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Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Teresa Reiber↗

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Tessa Reiber↗

Designing for Maintainability and System Availability

The final goal for a delivered system (whether a car, aircraft, avionics box or computer) should be its availability to operate and perform its intended function over its expected design life. Hence, in designing a system, we cannot think in terms of delivering the system and just walking away. The system supplier needs to provide support throughout the operating life of the product. Here, supportability requires an effective combination of reliability, maintainability, logistics and operations engineering (as well as safety engineering) to have a system that is available for its intended use throughout its designated mission lifetime. Maintainability is a key driving element in the effective support and upkeep of the system as well as providing the ability to modify and upgrade the system throughout its lifetime. This paper then, will concentrate on maintainability and its integration into the system engineering and design process. The topics to be covered include elements of maintainability, the total cost of ownership, how system availability, maintenance and logistics costs and spare parts cost effect the overall program costs. System analysis and maintainability will show how maintainability fits into the overall systems approach to project development. Maintainability processes and documents will focus on how maintainability is to be performed and what documents are typically generated for a large scale program. Maintainability analysis shows how trade-offs can be performed for various alternative components. The conclusions summarize the paper and are followed by specific problems for hands-on training.

Lalli, Vincent R.↗

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

NASA Planning for Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Ground Operations

The NASA Orion Ground Processing Team was originally formed by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Constellation (Cx) Project Office's Orion Division to define, refine and mature pre-launch and post-landing ground operations for the Orion human spacecraft. The multidisciplined KSC Orion team consisted of KSC civil servant, SAIC, Productivity Apex, Inc. and Boeing-CAPPS engineers, project managers and safety engineers, as well as engineers from Constellation's Orion Project and Lockheed Martin Orion Prime contractor. The team evaluated the Orion design configurations as the spacecraft concept matured between Systems Design Review (SDR), Systems Requirement Review (SRR) and Preliminary Design Review (PDR). The team functionally decomposed prelaunch and post-landing steps at three levels' of detail, or tiers, beginning with functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs). The third tier FFBDs were used to build logic networks and nominal timelines. Orion ground support equipment (GSE) was identified and mapped to each step. This information was subsequently used in developing lower level operations steps in a Ground Operations Planning Document PDR product. Subject matter experts for each spacecraft and GSE subsystem were used to define 5th - 95th percentile processing times for each FFBD step, using the Delphi Method. Discrete event simulations used this information and the logic network to provide processing timeline confidence intervals for launch rate assessments. The team also used the capabilities of the KSC Visualization Lab, the FFBDs and knowledge of the spacecraft, GSE and facilities to build visualizations of Orion pre-launch and postlanding processing at KSC. Visualizations were a powerful tool for communicating planned operations within the KSC community (i.e., Ground Systems design team), and externally to the Orion Project, Lockheed Martin spacecraft designers and other Constellation Program stakeholders during the SRR to PDR timeframe. Other operations planning tools included Kaizen/Lean events, mockups and human factors analysis. The majority of products developed by this team are applicable as KSC prepares 21st Century Ground Systems for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System.

Letchworth, Gary↗

Modeling to Mars: a NASA Model Based Systems Engineering Pathfinder Effort

The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) Systems Engineering (SE) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) initiated the Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Pathfinder effort in FY16. The goals and objectives of the MBSE Pathfinder include developing and advancing MBSE capability across NASA, applying MBSE to real NASA issues, and capturing issues and opportunities surrounding MBSE. The Pathfinder effort consisted of four teams, with each team addressing a particular focus area. This paper focuses on Pathfinder team 1 with the focus area of architectures and mission campaigns. These efforts covered the timeframe of February 2016 through September 2016. The team was comprised of eight team members from seven NASA Centers (Glenn Research Center, Langley Research Center, Ames Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center IV&V Facility, Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Stennis Space Center). Collectively, the team had varying levels of knowledge, skills and expertise in systems engineering and MBSE. The team applied their existing and newly acquired system modeling knowledge and expertise to develop modeling products for a campaign (Program) of crew and cargo missions (Projects) to establish a human presence on Mars utilizing In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU). Pathfinder team 1 developed a subset of modeling products that are required for a Program System Requirement Review (SRR)/System Design Review (SDR) and Project Mission Concept Review (MCR)/SRR as defined in NASA Procedural Requirements. Additionally, Team 1 was able to perform and demonstrate some trades and constraint analyses. At the end of these efforts, over twenty lessons learned and recommended next steps have been identified.

Phojanamongkolkij, Nipa↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 20-06: Material Compatibility Assessment of Spacecraft Oxidizer Systems

Recently designed oxidizer systems used in spacecraft propulsion are pushing the limits of materials and operating conditions. As a result, nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) oxidizer systems are exhibiting failures driven by ignition mechanisms similar to oxygen systems. Oxidizer systems (e.g., O 2 , N 2 O 4 , N 2 O H 2 O 2 ) have generally been designed and operated within industry experience for material corrosion concerns without a complete understanding or regard for the concerns regarding potential material ignition and burning. To compound the problem, the effects of varying parameters on ignition and the kindling chain have not been studied, and there is a very limited amount of published data to help with the understanding. NASA-sponsored testing is actively researching ignition mechanisms, determining thresholds, and defining operating envelopes to inform the aerospace community.

NESC↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 20-07: Evaluating and Mitigating Liner Strain Spikes in COPV's

Unexpected cracking and leaking in bonded composite overwrapped pressure vessel (COPV) liners occurring in recent test programs have been attributed to liner strain spikes observed through measurement and predicted by analysis. Diminished load transfer between the liner and composite overwrap can lead to localized excessive liner yielding in the dome section. This diminished constraint can occur due to yielding of the adhesive or a manufacturing unbond defect. COPVs should be assessed for susceptibility to this new failure mode.

Evaluating↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 20-08: Assessment of Ketazine Derived High Purity Hydrazine for Spacecraft Propellant Systems

Hydrazine and its derivatives have dominated the class of hypergolic liquid propellants for bipropellant propulsion systems in rockets such as the Titan, MX Missile, and Ariane; it has also been widely utilized as a monopropellant in auxiliary power units and in thrusters for altitude and in-orbit control of satellites and spacecraft. With continued use of hydrazine in current and future spacecraft and payloads, it is necessary to understand the historical and current states of synthesis for the commodity and possible implications that may arise from changes in production processes for the United States stock.

Ketazine↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-01: Experimental and Computational Study of Cavitation in Hydrogen Peroxide

Cavitation in liquid propulsion systems can lead to performance degradation and hardware failures. The NESC sponsored an investigation to measure and model cavitation in pressurized hydrogen peroxide fl ow. The experimentally measured and computationally predicted cavitation lengths were compared as a function of cavitation number. The measured and predicted data exhibited close agreement over the range of pressures and temperatures studied, and no calibration of the cavitation model coefficients was needed.

NESC Technical Bulletin No. 21-01↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-03-1: Best Practices for the Elemental Profiling of High-Purity Hydrazine

Trace contaminants in high-purity hydrazine (HPH) propellant impact a wide variety of commercial, Department of Defense (DoD), and NASA missions. Depending on thruster design, elemental contaminants must be kept at extremely low levels and are verified as such by routine analysis. A number of these contaminants have recently undergone an assessment to shed light on their quantities present following changes in the HPH supply chain. A round robin analysis utilizing four separate laboratories resulted in unacceptably high variability in the quantification of these contaminants. The principal objective of this technical bulletin is to signal the availability of a new analysis methodology which yields accurate and repeatable quantification by providing best practices for both quantitation methodology and strategies for avoiding sample contamination during analysis.

High-Purity Hydrazine↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-04: Evaluating Appropriateness of LEFM Tools for COPV and Metal Pressure Vessel Damage Tolerance Life Verification

Human spaceflight composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) and metal pressure vessels can use linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) analysis to demonstrate damage tolerance life per ANSI/AIAA-S-081 for COPVs and ANSI/AIAA-S-080 for metal pressure vessels. LEFM analysis assumptions require that the crack tip plastic zone is small relative to the crack size and is completely surrounded by elastically responding material. Test and analysis have shown that LEFM tools (i.e., NASGRO*) can provide unconservative crack growth predictions for cracks in COPV liners that violate LEFM assumptions. COPV and metal pressure vessel designers should evaluate and address the violation of LEFM plasticity assumptions before using LEFM analysis tools for damage tolerance life verification.

COPV↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-05: Industry Recommendations from Arecibo Observatory Zinc Spelter Socket Joint Failure Analysis

A structural analysis and forensic investigation concluded that the Arecibo Observatory M4N socket joint failure in August 2020 was primarily due to cumulative damage caused by initially low structural design margins and a high percentage of sustained load, resulting in zinc creep deformation, progressive internal socket wire damage, and eventual loss of joint capacity. Open spelter sockets of this type are used throughout industry in stay cables. Recommendations are proposed to prevent failures of similar socket joints, including verification of positive stress margins in socket joint wires for all failure modes, periodic visual inspections with pass/fail criteria for zinc extrusion that are tied to structural qualification, and revisiting codes/ industry standards to capture lessons learned.

Arecibo Observatory↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 22-04: Uncertainty Quantification of Reduced Order Structural Dynamic Models

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) provides statistical bounds on prediction accuracy based on finite element model (FEM) uncertainty. An alternate method for UQ, called the Hybrid Parametric Variation (HPV) combines a parametric variation of the Hurty/Craig-Bampton (HCB) fixed-interface (FI) modal frequencies with a nonparametric variation (NPV) method. This provides a UQ method that can be traced to test data, which can be updated as additional data and improved correlated models become available.

Uncertainty Quantification↗