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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1978

Design of a microprocessor based packet switch

The design of a packet switch incorporating a minicomputer to control and process data packets in a communications system has been reported. This paper proposes a design which uses a 6500 series microprocessor to realize the functions of a message switch in order to evaluate the viability of microprocessors in this application. The proposed design realizes the functions of header analysis, packet security, error control and line prioritization. The system hardware and software are presented together with a brief description of operation.

Carville, D. E.↗

NASA NTRS1985

Dynamic verification of very large space structures

The dynamic verification of spacecraft relies heavily on ground-based tests. These tests usually simulate flight environments or validate analytical models used in establishing design loads and in designing control algorithms. They also provide security against failures resulting from unanticipated or unmodeled hardware behavior. Future orbital antennas, space stations, and solar power systems are likely to be of sizes difficult to test using current ground test technology. In addition to size, other factors such as low natural frequencies, lightweight construction, and the presence of many structural joints, cause significant sensitivity of the test process to the earth-gravity environment. Yet, accuracy requirements on the verification process will be more stringent because of modern flexible-structure control approaches. This paper describes some of the problems and discusses research on potential solutions. The importance of an integrated ground test, analysis, and flight test program is emphasized. An ongoing research program of this type focusing on a 60-meter, deployable, truss-beam test article is described.

Hanks, B. R.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Pressure Sensitive Tape in the Manufacture of Reusable Solid Rocket Motors

ATK Launch Systems Inc. manufactures the reusable solid rocket motor (RSRM) for NASA's Space Shuttle program. They are used in pairs to launch the Space Shuttle. Pressure sensitive tape (PST) is used throughout the RSRM manufacturing process. A few PST functions are: 1) Secure labels; 2) Provide security seals; and 3) Protect tooling and flight hardware during various inert and live operations. Some of the PSTs used are: Cloth, Paper, Reinforced Teflon, Double face, Masking, and Vinyl. Factors given consideration for determining the type of tape to be used are: 1) Ability to hold fast; 2) Ability to release easily; 3) Ability to endure abuse; 4) Strength; and 5) Absence of adhesive residue after removal.

Champneys, Jeff↗

NASA NTRS2009

Controlling Infrastructure Costs: Right-Sizing the Mission Control Facility

Johnson Space Center's Mission Control Center is a space vehicle, space program agnostic facility. The current operational design is essentially identical to the original facility architecture that was developed and deployed in the mid-90's. In an effort to streamline the support costs of the mission critical facility, the Mission Operations Division (MOD) of Johnson Space Center (JSC) has sponsored an exploratory project to evaluate and inject current state-of-the-practice Information Technology (IT) tools, processes and technology into legacy operations. The general push in the IT industry has been trending towards a data-centric computer infrastructure for the past several years. Organizations facing challenges with facility operations costs are turning to creative solutions combining hardware consolidation, virtualization and remote access to meet and exceed performance, security, and availability requirements. The Operations Technology Facility (OTF) organization at the Johnson Space Center has been chartered to build and evaluate a parallel Mission Control infrastructure, replacing the existing, thick-client distributed computing model and network architecture with a data center model utilizing virtualization to provide the MCC Infrastructure as a Service. The OTF will design a replacement architecture for the Mission Control Facility, leveraging hardware consolidation through the use of blade servers, increasing utilization rates for compute platforms through virtualization while expanding connectivity options through the deployment of secure remote access. The architecture demonstrates the maturity of the technologies generally available in industry today and the ability to successfully abstract the tightly coupled relationship between thick-client software and legacy hardware into a hardware agnostic "Infrastructure as a Service" capability that can scale to meet future requirements of new space programs and spacecraft. This paper discusses the benefits and difficulties that a migration to cloud-based computing philosophies has uncovered when compared to the legacy Mission Control Center architecture. The team consists of system and software engineers with extensive experience with the MCC infrastructure and software currently used to support the International Space Station (ISS) and Space Shuttle program (SSP).

Martin, Keith↗

NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗

DOE OSTI2024

Remote operation of the DIII-D National Fusion Facility

Abstract Full remote scientific operation of the DIII-D National Fusion Facility is now possible through significant advances in the computer science hardware and software infrastructure made over the last decade. Capabilities around information visualization, data movement, and communication have all been enhanced. The level of capability deployed to remotely operate DIII-D required an infrastructure advancement over what had previously been achieved in the fusion community. The large quantity of real-time data that is automatically displayed on DIII-D’s control room screens can now be visualized by remote participants via web-based applications. New audio/video solutions using the VoIP and instant messaging application Discord have been implemented to mimic the dynamic and ad-hoc scientific conversations that are critical in successfully operating an experimental campaign. Discord’s ability for a user to rapidly move between audio channels, text with images, and share screens is a significant enhancement over traditional videoconferencing tools. In addition, multiple combinations of broadcast audio are made available via a web-based application to allow remote participants to simultaneously listen to general announcements/sounds while conducting their own specific conversations. Secure methodologies have been put into place to allow remote control of hardware including DIII-D’s plasma control system application. Secure methods also included the ability of the on-site team to closely coordinate their work with remote team members which has been enhanced through extensions to the wireless network and the use of tablet computers for audio/video/screen sharing. However, no amount of software can fully replace the need for ‘hands on hardware.’ This infrastructure was severely stress tested during the COVID-19 pandemic where occupancy of the DIII-D control room was restricted. Operational efficiency during the pandemic, measured in discharges per hour, remained high (3.8 ± 0.8) compared to values obtained pre-pandemic (3.7 ± 0.8).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2026

Assessing Energy Infrastructure Devices for Vulnerabilities

Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS2018

Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions

Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.

Giovannoni, Brian J.↗

DOE OSTI2025

FAIR Ecosystems for Science at Scale

High Performance Computing (HPC) centers provide resources to users who require greater scale to “get science done”. They deploy infrastructure with singular hardware architectures, cutting-edge software environments, and stricter security measures as compared with users’ own resources. As a result, users often create and configure digital artifacts in ways that are specialized for the unique infrastructure at a given HPC center. Each user of that center will face similar challenges as they develop specialized solutions to take full advantages of the center’s resources, potentially resulting in significant duplication of effort. Much duplicated effort could be avoided, however, if users of these centers found it easier to discover others’ solutions and artifacts as well as share their own. The FAIR principles address this problem by presenting guidelines focused around metadata practices to be implemented by vaguely defined “communities”; in practice, these tend to gather by domain (e.g. bioinformatics, geosciences, agriculture). Domain-based communities can unfortunately end up functioning as silos that tend both to inhibit sharing of solutions and best practices as well as to encourage fragile and unsustainable improvised solutions in the absence of best-practice guidance. We propose that these communities pursuing “science at scale” be nurtured both individually and collectively by HPC centers so that users can take advantage of shared challenges across disciplines and potentially across HPC centers. We describe an architecture based on the EOSC-Life FAIR Workflows Collaboratory, specialized for use with and inside HPC centers such as the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF), and we speculate on user incentives to encourage adoption. We note that a focus on FAIR workflow components rather than FAIR workflows is more likely to benefit the users of HPC centers.

Wilkinson, Sean [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000214437479)↗

DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cyber-Physical Smart Light Control System Integration with Smart Grid using Zigbee

This paper presents a hardware-in-the-loop cyber-physical system architecture design to monitor and control smart lights connected to the active distribution grid. The architecture uses Zigbee-based (IEEE 802.15.4) wireless sensor networks and publish-subscribe architecture to exchange monitoring and control signals between smart-light actuators (SLAs) and a smart-light central controller (SLCC). Each SLA integrated into a smart light consists of a Zigbee-based endpoint module to send and receive signals to and from the SLCC. The SLCC consists of a Zigbee-based coordinator module, which further exchanges the monitoring and control signals with the active distribution management system over the TCP/IP communication network. The monitoring signals from the SLAs include light status, brightness level, voltage, current, and power data, whereas, the control signals to the SLAs include light intensity, turn ON, turn OFF, standby, and default settings. We have used our existing hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) cyber-physical system (CPS) security SCADA testbed to process signals received from the SLCC and respond suitable control signals based on the smart light schedule requirements, system operation, and active distribution grid dynamic characteristics. We have integrated the proposed cyber-physical smart light control system (CPSLCS) testbed to our existing HIL CPS SCADA testbed. We use the integrated testbed to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithm by real-time performance and latency between the SLCC and SLAs. The experiments demonstrated significant results by 100% realtime performance and low latency while exchanging data between the SLCC and SLAs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

Voltage Service Limits Smart Contract Using Distributed Ledger Technology for Electrical Utility Grid with Customer-Owned Generator

Modern electrical grids face growing stability risks from customer-owned generators, especially at points of common couplings (PCCs). Disruptive behavior from power-electronic sources can cause protective relays to isolate problematic generators, making measurement integrity critical. This article presents a distributed ledger technology (DLT) approach that uses smart contracts to evaluate PCC voltage measurements and trigger backup breaker operations. The approach is framed as a verifiable, multi-organization attestation and audit layer, not as a real-time control security mechanism. In the proposed architecture, voltage measurements from a hardware protective relay are anchored on a DLT through the Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system for attestation by both the grid utility and customer-owned generator. A Voltage Service Limits (VSLs) smart contract evaluates the on-chain measurements against allowable phase-voltage limits derived from the ANSI C84.1 standard. The framework is validated in a hardware-relay-in-the-loop test bed under sustained-undervoltage, sustained-overvoltage, and transient line-to-line fault scenarios. The results show that the VSL smart contract can process these measurements and issue backup breaker actions consistent with the defined service-limit criteria, demonstrating the DLT potential as a verifiable audit layer at the PCC that complements primary protection.

cyber security↗

DOE OSTI2022

Experimental Setup for Grid Control Device Software Updates in Supply Chain Cyber-Security

Supply chain cyberattacks that exploit insecure third-party software are a growing concern for the security of the electric power grid. These attacks seek to deploy malicious software in grid control devices during the fabrication, shipment, installation, and maintenance stages, or as part of routine software updates. Malicious software on grid control devices may inject bad data or execute bad commands, which can cause blackouts and damage power equipment. This paper describes an experimental setup to simulate the software update process of a commercial power relay as part of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation for grid supply chain cyber-security assessment. The laboratory setup was successfully utilized to study three supply chain cyber-security use cases.

Keller, Joseph↗

DOE OSTI2024

Developing a Supply Chain Security Program

Amid growing concerns over foreign manufacturing for components and devices deployed in critical energy infrastructure, this research from the national labs will highlight best practices for developing and maintaining a supply chain security program. Tools for asset inventory, tips for developing and maintaining software- and hardware-bills-of-materials (SBOMs and HBOMs), recommended contractual language for vendor agreements, and identification of responsibilities will be shared. We discuss the one-time requirements to enable a successful supply chain security program and the best ways to operationalize this program for maximum impact, including development of robust practices for vulnerability tracking, patch management, and workarounds, with understanding of the reliability and uptime requirements for utilities. The recommendations shared are based on a cyber-informed engineering approach to identification of high-consequence impacts and the engineering controls related to supply chain management that can best mitigate these impacts. This approach allows for prioritization of resources. Additionally, we highlight relative up-front and ongoing costs associated with recommended controls. Viewers will leave with an understanding what a supply chain security program is, and what steps, prioritized for resource-constrained organizations, can build a robust program.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Feasibility of critical infrastructure protection using network functions for programmable and decoupled ICS policy enforcement over WAN

Industrial control systems (ICS) represent a major component of our critical infrastructure. With the increasing need for more control and monitoring of such systems, ICS have seen an increase in connectivity to wide area networks (WAN) exposing aging equipment to rapidly evolving cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, the ICS data requires a reliability measure from the networks for critical functions for infrastructure monitoring and control. Especially when remote plant sites are involved such as pipelines, energy distribution networks, and transportation, WAN transport impairments most often provide a best effort delivery with no strict reliability guarantees. Network functions can provide a vendor agnostic, programmable critical infrastructure protection with a single maintenance, policy determination, and reliability assurance surface. A network function (NF) can be utilized for policy enforcement over the communication between remote entities and the main control office. This paper presents the research on transparent integration with existing ICS without disrupting communications, resulting in minimal downtime while decoupling the fast paced evolution of defensive security measures from the upgrade cycle of expensive long term hardware. We report our measurements on the resource requirements and overhead in the network for successful NF insertion under a wide variety of network impairments (network packet delay, reordering, and loss). Our paired NF implementation provides a policy enforcement platform extensible to cover myriad cybersecurity-related communication goals, including packet signing for verification, encryption for data privacy, packet filtering and data diode operation (i.e. protecting against eavesdropping, packet injection, and denial-of-service). Furthermore, bundling communication specifications into packet flows allows for tunability in applying policies as coarse- or fine-grained as the needs of the operator. We report on network function resource requirements in the form of required queue depth and network utilization overhead to inform the decision making against hardware cost constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Secure and Adaptive Hierarchical Multi-Timescale Framework for Resilient Load Restoration Using a Community Microgrid

Distribution system integrated community microgrids (CMGs) can partake in restoring loads during extended duration outages. At such times, the CMGs are challenged with limited resource availability, absence of robust grid support, and heightened demand-supply uncertainty. Here, this paper proposes a secure and adaptive three-stage hierarchical multi-timescale framework for scheduling and real-time (RT) dispatch of CMGs with hybrid PV systems to address these challenges. The framework enables the CMG to dynamically expand its boundary to support the neighboring grid sections and is adaptive to the changing forecast error impacts. The first stage solves a stochastic extended duration scheduling (EDS) problem to obtain referral plans for optimal resource rationing. The intermediate near-real-time (NRT) scheduling stage updates the EDS schedule closer to the dispatch time using new obtained forecasts, followed by the RT dispatch stage. To make the decisions more secure and robust against forecast errors, a novel concept called delayed recourse is designed. The approach is evaluated via numerical simulations on a modified IEEE 123-bus system and validated using OpenDSS and hardware-in-loop simulations. The results show superior performance in maximizing load supply and continuous secure distribution network operation under different operating scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗