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Goals, Objectives, and Requirements (GOR) of the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)

The goal, objectives, and requirements (GOR) presented in this document define a framework for describing research directed specifically by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The intent of this document is to provide a communication tool for the GNDD Team with NNSA management and with its stakeholder community. It describes the GNDD expectation that much of the improvement in the proficiency of nuclear explosion monitoring will come from better understanding of the science behind the generation, propagation, recording, and interpretation of seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide signals and development of "game-changer" advances in science and technology.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Radiation and Nuclear Materials Detection Research and Development at ORNL

Research and development is underway to improve radiation and nuclear detection capabilities. This research and development in radiation and nuclear detection includes areas such as advanced materials, applied research and engineering for designing and fabricating customized detection equipment, and theoretical modeling and computational support. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has a distinctive set of detector materials fabrication and characterization capabilities and recently created a Center for Radiation Detection Materials and Systems. Applied research and engineering efforts have led to the development of improved detectors for specific applications including safeguards, treaty monitoring, and science experiments. All sizes, types, and capabilities of detector systems have been addressed from miniature to man-portable and from neutrons to gamma radiation. Dedicated test beds, in-house and in the field, have been established to analyze, characterize, and improve detection systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Geospatial Image Mining For Nuclear Proliferation Detection: Challenges and New Opportunities

With increasing understanding and availability of nuclear technologies, and increasing persuasion of nuclear technologies by several new countries, it is increasingly becoming important to monitor the nuclear proliferation activities. There is a great need for developing technologies to automatically or semi-automatically detect nuclear proliferation activities using remote sensing. Images acquired from earth observation satellites is an important source of information in detecting proliferation activities. High-resolution remote sensing images are highly useful in verifying the correctness, as well as completeness of any nuclear program. DOE national laboratories are interested in detecting nuclear proliferation by developing advanced geospatial image mining algorithms. In this paper we describe the current understanding of geospatial image mining techniques and enumerate key gaps and identify future research needs in the context of nuclear proliferation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Unattended sensors for nuclear threat detection

This paper discusses the ongoing development of a compact, unattended, and low-power radiation detection system designed for deployment to the front lines of nuclear proliferation. Current countermeasure deployments aim to detect nuclear threats by screening cargo containers abroad or at ports of entry, but the defensive nature of these systems means that they face the immense challenge of detecting intentionally-concealed materials. A complementary strategy places countermeasures closer to the source of nuclear proliferation, but deployments to these regions often must operate autonomously and in the absence of infrastructure. This application motivates our development of a low-power system capable of detecting gamma-ray and neutron emissions while operating autonomously for extended periods of time. Many challenges are present when developing radiation-detection systems for this application, and this paper describes work focused on two of them: the development of compact, low-power electronics for gamma-ray-spectrometer and 3He- tube signal processing, and analysis algorithms capable of distinguishing threats from benign sources in mid-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers. We discuss our development efforts on these fronts and present results based on implementation in a proof-of-principle system comprised of two 5 cm x 10 cm x 41 cm NaI(Tl) crystals and eight 40-cm 3He tubes.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY 2016 Data Analysis Annual Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 606 sites in 56 countries worldwide. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element in the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings. NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 56 countries around the world. Thirty-seven of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year 2016. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in fiscal year 2016. The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of approximately six from site to site. Some lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have approximately 8,000 occupancies per day and the different types of cargo that travel through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was above 96% for fiscal year 2016. NSDD takes all of these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (FY 2018 Data Analysis Annual Report)

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,728 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 660 sites in 63 countries. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element of the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings.NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries (summarized in the banner to the right) highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 63 countries around the world. Thirty-two of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year (FY) 2018. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in FY 2018.The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of up to nine from site to site. Some RPM lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have up to approximately 8,000 occupancies per day, and the different types of cargo traveling through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was 97% for FY 2018. NSDD takes all these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by ORNL Radiation Inspection Systems Team (RIST) data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Mechanical Detection of Nuclear Decays

We report the detection of individual nuclear alpha decays through the mechanical recoil of the entire micron-sized particle in which the decaying nuclei are embedded. Momentum conservation ensures that such measurements are sensitive to any particles emitted in the decay, including neutral particles that may otherwise evade detection with existing techniques. Detection of the minuscule recoil of an object more than 10^12 times more massive than the emitted particles is made possible by recently developed techniques in levitated optomechanics, which enable high-precision optical control and measurement of the mechanical motion of optically trapped particles. Observation of a change in the net charge of the particle coincident with the recoil allows decays to be identified with background levels at the micro-Becquerel level. Here, the techniques developed here may find use in fields ranging from nuclear forensics to dark matter and neutrino physics.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NA-213) [Slides]

The risk of a terrorist group acquiring radioactive/nuclear materials requires NSDD's continuous efforts to build capacity of partner countries to deter, detect, and investigate acts of nuclear smuggling. Over the past 25 years, NSDD has and continues to deploy radiation detection equipment tailored to operational requirements with the goal of developing a layered, flexible, varied, and unpredictable nuclear detection architecture. An effective counter nuclear smuggling strategy considers both technical and operational challenges to develop the tools necessary to achieve the mission. LANL provides expert support to the NSDD mission to constantly improve and adapt to any future challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Research and Development (NPAC R&D) [Slides]

NPAC R&D focus areas include: Advancing U.S. capabilities to detect and characterize nuclear weapon development activities globally, including material production, the movement of special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, and the testing or use of nuclear weapons, Supporting the development and testing of policy options and technical capabilities for international nuclear safeguards, arms control / treaty verification, nuclear export controls, and nonproliferation initiatives consistent with U.S. Government goals and objectives to enable monitoring and verification, Utilizing uranium, lithium, and high explosives (HE) materials expertise to support national-level activities in nuclear forensics and nuclear detection technology testing and evaluation, Providing unique training and capacity-building programs, particularly with the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC), and Engaging internationally to promote nonproliferation and arms control norms and best practices through bilateral and multilateral work.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Design and Fabrication of a CdMnTe Nuclear Radiation Detection System

Cadmium manganese telluride (CdMnTe) is one of the ternary compounds of cadmium telluride (CdTe) that has shown great potential applications in the development of X-ray and gamma-ray detectors used in medical imaging and in the detection of radiological and nuclear threats. CdMnTe nuclear detectors are capable of operating at room temperature without cryogenic cooling. The goal of this project is to design and fabricate CdMnTe detection system that can be used in laboratory experiments for characterizing detector materials and for identification of radionuclides. The engineering design objectives include a spring-based sample holder, ability to measure electrical properties of CdTe-based semiconductor nuclear detectors, and the detection of nuclear radiations. This paper presents the design of the sample holder and the fabrication of a CdMnTe detector. The current-voltage characterization experimental results showed that the CdMnTe has the high resistivity needed for CdTe-based nuclear detectors. The results also include the response of the CdMnTe detector to the 59.5-keV gamma peak of Am-241 nuclear radiation source.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

MCNP6 Study of Spatial Fidelity Required for ROC Curve Convergence

The detection of special nuclear material at ports and borders is one of the primary missions of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In support of this mission a large-scale modeling and simulation effort has been undertaken with the goal of providing a comprehensive tool-kit that addresses the complexity of problems involved with developing and maintaining technologies deployed to global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA) nodes. An important objective of DNDO's mission is to characterize detector system performance before deployment. In the effort to support this mission, the latest version of MCNP has been used to perform detectability studies of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to populate a database that will be used for the tool-kit. The characterization method used in the implementation of the database is the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). A ROC curve shows the limits of detectability of a given system as well as an overall metric of the efficacy of a detection system. This is accomplished by comparing total detector count distributions to the count distribution produced by background alone. For an in-depth explanation of the theory behind the MCNP production of ROC curves please refer to the paper, 'How To Use The Receiver Operating Characteristic Tally Option in MCNP6'. Building a useful database requires an expansive parameter space. The current tool-kit use nine parameters, which if varied with just 5 options each, results in nearly two million simulations to run. Depending on the set of parameters these simulations can take a few hours or a few weeks to complete. This computational cost necessitates the use of scaling algorithms to interpolate between the data contained in the database. The tool-kit employs a discrete event method to simulate the movement and detector response of special nuclear material (SNM) through a GNDA node. Given the nature of a discrete event simulation, constant motion of SNM must be split up in to discrete spatial detection points. The fidelity required of the spatial splitting to achieve a properly converged answer is investigated here for a neutron detection system. The detector used was a SNAP-3 neutron detector in front of a sphere of SNM in the presence of background radiation. A parameter study has been performed to determine the spatial fidelity required for ROC curve convergence for moving objects in a discrete event simulator. It appears that 5 points is the minimum number of detection points with 7 points needed for one of the parameter sets. The convergence worsens with increases to detection length but appears to improve with increasing detector distance. These results will help future work involving quantifying the accuracy based on given tolerances and parameters. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

PNNL Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School

PNNL's Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School gives graduate and advanced graduate students an understanding of how radiation detectors are used in national security missions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Technology Roadmap

This GNDD Technology Roadmap is intended to provide guidance to potential researchers and help management define research priorities to achieve technology advancements for ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring science being pursued by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team within the Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Four science-based elements were selected to encompass the entire scope of nuclear monitoring research and development (R&D) necessary to facilitate breakthrough scientific results, as well as deliver impactful products. Promising future R&D is delineated including dual use associated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Important research themes as well as associated metrics are identified along with a progression of accomplishments, represented by a selected bibliography, that are precursors to major improvements to nuclear explosion monitoring.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Investigation of Active Interrogation Techniques to Detect Special Nuclear Material in Maritime Environments

The detection and interdiction of special nuclear material (SNM) is still a high-priority focus area for many organizations around the world. One method that is commonly considered a leading candidate in the detection of SNM is active interrogation (AI). AI is different from its close relative, passive interrogation, in that an active source is used to enhance or create a detectable signal (usually fission) from SNM, particularly in shielded scenarios or scenarios where the SNM has a low activity. The use of AI thus makes the detection of SNM easier or, in some scenarios, even enables previously impossible detection. In this work the signal from prompt neutrons and photons as well as delayed neutrons and photons will be combined, as is typically done in AI. In previous work AI has been evaluated experimentally and computationally. However, for the purposes of this work, past scenarios are considered lightly shielded and tightly coupled spatially. At most, the previous work interrogated the contents of one standard cargo container (2.44 x 2.60 x 6.10 m) and the source and detector were both within a few meters of the object being interrogated. A few examples of this type of previous work can be found in references 1 and 2. Obviously, more heavily shielded AI scenarios will require larger source intensities, larger detector surface areas (larger detectors or more detectors), greater detector efficiencies, longer count times, or some combination of these.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Chemo-chromic Pd-V{sub 2}O{sub 5} Sensors for Passive Hydrogen Detection in Nuclear Containments - 18268

The ability to detect and monitor hydrogen gas efficiently in process and storage facilities, handling nuclear material, is crucial to ensuring their safety. The accumulation of hydrogen gas, above the lower flammable limit (LFL), in a nuclear waste containment is a concern since it creates the potential for a hydrogen-air explosion to occur, which could lead to a loss of containment and result in the uncontrolled release of radioactive material into the surrounding environment. The events that took place at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant highlighted the vulnerability of conventional hydrogen detection to extreme events, where power may be lost. In the present work, chemo-chromic hydrogen sensors have been fabricated, using transition metal oxide thin films, to provide eye-readable detection systems that would be resilient to plant power failure. Vanadium oxide (V{sub 2}O{sub 5}) films were prepared on quartz glass substrates by sol-gel deposition and sensitized with a palladium (Pd) catalyst, deposited by electron beam evaporation. When exposed to hydrogen, the Pd catalyst dissociates H{sub 2} to H atoms, which diffuse into the V{sup (V)}{sub 2}O{sub 5} forming a hydrogen-vanadium metal bronze, H{sub 2}V{sup (III)}{sub 2}O{sub 5}, resulting in a noticeable colour change from orange to dark green. To assess their viability for nuclear safety applications, these sensors have been irradiated to total doses between 5 and 250 kGy using a Co-60 gamma isotope irradiator. The results suggest that gamma irradiation, at the levels examined, has an effect on the initial colour of the V{sub 2}O{sub 5} and Pd-V{sub 2}O{sub 5} thin films with decreased transmittance above 540 nm. The orange starting colour darkened and developed a green tone, with the degree of colour change depending on the applied total dose. Changes in surface morphology and characteristics have been examined by using Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Raman spectroscopy. High level (250 kGy) gamma radiation exposure begins to produce surface degradation on V{sub 2}O{sub 5} thin films; however this behaviour is not observed for films that are also coated with palladium. Chemo-chromic properties of both un-irradiated and irradiated Pd-V{sub 2}O{sub 5} thin films were determined by examining their optical transmittance, using UV-vis spectroscopy, under exposure to a 4% H{sub 2}-N{sub 2} gas mixture. Exposure to gamma radiation has been found to have negligible effect upon colour change behaviour after 30 minutes exposure to hydrogen gas. The results suggest that the thin film V{sub 2}O{sub 5} sensitised with Pd is a plausible technique for application in the monitoring of hydrogen gas in low-level gamma radiation environments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗