Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “software vulnerabilities”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 91 records · Page 5

Common Cause Failure Mitigation Experience on Digital I and C System in NPP

CCF is failures of redundant or separate structures, systems, or components due to a shared root cause. The CCF includes those are resulted from severe environments, design errors, calibration and maintenance errors, and consequential failures. In addition, digital I and C systems can be vulnerable to CCF caused by software errors or software developed logic, which could defeat the redundancy achieved by the hardware architecture. Therefore, diversity and defense in-depth (D3) has become an important issue to overcome the CCF of the safety I and C system. The U.S. NRC has established regulatory guidance addressing a method for assessing D3 provided by the safety I and C system architecture at a NPP. This method enables determination of whether vulnerabilities to CCF have been adequately addressed. The guidance is included in BTP 7-19 and Chapter 7 of NUREG-0800. The regulatory guidance provides a methodology for designing diversity. APR1400 establishes the mitigating strategies that consider the characteristics of digital I and C system that contribute to the potential for CCF. The diversity strategies consist of a combination of diversity attributes and associated criteria to address potential CCF vulnerabilities in digital safety I and C system. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm (CyFEr): Prioritized Gap Analysis

Cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools, frameworks, methodologies, and processes are commonly used to understand the cybersecurity maturity and posture of a system or a facility. Although, those tools are strictly developed based on standards defined by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Energy, the majority of these tools and frameworks do not provide a platform to prioritize the requirements to reach a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we have been developing a framework and a software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). The efficacy of CyFEr was evaluated by implementing it on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). This paper provides a detailed architecture of CyFEr and demonstrates its application to CSF by testing against a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems in a critical infrastructure facility.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Evaluation of Apex Alpha with LabWare-LIMS Data Reduction for Alpha Analyses

Savannah River Site's Environmental Bioassay Laboratory is migrating its laboratory information management system (LIMS) from SQL-LIMS to Oracle Labware-LIMS (LW-LIMS) systems to align with the Department of Energy's cyber security policies. Concurrently with the LIMS upgrade, the current VMS based Alpha Measurement System (AMS) software is being replaced with Apex Alpha software to reduce other cyber vulnerabilities, streamline procedural production aspects of data handling, and improve outdated reduction processes to align the program with requirements outlined in ANSI N13.30. The primary technical changes which are being implemented are: - Reagent contributions are added in data reduction, - Moving average background equivalent activity are used for gross signal corrections, - Measured uncertainty of both are included in the decision level and propagated uncertainty, - Tracer levels are increased for precision and accuracy improvements, and - Reports are modified for compliance.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SCA Tools - SCRM Value Add or Lossy Noise Machines

Software supply chain risk management (SCRM) depends upon accurate information regarding the software components that comprise any given software system. The collection of components included in a software package can be organized within a software bill of materials, or SBOM. SBOMs are ideally generated when the software components are put together, such as at compile time, but for many reasons that has not and is not always possible. For example, legacy or proprietary software packages often do not have SBOMs available to downstream consumers of that software. It’s not just end users that are affected, manufacturers themselves also must deal with this problem. To answer these questions, the market has seen the rise of several commercial software composition analysis (SCA) tools. These tools aim to peer into completed software systems, automatically identifying hidden software dependencies and looking up known vulnerabilities associated with those dependencies to enable end-users to enhance their cyber supply chain risk management processes. These tools are potentially a huge boon to end users of legacy and proprietary software – and a potential bane, depending on how accurate they are. This research asks that question – how accurate are currently available binary SCA tools – and provides answers to several other questions: What does it mean to be “accurate”? What limitations do the tools have in identifying common edge cases that take place in modern software development? Can they help you avoid a devastating supply chain attack, or is it all just noise? After researching SCA tools on the market, we identified three vendors that fit our use case and would provide analysis on compiled binaries. Using these tools, we submitted firmware for critical infrastructure devices for analysis and SBOM generation. The SBOM outputs were then cross referenced with SBOMs generated through manual analysis for comparison. In addition to the firmware samples, we also submitted edge case samples based off a popular open-source library that were specifically crafted to evaluate each tools’ ability to accurately identify components. These samples were customized to be consistent with modifications we have seen in modern software development as well as a couple that are representative of supply chain attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Blueprint: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Adoption for Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)-Like Groups

The electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) industry is an incredibly diverse set of participants (EVSE manufacturers, charge network operators (CNOs), original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), etc.), and with the potential for an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) or ISAC-like group, it requires a series of guidance for doing a multiparty coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) such that a group like this could be successful. This blueprint provides a template and guidance to stakeholders in the EVSE industry for conducting a multiparty CVD. It also formalizes what multiparty CVD could look like in an ISAC-like group with multiple entities as well as vulnerability coordinators by specifically calling out who in the ISAC-like group may be involved, and which industry members it may apply to. This blueprint leverages tools such as Vultron, VINCE, etc. along with open resources such as the Software Engineering Institutes guide for coordinated vulnerability disclosure, for the stakeholder in the EVSE industry to start up a CVD program of their own.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

SoK: A Framework for and Analysis of Software Bill of Materials Tools

Modern software development has gradually become more complex, leveraging available open-source software and third party components. This practice has raised questions about the provenance, licensing, versioning and compliance of reused code and its dependencies. Furthermore, it is par ticularly important to review such code fragments and third party components for known-vulnerabilities before they are included in a software product. A Software Bill of Materials (SBoM) is a mechanism to achieve such an analysis, provid ing transparency and visibility into a software product to both the software developer and its respective consumer. An SBoM lists information and details about all the elements constituting a piece of software and can, therefore, be used to evaluate associated security risk. While the concept of SBoMs is growing in popularity, it is still fairly new to many organizations, causing them to potentially struggle with pro ducing and processing SBoMs and limiting their widespread adoption. In this work, we delve into the area of SBoMs and present the state-of-the-art SBoM tools, creating a framework for analysis and categorizing them based on a diverse set of features and functionalities. We are the first to provide a detailed analysis of 83 open-source SBoM tools along with a perspective on how a potential SBoM user can select a tool based on their specific requirements. Our work aims to help promote understanding of this domain, thereby encouraging and furthering its overall adoption. We additionally seek to pave a path for future work in this area by providing recommendations to tool developers and users, researchers, and standardizing organizations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Blueprint: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Adaption and Adoption Guide for Industry To Create Their Own CVD Program

This guide provides a series of steps and guidance for electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) industry members to set up their own coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) program by utilizing the Software Engineering Institute/Computer Emergency Response Team (SEI/CERT)’s CVD how-to guide. Due to the complexity of CVD, and with the existing resources out there, this guide is intended that this portion of the blueprint is an extension of the CVD how-to guide, not meant as a replacement. This guide is meant to outline a process for what to do when you discover a vulnerability on EVSE equipment. It is written for developers, vendors and security researchers as well as management. This is not a technical document. It is meant to be accessible for both technical and non-technical roles.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

A Survey of Techniques for Modeling and Improving Reliability of Computing Systems

Recent trends of aggressive technology scaling have greatly exacerbated the occurrences and impact of faults in computing systems. This has made `reliability' a first-order design constraint. To address the challenges of reliability, several techniques have been proposed. In this study, we provide a survey of architectural techniques for improving resilience of computing systems. We especially focus on techniques proposed for microarchitectural components, such as processor registers, functional units, cache and main memory etc. In addition, we discuss techniques proposed for non-volatile memory, GPUs and 3D-stacked processors. To underscore the similarities and differences of the techniques, we classify them based on their key characteristics. We also review the metrics proposed to quantify vulnerability of processor structures. Finally, we believe that this survey will help researchers, system-architects and processor designers in gaining insights into the techniques for improving reliability of computing systems.

3D-stacked processors↗

Forensic Analysis of SOHO Router Binaries

Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) routers are used by millions of consumers across the United States, and are commensurately vulnerable. Forensic analysis of SOHO router firmware helps to understand and mitigate those vulnerabilities. This poster focused particularly on analysis of BusyBox executables, a software suite that provides several Unix utilities in a single file. Three main tools were used to analyze the binaries. BinWalk was used to extract the files, but also to build entropy graphs, extract Linux kernel images, and identify CPU architectures; WiiBin processed the binaries to find endianness, architecture, the percent compressed/encrypted, and compiler data; and @DisCo, a machine learning tool used to determine function similarity in disassembled binaries, analyzed similarities and determined versions of extracted BusyBox files from each router. These tools found that venders from all five routers utilized the same version of the BusyBox software across different firmware updates, demonstrating the importance of constant firmware scrutiny to protect against security vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Wireless infrastructure protection using low-cost radio frequency fingerprinting receivers

We report that low-data-rate wireless networks incorporated in critical infrastructure applications can be protected through 128-bit encryption keys and address-based access control lists. However, these bit-level credentials are vulnerable to interception, extraction and spoofing using software tools available free of charge on the Internet. Recent research has demonstrated that wireless physical layer device fingerprinting can be used to defend against replay and spoofing attacks. However, radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting typically uses expensive signal collection systems; this is because fingerprinting wireless devices with low-cost receivers has been reported to have inconsistent accuracy. In conclusion, this paper demonstrates a robust radio frequency fingerprinting process that is consistently accurate with both high-end and low-cost receivers. Indeed, the results demonstrate that low-cost software-defined radios can be used to perform accurate radio frequency fingerprinting and to identify spoofing attacks in critical IEEE 802.154-based infrastructure networks such as ZigBee.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber-Security Considerations for the Smart Grid

The electrical power grid is evolving into the “smart grid”. The goal of the smart grid is to improve efficiency and availability of power by adding more monitoring and control capabilities. These new technologies and mechanisms are certain to introduce vulnerabilities into the power grid. In this paper we provide an overview of the cyber security state of the electrical power grid. We highlight some of the vulnerabilities that already exist in the power grid including limited capacity systems, implicit trust and the lack of authentication. We also address challenges of complexity, scale, added capabilities and the move to multipurpose hardware and software as the power grid is upgraded. These changes create vulnerabilities that did not exist before and bring increased risks. We conclude the paper by showing that there are a number mitigation strategies that can help keep the risk at an acceptable level.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) [Poster]

Cybersecurity companies such as CrowdStrike, Dragos, Microsoft and Unit 42 categorize Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using their own naming schemes. As a result, these APTs are mapped to different malware sources and campaigns, all from differing sources, leading to inconsistent mapping. Inconsistent mapping causes confusion and adds further obscurity around these groups, making it difficult to track and mitigate APT cyberattacks. The Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) tool remediates the mapping challenge by collecting, updating and converting adversary data and their sources into a valid, codified STIX v2.1 bundle which is then stored in a Neo4j graph database. It utilizes graph traversal methods and centrality analysis to generate actionable information as a Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG), based on user queries. EGRAM exists as Python code and a Jupyter Notebook that acts as a searchable, evidence-based, source of intelligence for APT groups’ artifacts and cyber campaigns.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

INL@Work Cyber Security

May Chaffin is one of many Idaho National Laboratory researchers who are helping secure the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber attacks.Lots more content like this is available at INL's facebook page http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Essence of Cryptol: A Denotational Cryptol Interpreter in Coq for Foundational Assurances for Quantum Resistant Cryptosystems

Systems of the utmost consequence need a means to establish authenticity of software and data. Cryptosystems implement authentication, but can be vulnerable to cryptographic and implementation attacks. With the threat of quantum cryptographic attacks, “post-quantum” cryptosystems (PQCs) must be henceforth used in these systems. However, the new cryptography needs new ways to, rigorously and machine-checkably, prove systems free of vulnerabilities. We propose a retargetable capability to rapidly instantiate proven correct postquantum cryptosystems through novel proof-carrying synthesis and proof-automation technique, extending those proven successful on existing systems. This capability is crucial to meeting the cryptographic requirements for future high-consequence systems. Since specifications for high consequence cryptography are presently captured in a domain specific language known as Cryptol. While this can enable convenient fully automated reasoning about Cryptol specificaitons and implementations via the Software Analysis Workbench (SAW), Cryptol has expressivity gaps, so that cryptosystems with probabilistic programming features like Falcon cannot be fully expressed in the language. Moreover, SAW’s automation fails for programs and specificaitons with inductive and recursive structure, as in the Sphincs+ PQC. Finally, Cryptol and SAW together represent some 200,000 lines of unverified Haskell, so that the any guarantees about high consequence cryptography are presently contingent on a large, unverified, yet trusted computing base. The first step of the larger project of agile, assured crpytography is therefore to provide a formal, mechanized semantics for Cryptol, so that the specifications expressed by cryptographers in Cryptol can be reasoned about and compiled into performant implementations with a foundational, machine checkable certificate of correctness. This report describes our work on this first step, culminating in the design of a certified denotational interpreter, in Coq, for core Cryptol.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

SECURITY MODELING FOR MARITIME PORT DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Redeployment of existing law enforcement resources and optimal use of geographic terrain are examined for countering the threat of a maritime based small-vessel radiological or nuclear attack. The evaluation was based on modeling conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory that involved the development of options for defensive resource allocation that can reduce the risk of a maritime based radiological or nuclear threat. A diverse range of potential attack scenarios has been assessed. As a result of identifying vulnerable pathways, effective countermeasures can be deployed using current resources. The modeling involved the use of the Automated Vulnerability Evaluation for Risks of Terrorism (AVERT{reg_sign}) software to conduct computer based simulation modeling. The models provided estimates for the probability of encountering an adversary based on allocated resources including response boats, patrol boats and helicopters over various environmental conditions including day, night, rough seas and various traffic flow rates.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗