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NASA NTRS1986

Crew Communication as a Factor in Aviation Accidents

The crew communication process is analyzed. Planning and explanation are shown to be well-structured discourse types, described by formal rules. These formal rules are integrated with those describing the other most important discourse type within the cockpit: the command-and-control speech act chain. The latter is described as a sequence of speech acts for making requests (including orders and suggestions), for making reports, for supporting or challenging statements, and for acknowledging previous speech acts. Mitigation level, a linguistic indication of indirectness and tentativeness in speech, was an important variable in several hypotheses, i.e., the speech of subordinates is more mitigated than the speech of superiors, the speech of all crewmembers is less mitigated when they know that they are in either a problem or emergency situation, and mitigation is a factor in failures of crewmembers to initiate discussion of new topics or have suggestions ratified by the captain. Test results also show that planning and explanation are more frequently performed by captains, are done more during crew- recognized problems, and are done less during crew-recognized emergencies. The test results also indicated that planning and explanation are more frequently performed by captains than by other crewmembers, are done more during crew-recognized problems, and are done less during-recognized emergencies.

Goguen, J.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Demonstrating Acquisition of Real-Time Thermal Data over Fires Utilizing UAVs

NASA-Ames Research Center, in collaboration with General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. has been developing real-time data acquisition and information delivery systems employing uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) technology for disaster mitigation and assessment demonstrations. Working in conjunction with the US Forest Service, a disaster community agency responsible for wildfire management and mitigation, we developed a large-scale wildfire demonstration called the First Response Experiment (FIRE). During that experiment in late summer 2001, the participants demonstrated the melding of innovative technologies such as UAV platforms, real-time data processing, and data telemetry for quick analysis of a disaster event. The General Atomics ALTUS UAV, the Airborne Infrared Disaster Assessment System (AIRDAS) and Over-The-Horizon (OTH) satellite data telemetry equipment were employed over a controlled burn to test the feasibility of a disaster monitoring and mitigation platform for hazardous duty. The ALTUS UAV was employed to demonstrate the long duration, altitude, and payload capability of unmanned platforms for acquiring disaster related data. The ALTUS has an operational altitude to 45,000 feet (13,700 in), with a flight duration of twenty-four hours and a payload capacity of over 300 lbs. (148.5 kg). This allows the platform to operate under the conditions that would be necessary for monitoring and mitigating disaster events throughout the Unites States. The four channel AIRDAS data (calibrated thermal infrared digital imagery of the fire event) was sent from the ALTUS UAV via a satellite communications system (NERA transponder and INMARSAT satellite) to a data archive server and an image processing work station at NASA-Ames Research Center, 400 miles away.

Wegener, Steven S.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Advanced Health Management System for the Space Shuttle Main Engine

Boeing-Canoga Park (BCP) and NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA-MSFC) are developing an Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) for use on the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) that will improve Shuttle safety by reducing the probability of catastrophic engine failures during the powered ascent phase of a Shuttle mission. This is a phased approach that consists of an upgrade to the current Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller (SSMEC) to add turbomachinery synchronous vibration protection and addition of a separate Health Management Computer (HMC) that will utilize advanced algorithms to detect and mitigate predefined engine anomalies. The purpose of the Shuttle AHMS is twofold; one is to increase the probability of successfully placing the Orbiter into the intended orbit, and the other is to increase the probability of being able to safely execute an abort of a Space Transportation System (STS) launch. Both objectives are achieved by increasing the useful work envelope of a Space Shuttle Main Engine after it has developed anomalous performance during launch and the ascent phase of the mission. This increase in work envelope will be the result of two new anomaly mitigation options, in addition to existing engine shutdown, that were previously unavailable. The added anomaly mitigation options include engine throttle-down and performance correction (adjustment of engine oxidizer to fuel ratio), as well as enhanced sensor disqualification capability. The HMC is intended to provide the computing power necessary to diagnose selected anomalous engine behaviors and for making recommendations to the engine controller for anomaly mitigation. Independent auditors have assessed the reduction in Shuttle ascent risk to be on the order of 40% with the combined system and a three times improvement in mission success.

Davidson, Matt↗

NASA NTRS2004

The NASA Continuous Risk Management Process

As an intern this summer in the GRC Risk Management Office, I have become familiar with the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process. In this process, risk is considered in terms of the probability that an undesired event will occur and the impact of the event, should it occur (ref., NASA-NPG: 7120.5). Risk management belongs in every part of every project and should be ongoing from start to finish. Another key point is that a risk is not a problem until it has happened. With that in mind, there is a six step cycle for continuous risk management that prevents risks from becoming problems. The steps are: identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate & document. Incorporated in the first step are several methods to identify risks such as brainstorming and using lessons learned. Once a risk is identified, a risk statement is made on a risk information sheet consisting of a single condition and one or more consequences. There can also be a context section where the risk is explained in more detail. Additionally there are three main goals of analyzing a risk, which are evaluate, classify, and prioritize. Here is where a value is given to the attributes of a risk &e., probability, impact, and timeframe) based on a multi-level classification system (e.g., low, medium, high). It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of these levels are probably different for each project. Furthermore the risks can be combined into groups. Then, the risks are prioritized to see what risk is necessary to mitigate first. After the risks are analyzed, a plan is made to mitigate as many risks as feasible. Each risk should be assigned to someone in the project with knowledge in the area of the risk. Then the possible approaches to choose from are: research, accept, watch, or mitigate. Next, all risks, mitigated or not, are tracked either individually or in groups. As the plan is executed, risks are re-evaluated, and the attribute values are adjusted as necessary. Metrics are established and monitored as tools for risk tracking. Also a trigger or threshold should be set on the metric data that indicates when an action is needed. Results of this tracking are usually evaluated and reported in a relevant format at weekly or monthly meetings. Choosing controls is the subsequent step, which involves the effects of the tracking. The three basic controls are: close, continue tracking, and re- plan. Finally communicate & document is the last step, but occurs throughout the process. It is vital that main risks, plans, changes, and progress are known by everyone in the project. A good way to keep everyone updated and inform other projects of common issues is by thoroughly documenting project risks. NASA sees value in risk management and believes that projects have greater probability or success by using the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process.

Pokorny, Frank M.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Lunar Dust on Heat Rejection System Surfaces: Problems and Prospects

Heat rejection from power systems will be necessary for human and robotic activity on the lunar surface. Functional operation of such heat rejection systems is at risk of degradation as a consequence of dust accumulation. The Apollo astronauts encountered marked degradation of performance in heat rejection systems for the lunar roving vehicle, science packages, and other components. Although ground testing of dust mitigation concepts in support of the Apollo mission identified mitigation tools, the brush concept adopted by the Apollo astronauts proved essentially ineffective. A better understanding of the issues associated with the impact of lunar dust on the functional performance of heat rejection systems and its removal is needed as planning gets underway for human and robotic missions to the Moon. Renewed emphasis must also be placed on ground testing of pristine and dust-covered heat rejection system surfaces to quantify degradation and address mitigation concepts. This paper presents a review of the degradation in performance of heat rejection systems encountered on the lunar surface to-date, and will discuss current activities underway to evaluate the durability of candidate heat rejection system surfaces and current dust mitigation concepts.

Gaier, James R.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management↗

NASA NTRS2009

Improving Our Odds: Success through Continuous Risk Management

Launching a rocket, running a business, driving to work and even day-to-day living all involve some degree of risk. Risk is ever present yet not always recognized, adequately assessed and appropriately mitigated. Identification, assessment and mitigation of risk are elements of the risk management component of the "continuous improvement" way of life that has become a hallmark of successful and progressive enterprises. While the application of risk management techniques to provide continuous improvement may be detailed and extensive, the philosophy, ideals and tools can be beneficially applied to all situations. Experiences with the use of risk identification, assessment and mitigation techniques for complex systems and processes are described. System safety efforts and tools used to examine potential risks of the Ares I First Stage of NASA s new Constellation Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) presently being designed are noted as examples. Recommendations from lessons learned are provided for the application of risk management during the development of new systems as well as for the improvement of existing systems. Lessons learned and suggestions given are also examined for applicability to simple systems, uncomplicated processes and routine personal daily tasks. This paper informs the reader of varied uses of risk management efforts and techniques to identify, assess and mitigate risk for improvement of products, success of business, protection of people and enhancement of personal life.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Visual Impairment/Intracranial Pressure Risk Assessment

Since 2006 there have been 6 reported cases of altered visual acuity and intracranial pressure (ICP) in long duration astronauts. In order to document this risk and develop an integrated approach to its mitigation, the NASA Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) and Human Research Program (HRP) have chosen to use the Human System Risk Board (HSRB) and the risk management analysis tool (RMAT). The HSRB is the venue in which the stakeholders and customers discuss and vet the evidence and the RMAT is the tool that facilitates documentation and comparison of the evidence across mission profiles as well as identification of risk factors, and documentation of mitigation strategies. This process allows for information to be brought forward and dispositioned so that it may be properly incorporated into the RMAT and contribute to the design of the research and mitigation plans. The evidence thus far has resulted in the identification of a visual impairment/intracranial pressure (VIIP) project team, updating of both short and long duration medical requirements designed to assess visual acuity, and a research plan to characterize this issue further. In order to understand this issue more completely, a plan to develop an Accelerated Research Collaboration (ARC) has been approved by the HSRB. The ARC is a novel research model pioneered by the Myelin Repair Foundation. It is a patient centered research model that brings together researchers and clinicians, under the guidance of a scientific advisory panel, to collaborate and produce results much quickly than accomplished through traditional research models. The data and evidence from the updated medical requirements and the VIIP ARC will be reviewed at the HSRB on a regular basis. Each review package presented to the HSRB will include an assessment and recommendation with respect to continuation of research, countermeasure development, occupational surveillance modalities, selection criteria, etc. This process will determine the course of the VIIP project and ultimately how SLSD and HRP mitigate this emerging human health and performance risk.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Copoly(imide siloxane) Abhesive Materials with Varied Siloxane Oligomer Length

In this work, low surface energy copoly(imide siloxane)s were synthesized with various siloxane segment lengths. Characterization of these materials revealed that domain formation of the low surface energy component within the matrix was more prevalent for longer siloxane segments as indicated by increased opacity, decreased mechanical properties, and variation of the Tg. Incorporation of siloxanes lowered the polymer s surface energy as indicated by water contact angle values. Topographical modification of these materials by laser ablation patterning further reduced the surface energy, even generating superhydrophobic surfaces. Combined, the contact angle data and particle adhesion testing indicated that copoly(imide siloxane) materials may provide greater mitigation to particulate adhesion than polyimide materials alone. These enhanced surface properties for abhesive applications did result in a reduction of the tensile moduli of the copolymers. It is possible that lower siloxane loading levels would result in retention of the mechanical properties of the polyimide while still affording abhesive surface properties. This hypothesis is currently being investigated. Laser ablation patterning offers further reduction in particle retention as the available surface area for particle adhesion is reduced. Pattern variation and size dependencies are currently being evaluated. For the purposes of lunar dust adhesion mitigation, it is likely that this approach, termed passive due to the lack of input from an external energy source, would not be sufficient to mitigate surface contamination or clean contaminated surfaces for some lunar applications. It is feasible to combine these materials with active mitigation strategies - methods that utilize input from external energy sources - would broaden the applicability of such materials for abhesive purposes. Collaborative efforts along these lines have been initiated with researchers at NASA Kennedy Space Center where experiments are being conducted involving a series of embedded electrodes within polymeric matrices.

Wohl, Christoper J.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Current Issues in Orbital Debris

During the past two decades, great strides have been made in the international community regarding orbital debris mitigation. The majority of space-faring nations have reached a consensus on an initial set of orbital debris mitigation measures. Implementation of and compliance with the IADC and UN space debris mitigation guidelines should remain a high priority. Improvements of the IADC and UN space debris mitigation guidelines should continue as technical consensus permits. The remediation of the near-Earth space environment will require a significant and long-term undertaking.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

A Contemporary Analysis of the O'Neill-Glaser Model for Space-Based Solar Power and Habitat Construction

In 1975 Gerard O Neill published in the journal Science a model for the construction of solar power satellites. He found that the solar power satellites suggested by Peter Glaser would be too massive to launch economically from Earth, but could be financially viable if the workforce was permanently located in free space habitats and if lunar and asteroid materials were used for construction. All new worldwide electrical generating capacity could be then achieved by solar power satellites. The project would financially break even in about 20 years after which it would generate substantial income selling power below fossil fuel prices. Two NASA / Stanford University led studies at Ames Research center during the summers of 1974 and 1976 found the concept technically sound and developed a detailed financial parametric model. Although the project was not undertaken when suggested in the 1970s, several contemporary issues make pursuing the O Neill -- Glaser concept more compelling today. First, our analysis suggests that if in the first ten years of construction that small habitats (compared to the large vista habitats envisioned by O Neill) supporting approximately 300 people were utilized, development costs of the program and the time for financial break even could be substantially improved. Second, the contemporary consensus is developing that carbon free energy is required to mitigate global climate change. It is estimated that 300 GW of new carbon free energy would be necessary per year to stabilize global atmospheric carbon. This is about 4 times greater energy demand than was considered by the O Neill Glaser model. Our analysis suggests that after the initial investments in lunar mining and space manufacturing and transportation, that the profit margin for producing space solar power is very high (even when selling power below fossil fuel prices). We have investigated the financial scaling of ground launched versus space derived space solar power satellites. We find that for the carbon mitigation case even modernized ground launched space solar power satellites are not financially viable. For space derived solar power satellites, however, the increased demand makes them break even substantially sooner and yield much higher profit. Third, current awareness is increasing about the dangers of humanity remaining a single planet species. Our technological power has been increasing relative to the size of the planet Earth. Since the middle of the 20th century our technological power has grown large relative to our planet's size. This presents a very real potential for human self-extinction. We argue that the potential for human self-extinction is increasing with time in proportion to the exponential growth of our technological power making self-extinction likely within this century if humanity remains a single planet species. The O Neill model of multiple independent free space habitats, it is argued, can protect humanity from extinction in the same way that portfolio diversification protects ones assets from total loss. We show that about 1 million people for the electricity only case, and about 1 billion people for the carbon mitigation case, can be provided with permanent space habitats and transportation from Earth in 30 years and can be funded by the space derived solar power satellite program. 1.2 Scope of this Chapter The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the power and importance of the O'Neill-Glaser concept in the context of human survival and maintaining a healthy planet Earth. We argue that at this point in human history our technological power is too dangerous to our selves and our home planet for us not to expand into space. We show by the models presented in the chapter that the imminent dangers of global warming and human self-extinction mandate that humanity move aggressively into the solar system in this generation. We show that the production of solar power satellites using space resources and with a work foe living in space provides a viable financial model to mitigate CO2 preventing the worst global warming scenarios, and safeguards humanity against self-extinction by providing hundreds of habitats and a billion people living in space within about 35 years. To accomplish this goal we need only consider the classic O'Neill-Glaser model which was parameterized for 1970's technological projections. Only habitat size optimization for the first ten years of production is added. This is a conservative approach since the innovations of the last 30 years will make the financial projections more favorable. However, the classic O'Neill-Glaser model represented a broad technological consensus. The model is well documented in the references and our calculations can be easily reproduced In this chapter the economics of the O Neill - Glaser model is compared with models that rely exclusively on Earth launched materials. Although many studies of Earth launched Solar Power Satellites have been made, we found that the NASA "Fresh Look Study" was the most comprehensive and well documented. It also provided one of the most optimistic Earth launch financial projections. We thus chose it for comparison purposes.

Curreri, Peter A.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Adhesion Between Volcanic Glass and Spacecraft Materials in an Airless Body Environment

The successful exploration of airless bodies, such as the Earth s moon, many smaller moons of the outer planets (including those of Mars) and asteroids, will depend on the development and implementation of effective dust mitigation strategies. The ultrahigh vacuum environment (UHV) on the surfaces of these bodies, coupled with constant ion and photon bombardment from the Sun and micrometeorite impacts (space weathering), makes dust adhesion to critical spacecraft systems a severe problem. As a result, the performance of thermal control surfaces, photovoltaics and mechanical systems can be seriously degraded even to the point of failure. The severe dust adhesion experienced in these environments is thought to be primarily due to two physical mechanisms, electrostatic attraction and high surface energies, but the dominant of these has yet to be determined. The experiments presented here aim to address which of these two mechanisms is dominant by quantifying the adhesion between common spacecraft materials (polycarbonate, FEP and PTFE Teflon, (DuPont) Ti-6-4) and a synthetic noritic volcanic glass, as a function of surface cleanliness and triboelectric charge transfer in a UHV environment. Adhesion force has been measured between pins of spacecraft materials and a plate of synthetic volcanic glass by determining the pull-off force with a torsion balance. Although no significant adhesion is observed directly as a result of high surface energies, the adhesion due to induced electrostatic charge is observed to increase with spacecraft material cleanliness, in some cases by over a factor of 10, although the increase is dependent on the particular material pair. The knowledge gained by these studies is envisioned to aid the development of new dust mitigation strategies and improve existing strategies by helping to identify and characterize mechanisms of glass to spacecraft adhesion for norite volcanic glass particles. Furthermore, the experience of the Apollo missions revealed that dust mitigation strategies must be subjected to high fidelity tests. To facilitate the effectiveness of ground-based testing of mitigation strategies, the issue of a pressure limit for high fidelity tests will be addressed.

Berkebile, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2014

Managing Research in a Risk World

The Office of Chief Medical Officer (OCHMO) owns all human health and performance risks managed by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). While the HSRB manages the risks, the Human Research Program (HRP) manages the research portion of the overall risk mitigation strategy for these risks. The HSRB manages risks according to a process that identifies and analyzes risks, plans risk mitigation and tracks and reviews the implementation of these strategies according to its decisions pertaining to the OCHMO risk posture. HRP manages risk research work using an architecture that describes evidence-based risks, gaps in our knowledge about characterizing or mitigating the risk, and the tasks needed to produce deliverables to fill the gaps and reduce the risk. A planning schedule reflecting expected research milestones is developed, and as deliverables and new evidence are generated, research progress is tracked via the Path to Risk Reduction (PRR) that reflects a risk's research plan for a design reference mission. HRP's risk research process closely interfaces with the HSRB risk management process. As research progresses, new deliverables and evidence are used by the HSRB in conjunction with other operational and non-research evidence to inform decisions pertaining to the likelihood and consequence of the risk and risk posture. Those decisions in turn guide forward work for research as it contributes to overall risk mitigation strategies. As HRP tracks its research work, it aligns its priorities by assessing the effectiveness of its contributions and maintaining specific core competencies that would be invaluable for future work for exploration missions.

Anton, W.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Human System Risks to Future Space Exploration

NASA is contemplating future human exploration missions to destinations beyond low Earth orbit, including the Moon, deep-space asteroids, and Mars. While we have learned much about protecting crew health and performance during orbital space flight over the past half-century, the challenges of these future missions far exceed those within our current experience base. To ensure success in these missions, we have developed a Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to identify, quantify, and develop mitigation plans for the extraordinary risks associated with each potential mission scenario. The HSRB comprises research, technology, and operations experts in medicine, physiology, psychology, human factors, radiation, toxicology, microbiology, pharmacology, and food sciences. Methods: Owing to the wide range of potential mission characteristics, we first identified the hazards to human health and performance common to all exploration missions: altered gravity, isolation/confinement, increased radiation, distance from Earth, and hostile/closed environment. Each hazard leads to a set of risks to crew health and/or performance. For example the radiation hazard leads to risks of acute radiation syndrome, central nervous system dysfunction, soft tissue degeneration, and carcinogenesis. Some of these risks (e.g., acute radiation syndrome) could affect crew health or performance during the mission, while others (e.g., carcinogenesis) would more likely affect the crewmember well after the mission ends. We next defined a set of design reference missions (DRM) that would span the range of exploration missions currently under consideration. In addition to standard (6-month) and long-duration (1-year) missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), these DRM include deep space sortie missions of 1 month duration, lunar orbital and landing missions of 1 year duration, deep space journey and asteroid landing missions of 1 year duration, and Mars orbital and landing missions of 3 years duration. We then assessed the likelihood and consequences of each risk against each DRM, using three levels of likelihood (Low: less than or equal to 0.1%; Medium: 0.1%–1.0%; High: greater than or equal to 1.0%) and four levels of consequence ranging from Very Low (temporary or insignificant) to High (death, loss of mission, or significant reduction to length or quality of life). Quantitative evidence from clinical, operational, and research sources were used whenever available. Qualitative evidence was used when quantitative evidence was unavailable. Expert opinion was used whenever insufficient evidence was available. Results: A set of 30 risks emerged that will require further mitigation efforts before being accepted by the Agency. The likelihood by consequence risk assessment process provided a means of prioritizing among the risks identified. For each of the high priority risks, a plan was developed to perform research, technology, or standards development thought necessary to provide suitable reduction of likelihood or consequence to allow agency acceptance. Conclusion: The HSRB process has successfully identified a complete set of risks to human space travelers on planned exploration missions based on the best evidence available today. Risk mitigation plans have been established for the highest priority risks. Each risk will be reassessed annually to track the progress of our risk mitigation efforts.

Paloski, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS2015

A Framework for the Cross-Sectoral Integration of Multi-Model Impact Projections: Land Use Decisions Under Climate Impacts Uncertainties

Climate change and its impacts already pose considerable challenges for societies that will further increase with global warming (IPCC, 2014a, b). Uncertainties of the climatic response to greenhouse gas emissions include the potential passing of large-scale tipping points (e.g. Lenton et al., 2008; Levermann et al., 2012; Schellnhuber, 2010) and changes in extreme meteorological events (Field et al., 2012) with complex impacts on societies (Hallegatte et al., 2013). Thus climate change mitigation is considered a necessary societal response for avoiding uncontrollable impacts (Conference of the Parties, 2010). On the other hand, large-scale climate change mitigation itself implies fundamental changes in, for example, the global energy system. The associated challenges come on top of others that derive from equally important ethical imperatives like the fulfilment of increasing food demand that may draw on the same resources. For example, ensuring food security for a growing population may require an expansion of cropland, thereby reducing natural carbon sinks or the area available for bio-energy production. So far, available studies addressing this problem have relied on individual impact models, ignoring uncertainty in crop model and biome model projections. Here, we propose a probabilistic decision framework that allows for an evaluation of agricultural management and mitigation options in a multi-impactmodel setting. Based on simulations generated within the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP), we outline how cross-sectorally consistent multi-model impact simulations could be used to generate the information required for robust decision making. Using an illustrative future land use pattern, we discuss the trade-off between potential gains in crop production and associated losses in natural carbon sinks in the new multiple crop- and biome-model setting. In addition, crop and water model simulations are combined to explore irrigation increases as one possible measure of agricultural intensification that could limit the expansion of cropland required in response to climate change and growing food demand. This example shows that current impact model uncertainties pose an important challenge to long-term mitigation planning and must not be ignored in long-term strategic decision making

farmlands↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Mock Certification Basis for an Unmanned Rotorcraft for Precision Agricultural Spraying

This technical report presents the results of a case study using a hazard-based approach to develop preliminary design and performance criteria for an unmanned agricultural rotorcraft requiring airworthiness certification. This case study is one of the first in the public domain to examine design and performance criteria for an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) in tandem with its concept of operations. The case study results are intended to support development of airworthiness standards that could form a minimum safety baseline for midsize unmanned rotorcraft performing precision agricultural spraying operations under beyond visual line-of-sight conditions in a rural environment. This study investigates the applicability of current methods, processes, and standards for assuring airworthiness of conventionally piloted (manned) aircraft to assuring the airworthiness of UAS. The study started with the development of a detailed concept of operations for precision agricultural spraying with an unmanned rotorcraft (pp. 5-18). The concept of operations in conjunction with a specimen unmanned rotorcraft were used to develop an operational context and a list of relevant hazards (p. 22). Minimum design and performance requirements necessary to mitigate the hazards provide the foundation of a proposed (or mock) type certification basis. A type certification basis specifies the applicable standards an applicant must show compliance with to receive regulatory approval. A detailed analysis of the current airworthiness regulations for normal-category rotorcraft (14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 27) was performed. Each Part 27 regulation was evaluated to determine whether it mitigated one of the relevant hazards for the specimen UAS. Those regulations that did were included in the initial core of the type certification basis (pp. 26-31) as written or with some simple modifications. Those regulations that did not mitigate a recognized hazard were excluded from the certification basis. The remaining regulations were applicable in intent, but the text could not be easily tailored. Those regulations were addressed in separate issue papers. Exploiting established regulations avoids the difficult task of generating and interpreting novel requirements, through the use of acceptable, standardized language. The rationale for the disposition of the regulations was assessed and captured (pp. 58-115). The core basis was then augmented by generating additional requirements (pp. 38-47) to mitigate hazards for an unmanned sprayer that are not covered in Part 27.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Performance Analysis of a Hardware Implemented Complex Signal Kurtosis Radio-Frequency Interference Detector

Radio-frequency interference (RFI) is a known problem for passive remote sensing as evidenced in the L-band radiometers SMOS, Aquarius and more recently, SMAP. Various algorithms have been developed and implemented on SMAP to improve science measurements. This was achieved by the use of a digital microwave radiometer. RFI mitigation becomes more challenging for microwave radiometers operating at higher frequencies in shared allocations. At higher frequencies larger bandwidths are also desirable for lower measurement noise further adding to processing challenges. This work focuses on finding improved RFI mitigation techniques that will be effective at additional frequencies and at higher bandwidths. To aid the development and testing of applicable detection and mitigation techniques, a wide-band RFI algorithm testing environment has been developed using the Reconfigurable Open Architecture Computing Hardware System (ROACH) built by the Collaboration for Astronomy Signal Processing and Electronics Research (CASPER) Group. The testing environment also consists of various test equipment used to reproduce typical signals that a radiometer may see including those with and without RFI. The testing environment permits quick evaluations of RFI mitigation algorithms as well as show that they are implementable in hardware. The algorithm implemented is a complex signal kurtosis detector which was modeled and simulated. The complex signal kurtosis detector showed improved performance over the real kurtosis detector under certain conditions. The real kurtosis is implemented on SMAP at 24 MHz bandwidth. The complex signal kurtosis algorithm was then implemented in hardware at 200 MHz bandwidth using the ROACH. In this work, performance of the complex signal kurtosis and the real signal kurtosis are compared. Performance evaluations and comparisons in both simulation as well as experimental hardware implementations were done with the use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The complex kurtosis algorithm has the potential to reduce data rate due to onboard processing in addition to improving RFI detection performance.

microwaves↗