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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1993

Knowledge-based reasoning in the Paladin tactical decision generation system

A real-time tactical decision generation system for air combat engagements, Paladin, has been developed. A pilot's job in air combat includes tasks that are largely symbolic. These symbolic tasks are generally performed through the application of experience and training (i.e. knowledge) gathered over years of flying a fighter aircraft. Two such tasks, situation assessment and throttle control, are identified and broken out in Paladin to be handled by specialized knowledge based systems. Knowledge pertaining to these tasks is encoded into rule-bases to provide the foundation for decisions. Paladin uses a custom built inference engine and a partitioned rule-base structure to give these symbolic results in real-time. This paper provides an overview of knowledge-based reasoning systems as a subset of rule-based systems. The knowledge used by Paladin in generating results as well as the system design for real-time execution is discussed.

Chappell, Alan R.↗
NASA NTRS2007

My Rewarding Summer Research Experience at NASA

My summer research experience at the Kennedy Space Center has been a truly rewarding one. As an electrical engineering student at the University of South Florida, I was blessed with a beneficial opportunity to gain valuable knowledge in my career, and also apply it through working at NASA. One of my inspirations in becoming an engineer is to work at NASA someday, and I was very excited and honored to have this opportunity. My goal in this internship was to strengthen my preparation in becoming an engineer by learning new material, acquiring skills by practicing what I learned, and discovering the expectations of engineering work at NASA. Through this summer research, I was able to learn new computer programs and perform various tasks that gave me experience and skills as an engineer. My primary job was to conduct work on the Constellation Test article, which is a simulation model of the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) tanking system. This is a prototype of a launch facility and an Ares I Vehicle, which God willing will transport astronauts to the moon. Construction of the CLV is in progress and a test launch is anticipated for 2010. Moreover, the Test Article serves as a demonstration too, training test bed, and may be expanded for new simulation of launch system elements, which could be applied to real life operations. The test article is operated and run by a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), which is a digital computer that is used to control all forms of machinery such as those in manufacturing buildings and other industries. PLCs are different than other computers because of the physical protection they have against damaging environmental conditions that would destroy other computers. Also, PLCs are equipped with lots of input and output connections that allow extensive amounts of commands to be executed, which would normally require many computers to do. Therefore, PLCs are small, rugged, and extremely powerful tools that may continue to be employed at NASA. Furthermore, in order to conduct productive work on the Test Article, I needed to learn the computer program called RS Logics 5000.

Aviles, Andres↗
NASA NTRS1994

Certification of tactics and strategies in aviation

The paper suggests that the 'tactics and strategies' notion is a highly suitable paradigm to describe the cognitive involvement of human operators in advanced aviation systems (far more suitable than classical functional analysis), and that the workload and situational awareness of operators are intimately associated with the planning and execution of their tactics and strategies. If system designers have muddled views about the collective tactics and strategies to be used during operation, they will produce sub-optimum designs. If operators use unproven and/or inappropriate tactics and strategies, the system may fail. The author wants to make a point that, beyond certification of people or system designs, there may be a need to go into more detail and examine (certify?) the set of tactics and strategies (i.e., the Operational Concept) which makes the people and systems perform as expected. The collective tactics and strategies determine the information flows and situational awareness which exists in organizations and composite human-machine systems. The available infrastructure and equipment (automation) enable these information flows and situational awareness, but are at the same time the constraining factor. Frequently, the tactics and strategies are driven by technology, whereas we would rather like to see a system designed to support an optimized Operational Concept, i.e., to support a sufficiently coherent, cooperative and modular set of anticipation and planning mechanisms. Again, in line with the view of MacLeod and Taylor (1993), this technology driven situation may be caused by the system designer's and operator job designer's over-emphasis on functional analysis (a mechanistic engineering concept), at the expense of a subject which does not seem to be well understood today: the role of the (human cognitive and/or automated) tactics and strategies which are embedded in composite human-machine systems. Research would be needed to arrive at a generally accepted 'planning theory' which can elevate the analysis, description and design of tactics and strategies from today's cottage industry methods to an engineering discipline. The available infrastructure and equipment (automation) enable these information flows and situational awareness, but are at the same time the constraining factor. Frequently, the tactics and strategies are driven by technology, whereas we would rather like to see a system designed to support an optimized Operational Concept, i.e., to support a sufficiently coherent, cooperative and modular set of anticipation and planning mechanisms. Again, in line with the view of MacLeod and Taylor (1993), this technology driven situation may be caused by the system designer's and operator job designer's over-emphasis on functional analysis (a mechanistic engineering concept), at the expense of a subject which does not seem to be well understood today: the role of the (human cognitive and/or automated) tactics and strategies which are embedded in composite human-machine systems. Research would be needed to arrive at a generally accepted 'planning theory' which can evaluate the analysis, description and design of tactics and strategies from today's cottage industry methods to an engineering discipline.

Koelman, Hartmut↗
NASA NTRS2016

Holodeck Testbed Project

The main objective of the Holodeck Testbed is to create a cost effective, realistic, and highly immersive environment that can be used to train astronauts, carry out engineering analysis, develop procedures, and support various operations tasks. Currently, the Holodeck testbed allows to step into a simulated ISS (International Space Station) and interact with objects; as well as, perform Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA) on the surface of the Moon or Mars. The Holodeck Testbed is using the products being developed in the Hybrid Reality Lab (HRL). The HRL is combining technologies related to merging physical models with photo-realistic visuals to create a realistic and highly immersive environment. The lab also investigates technologies and concepts that are needed to allow it to be integrated with other testbeds; such as, the gravity offload capability provided by the Active Response Gravity Offload System (ARGOS). My main two duties were to develop and animate models for use in the HRL environments and work on a new way to interface with computers using Brain Computer Interface (BCI) technology. On my first task, I was able to create precise computer virtual tool models (accurate down to the thousandths or hundredths of an inch). To make these tools even more realistic, I produced animations for these tools so they would have the same mechanical features as the tools in real life. The computer models were also used to create 3D printed replicas that will be outfitted with tracking sensors. The sensor will allow the 3D printed models to align precisely with the computer models in the physical world and provide people with haptic/tactile feedback while wearing a VR (Virtual Reality) headset and interacting with the tools. Getting close to the end of my internship the lab bought a professional grade 3D Scanner. With this, I was able to replicate more intricate tools at a much more time-effective rate. The second task was to investigate the use of BCI to control objects inside the hybrid reality ISS environment. This task looked at using an Electroencephalogram (EEG) headset to collect brain state data that could be mapped to commands that a computer could execute. On this Task, I had a setback with the hardware, which stopped working and was returned to the vendor for repair. However, I was still able to collect some data, was able to process it, and started to create correlation algorithms between the electrical patterns in the brain and the commands we wanted the computer to carry out. I also carried out a test to investigate the comfort of the headset if it is worn for a long time. The knowledge gained will benefit me in my future career. I learned how to use various modeling and programming tools that included Blender, Maya, Substance Painter, Artec Studio, Github, and Unreal Engine 4. I learned how to use a professional grade 3D scanner and 3D printer. On the BCI Project I learned about data mining and how to create correlation algorithms. I also supported various demos including a live demo of the hybrid reality lab capabilities at ComicPalooza. This internship has given me a good look into engineering at NASA. I developed a more thorough understanding of engineering and my overall confidence has grown. I have also realized that any problem can be fixed, if you try hard enough, and as an engineer it is your job to not only fix problems but to embrace coming up with solutions to those problems.

Arias, Adriel↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS Payload Operations Training During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Impacts and Solutions

Introduction: The onset and the protracted duration of the COVID-19 pandemic brought a dramatic and rapid transformation to almost every aspect of humanity in 2020. The world’s space agencies and their missions were not immune to the unpredictable and wide-sweeping changes. One discipline principally affected was mission operations and the various groups supporting that critical function. Mission support teams, especially for complex and crewed missions like the International Space Station (ISS) were forced to rapidly rethink how and where control center staff performed their vital work. Operations training – an essential element to mission ops, had unique hurdles to overcome. Operations training is responsible for preparing astronaut crews for their scientific missions, providing recurring proficiency and currency material to flight controllers, as well as ensuring new team members are ready to join their colleagues on console. Every element of training was impacted by COVID restrictions. From orientation and introductory classes for new controllers, training for scientists and payload developers, to simulations and advanced lessons, critical On the Job Training (OJT) and final evaluations; all aspects faced new challenges. Operations trainers at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, were forced to rethink, retool, and become more efficient with trainees and training resources in order to continue supporting payload operations on the ISS. Impacts and Barriers to Operations Training: The pandemic started in the United States in early March 2020. Immediately, NASA mandated that the support for ISS real-time operations was critical. As a result, physical access to the ISS Payload Operations Center was restricted to only those people supporting console operations. Thus, use of on-site NASA facilities and any trainer to trainee face-to-face interaction was not authorized. Trainers and trainees had to quickly shift to 100% remote learning. In the short term, this was not a problem since NASA had already prepared Information Technology (IT) resources that facilitated remote access to mission resources like classes, documents and teleconferences. However, instructors quickly discovered the classes that they were accustomed to delivering in a large classroom environment did not translate well to remote teaching. The lack of non-verbal communication with the class became a major barrier to instruction. Another significant hurdle to operations training was the mandate that all simulations could only be held remotely. The logistics of planning and executing even small simulations proved to be challenging, almost impossible, due to IT technology and public internet limitations. With simulations essentially stopped, as well as the restrictions on most OJT training, trainees were essentially stopped in their advancement towards certification. An additional barrier that had to be overcome was the formal documentation of the curriculum objectives. Even though NASA had been deliberately transitioning to electronic documents for years, some organizations were still relying on “pen and ink” documents to formalize training completion. The logistics of implementing secure and controlled e-signature documents in a standardized, NASA approved format had to be addressed. Lesson Learned and Efficiencies: Once the various limitations were identified, ISS trainers at MSFC discussed, proposed, and prioritized new options and techniques. Transitioning to all electronic learning materials and certifications was a relevantly easy fix. Teaching courses to large and diverse groups took additional shifts in the NASA training paradigm. Likewise, methods and procedures for preparing astronauts for their missions were forced to be revised. Simulation supervisors and their teams were also forced to find more efficient techniques to provide realistic training experience. Communication and approvals from management was essential. In every case, the ISS payload operations instructors found novel and efficient solutions to all functions listed above. This paper will discuss the factors and solutions payloads operations trainers found to keep scientific research on the ISS flying forward to mission success.

ISS Operations↗
NASA NTRS2010

The ICARE Method

The ICARE method is a flexible, widely applicable method for systems engineers to solve problems and resolve issues in a complete and comprehensive manner. The method can be tailored by diverse users for direct application to their function (e.g. system integrators, design engineers, technical discipline leads, analysts, etc.). The clever acronym, ICARE, instills the attitude of accountability, safety, technical rigor and engagement in the problem resolution: Identify, Communicate, Assess, Report, Execute (ICARE). This method was developed through observation of Space Shuttle Propulsion Systems Engineering and Integration (PSE&I) office personnel approach in an attempt to succinctly describe the actions of an effective systems engineer. Additionally it evolved from an effort to make a broadly-defined checklist for a PSE&I worker to perform their responsibilities in an iterative and recursive manner. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Systems Engineering Handbook states, engineering of NASA systems requires a systematic and disciplined set of processes that are applied recursively and iteratively for the design, development, operation, maintenance, and closeout of systems throughout the life cycle of the programs and projects. ICARE is a method that can be applied within the boundaries and requirements of NASA s systems engineering set of processes to provide an elevated sense of duty and responsibility to crew and vehicle safety. The importance of a disciplined set of processes and a safety-conscious mindset increases with the complexity of the system. Moreover, the larger the system and the larger the workforce, the more important it is to encourage the usage of the ICARE method as widely as possible. According to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, elements of a system can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies and documents; all things required to produce system-level results, qualities, properties, characteristics, functions, behavior and performance. The ICARE method can be used to improve all elements of a system and, consequently, the system-level functional, physical and operational performance. Even though ICARE was specifically designed for a systems engineer, any person whose job is to examine another person, product, or process can use the ICARE method to improve effectiveness, implementation, usefulness, value, capability, efficiency, integration, design, and/or marketability. This paper provides the details of the ICARE method, emphasizing the method s application to systems engineering. In addition, a sample of other, non-systems engineering applications are briefly discussed to demonstrate how ICARE can be tailored to a variety of diverse jobs (from project management to parenting).

Henke, Luke↗
NASA NTRS2008

Leading Your Leaders

Even though working on a problem has been your primary effort for the past year, your leadership may have heard about this once in a briefing a decade ago. Now they are basically clueless. Pretend that you are talking to your daughter's fifth-grade class. Explain how your complicated gizmo works. If possible, do not use acronyms. Define your terms. Put your work in context. Assume your leader has no idea what you do, who you work for, or what your gizmo does. That is a good place to start. Remember, taking the next century to study the problem or spending the Gross National Product to invent a new solution are probably not going to be acceptable solutions. Real engineers and technicians build real hardware that works in the real world in a reasonable manner within a reasonable time at a reasonable cost. True, skimping on time or money can cause mistakes, but folks whose gizmos are delayed unreasonably or cost more than is practical get their programs canceled, force the business into bankruptcy, or give the market over to the competition. Real engineers and technicians always consider cost and schedule in their work. Raising questions is important. However, we are in the business of doing things. Engineers and technicians are paid to get things done. Yes, you have to identify the problem, frame the design, identify the tests, perform the analysis, and assemble the hardware. But the goal is to solve the problem. Nobody ever said flying in space was easy. We make it look easy the same way that an Olympic champion makes her sport look easy: by working hard at improving performance every day. Better are the results of a well-defined test. Remember that a test on a laboratory bench is always an approximation of reality, and rules similar to those for good analysis also apply. One should always be mindful of Mechelay's rule: "It is better to be stupid than to run a stupid test." Often we try to overtest. If a piece of hardware passes an unbelievably difficult test, then life is good. More often when an unbelievably difficult test fails, we are left with a very long discussion of why and what was wrong in the design or execution of the test. Make sure that the test is well defined. Even then, it is important to explain to your leaders what inherent accuracy (or error) the test conditions or equipment have and what the assumptions or initial conditions were for the test. Test results without a good understanding of the test's accuracy or the pedigree of the test assumptions are worth very little. Finally, there is flight test data. Always limited, never at the edge of the envelope, it still shows how the real hardware works in a combined environment. Flight experience is dangerous because it typically doesn't show how close to the edge of the cliff the equipment is operating, but it does demonstrate how the hardware really works. A flight test is the ultimate test, again taken with the knowledge that it is probably not the extreme but something more like the middle of the environmental and systems performance. Good understanding of a problem and its solution always relies on a combination of all these methods. Be sure to lead your leaders by using all the tools you have at your disposal. At the end of the day, decisions in space flight always come down to a risk trade. Our business is not remotely safe, not in the sense that the public, the media, or our legislators use the term. Everything we do has a risk, cost, schedule, or performance trade-off. For your leaders to make an appropriate decision, you need to educate them, lead them, talk with them, and engage them in the discussion until full understanding takes place. It's your job. *

Hale, Wayne N.↗