Results for “standard operating procedure” — Page 5

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Brief Introduction to AI/ML Applications of Air Traffic Management Data at NASA Ames

This presentation will give a brief overview of several AI/ML This presentation will give a brief overview of several AI/ML projects that NASA Ames interns are exploring in partnership with NASA Aeronautic Research Institute (NARI) and the FAA. NASA is interested in Natural Language Processing (NLP) of various legacy text and speech data within air traffic management e.g., Notices To Airmen (NOTAMs), Letters of Agreement (LoAs), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and Air Traffic Control Center audio briefings. Since our focus is on applying state of the art AI/ML tools to legacy air traffic management data, we first showcase the different data sources of interest followed by a brief introduction to the techniques and language models used. We present some exciting preliminary results on each topic including both unsupervised learning techniques (e.g., clustering) and other modern language models (e.g., BERT) that help extract useful information from these data sources that are interpretable by both man and machine.

Air Traffic Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Enabling Space Biology Knowledge Discovery Through Biospecimen Sharing: The NASA Biological Institutional Scientific Collection

NASA and international partners have conducted experiments in space to understand the biological impacts and address hazards to health. The resulting basic and applied science is imperative to enabling humanity to venture back to the Moon and then to Mars and beyond. Sending organisms into space is a costly endeavor. All biospecimens not required by spaceflight-relevant Principal Investigators are harvested, preserved, and archived in the NASA Biological Institutional Scientific Collection (NBISC) to maximize the scientific return. The NASA Biological and Physical Sciences (BPS) Division has an ‘Open Science’ endeavor which includes NASA Genelab, the Space Biology Program’s Biospecimen Sharing Program, Physical Sciences Informatics, the Ames Life Sciences Data Archive, and NBISC. Its purpose is to integrate extensive data and biospecimen resources from spaceflight and/or ground-based analog experiments. NBISC biospecimens are collected and preserved according to well-established standard operating procedures to maintain scientific quality and are available on-request by the international scientific community. NBISC currently stores over 32,000 biospecimens from Shuttle, International Space Station, and ground-based space analog investigations. Tissue sharing has resulted in at least 33 publications since 2011 and 48 requests since 2016. Many requests for NBISC biospecimen come from first-time investigators who subsequently submit grants as the port-of-entry into the field of space biology. Some NBISC biospecimens have been awarded to NASA Genelab, who then generate various ‘Open Science’ -omics data sets on their platform for bioinformatics. Other NBISC biospecimen awards have led to multiple studies such as fecal microbiome analysis, DNA damage analysis using single-cell DNA sequencing, enzymatic-pathway identification involved in spaceflight muscle atrophy, and characterization of ocular morphological changes. Of note, NBISC has expanded to include a new Space Microbial Culture Collection (SMCC) for the collection, identification, documentation, long-term preservation, and distribution of space-related microbial isolates.

Ryan T. Scott↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Enabling Biological Discovery Through Biospecimen Sharing: The Nasa Biological Institutional Scientific Collection

Understanding biological impacts from spaceflight hazards and the subsequent development of countermeasures are a high priority to enable humanity to venture back to the Moon, and then to Mars and beyond. Experiments have been conducted with model organisms flown to space and analogous investigations terrestrially, to identify biological mechanistic impacts from spaceflight hazards and to develop mitigation countermeasures, thus contributing towards basic and applied science goals. However, sending organisms into space is a costly endeavor. To maximize scientific return, all biospecimens not required by spaceflight-relevant Principal Investigators are harvested, preserved, and archived in the NASA Biological Institutional Scientific Collection (NBISC). Biospecimens are collected and preserved according to well-established standard operating procedures to maintain scientific quality and are available on-request by the international scientific community. NBISC currently stores over 32,000 biospecimens from Shuttle, International Space Station, and ground-based space analog investigations. Tissue sharing has resulted in at least 33 publications since 2011 and 51 requests since 2016. Many requests for NBISC biospecimens come from first-time investigators who subsequently submit grants as their point-of-entry into the field of spaceflight biology and health. The NBISC biorepository is part of the NASA ‘Open Science for Life in Space’ collaborative group of projects, which includes NASA Genelab, the Space Biology Program’s Biospecimen Sharing Program, Physical Sciences Informatics, and the Ames Life Sciences Data Archive. NBISC biospecimens have been awarded to NASA Genelab, who then generated various open access science ‘omics datasets through the GeneLab Sample Processing laboratory, with resulting data widely used for biological study. Other NBISC biospecimen awards have led to studies on fecal microbiome analysis, DNA damage analysis using single-cell DNA sequencing, enzymatic-pathway identification involved in spaceflight muscle atrophy, and characterization of ocular morphological changes. Of note, NBISC is expanded to include a new Space Microbial Culture Collection (SMCC) for the collection, identification, documentation, long-term preservation, and distribution of space-related microbial isolates.

Biospecimens↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Pipeline for Assessing the Quality of Rna-Seq Datasets in GeneLab

Transcriptome profiling by RNA sequencing (RNA-seq) is a powerful approach to identify gene expression changes in organisms exposed to unique environments such as spaceflight. One of the challenges of evaluating RNA-seq data both within and across different space-relevant studies is the ability to control for technical differences, including the use of different library preparation kits, sequencing platforms, RNA yield, and person-to-person variation. To help address this issue, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, nist.gov) initiated a consortium, at the request of industry and academia, to develop a set of controls for gene expression measurements. The result was a set of 92 unlabeled, polyadenylated transcripts that range from 250 – 2,000 nucleotides in length to mimic natural eukaryotic mRNAs. These External RNA Controls Consortium (ERCC) genes can be used in any RNA-seq experiment, by adding known concentrations of the ERCC genes to samples after RNA extraction, to offer a standard measurement for data comparison. At NASA GeneLab, we employ these controls as part of our standard operating procedures for every in-house RNA-seq study to assess the limit of detection, dynamic range, and power of differential expression analysis both within and across experiments. Here we will discuss the use, benefits, and limitations of ERCC genes and other types of controls, such as universal RNA references, to generate quality control information for RNA-seq studies conducted at GeneLab.

GeneLab↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Survey Development and Initial Data: Flight Context and Pilot Techniques in Everyday Flights

The aviation industry is recognizing that flight crews routinely contribute to system safety in ways that go beyond adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs). Our research goals were to explore a) whether a survey could shed light on pilots' contributions to adaptation and resilience in everyday flights and b) relevant assessment methods. The survey focused on challenges faced by pilots in normal operations, and on the ways that pilots anticipate and monitor those challenges. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two pilot groups; one group also provided responses concerning a simulated scenario. The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We discuss some design and assessment challenges encountered for a survey on this topic, we provide 5 approaches to assessment, and we present example findings as illustrations. We hope assessment methods such as these will lead to useful surveys of resilience in flight.

pilot behavior↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

DOE OSTI2020

Implications of End Points on Remediation - 20476

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being implemented as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The Port Hope Project is the larger of the two and includes the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic waste. The Port Hope Project includes a unique and important component - the remediation of approximately 1,200 private residences and businesses to include both interior and exterior verification of soil and surface-contaminated objects. Planning and consultation for the PHAI clean-up criteria and remediation verification standard operating procedures (RVSOP) were initiated in the early 2000's. The criteria were developed through a cooperative effort involving the PHAI, scientific specialists, federal and provincial government agencies, peer reviewers, the municipalities and members of the public. Subsequent verification procedures which detail the unique systematic methods to verify compliance with the clean-up criteria were developed by CNL in consultation with federal regulators and relevant stakeholders. Now, specifically with the Port Hope Small-Scale Sites project having been underway for a year and approximately 38 properties in some stage of remediation, it has become increasingly evident that the practical application of the clean-up criteria and RVSOP methodology is posing unique challenges that are having direct impact on project execution. The current RVSOP approach is based on discrete sample verification not allowing failure of any one sample. When implemented in the field, particularly at the Small-Scale Sites, it leads to a much more extensive excavation than what was accounted for in the original design, the implications of which are substantial delays in project progress and much more significant impact on the individual properties than originally anticipated. This paper will examine the evolution of PHAI clean-up criteria, subsequent RVSOP methodology and its impact on current project execution and the justification for exploring potential revisions to methods of remediation verification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1997

Standardized Methods for Electronic Shearography

Research was conducted in development of operating procedures and standard methods to evaluate fiber reinforced composite materials, bonded or sprayed insulation, coatings, and laminated structures with MSFC electronic shearography systems. Optimal operating procedures were developed for the Pratt and Whitney Electronic Holography/Shearography Inspection System (EH/SIS) operating in shearography mode, as well as the Laser Technology, Inc. (LTI) SC-4000 and Ettemeyer SHS-94 ISTRA shearography systems. Operating practices for exciting the components being inspected were studied, including optimal methods for transient heating with heat lamps and other methods as appropriate to enhance inspection capability.

Lansing, Matthew D.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems recommendation for space data system standards: Telecommand. Part 2.1: Command operation procedures

This recommendation contains the detailed specification of the logic required to carry out the Command Operations Procedures of the Transfer Layer. The Recommendation for Telecommand--Part 2, Data Routing Service contains the standard data structures and data communication procedures used by the intermediate telecommand system layers (the Transfer and Segmentation Layers). In particular, it contains a brief description of the Command Operations Procedures (COP) within the Transfer Layer. This recommendation contains the detailed definition of the COP's in the form of state tables, along with definitions of the terms used. It is assumed that the reader of this document is familiar with the data structures and terminology of part 2. In case of conflict between the description of the COP's in part 2 and in this recommendation, the definition in this recommendation will take precedence. In particular, this document supersedes section 4.3.3.1 through 4.3.3.4 of part 2.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2020

Interlaboratory Study of Digital Volume Correlation Error Due to X-Ray Computed Tomography Equipment and Scan Parameters: an Update from the DVC Challenge

Background: The quality of Digital Volume Correlation (DVC) full-field displacement measurements depends directly on the characteristics of the X-ray Computed Tomography (XCT) equipment, and scan procedures used to acquire the tomographic images. Objective: In this work, we seek to experimentally study the effects of XCT equipment and tomographic scan procedures on the quality of these images for DVC analysis, and to survey the level of DVC error that may be achieved using standard XCT operating procedures. Methods: Six participants in an interlaboratory study acquired high-quality XCT scans of a syntactic foam before and after rigid body motion. The resulting images were correlated using commercial DVC software to quantify error sources due to random image noise, reconstruction artifacts, as well as systematic spatial or temporal distortion. Results: In the absence of rigid body motion, the standard deviation of the displacement measurements ranged from 0.012 to 0.043 voxels using a moderate subvolume size, indicating that subvoxel measurement resolution could readily be achieved with a variety of XCT equipment and scan recipes. Comparison of consecutive scans without rigid body motion showed transient dilatational displacement gradients due to self-heating of the X-ray source and/or thermal expansion of the foam. Evaluation of the scans after rigid body motion showed significant, machine-specific spatial distortion in the displacement fields of up to 0.5 voxels; new approaches to remove this error need to be developed. Conclusions: Analysis of the scan protocols used in the interlaboratory study, as well as a complementary parametric sensitivity study, showed that the DVC error was strongly influenced by the XCT equipment, but could be mitigated by adjusting the total scan duration.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gap Analysis of UAS Manuals and Hazards

Emerging aviation includes the use of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in novel operations. The manufacture and operation of these small UAS are not as regulated as today’s commercial operation, and their widespread use introduces new risks and hazards to the general public. Today, there are case-by-case approvals for sUAS operations, particularly for emergency response operations in which the potential benefits to use of sUAS is perceived to outweigh potential risks. We analyze operational approvals, procedures, and concepts of operation to identify and categorize the risks and hazards that applicants and approvers are already considering, and also identify barriers and mitigations that the operators have already put in place. This analysis may help lead to routine checklists that standardize safety analysis and lead to more routine operations.

grounded theory↗

NASA NTRS2014

A Review of Current and Prospective Factors for Classification of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems

While progress is being made on integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into our national airspace on a broad scale, much work remains to establish appropriate certification standards and operational procedures, particularly with respect to routine commercial operations. This paper summarizes research to examine the extent to which today's civil aircraft taxonomy applies to UAS, and, if needed, how that taxonomy could be amended to better cover different UAS designs and operations. Factors that shape the current taxonomy, as defined in the Federal Aviation Regulations, were assessed for applicability to UAS, potential incompatibilities were identified, and additional factors were proposed that might be useful for an updated aircraft taxonomy intended to cover UAS. The results suggest the possibility of constructing new groups in the taxonomy for UAS under a restricted category that share common airworthiness standards. Establishing distinct groups for UAS and associated standards that enable low risk operations for compensation or hire could be a timely step toward full integration. Such a step would allow the civil aviation industry and regulators to gain valuable experience with UAS while carefully controlling access and potential harm to the aviation system as a whole.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Expanding standards in viromics: in silico evaluation of dsDNA viral genome identification, classification, and auxiliary metabolic gene curation

Viruses influence global patterns of microbial diversity and nutrient cycles. Though viral metagenomics (viromics), specifically targeting dsDNA viruses, has been critical for revealing viral roles across diverse ecosystems, its analyses differ in many ways from those used for microbes. To date, viromics benchmarking has covered read pre-processing, assembly, relative abundance, read mapping thresholds and diversity estimation, but other steps would benefit from benchmarking and standardization. Here we use in silico-generated datasets and an extensive literature survey to evaluate and highlight how dataset composition (i.e., viromes vs bulk metagenomes) and assembly fragmentation impact (i) viral contig identification tool, (ii) virus taxonomic classification, and (iii) identification and curation of auxiliary metabolic genes (AMGs). The in silico benchmarking of five commonly used virus identification tools show that gene-content-based tools consistently performed well for long (≥3 kbp) contigs, while k -mer- and blast-based tools were uniquely able to detect viruses from short (≤3 kbp) contigs. Notably, however, the performance increase of k -mer- and blast-based tools for short contigs was obtained at the cost of increased false positives (sometimes up to ~5% for virome and ~75% bulk samples), particularly when eukaryotic or mobile genetic element sequences were included in the test datasets. Furthermore, for viral classification, variously sized genome fragments were assessed using gene-sharing network analytics to quantify drop-offs in taxonomic assignments, which revealed correct assignations ranging from ~95% (whole genomes) down to ~80% (3 kbp sized genome fragments). A similar trend was also observed for other viral classification tools such as VPF-class, ViPTree and VIRIDIC, suggesting that caution is warranted when classifying short genome fragments and not full genomes. Finally, we highlight how fragmented assemblies can lead to erroneous identification of AMGs and outline a best-practices workflow to curate candidate AMGs in viral genomes assembled from metagenomes. Together, these benchmarking experiments and annotation guidelines should aid researchers seeking to best detect, classify, and characterize the myriad viruses ‘hidden’ in diverse sequence datasets.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1977

User access to the National Space Transportation System

Economical and efficient use of the Space Transportation System (STS) will depend to a large extent on the ability to utilize standard procedures and operations; and for early users transitioning from expendable launch vehicles, the ability to use previous procedures and documentation. Users of the STS will need to know how and where to obtain the information needed to know the STS capabilities, how to obtain a flight assignment, costs involved, and processing of their payloads in preparation for launch.

Mccoy, H. E.↗