Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (CUAS) Security Performance Metrics and Requirements.
Abstract not provided.
Russell, John L.↗
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Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems: 2024 Mission Campaign White Paper
This Sandia National Laboratories Mission Campaign (MC) seeks to create the technical basis that allows national leaders to efficiently assess and manage the digital assurance of high consequence systems. We will call for transformative research that enables efficient (1) development of provably secure systems and secure integration of untrusted products, (2) intelligent threat mitigation, and (3) digital risk-informed engineering trade-offs. Ultimately, this MC will impact multiple national security missions; it will develop an informed Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems (DAHCS) community and expand Sandia partnerships to build this national capability.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
The role of energy storage systems for a secure energy supply: A comprehensive review of system needs and technology solutions
Not Available
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations
Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.
Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
Dynamics of Water, Climate, and Infrastructure
Climate and its impacts on the natural environment, and on the ability of the natural environment to support population and the built environment, stands as a threat multiplier that impacts national and global security. The Water Intersections with Climate Systems Security (WICSS) Strategic Initiative is designed to improve understanding of water’s role in, among other topics, the connection of critical infrastructure to climate in light of competing national and global security interests (including transboundary issues and stability), and identifying research gaps aligned with Sandia, and Federal agency priorities. With this impetus in mind, the WICSS Strategic Initiative team conceptualized a causal loop diagram (CLD) of the relationship between and among climate, the natural environment, population, and the built environment, with an understanding that any such regionally focused system must have externalities that influence the system from beyond its’ control, and metrics for better understanding the consequences of the set of interactions. These are discussed in light of a series of worldviews that focus on portions of the overall systems relationship. The relationships are described and documented in detail. A set of reinforcing and balancing loops are then highlighted within the context of the model. Finally, forward-looking actions are highlighted to describe how this conceptual model can be turned into modeling to address multiple problems described under the purview of the Strategic Initiative.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Model-Free Data Authentication for Cyber Security in Power Systems
With the development and wide deployment of measurement equipment, data can be automatically measured and visualized for situation awareness in power systems. However, the cyber security of power systems is also threated by data spoofing attacks. This letter proposed a measurement data source authentication (MDSA) algorithm based on feature extraction techniques including ensemble empirical mode decomposition (EEMD) and fast Fourier transform (FFT), and machine learning for real-time measurement data classification. Compared with previous work, the proposed algorithm can achieve higher accuracy of MDSA using a shorter window of data from closely located synchrophasor measurement sensors.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Cyber Threat Landscape for Distribution Systems
INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects
Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
ARIES Annual Report FY25
Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) test bed for energy system demonstration and de-risking. ARIES comprises the largest collection of physical and digital assets in the DOE laboratory complex, supporting flexible configuration across a broad range of energy scenarios. In Fiscal Year 2025, ARIES provided a platform for system-level research to anticipate and address future energy needs in energy security, system reliability, and technology deployment.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Impact of Extreme Weather Events on Physical Protection System Effectiveness for a Hypothetical Small Modular Reactor Facility: Systems Analysis and Considerations
This report will summarize the group's work to provide recommendations to secure nuclear facilities before, during and after an extreme weather event. Extreme weather events can have drastic impacts to nuclear facilities as seen by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011. Recent hurricanes in the United States including Hurricane Harvey demonstrate the devastating effects these storms can have on infrastructure and the surrounding communities. The group is attempting to identify the gaps that potential small modular reactor (SMR) facilities will need to address in order to provide adequate site security before, during and after extreme weather events. This effort proceeded in three parts to provide insights and recommendations to secure Small Modular Reactor facilities for extreme weather events:(1) a literature review of academic articles as well as relevant documents including the existing regulatory framework and recommendations from the IAEA, NRC, and DOE, (2) subject matter expert interviews from a wide variety of security backgrounds, and (3) modeling and simulation on a hypothetical SMR facility. Special attention was paid to the interactions between stakeholders and nuclear facility design considerations, particularly the topics of safety and security. Engineering design issues from safety and security perspectives were discussed and included in simulation. Each step informed the proceeding, with the result including full tabletop scenarios of EWE impacts to security system effectiveness on the hypothetical model. This systems-level analysis provides results to inform recommendations to secure SMR facilities.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System
In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Neural Lyapunov Control for Power System Transient Stability: A Deep Learning-Based Approach
We report that power system control and transient stability analysis play essential roles in secure system operation. Control of power systems typically involves highly nonlinear and complex dynamics. Most of the existing works address such problems with additional assumptions in system dynamics, leading to a requirement for a complete and general solution. This paper, therefore, proposes a novel control framework for various power system control and stability problems leveraging a learning-based approach. The proposed framework includes a two-module structure that iteratively and jointly learns the candidate Lyapunov function and control law via deep neural networks in a learning module. Meanwhile, it guides the learning procedure towards valid results satisfying Lyapunov conditions in a falsification module. The introduced termination criteria ensure provable system stability. This control framework is verified through several studies handling different types of power system control problems. The results show that the proposed framework is generalizable and can simplify the control design for complex power systems with the stability guarantee and enlarged region of attraction.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Security Licensing Basis Framework Development
This report summarizes a technology-inclusive and performance-based method to determine the physical security licensing basis for a commercial nuclear reactor under the proposed 10 CFR 73.100 for Part 53 licensees. The method focuses on the identification of security functions, the contributing security systems and programs to meet those functions, the identification of security events that will provide the foundation for the security licensing basis and includes a risk-informed performance-based defense in depth adequacy method. The method can also be employed to justify performance-based alternative measures to traditional security requirements found in 10 CFR 73.55.
98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)
The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.
Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗
Characterizing Plug Load Energy Use and Savings Potential in Army Buildings
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy and Environment) tasked the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine plug loads in typical Army buildings. Plug loads (also known as miscellaneous electric loads (MELs)) represent the electricity used by appliances and devices that are plugged in or hardwired and serve functions outside of a building’s core end uses. Common plug loads include computers, printers, copiers, networking devices, refrigerators, and vending machines. They also include personal electronic devices such as televisions, smart phones, tablets, and gaming systems. Examples of hardwired MELs include elevators, air compressors, and fire and security systems. The findings from this study confirm that significant energy is consumed within Army buildings by plug load devices and hardwired MEL equipment. A number of opportunities are identified for reducing unnecessary energy use that could save the Army over $5 million per year when broadly applied. Army regulations clearly spell out expectations for the purchase and operation of information technology equipment (computers, laptops, monitors, printers, and multi-function devices). However, the policies regarding the shutdown or activation of sleep and other lower power modes after 30 minutes of inactivity (15 minutes for monitors) do not appear to be consistently followed. There are many effective approaches and pathways for impacting change as it relates to improving awareness, implementing measures, and adjusting behaviors to identify and reduce plug load energy use. The Army should prioritize and consider deploying all of these to better understand and manage plug load equipment to save energy and enhance resilience across their facilities. Engaging the building occupants who use these devices daily via outreach and education should be a strong component of the strategy. The focus should be on reducing waste without sacrificing productivity or the benefits that many of these devices provide. Continued evaluation of plug loads beyond that performed here is important to gather lessons from additional building and equipment types, and to stay aware of evolving device technology and management options. This will highlight additional needs for policies, best practices, control technologies, and education of personnel to achieve real reductions in energy waste from plug load equipment. It is recommended that this study may serve as the foundation for a broader and sustained focus on plug loads and MELs, towards simultaneously enhancing the productivity, readiness, and resilience of the Army while reducing energy use and demand, and freeing up resources to better support the mission.
32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
Convergence of Emerging Technologies - OWL Test Results
The OWL GroundAware GA1360 2D radar system with advertised capability of advanced digital beam-forming radar technology, classification intelligence, reconfigurability, and easy integration with other security systems to bring 360° of real-time, all-weather situational awareness for the physical security of perimeters and other sensitive areas for critical infrastructure.
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
A Review of Cyber-Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems
In this paper, the challenges and a future vision of the cyber-physical security of photovoltaic (PV) systems are discussed from a firmware, network, PV converter controls, and grid security perspective. The vulnerabilities of PV systems are investigated under a variety of cyber-attacks, ranging from data integrity attacks to software-based attacks. A success rate metric is designed to evaluate the impact and facilitate decision making. Model-based and data-driven methods for threat detection and mitigation are summarized. In addition, the blockchain technology that addresses cyber-attacks in software and cyber networks is described. Simulation and experimental results that show the impact of cyber-attacks at the converter (device) and grid (system) levels are presented. Finally, potential research opportunities are discussed for next-generation, cyber-secure power electronics systems. These opportunities include multi-scale controllability, self-/event-triggering control, artificial intelligence/machine learning, hot patching, and online security. As of today, this study will be one of the few comprehensive studies in this emerging and fast-growing area.
14 SOLAR ENERGY↗