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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 901 records · Page 50
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Criticality of Low-Energy Protons in Single-Event Effects Testing of Highly-Scaled Technologies

We report low-energy proton and low-energy alpha particle single-event effects (SEE) data on a 32 nm silicon-on-insulator (SOI) complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) latches and static random access memory (SRAM) that demonstrates the criticality of using low-energy protons for SEE testing of highly-scaled technologies. Low-energy protons produced a significantly higher fraction of multi-bit upsets relative to single-bit upsets when compared to similar alpha particle data. This difference highlights the importance of performing hardness assurance testing with protons that include energy distribution components below 2 megaelectron-volt. The importance of low-energy protons to system-level single-event performance is based on the technology under investigation as well as the target radiation environment.

random access memory↗
NASA NTRS2016

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture to where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publicatoin5, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra- Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Mars ISRU for Production of Mission Critical Consumables - Options, Recent Studies, and Current State of the Art

In 1978, a ground breaking paper titled, "Feasibility of Rocket Propellant Production on Mars" by Ash, Dowler, and Varsi discussed how ascent propellants could be manufactured on the Mars surface from carbon dioxide collected from the atmosphere to reduce launch mass. Since then, the concept of making mission critical consumables such as propellants, fuel cell reactants, and life support consumables from local resources, commonly known as In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU), for robotic and human missions to Mars has been studied many times. In the late 1990's, NASA initiated a series of Mars Human Design Reference Missions (DRMs), the first of which was released in 1997. These studies primarily focused on evaluating the impact of making propellants on Mars for crew ascent to Mars orbit, but creating large caches of life support consumables (water & oxygen) as a backup for regenerative life support systems for long-duration surface stays (>500 days) was also considered in Mars DRM 3.0. Until science data from the Mars Odyssey orbiter and subsequent robotic missions revealed that water may be widely accessable across the surface of Mars, prior Mars ISRU studies were limited to processing Mars atmospheric resources (carbon dioxide, nitrogen, argon, oxygen, and water vapor). In December 2007, NASA completed the Mars Human Design Reference Architecture (DRA) 5.0 study which considered water on Mars as a potential resource for the first time in a human mission architecture. While knowledge of both water resources on Mars and the hardware required to excavate and extract the water were very preliminary, the study concluded that a significant reduction in mass and significant enhancements to the mission architecture were possible if Mars water resources were utilized. Two subsequent Mars ISRU studies aimed at reexamining ISRU technologies, processing options, and advancements in the state-of-the-art since 2007 and to better understand the volume and packaging associated with Mars ISRU systems further substantiated the preliminary results from the Mars DRA 5.0 study. This paper will provide an overview of Mars ISRU consumable production options, the analyses, results, and conclusions from the Mars DRA 5.0 (2007), Mars Collaborative (2013), and Mars ISRU Payload for the Supersonic Retro Propulsion (2014) mission studies, and the current state-of-the-art of Mars ISRU technologies and systems. The paper will also briefly discuss the mission architectural implications associated with Mars resource and ISRU processing options.

Sanders, G. B.↗
NASA NTRS2015

The Iodine Satellite (iSat) Project Development Towards Critical Design Review

Despite the prevalence of small satellites in recent years, the systems flown to date have very limited propulsion capability. SmallSats are typically secondary payloads and have significant constraints for volume, mass, and power in addition to limitations on the use of hazardous propellants or stored energy. These constraints limit the options for SmallSat maneuverability. NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate approved the iodine Satellite flight project for a rapid demonstration of iodine Hall thruster technology in a 12U (cubesat units) configuration under the Small Spacecraft Technology Program. The mission is a partnership between NASA MSFC, NASA GRC, and Busek Co, Inc., with the Air Force supporting the propulsion technology maturation. The team is working towards the critical design review in the final design and fabrication phase of the project. The current design shows positive technical performance margins in all areas. The iSat project is planned for launch readiness in the spring of 2017.

Dankanich, John W.↗
NASA NTRS2015

ACCEPT: Introduction of the Adverse Condition and Critical Event Prediction Toolbox

The prediction of anomalies or adverse events is a challenging task, and there are a variety of methods which can be used to address the problem. In this paper, we introduce a generic framework developed in MATLAB (sup registered mark) called ACCEPT (Adverse Condition and Critical Event Prediction Toolbox). ACCEPT is an architectural framework designed to compare and contrast the performance of a variety of machine learning and early warning algorithms, and tests the capability of these algorithms to robustly predict the onset of adverse events in any time-series data generating systems or processes.

machine learning↗
NASA NTRS2015

Assuring NASA's Safety and Mission Critical Software

What is IV&V? Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is an objective examination of safety and mission critical software processes and products. Independence: 3 Key parameters: Technical Independence; Managerial Independence; Financial Independence. NASA IV&V perspectives: Will the system's software: Do what it is supposed to do?; Not do what it is not supposed to do?; Respond as expected under adverse conditions?. Systems Engineering: Determines if the right system has been built and that it has been built correctly. IV&V Technical Approaches: Aligned with IEEE 1012; Captured in a Catalog of Methods; Spans the full project lifecycle. IV&V Assurance Strategy: The IV&V Project's strategy for providing mission assurance; Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project; Implemented via an Assurance Design; Communicated via Assurance Statements.

Validation↗
NASA NTRS2015

Application of SAE ARP4754A to Flight Critical Systems

This report documents applications of ARP4754A to the development of modern computer-based (i.e., digital electronics, software and network-based) aircraft systems. This study is to offer insight and provide educational value relative to the guidelines in ARP4754A and provide an assessment of the current state-of-the- practice within industry and regulatory bodies relative to development assurance for complex and safety-critical computer-based aircraft systems.

Peterson, Eric M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

Initial "Big 14" work was put to the test for the first time in 2010. Deficiencies were found in some of the planning and approaches to that work; Failure Response Assessment Team created in 2010 to address deficiencies -Identify and perform engineering analysis in operations products prior to failure; incorporate results into operations products -Identify actions for protecting ISS against a Next Worse Failure after the first failure occurs -Better document not only EVA products but also planning products, assumptions, and open actions; Pre-failure investments against critical failures best postures ISS for swift response and recovery -A type of insurance policy -Has proven effective in a number of contingency EVA cases since 2010. Planning for MBSU R&R in 2012, Second PM R&R in 2013, EXT MDM R&R in 2014; Current FRAT schedule projects completion of all analysis in 2018

Van Cise, Edward A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publication, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Consistent Practices for the Probability of Detection (POD) of Fracture Critical Metallic Components Project

NASA-STD-5009 requires that successful flaw detection by NDE methods be statistically qualified for use on fracture critical metallic components, but does not standardize practices. This task works towards standardizing calculations and record retention with a web-based tool, the NNWG POD Standards Library or NPSL. Test methods will also be standardized with an appropriately flexible appendix to -5009 identifying best practices. Additionally, this appendix will describe how specimens used to qualify NDE systems will be cataloged, stored and protected from corrosion, damage, or loss.

Hughitt, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA's Space Launch System Marks Critical Design Review

With completion of its Critical Design Review (CDR) in 2015, NASA is deep into the manufacturing and testing phases of its new Space Launch System (SLS) for beyond-Earth exploration. This CDR was the first in almost 40 years for a NASA human launch vehicle and marked another successful milestone on the road to the launch of a new era of deep space exploration. The review marked the 90-percent design-complete, a final look at the design and development plan of the integrated vehicle before full-scale fabrications begins and the prelude to the next milestone, design certification. Specifically, the review looked at the first of three increasingly capable configurations planned for SLS. This "Block I" design will stand 98.2 meters (m) (322 feet) tall and provide 39.1 million Newtons (8.8 million pounds) of thrust at liftoff to lift a payload of approximately 70 metric tons (154,000 pounds). This payload is more than double that of the retired space shuttle program or other current launch vehicles. It dramatically increases the mass and volume of human and robotic exploration. Additionally, it will decrease overall mission risk, increase safety, and simplify ground and mission operations - all significant considerations for crewed missions and unique, high-value national payloads. The Block 1 SLS will launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) on an uncrewed flight beyond the moon and back and the first crewed flight around the moon. The current design has a direct evolutionary path to a vehicle with a 130t lift capability that offers even more flexibility to reduce planetary trip times, simplify payload design cycles, and provide new capabilities such as planetary sample returns. Every major element of SLS has hardware in production or testing, including flight hardware for the Exploration 1 (EM-1) test flight. In fact, the SLS MPCV-to-Stage-Adapter (MSA) flew successfully on the Exploration Flight Test (EFT) 1 launch of a Delta IV and Orion spacecraft in December 2014. This paper will discuss these and other technical and programmatic successes and challenges over the past year and provide a preview of work ahead before the first flight of this new capability.

Singer, Chris↗
NASA NTRS2016

An Evaluation of Flash Cells Used in Critical Applications

Due to the common use of Flash technology in many commercial and industrial Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs) such as FPGAs and mixed-signal microcontrollers, flash technology is being utilized in fuzed munition applications. This presents a long-term reliability issue for both DoD and NASA safety- and mission-critical applications. A thorough understanding of the data retention failure modes and statistics associated with Flash data retention is of vital concern to the fuze safety community. A key retention parameter for a flash cell is the threshold voltage (VTH), which is an indirect indicator of the amount of charge stored on the cells floating gate. Initial test results based on a study of charge loss in flash cells in an FPGA device is presented. Statistical data taken from a small sample set indicates quantifiable charge loss for devices stored at both room temperature and 150 C. Initial evaluation of the distribution of threshold voltage in a large sample set (800 devices) is presented. The magnitude of charge loss from exposure to electrostatic discharge and electromagnetic fields is measured and presented. Simulated data (and measured data as available) resultant from harsh-environment testing (neutron, heavy ion, EMP) is presented.

data retention↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Iodine Satellite (iSat) Project Development Towards Critical Design Review (CDR)

Despite the prevalence of Small Satellites in recent years, the systems flown to date have very limited propulsion capability. SmallSats are typically secondary payloads and have significant constraints for volume, mass, and power in addition to limitations on the use of hazardous propellants or stored energy (i.e. high pressure vessels). These constraints limit the options for SmallSat maneuverability. NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate approved the iodine Satellite flight project for a rapid demonstration of iodine Hall thruster technology in a 12U configuration under the Small Spacecraft Technology Program. The project formally began in FY15 as a partnership between NASA MSFC, NASA GRC, and Busek Co, Inc., with the Air Force supporting the propulsion technology maturation. The team is in final preparation of the Critical Design Review prior to initiating the fabrication and integration phase of the project. The iSat project is on schedule for a launch opportunity in November 2017.

Electric Propulsion↗
NASA NTRS2016

Thermal Analysis of Iodine Satellite (iSAT) from Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to Critical Design Review (CDR)

The Iodine Satellite (iSAT) is a 12U cubesat with a primary mission to demonstrate the iodine fueled Hall Effect Thruster (HET) propulsion system. The spacecraft (SC) will operate throughout a one year mission in an effort to mature the propulsion system for use in future applications. The benefit of the HET is that it uses a propellant, iodine, which is easy to store and provides a high thrust-to-mass ratio. This paper will describe the thermal analysis and design of the SC between Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR). The design of the satellite has undergone many changes due to a variety of challenges, both before PDR and during the time period discussed in this paper. Thermal challenges associated with the system include a high power density, small amounts of available radiative surface area, localized temperature requirements of the propulsion components, and unknown orbital parameters. The thermal control system is implemented to maintain component temperatures within their respective operational limits throughout the mission, while also maintaining propulsion components at the high temperatures needed to allow gaseous iodine propellant to flow. The design includes heaters, insulation, radiators, coatings, and thermal straps. Currently, the maximum temperatures for several components are near to their maximum operation limit, and the battery is close to its minimum operation limit. Mitigation strategies and planned work to solve these challenges will be discussed.

Mauro, Stephanie↗
NASA NTRS2016

Thermal Design, Tvac Testing, and Lessons Learned for Critical GSE of ATLAS and the ICESat-2 Mission

This presentation describes the thermal design of the three main of optical components which comprise the Bench Checkout Equipment (BCE) for the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument, which is flying on the ICESat-2 mission. Thermal vacuum testing of these components is also described in this presentation, as well as a few lessons learned. These BCE components serve as critical GSE for the mission; their purpose is to verify ATLAS is performing well. It has been said that, in one light, the BCE is the most important part of ATLAS, since, without it, ATLAS cannot be aligned properly or its performance verified before flight. Therefore, careful attention was paid to the BCEs thermal design, development, and component-level Tvac testing prior to its use in instrument-level and spacecraft-level Tvac tests with ATLAS. This presentation describes that thermal design, development, and testing, as well as a few lessons learned.

Thermal ATLAS BCE↗