid does indeed offer the promise of being able to address the sustainability issues associated with conventional nuclear power. On the other hand, when participants were asked whether these hybrid solutions are potentially more attractive than contemplated pure fission solutions (that is, fast burners and fast breeders), there was general consensus that this question could not be quantitatively answered based on the known technical information. Pure fission solutions are based largely on existing both fusion and nuclear technology, thereby prohibiting a fair side-by-side comparison. Another important issue addressed at the conference was the time scale on which long-term sustainability issues must be solved. There was a wide diversity of opinion and no consensus was possible. One group, primarily composed of members of the fission community, argued that the present strategies with respect to waste management (on-site storage) and fuel supply (from natural uranium) would suffice for at least 50 years, with the main short-term problem being the economics of light water reactors (LWRs). Many from the fusion community believed that the problems, particularly waste management, were of a more urgent nature and that we needed to address them sooner rather than later. There was rigorous debate on all the issues before, during, and after the workshop. Based on this debate, the workshop participants developed a set of high-level Findings and Research Needs and a companion set of Technical Findings and Research Needs. In the context of the Executive Summary it is sufficient to focus on the high-level findings which are summarized.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Technology gap analysis on sodium-cooled reactor fuel handling system supporting advanced burner reactor development.

The goals of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) are to expand the use of nuclear energy to meet increasing global energy demand in an environmentally sustainable manner, to address nuclear waste management issues without making separated plutonium, and to address nonproliferation concerns. The advanced burner reactor (ABR) is a fast reactor concept which supports the GNEP fuel cycle system. Since the integral fast reactor (IFR) and advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR) projects were terminated in 1994, there has been no major development on sodium-cooled fast reactors in the United States. Therefore, in support of the GNEP fast reactor program, the history of sodium-cooled reactor development was reviewed to support the initiation of this technology within the United States and to gain an understanding of the technology gaps that may still remain for sodium fast reactor technology. The fuel-handling system is a key element of any fast reactor design. The major functions of this system are to receive, test, store, and then load fresh fuel into the core; unload from the core; then clean, test, store, and ship spent fuel. Major requirements are that the system must be reliable and relatively easy to maintain. In addition, the system should be designed so that it does not adversely impact plant economics from the viewpoints of capital investment or plant operations. In this gap analysis, information on fuel-handling operating experiences in the following reactor plants was carefully reviewed: EBR-I, SRE, HNPF, Fermi, SEFOR, FFTF, CRBR, EBR-II, DFR, PFR, Rapsodie, Phenix, Superphenix, KNK, SNR-300, Joyo, and Monju. The results of this evaluation indicate that a standardized fuel-handling system for a commercial fast reactor is yet to be established. However, in the past sodium-cooled reactor plants, most major fuel-handling components-such as the rotatable plug, in-vessel fuel-handling machine, ex-vessel fuel transportation cask, ex-vessel sodium-cooled storage, and cleaning stations-have accumulated satisfactory construction and operation experiences. In addition, two special issues for future development are described in this report: large capacity interim storage and transuranic-bearing fuel handling.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Enhanced Sealing Project, Monitoring a Full-Scale Shaft Seal at Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (2009-2015) - 16070

A full-scale shaft seal was designed and installed in the 5-m-diameter main shaft at Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (URL) in 2009. Located where the main shaft intersects a water-bearing fracture zone at a depth of approximately 273 m, a 6-m-thick clay component was sandwiched between two 3-m-thick concrete components. The clay component was 40:60 mixture of bentonite and quartz/feldspar sand and spans approximately 1 m beyond the maximum identified vertical extent of the fracture zone. Its purpose is to limit the mixing of saline groundwater from the deeper region with the fresher, near-surface groundwater. Its construction was part of Canada's Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP). The 1. phase of the Enhanced Sealing Project (ESP), a jointly-funded Research, Development and Demonstration (RD and D) project was started in 2009 to monitor the saturation of the shaft seal until the end of 2013. The 2. phase, extended monitoring of the ESP is supported by Posiva (Finland), Andra (France) and CNL (Canada) and this will run until the end of 2016. The slow evolution of the seal and its surroundings and complete removal of the surface facilities at the URL site in 2014, has meant that the ESP monitoring has evolved to a stand-alone, lower frequency data collection program. Information gained from the ESP monitoring is applicable to support the development of sealing technology to safely close a deep geological repository for the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes. (authors)

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2020. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2020 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act↗

Application of the New Decommissioning Regulation to the Nuclear Licensed Facilities (NLF) at Fontenay-aux-Roses's Nuclear Center (CEA)

This abstract describes the application of the new decommissioning regulation on all Nuclear Licensed Facilities (NLF is to say INB in French) at Fontenay-aux-Roses's Center (CEA/FAR). The decommissioning process has been applied in six buildings which are out of the new nuclear perimeter proposed (buildings no 7, no 40, no 94, no 39, no 52/1 and no 32) and three buildings have been reorganized (no 54, no 91 and no 53 instead of no 40 and no 94) in order to increase the space for temporary nuclear waste disposal and to reduce the internal transports of nuclear waste on the site. The advantages are the safety and radioprotection improvements and a lower operating cost. A global safety file was written in 2002 and 2003 and was sent to the French Nuclear Authority on November 2003. The list of documents required is given in the paragraph I of this paper. The main goals were two ministerial decrees (one decree for each NLF) getting the authorization to modify the NLF perimeter and to carry out cleaning and dismantling activities leading to the whole decommissioning of all NLF. Some specific authorizations were necessary to carry out the dismantling program during the decommissioning procedure. They were delivered by the French Nuclear Safety Authority (FNSA) or with limited delegation by the General Executive Director (GED) on the CEA Fontenay-aux-Roses's Center, called internal authorization. Some partial dismantling or decontamination examples are given below: - evaporator for the radioactive liquid waste treatment station (building no 53): FNSA authorization: phase realised in 2002/2003. - disposal tanks for the radioactive liquid waste treatment station (building no 53) FNSA authorization: phase realised in 2004, - incinerator for the radioactive solid waste treatment station (building no 07): FNSA authorization: operation realised in 2004, - research equipments in the building no. 54 and building no. 91: internal authorization ; realised in 2005, - sample-taking to characterize solvent contained in one tank of Petrus installation (NLF 57, building 18) for radiological and chemical analysis needed to prepare the treatment and the evacuation of these wastes : internal authorization ; realised in june 2005. It was possible to plan the whole decommissioning process on the Nuclear Licensed Facilities of Fontenay-aux-Roses's Center (CEA/FAR) taking into account the French new regulation and to plan a coherent and continue program activity for the dismantling process. For the program not to be interrupted during the administrative process (2003-2006), specific authorisations have been delivered by the French Nuclear Safety Authority or by the General Executive Director (GED) on the CEA Fontenay-aux- Roses's Center (internal authorization). The time schedule to complete the entire program is until 2017 for NLF 'Procede' (NLF no 165) and until 2018 for NLF 'Support' (NLF no 166). Since 1999, an annual press meeting has been organised by the Fontenay-aux-Roses's Center Head Executive Manager.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

System Health and Status Reporting is Used to Improve Infrastructure Systems at the Hanford Site - 20449

Reliable physical infrastructure systems are vital to completing the clean-up mission and the start-up and commissioning of new nuclear waste processing facilities at the Hanford Site. Key infrastructure systems at Hanford include water, sewer, and electrical utilities, roads, telecommunications/network systems, and fire systems. All of the infrastructure systems are non-nuclear, General Service systems that are being maintained under formal engineering configuration control and none are specifically credited in any documented safety analysis (DSA). Starting in calendar year 2017, the Hanford Site's infrastructure and services contractor started producing system health and status reports for a total of 15 critical infrastructure systems as means to get a better understanding of each system's health and how it could be improved to ensure better and more reliable service delivery. As the reporting, tracking, and use of the metrics has matured, the number of systems for which reports are being developed has been expanded to a total of 23. Each of the critical infrastructure systems are assigned primary and alternate design authorities that complete qualifications on each assigned system. The design authorities actively manage and maintain configuration control on each of their systems and track metrics associated with availability, maintenance (corrective and preventive), and configuration of the technical baseline. The metrics are based on the principles established in Chapter V of DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety, [1] and have been tailored as appropriate to each of the key infrastructure systems. An overall assessment of system health is performed and documented on a routine basis (e.g., quarterly). Included in this documentation is a quantitative score for each of the metrics (i.e., availability, maintenance, configuration management) along with results of system walk-downs, description of any permanent design modifications, identification of new or emerging issues and vulnerabilities affecting the system, and an assessment by the design authority of actions necessary to improve the system health score. The overall status scores are calculated using a formula and based on a pre-determined grading scale, a color is assigned for simple presentation. The information gained from developing the reports is being used to (1) assist with making timely and better informed decisions through the use of solid technical bases that are increasing the overall reliability and capabilities of the Site's infrastructure systems as new expense and capital projects in the Reliability Projects Investment Portfolio (RPIP) are prioritized and executed; (2) feed the risk management program, and (3) integrate the technical content of Master Plans that describe the Site's needs for the system and the system's capabilities to meet those future needs. (authors)

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SRNL LDRD Program Report 2012

Progress is reported on 20 different projects in a wide variety of areas ranging from nuclear chemistry and radiation detection to energy storage and renewable energy.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

IER-479: Final Design of Low-Temperature TEX Experiments [Slides]

This presentation discusses the final design of low-temperature Thermal Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) experiments. Designed to validate low temperature cross sections and crit safety analyses. The presentation includes discussion on Low-Temp TEX Chamber a Cryostat Chamber capable of cooling between room temp and -40c. Finally, the presentation touches on reactivity via separation where the need to know how the system will behave approaching critical as lifted into annular reflector is analyzed.

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Analysis of Spent Fuel Assay with a Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer

Assay of fissile materials in spent fuel that are produced or depleted during the operation of a reactor, is of paramount importance to nuclear materials accounting, verification of the reactor operation history, as well as for criticality considerations for storage. In order to prevent future proliferation following the spread of nuclear energy, we must develop accurate methods to assay large quantities of nuclear fuels. We analyze the potential of using a Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer for assaying spent fuel. We conclude that it is possible to design a system that will provide around 1% statistical precision in the determination of the 239 Pu, 241 Pu and 235 U concentrations in a PWR spent-fuel assembly, for intermediate-to-high burnup levels, using commercial neutron sources, and a system of 238 U threshold fission detectors. Pending further analysis of systematic errors, it is possible that missing pins can be detected, as can asymmetry in the fuel bundle.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

International Governmental Collaboration on Best Practice in Aging Infrastructure Management - 18027

Legacy nuclear sites in the US, UK and Canada are all facing a similar challenge of completing their operational and cleanup missions in parallel in a safe, efficient and cost-effective manner. Compounding the challenge is the fact that many important facilities are old with a significant level of deferred maintenance/capital needs, resulting in the need for a strategic approach to infrastructure management to ensure that maintenance and capital funding is directed at the highest priority items and that neither operations nor ongoing Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) activities are compromised. To help address this challenge, a Technical Information Exchange meeting was held in Ottawa, Canada in early June 2017 which brought together responsible parties from; - Government agencies including the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), US Department of Energy Environmental Management (DOE EM), US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) and Canadian Department of Defense - Implementers and other Government entities including Savannah River National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) - Associations including representation on behalf of the Institute of Asset Management and; - Contractors including Mission Support Alliance, Mott McDonald, and Longenecker and Associates The objective of this meeting was to share information about respective 'best practices' and to begin to develop common approaches to the prioritization and management of aging infrastructure investment across the organizations. The exchange focused on identifying common critical issues which were discussed through a series of presentations and small group discussions. The outcome from the meeting was an improved understanding by all participants of the latest approaches being applied to Infrastructure Asset Management and the formation of four International Working Groups which now meet on a regular (4-6 week) basis to share lessons learned and to develop international best practice in their area of interest. This paper details; - the issues and challenges that were identified during the meeting - how these were assimilated and distilled into discrete areas to enable formation of specific Working Groups - progress made by the Working Groups to date. (authors)

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