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Contents include the following: mission description and system identification; environment description; system architectural description; system security requirements; organization and resources; and ditscap plan. Appendix A, acronym list. Appendix B, definitions. Appendix C, references.
NASA Glenn Research Center has developed a smart card prototype capable of encrypting and decrypting disk files required to run a distributed aerospace propulsion simulation. Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption is used to secure the sensitive intellectual property on disk pre, during, and post simulation execution. The prototype operates as a secure system and maintains its authorized state by safely storing and permanently retaining the encryption keys only on the smart card. The prototype is capable of authenticating a single smart card user and includes pre simulation and post simulation tools for analysis and training purposes. The prototype's design is highly generic and can be used to protect any sensitive disk files with growth capability to urn multiple simulations. The NASA computer engineer developed the prototype on an interoperable programming environment to enable porting to other Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) capable operating system environments.
The Integrated Communications, Navigational and Surveillance (ICNS) Technologies Conference and Workshop provides a forum for Government, industry, and academic communities performing research and technology development for advanced digital communications, navigation, and surveillance security systems and associated applications supporting the national and global air transportation systems. The event's goals are to understand current efforts and recent results in near-and far-term research and technology demonstration; identify integrated digital communications, navigation and surveillance research requirements necessary for a safe, high-capacity, advanced air transportation system; foster collaboration and coordination among all stakeholders; and discuss critical issues and develop recommendations to achieve the future integrated CNS vision for the national and global air transportation system.
This paper proposes an approach that mitigates the problem of verification of network security system properties over concurrent processes.
The Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS) Technologies Conference and Workshop provides a forum for government, industry, and academic communities performing research and technology development for advanced digital communications, navigation, and surveillance security systems and associated applications supporting the national and global air transportation systems. The event s goals are to understand current efforts and recent results in near- and far-term research and technology demonstration; identify integrated digital communications, navigation and surveillance research requirements necessary for a safe, high-capacity, advanced air transportation system; foster collaboration and coordination among all stakeholders; and discuss critical issues and develop recommendations to achieve the future integrated CNS vision for the national and global air transportation system.
This viewgraph presentation begins with a review of some of the problems inherent in running medical services for the International Space Station. Part of the solution for the problems is the development of the information portal for the ISS medical groups. The presentation shows the tools that have been developed to assist in collaboration for the medical services, the security system and the capabilities of the portal.
Under a series of SBIR contracts with Langley Research Center, inventor Richard Billmers refined a prototype for a laser imaging camera capable of seeing through fire, fog, smoke, and other obscurants. Now, Canton, Ohio-based Laser Imaging through Obscurants (LITO) Technologies Inc. is demonstrating the technology as a perimeter security system at Glenn Research Center and planning its future use in aviation, shipping, emergency response, and other fields.
The SIRIUS (Scientific International Research In a Unique terrestrial Station) missions represent a collaborative effort between NASA and Russia’s Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP) to conduct a series of long duration isolation and confinement spaceflight analog missions. Three missions of 17-day, 4-month, and 8-month duration (SIRIUS 17, 19, and 21) have been completed at IBMP’s Ground-Based Experimental Complex / Nazemnyy eksperimental'nyy kompleks (NEK) in Moscow, Russia. The international SIRIUS 21 crew comprising representatives from the United States, United Arab Emirates and Russia recently completed the 8-month analog lunar mission. The extended duration mission included simulated lunar transit, orbital, and surface operations with corresponding deep space communication delay, during which the crew participated in nearly 70 studies, eight of which were sponsored by NASA’s Human Research Program. The studies examined the effect of isolation and confinement on the behavioral health of research subjects, and investigated medical countermeasures, team performance, crew dynamics, crew autonomy, food system risks, consequences of confinement and associated physiological stressors. SIRIUS 21 crewmembers also participated in operational tasks such as Rover and CubeSat assembly, simulated lunar sample assessment, VR activities, robotic arm training, environmental systems monitoring, exercise, greenhouse maintenance and 3D printing. Communication with Mission Control was limited to 30-minute periods every two hours. Since access to the internet and email was restricted, simulated ground support provided the Crew’s primary source of daily news and mission information. This panel discussion will include presentations from the US SIRIUS 21 crewmembers – William Brown and Ashley Kowalski – about their experience participating in the mission and science. A facilitated question and answer session will follow with attendees encouraged to ask questions and join in discussion with the SIRIUS 21 crewmembers about their experiences. William Brown came to SIRIUS 21 with experience spread across multiple industries, including the military, defense contracting, healthcare consulting, software engineering, and logistics. He has lived in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia. A former Boren Scholar, Brown is fluent in Russian. He holds a Master of International Business degree from the University of South Carolina’s Darla Moore School of Business. Prior to that, he earned a bachelor’s degree in Russian language, literature, and culture from the University of South Carolina. There, he also completed additional undergraduate coursework in computer science. Ashley Kowalski is a Project Leader in The Aerospace Corporation’s International Partnerships Department, where she works with, represents, and provides technical support to the the U.S. Space Force Space Systems Command International Affairs (SSC/IA) office. Through her numerous national and international assignments (Russia, China, and Germany), she has worked on topics related to international space systems, national security space systems, civil systems (including human spaceflight and civil launch projects), space policy, satellite industry analysis, and satellite manufacturing start-ups. She is proficient in Russian and German, and fluent in Polish. Kowalski received her Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in mechanical and aerospace engineering from George Washington University in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
The cryptographic communication has a lot of important applications, particularly in the magnificent prospects of private communication. As one knows, the security of cryptographic channel depends crucially on the secrecy of the key. The Vernam cipher is the only cipher system which has guaranteed security. In that system the key must be as long as the message and most be used only once. Quantum cryptography is a method whereby key secrecy can be guaranteed by a physical law. So it is impossible, even in principle, to eavesdrop on such channels. Quantum cryptography has been developed in recent years. Up to now, many schemes of quantum cryptography have been proposed. Now one of the main problems in this field is how to increase transmission distance. In order to use quantum nature of light, up to now proposed schemes all use very dim light pulses. The average photon number is about 0.1. Because of the loss of the optical fiber, it is difficult for the quantum cryptography based on one photon level or on dim light to realize quantum key-distribution over long distance. A quantum key distribution based on coherent state is introduced in this paper. Here we discuss the feasibility and security of this scheme.
This paper presents the design of derived virtual devices (DVDs). DVDs are the mechanism used by the Netstation Project to provide secure shared access to network-attached peripherals distributed in an untrusted network environment. DVDs improve Input/Output efficiency by allowing user processes to perform I/O operations directly from devices without intermediate transfer through the controlling operating system kernel. The security enforced at the device through the DVD mechanism includes resource boundary checking, user authentication, and restricted operations, e.g., read-only access. To illustrate the application of DVDs, we present the interactions between a network-attached disk and a file system designed to exploit the DVD abstraction. We further discuss third-party transfer as a mechanism intended to provide for efficient data transfer in a typical NAP environment. We show how DVDs facilitate third-party transfer, and provide the security required in a more open network environment.
A distributed security architecture is proposed for incorporation into group oriented distributed systems, and in particular, into the Isis distributed programming toolkit. The primary goal of the architecture is to make common group oriented abstractions robust in hostile settings, in order to facilitate the construction of high performance distributed applications that can tolerate both component failures and malicious attacks. These abstractions include process groups and causal group multicast. Moreover, a delegation and access control scheme is proposed for use in group oriented systems. The focus is the security architecture; particular cryptosystems and key exchange protocols are not emphasized.
This presentation describes experiments conducted with single board computers to investigate methods for creating trust for enabling the development of cyber-resilient air transportation systems. Methods included secure communication to prevent unauthorized access to data, consistency of data obtained via sensors and by processing, and built-in safeguards to prevent mission failure. The motivation for this work are the following. The future air transportation system needs to ensure availability, integrity, confidentiality and safety of operations. Safety of vehicles and operations is paramount for successful integration of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), supersonic aircraft and launch vehicles with conventional aviation operations in the National Airspace System. Security is becoming critical because the sensors, networks and computers are far more vulnerable to bad actors than their mechanical or human predecessors. The goal therefore is to design and develop cyber-resilient systems that continue to function even in degraded states. The main findings are (1) off-the-shelf hardware can support development of cyber-resilient onboard flight computers and (2) trust in system design and implementation can be accomplished by integrating layers in depth (detail) and in breadth (scope).
The increasing prevalence and sophistication of cyber attacks has prompted the Multimission Ground Systems and Services (MGSS) Program Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to initiate the Common Access Manager (CAM) effort to protect software applications used in Ground Data Systems (GDSs) at JPL and other NASA Centers. The CAM software provides centralized services and software components used by GDS subsystems to meet access control requirements and ensure data integrity, confidentiality, and availability. In this paper we describe the CAM software; examples of its integration with spacecraft commanding software applications and an information management service; and measurements of its performance and reliability.
Food security in South Korea is tightly linked to the global food system. The country's production of major grains declined from 5.8 million metric tons (mmt) in 1998 to 4.8 mmt in 2014, which caused the country's grain self suciency to decline from 31.4% to 24%. This decline is a consequence of several factors including reductions in domestic agricultural land, governmental policies supporting industry over agriculture, and a push towards trade liberalization. South Korea's self suciency is now one of the lowest among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, leaving it vulnerable to disruptions in the global food system.
A method gathers scene information from a low-cost camera system. Existing surveillance systems using sufficient cameras for continuous coverage of a large field necessarily generate enormous amounts of raw data. Digitizing and channeling that data to a central computer and processing it in real time is difficult when using low-cost, commercially available components. A newly developed system is located on a combined power and data wire to form a string-of-lights camera system. Each camera is accessible through this network interface using standard TCP/IP networking protocols. The cameras more closely resemble cell-phone cameras than traditional security camera systems. Processing capabilities are built directly onto the camera backplane, which helps maintain a low cost. The low power requirements of each camera allow the creation of a single imaging system comprising over 100 cameras. Each camera has built-in processing capabilities to detect events and cooperatively share this information with neighboring cameras. The location of the event is reported to the host computer in Cartesian coordinates computed from data correlation across multiple cameras. In this way, events in the field of view can present low-bandwidth information to the host rather than high-bandwidth bitmap data constantly being generated by the cameras. This approach offers greater flexibility than conventional systems, without compromising performance through using many small, low-cost cameras with overlapping fields of view. This means significant increased viewing without ignoring surveillance areas, which can occur when pan, tilt, and zoom cameras look away. Additionally, due to the sharing of a single cable for power and data, the installation costs are lower. The technology is targeted toward 3D scene extraction and automatic target tracking for military and commercial applications. Security systems and environmental/ vehicular monitoring systems are also potential applications.
NASA develops, runs, and maintains software systems for which security is of vital importance. Therefore, it is becoming an imperative to develop secure systems and extend the current software assurance capabilities to cover information assurance and cybersecurity concerns of NASA missions. The results presented in this report are based on the information provided in the issue tracking systems of one ground mission and one flight mission. The extracted data were used to create three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified the software bugs that are security related and classified them in specific security classes. This information was then used to create the security vulnerability profiles (i.e., to determine how, why, where, and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced) and explore the existence of common trends. The main findings of our work include:- Code related security issues dominated both the Ground and Flight mission IVV security issues, with 95 and 92, respectively. Therefore, enforcing secure coding practices and verification and validation focused on coding errors would be cost effective ways to improve mission's security. (Flight mission Developers issues dataset did not contain data in the Issue Category.)- In both the Ground and Flight mission IVV issues datasets, the majority of security issues (i.e., 91 and 85, respectively) were introduced in the Implementation phase. In most cases, the phase in which the issues were found was the same as the phase in which they were introduced. The most security related issues of the Flight mission Developers issues dataset were found during Code Implementation, Build Integration, and Build Verification; the data on the phase in which these issues were introduced were not available for this dataset.- The location of security related issues, as the location of software issues in general, followed the Pareto principle. Specifically, for all three datasets, from 86 to 88 the security related issues were located in two to four subsystems.- The severity levels of most security issues were moderate, in all three datasets.- Out of 21 primary security classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, these classes contributed from around 80 to 90 of all security issues in each dataset. This again proves the Pareto principle of uneven distribution of security issues, in this case across CWE classes, and supports the fact that addressing these dominant security classes provides the most cost efficient way to improve missions' security. The findings presented in this report uncovered the security vulnerability profiles and identified the common trends and dominant classes of security issues, which in turn can be used to select the most efficient secure design and coding best practices compiled by the part of the SARP project team associated with the NASA's Johnson Space Center. In addition, these findings provide valuable input to the NASA IVV initiative aimed at identification of the two 25 CWEs of ground and flight missions.
We present a novel model-based, mission-centric approach to perform cyber security assessments for evaluating the impact of low-level cyber events on high-level mission objectives.We demonstrate the benefits of our approach using a system model and attack trees specific to the command-and-control system of a spacecraft. Specifically, we demonstrate how our approach enables a decision-maker to assess the security posture of the system, identify necessary mitigations and prioritize their deployment.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).