System safety - A management system for safety used in manned space flight.
Management system for safety in NASA Manned Space Flight Program, discussing hazard analyses and reduction precedence sequence
Bolger, P. H.↗
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Payload safety requirements
Space Shuttle payload safety requirements are summarized. Consideration is given to NASA objectives on STS payloads, payload safety documents, STS payload safety management, safety implementation possibilities, the hazard control procedure, and significant technical requirements.
Scheller, J.↗
Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation
Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.
Null, Cynthia H.↗
A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety
Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.
Safety↗
Design and Testing of an Approach to Automated In-Flight Safety Risk Management for sUAS Operations
An onboard risk management automation design is presented based on run-time assurance principles, as well as the concept for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) as described by the National Academies. The automation is designed to operate independently of the autopilot and perform real-time risk assessment spanning multiple classes of hazards, predict constraint violations, and track autopilot states. In the event of elevated risk conditions or predicted constraint violations, the automation will select from a set of available contingencies and trigger autopilot mode changes if necessary to mitigate risk exposure. The onboard automation also informs the remote operator/pilot of what the independent monitor is observing and any contingency decisions or actions that may arise during flight. Details of an implementation of this design and results of verification and validation activities, as required to meet stringent NASA software and system assurance standards, are also presented. This includes simulation and flight testing using small unmanned aircraft systems.
Ersin Ancel↗
JDD, Inc. Database
JDD Inc, is a maintenance and custodial contracting company whose mission is to provide their clients in the private and government sectors "quality construction, construction management and cleaning services in the most efficient and cost effective manners, (JDD, Inc. Mission Statement)." This company provides facilities support for Fort Riley in Fo,rt Riley, Kansas and the NASA John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field here in Cleveland, Ohio. JDD, Inc. is owned and operated by James Vaughn, who started as painter at NASA Glenn and has been working here for the past seventeen years. This summer I worked under Devan Anderson, who is the safety manager for JDD Inc. in the Logistics and Technical Information Division at Glenn Research Center The LTID provides all transportation, secretarial, security needs and contract management of these various services for the center. As a safety manager, my mentor provides Occupational Health and Safety Occupation (OSHA) compliance to all JDD, Inc. employees and handles all other issues (Environmental Protection Agency issues, workers compensation, safety and health training) involving to job safety. My summer assignment was not as considered "groundbreaking research" like many other summer interns have done in the past, but it is just as important and beneficial to JDD, Inc. I initially created a database using a Microsoft Excel program to classify and categorize data pertaining to numerous safety training certification courses instructed by our safety manager during the course of the fiscal year. This early portion of the database consisted of only data (training field index, employees who were present at these training courses and who was absent) from the training certification courses. Once I completed this phase of the database, I decided to expand the database and add as many dimensions to it as possible. Throughout the last seven weeks, I have been compiling more data from day to day operations and been adding the information to the database. It now consists of seven different categories of data (carpet cleaning, forms, NASA Event Schedules, training certifications, wall and vent cleaning, work schedules, and miscellaneous) . I also did some field inspecting with the supervisors around the site and was present at all of the training certification courses that have been scheduled since June 2004. My future outlook for the JDD, Inc. database is to have all of company s information from future contract proposals, weekly inventory, to employee timesheets all in this same database.
Miller, David A., Jr.↗
In-Time Terminal Area Risk Management
In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Commercial Operations Developing methods to Improve risk management and safety assurance processes by proactively identifying risks and causal factors before an accident/incident occurs.
Kyle Kent Edward Ellis↗
Design and Testing of an Approach to Automated In-Flight Safety Risk Management for sUAS Operations
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safety management↗
System safety education focused on flight safety
The measures necessary for achieving higher levels of system safety are analyzed with an eye toward maintaining the combat capability of the Air Force. Several education courses were provided for personnel involved in safety management. Data include: (1) Flight Safety Officer Course, (2) Advanced Safety Program Management, (3) Fundamentals of System Safety, and (4) Quantitative Methods of Safety Analysis.
Eugene Holt↗
Tracing NASA Contributions Toward Aviation Safety Stakeholder Guidance
The System-Wide Safety project at NASA is developing the concept and a subset of supporting technologies for evolving safety management from a post-accident iterative improvement on safety performed by large commercial operators only to predictive and increasingly autonomous safety functions that are performed during operations across vehicles, airports, and services. The system of interest is the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), recommended by the National Academies for NASA to develop the concept in coordination with the broad and diverse community of stakeholders in aviation safety. Because the system context is the airspace and aviation industry, it is important to create and maintain traceability from the research work and system architecture elements developed at NASA to community-created roadmaps and aviation agency guidance.
IASMS↗
Energize the Future - Systems Engineering Processes and Methods: Tracing NASA Contributions Toward Aviation Safety Stakeholder Guidance
The System-Wide Safety project at NASA is developing the concept and a subset of supporting technologies for evolving safety management from a post-accident iterative improvement on safety performed by large commercial operators only to predictive and increasingly autonomous safety functions that are performed during operations across vehicles, airports, and services. The system of interest is the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), recommended by the National Academies for NASA to develop the concept in coordination with the broad and diverse community of stakeholders in aviation safety. Because the system context is the airspace and aviation industry, it is important to create and maintain traceability from the research work and system architecture elements developed at NASA to community-created roadmaps and aviation agency guidance.
MBSE↗
Crash Risks Evaluation of Urban Expressways: A Case Study in Shanghai
We report that proactive traffic safety management systems can reduce crashes by identifying crash precursors, evaluating real-time crash risks, and implementing suitable interventions. The basic prerequisite for developing such a system is to propose a reliable crash risk evaluation model that takes real-time traffic flow data as input. Previous studies have primarily focused on real-time crash prediction using some statistical or machine-learning methods. However, further quantitative evaluation and classification of crash risks have been ignored. In this study, we conduct a systematic crash risk evaluation workflow, including crash risk prediction, crash risk quantification, and crash risk classification. Specifically, the crash risk prediction using an extended logit model is proposed, from which CAS, CSD, UAS, DAS, DTV are identified to be contributing factors of crash risks. Then a crash risk quantification model based on the parameter evaluation of the extended logit model is developed. The crash risks of urban expressways and their spatial-temporal evolution trends are quantified. Finally, the crash risks are classified into high crash risk level, moderate crash risk level, and low crash risk level by the k-means cluster algorithm. Then the threshold boundaries of different crash risk levels are determined. The research results provide a proactive guidance for traffic safety management of urban expressways.
33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
Workshop on the Role of Design Assurance in System-Wide Safety’s Safety Demonstrator Series
This report summarizes a three-hour hybrid in-person/online workshop on June 7, 2024 on the topic of design assurance and the Safety Demonstrator Series (SDS), which was held at NASA Ames Research Center. The SDS provides an operational demonstration of, and recommendations for, requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate risks to assure safety in disaster-oriented operations. Over sixty NASA personnel participated in the workshop. Four main topics were discussed: (1) assurance needs for the Safety Demonstrator Series, (2) assurance and the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), (3) in-time assurance: existing efforts and future opportunities, and (4) demonstrating assurance tools in the Safety Demonstrators. Key takeaways are as follows: 1. Design assurance tools can be used to assure an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, the systems that comprise it, and other systems or missions. Assurance must consider both systems and components and include the interactions between elements in both a systems/aircraft context and a systems-of-systems/airspace context. 2. Design-time assurance activities can support the identification of monitors needed for operational assurance activities (i.e., the “monitor” function in the monitor-assess-mitigate paradigm at the heart of the IASMS concept). 3. A major opportunity for design-time assurance tools to contribute to the IASMS concept is to support rapid re-validation of systems. This will be particularly important for (1) supporting novel operations in the IASMS, where operational data may disprove design-time assumptions (motivating re-analysis of system safety) and (2) adapting technologies (e.g., AI/ML for autonomous operations) to new operational domains, where there may be new or different safety considerations not included in the initial scope of operations. 4. There are several design assurance tools under development in the System-Wide Safety project that can support assurance of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) in the Safety Demonstrators. Transitioning these tools from one-off research projects into a functioning part of IASMS assurance will require closer integration between these tools. 5. It is not clear whether the role of design assurance tools is primarily as a part of IASMS architecture or as an external check on IASMS. The workshop consisted of four discussion topics initiated via four lightning talks by System-Wide Safety researchers. Discussions utilized Mural to engage both in-person and online participants in the hybrid format. Polls and surveys were also utilized to gather participant input. The workshop closed with a reflection activity for participants, as well as new ideas for collaboration and coordination of ongoing System-Wide Safety research.
design assurance↗
Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460
Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
A hazard control system for robot manipulators
A robot for space applications will be required to complete a variety of tasks in an uncertain, harsh environment. This fact presents unusual and highly difficult challenges to ensuring the safety of astronauts and keeping the equipment they depend on from becoming damaged. The systematic approach being taken to control hazards that could result from introducing robotics technology in the space environment is described. First, system safety management and engineering principles, techniques, and requirements are discussed as they relate to Shuttle payload design and operation in general. The concepts of hazard, hazard category, and hazard control, as defined by the Shuttle payload safety requirements, is explained. Next, it is shown how these general safety management and engineering principles are being implemented on an actual project. An example is presented of a hazard control system for controlling one of the hazards identified for the Development Test Flight (DTF-1) of NASA's Flight Telerobotic Servicer, a teleoperated space robot. How these schemes can be applied to terrestrial robots is discussed as well. The same software monitoring and control approach will insure the safe operation of a slave manipulator under teleoperated or autonomous control in undersea, nuclear, or manufacturing applications where the manipulator is working in the vicinity of humans or critical hardware.
Carter, Ruth Chiang↗
Psychophysiological Research Methods to Assess Airline Flight Crew Resilient Performance in High-Fidelity Flight Simulation Scenarios
New concepts in aviation system safety thinking have emerged to consider not only what may go wrong, but also what can be learned when things go right. This approach forms a more comprehensive approach to system safety thinking. A need exists for methods to enable a better understanding of human contributions to aviation safety and how they may inform Safety Management Systems (SMS). A high-fidelity 737-800 simulation study was conducted to study how current type-rated commercial airline flight crews anticipate, monitor, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected disturbances during line operations. A number of dependent measures were collected that included traditional SMS data types, but also non-traditional safety data to include multiple psychophysiological metrics. This paper describes the psychophysiological measures results that evinced the capability of measures to help identify resilient flight crews. Implications for future research and design of future In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems are discussed.
Psychophysiology↗
Optimal CO 2 storage management considering safety constraints in multi-stakeholder multi-site GCS projects: A Markov game perspective
Geological carbon storage (GCS) projects could involve a diverse array of stakeholders or players from public, private, and regulatory sectors, each with different objectives and responsibilities. Given the complexity, scale, and long-term nature of GCS operations, determining whether individual stakeholders can independently optimize their interests — or whether collaborative coalition agreements are needed — remains a central question for effective GCS project planning and management. To access large, high-quality storage resources, future GCS deployment may increasingly occur in geologically connected sites, where shared geological features such as pressure space and reservoir pore capacity can lead to competitive behavior among stakeholders. In this work, we propose a paradigm based on Markov games to quantitatively investigate how different coalition structures affect the goals of stakeholders. We frame this multi-stakeholder multi-site problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning problem with safety constraints. Our approach enables agents to learn optimal strategies while complying with safety regulations. We present an example where multiple operators are injecting CO 2 into their respective project areas in a geologically connected basin. To address the high computational cost of repeated simulations of high fidelity models, a previously developed surrogate model based on the Embed-to-Control (E2C) framework is employed. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in addressing optimal management of CO 2 storage when multiple stakeholders with different objectives and goals are involved.
58 GEOSCIENCES↗
Psychophysiological Research Methods to Assess Airline Flight Crew Resilient Performance in High-Fidelity Flight Simulation Scenarios
New concepts in aviation system safety thinking have emerged to consider not only what may go wrong, but also what can be learned when things go right. This approach forms a more comprehensive approach to system safety thinking. A need exists for methods to enable a better understanding of human contributions to aviation safety and how they may inform Safety Management Systems (SMS). A high-fidelity 737-800 simulation study was conducted to study how current type-rated commercial airline flight crews anticipate, monitor, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected disturbances during line operations. A number of dependent measures were collected that included traditional SMS data types, but also non-traditional safety data to include multiple psychophysiological metrics. This paper describes the psychophysiological measures results that evinced the capability of measures to help identify resilient flight crews. Implications for future research and design of future In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems are discussed.
Psychophysiology↗