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At least 91 records · Page 5

The use of subjective expert opinions in cost optimum design of aerospace structures

The results of two questionnaires sent to engineering experts are statistically analyzed and compared with objective data from Saturn V design and testing. Engineers were asked how likely it was for structural failure to occur at load increments above and below analysts' stress limit predictions. They were requested to estimate the relative probabilities of different failure causes, and of failure at each load increment given a specific cause. Three mathematical models are constructed based on the experts' assessment of causes. The experts' overall assessment of prediction strength fits the Saturn V data better than the models do, but a model test option (T-3) based on the overall assessment gives more design change likelihood to overstrength structures than does an older standard test option. T-3 compares unfavorably with the standard option in a cost optimum structural design problem. The report reflects a need for subjective data when objective data are unavailable.

Thomas, J. M.↗

HAZARD ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USING A REDUNDANCY-GUIDED APPROACH

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. This paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the triggers of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) Power Processing Unit (PPU) Capacitor Failure Root Cause Analysis

The NASA s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) project is developing an advanced ion propulsion system for future NASA missions for solar system exploration. A critical element of the propulsion system is the Power Processing Unit (PPU) which supplies regulated power to the key components of the thruster. The PPU contains six different power supplies including the beam, discharge, discharge heater, neutralizer, neutralizer heater, and accelerator supplies. The beam supply is the largest and processes up to 93+% of the power. The NEXT PPU had been operated for approximately 200+ hr and has experienced a series of three capacitor failures in the beam supply. The capacitors are in the same, nominally non-critical location-the input filter capacitor to a full wave switching inverter. The three failures occurred after about 20, 30, and 135 hr of operation. This paper provides background on the NEXT PPU and the capacitor failures. It discusses the failure investigation approach, the beam supply power switching topology and its operating modes, capacitor characteristics and circuit testing. Finally, it identifies root cause of the failures to be the unusual confluence of circuit switching frequency, the physical layout of the power circuits, and the characteristics of the capacitor.

Soeder, James F.↗

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) Power Processing Unit (PPU) Capacitor Failure Root Cause Analysis

The NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) project is developing an advanced ion propulsion system for future NASA missions for solar system exploration. A critical element of the propulsion system is the Power Processing Unit (PPU) which supplies regulated power to the key components of the thruster. The PPU contains six different power supplies including the beam, discharge, discharge heater, neutralizer, neutralizer heater, and accelerator supplies. The beam supply is the largest and processes up to 93+% of the power. The NEXT PPU had been operated for approximately 200+ hours and has experienced a series of three capacitor failures in the beam supply. The capacitors are in the same, nominally non-critical location the input filter capacitor to a full wave switching inverter. The three failures occurred after about 20, 30, and 135 hours of operation. This paper provides background on the NEXT PPU and the capacitor failures. It discusses the failure investigation approach, the beam supply power switching topology and its operating modes, capacitor characteristics and circuit testing. Finally, it identifies root cause of the failures to be the unusual confluence of circuit switching frequency, the physical layout of the power circuits, and the characteristics of the capacitor.

Soeder, James F.↗

Ultra Reliable Closed Loop Life Support for Long Space Missions

Spacecraft human life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by providing sufficient spares to replace all failed components. The additional mass of spares for ultra reliability is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided that the original system reliability is not too low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the Space Shuttle and Space Station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units. However, on-demand maintenance and repair requires a logistics supply chain in place to provide the needed spares. In contrast, a Mars or other long space mission must take along all the needed spares, since resupply is not possible. Long missions must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since they will take years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, distant missions have a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than near-Earth missions. Achieving ultra reliable spacecraft life support systems with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must determine the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Ultra reliability requires reducing the intrinsic failure causes, providing spares to replace failed components and having "graceful" failure modes. Technologies, components, and materials must be selected and designed for high reliability. Long duration testing is needed to confirm very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The system must be designed, developed, integrated, and tested with system reliability in mind. Maintenance and reparability of failed units must not add to the probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass should start soon since it must be a long term effort.

Jones, Harry W.↗

Effect of specimen size on the buckling behavior of laminated composites subjected to low-velocity impact

An experimental investigation was conducted to study the effect of specimen size on the buckling strains of composite laminates subjected to low-velocity projectile impact. The specimens were fabricated from a T300/5208 graphite/epoxy material with laminate configurations (+ or - 45,0,90)2s and (+ or - 45,0,90)4s. These 16- and 32-ply quasi-isotropic laminates were side-supported during testing. Specimens of three different length-to-width aspect ratios of 1, 1.5, and 2 were studied. The low-velocity projectile impact was provided by an air gun. The preload and impact energy combination necessary to cause catastrophic buckling failure was determined. The residual strength of specimens that survived the impact damage was also measured. The results were compared with those of a 48-ply laminate tested elsewhere. The present experimental results show that (1) specimen length does not seem to have any significant influence on the buckling strains at failure caused by projectile impact and (2) the influence of specimen thickness on strain at failure decreases as the velocity of the projectile increases.

Avva, V. S.↗

Demonstrating the Safety and Reliability of a New System or Spacecraft: Incorporating Analyses and Reviews of the Design and Processing in Determining the Number of Tests to be Conducted

Design Safety/Reliability is associated with the probability of no failure-causing faults existing in a design. Confidence in the non-existence of failure-causing faults is increased by performing tests with no failure. Reliability-Growth testing requirements are based on initial assurance and fault detection probability. Using binomial tables generally gives too many required tests compared to reliability-growth requirements. Reliability-Growth testing requirements are based on reliability principles and factors and should be used.

Vesely, William E.↗

Command decoder unit

The design and testing of laboratory hardware (a command decoder unit) used in evaluating space shuttle instrumentation, data processing, and ground check-out operations is described. The hardware was a modification of another similar instrumentation system. A data bus coupler was designed and tested to interface the equipment to a central bus controller (computer). A serial digital data transfer mechanism was also designed. Redundant power supplies and overhead modules were provided to minimize the probability of a single component failure causing a catastrophic failure. The command decoder unit is packaged in a modular configuration to allow maximum user flexibility in configuring a system. Test procedures and special test equipment for use in testing the hardware are described. Results indicate that the unit will allow NASA to evaluate future software systems for use in space shuttles. The units were delivered to NASA and appear to be adequately performing their intended function. Engineering sketches and photographs of the command decoder unit are included.

Source record↗

Failure analysis of a tool steel torque shaft

A low design load drive shaft used to deliver power from an experimental exhaust heat recovery system to the crankshaft of an experimental diesel truck engine failed during highway testing. An independent testing laboratory analyzed the failure by routine metallography and attributed the failure to fatigue induced by a banded microstructure. Visual examination by NASA of the failed shaft plus the knowledge of the torsional load that it carried pointed to a 100 percent ductile failure with no evidence of fatigue. Scanning electron microscopy confirmed this. Torsional test specimens were produced from pieces of the failed shaft and torsional overload testing produced identical failures to that which had occurred in the truck engine. This pointed to a failure caused by a high overload and although the microstructure was defective it was not the cause of the failure.

Reagan, J. R.↗

A Markov chain model for reliability growth and decay

A mathematical model is developed to describe a complex system undergoing a sequence of trials in which there is interaction between the internal states of the system and the outcomes of the trials. For example, the model might describe a system undergoing testing that is redesigned after each failure. The basic assumptions for the model are that the state of the system after a trial depends probabilistically only on the state before the trial and on the outcome of the trial and that the outcome of a trial depends probabilistically only on the state of the system before the trial. It is shown that under these basic assumptions, the successive states form a Markov chain and the successive states and outcomes jointly form a Markov chain. General results are obtained for the transition probabilities, steady-state distributions, etc. A special case studied in detail describes a system that has two possible state ('repaired' and 'unrepaired') undergoing trials that have three possible outcomes ('inherent failure', 'assignable-cause' 'failure' and 'success'). For this model, the reliability function is computed explicitly and an optimal repair policy is obtained.

Siegrist, K.↗

An Approach to Automate tools for the Risk Assessment of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Reliable digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C) are integral for sustaining the continued operation of nuclear power plants. These systems ensure that nuclear reactors operate safely, efficiently, and within regulatory requirements. Yet, the cost of designing and licensing new nuclear DI&C can be prohibitively expensive. Under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, Idaho National Laboratory has developed a framework for supporting the risk-informed design of DI&C systems by offering methods to support the identification, quantification, and evaluation of risks for various DI&C design architectures. The framework indicates potential software failure modes and provides pathways for quantifying the potential for these software failures, including common cause failures. Using the framework’s systematic approach, challenges for assessing risks within new and existing nuclear DI&C systems can be reduced. Nevertheless, the current framework can be further improved using the convenience of automation. This paper introduces the development of Software for the Hazard Identification and Evaluation of Digital Systems (SHIELDS). SHIELDS is an engineering software package that enables the identification, elimination, and mitigation of potential risks and reduces the burden of deploying reliable DI&C systems. This work introduces plans and techniques to digitize and improve the manual risk assessment modules of the framework. These improvements will save time and increase the repeatability and usability of the framework, making it more accessible to a wider range of users. Ultimately, this introduces SHIELDS and how its modules support efficient development of safe and reliable DI&C systems.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Graded approach for assessing digital system failure susceptibilities - 305

Owner/operators of nuclear plants must be able to identify and assess susceptibilities to digital system failures and unintended behaviors that could lead to plant system malfunctions, including common-cause failures (CCFs) of multiple controlled components that may impact overall plant safety. Nuclear plant designers and regulators often assess and manage potential failure modes by assuming the failure occurs and showing by analysis that the results are acceptable. In 2016 EPRI published a guideline on Methods for Assuring Safety and Dependability when Applying Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems (EPRI 3002005326), which takes a more holistic approach that considers digital system failure modes from the perspective of their impact on plant risk and includes a graded approach based on safety significance. This paper describes that graded approach. The methodology in EPRI 3002005326 systematically identifies potential I and C vulnerabilities that could lead to significant malfunctions of controlled components and systems, including common-cause failures (CCF), and discusses in detail methods to protect against them. It considers both preventive measures that reduce the likelihood of failures, and plant systems and features that mitigate the effects of component failures and misbehaviors. Coping analysis is then performed as appropriate to provide additional assurance of protection. The safety significance based graded approach is an important feature in that it can help users focus attention on overall plant safety, including potentially risk-significant scenarios that might not be considered in traditional safety analyses. The purpose is to help the user ensure that modifications to the I and C that could potentially be safety significant are treated appropriately and at the same time not waste valuable resources on excessive protection against changes that have little or no impact on safety. The graded approach allows the design engineer to tailor the rigor of the preventive, limiting, and mitigative measures commensurately with the effects the I and C modification has on overall plant safety. The graded approach focuses on safety significance impact, which is effectively a qualitative measure of the potential change in safety (or risk) caused by a proposed I and C modification, as compared to the I and C that is being replaced. Safety significance impact should not be confused with importance to safety or risk significance. It is possible that an upgrade to safety-related and/or risk-significant I and C systems may have little or no safety significant impact and vice versa. The approach considers three factors that influence the impact on safety significance of a proposed I and C modification: context, likelihood of failure, and consequences of failure. The most significant of the three factors is context - what the I and C is connected to, both directly and indirectly, including its potential effects on plant systems that respond to transients or accidents. The graded approach is particularly helpful in assessing potential CCFs resulting from digital I and C failures, and shows why the most problematic CCFs will be those that can affect multiple plant systems. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Solving Component Structural Dynamic Failures Due to Extremely High Frequency Structural Response on the Space Shuttle Program

For many years, the capabilities to determine the root-cause failure of component failures have been limited to the analytical tools and the state of the art data acquisition systems. With this limited capability, many anomalies have been resolved by adding material to the design to increase robustness without the ability to determine if the design solution was satisfactory until after a series of expensive test programs were complete. The risk of failure and multiple design, test, and redesign cycles were high. During the Space Shuttle Program, many crack investigations in high energy density turbomachines, like the SSME turbopumps and high energy flows in the main propulsion system, have led to the discovery of numerous root-cause failures and anomalies due to the coexistences of acoustic forcing functions, structural natural modes, and a high energy excitation, such as an edge tone or shedding flow, leading the technical community to understand many of the primary contributors to extremely high frequency high cycle fatique fluid-structure interaction anomalies. These contributors have been identified using advanced analysis tools and verified using component and system tests during component ground tests, systems tests, and flight. The structural dynamics and fluid dynamics communities have developed a special sensitivity to the fluid-structure interaction problems and have been able to adjust and solve these problems in a time effective manner to meet budget and schedule deadlines of operational vehicle programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program over the years.

Frady, Greg↗

Detailed Study of Emergency Diesel Generator Performance Using EPIX/RADS Database

A recent report was published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR-6928. That report characterized industry performance (generally covering 1998 – 2002) for 51 component types found in commercial nuclear power plants. For example, for emergency diesel generators, three failure modes were identified: fail to start and reach rated speed and voltage, fail to load and run for one hour, and fail to run beyond one hour. Data from the U.S. industry contained in the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) database maintained by The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations were used to evaluate the failure probabilities and rates for these failure modes, covering 1998 – 2002. The software package Reliability and Availability Database System (RADS) was used to search and process the EPIX data. In addition, train test and maintenance unavailability was characterized for 34 train types. As a follow-on effort to this report, several components will be analyzed in more detail each year. These detailed studies include more recent data and analyze various subcategories such as manufacturer, system, size and type (as applicable). In addition, engineering insights such as piece part contribution to each failure mode and failure cause will be determined. This paper summarizes the preliminary results for emergency diesel generators. EPIX data coverage was expanded to include 1998 – 2007 and reliability results were compared with unplanned demand performance (bus under voltage events requiring the emergency diesel generator to start, load and run) over the same period. In addition, performance by manufacturer was evaluated. Finally, piece part contributions and failure causes were determined for each failure mode.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Reliability Growth Modeling and Testing

Reliability growth has been modelled as an exponential decline in the cumulative failure rate that continues indefinitely as long as testing continues. Contrary to this, most reliability growth data show a brief high initial failure rate due to infant mortality followed by a long period of constant low failure rate. A two part failure rate model with an initial exponential decline followed by a constant failure rate usually fits the data and provides a more realistic description of reliability growth. The reliability growth process consists of testing, experiencing failures, finding the failure causes, and redesigning the system to remove them. The cost of reliability growth increases with the number of inherent failure modes and the time needed for them to occur and be removed. The failure modes with the lower failure rates will tend to occur later, as their Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is the inverse of the failure rate. Reliability growth testing has diminishing returns, since it takes longer to find and remove the less probable failures.This paper first discusses the reliability bathtub curve and then explains that reliability growth is produced by testing, identifying failure causes, and designing to remove them. A simple model of reliability growth is introduced, with a brief group of early failures followed by a constant failure rate. The cumulative failure rate n(t)/t can decline as rapidly as1/t or t-1butdeclines more slowly if additiona lfailures occur. The 56-failure Crow data seti s used to demonstrate the two-phase model of reliability growth followed by a constant failure rate. 13 additional data sets are modeled, with 9 of the 14 data sets showing reliability growth approximately as n(t)/t =1/t or t-1and substantial final failure rates. The model fits most of the data sets, but 4of the 14 show no reliability growth. The reliability growth period typically includes six failures and extends one-quarter or half the total test time. As reliability growth testing continues, the cumulative failure rate should be tracked to estimate the reliability growth exponent and the final failure rate.

reliability growth modeling↗

Modeling Reliability Growth

Reliability growth has been modelled as an exponential decline in the cumulative failure rate that continues indefinitely as long as testing continues. Contrary to this, most reliability growth data show a brief high initial failure rate due to infant mortality followed by a long period of constant low failure rate. A two part failure rate model with an initial exponential decline followed by a constant failure rate usually fits the data and provides a more realistic description of reliability growth. The reliability growth process consists of testing, experiencing failures, finding the failure causes, and redesigning the system to remove them. The cost of reliability growth increases with the number of inherent failure modes and the time needed for them to occur and be removed. The failure modes with the lower failure rates will tend to occur later, as their Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is the inverse of the failure rate. Reliability growth testing has diminishing returns, since it takes longer to find and remove the less probable failures.This paper first discusses the reliability bathtub curve and then explains that reliability growth is produced by testing, identifying failure causes, and designing to remove them. A simple model of reliability growth is introduced, with a brief group of early failures followed by a constant failure rate. The cumulative failure rate n(t)/t can decline as rapidly as1/t or t-1butdeclines more slowly if additiona lfailures occur. The 56-failure Crow data seti s used to demonstrate the two-phase model of reliability growth followed by a constant failure rate. 13 additional data sets are modeled, with 9 of the 14 data sets showing reliability growth approximately as n(t)/t =1/t or t-1and substantial final failure rates. The model fits most of the data sets, but 4of the 14 show no reliability growth. The reliability growth period typically includes six failures and extends one-quarter or half the total test time. As reliability growth testing continues, the cumulative failure rate should be tracked to estimate the reliability growth exponent and the final failure rate.

reliability growth modeling↗

REALIZATION OF A AUTOMATED T-WAY COMBINATORIAL TESTING APPROACH FOR A SOFTWARE BASED EMBEDDED DIGITAL DEVICE

Under the Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, within the Plant Modernization research pathway, the Digital I&C Qualification Project is identifying new methods that would be beneficial in qualifying digital I&C systems and devices for safety-related usage. One such method that would be useful in qualifying field components such as sensors and actuators is the concept of testability. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers testability to be one of two design attributes sufficient to eliminate consideration of software-based or software logic-based common cause failure (the other being diversity). The NRC defines acceptable “testability” as follows: Testability – A system is sufficiently simple such that every possible combination of inputs and every possible sequence of device states are tested and all outputs are verified for every case (100% tested). [NUREG 0800, Chapter 7, Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19] This qualification method has never proven to be practical in view of the very large number of combinations of inputs and sequences of device states for a typical I&C device. However, many of these combinations are not unique in the sense that they represent the same state space or in that that they represent state space that would not affect the critical design basis functions of the device. Therefore, the state space of interest might possibly be reduced to a manageable dimension through such analysis. This project will focus on a representative I&C device similar in design, function, and complexity to the types of devices that would likely be deployed in nuclear power plants as digital or software based sensors and actuators (e.g. Smart Sensors). Analysis will be conducted to determine the feasibility of testing this device in a manner consistent with the NRC definition. This report describes the development of test process for Bounded Exhaustive Testing with respect to Combinatorial Test (CT) methods. The report describes the candidate Device Under Test SW – the VCU smart sensor, conceptual experimental methods for stated test objectives, description of the process, tools, resources, and computing. This information will be used to fully develop a detailed test plan (based on statistical measure needs) and test environment for conducting an I&C device testability demonstration study. The future planed experimental study of this project is to demonstrate digital qualification via Bounded Exhaustive Testability with respect to Common Cause Failure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Diverse Redundant Systems for Reliable Space Life Support

Reliable life support systems are required for deep space missions. The probability of a fatal life support failure should be less than one in a thousand in a multi-year mission. It is far too expensive to develop a single system with such high reliability. Using three redundant units would require only that each have a failure probability of one in ten over the mission. Since the system development cost is inverse to the failure probability, this would cut cost by a factor of one hundred. Using replaceable subsystems instead of full systems would further cut cost. Using full sets of replaceable components improves reliability more than using complete systems as spares, since a set of components could repair many different failures instead of just one. Replaceable components would require more tools, space, and planning than full systems or replaceable subsystems. However, identical system redundancy cannot be relied on in practice. Common cause failures can disable all the identical redundant systems. Typical levels of common cause failures will defeat redundancy greater than two. Diverse redundant systems are required for reliable space life support. Three, four, or five diverse redundant systems could be needed for sufficient reliability. One system with lower level repair could be substituted for two diverse systems to save cost.

life support↗