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DOE OSTI2024

Hydrogen Transportation and Distributed Energy Systems Risk and Feasibility Assessment for Airport Facilities - CRADA 555 (Abstract)

This CRADA presents the strategy that Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) will take to support PDX in performing a risk assessment for several hydrogen deployment scenarios. It is intended that the deployment of hydrogen at PDX could serve several roles, including decarbonizing its bus fleet and building out a distributed energy system which could also be used to facilitate emergency operations. PDX’s initial plans concern replacing their current fleet of 28 busses with FCEBs. To do so, PDX will need to deploy the hydrogen systems needed to support the buses. This includes hydrogen storage, production, delivery, filling, compression, and maintenance. PDX also has long range plans to build a distributed energy system to support normal and resilient operations. This study will investigate the risks of each plan individually, and a combined plan which serves both. Additionally, PDX is in an area with the potential for high seismic activity, as such this work will also include a seismic risk assessment. A detailed risk assessment using PDX as a test case is necessary to ensure the deployment of large-scale hydrogen is successful and to understand the benefits or drawbacks in contrast to electric only technologies. Many technologies have been proposed that claim to utilize hydrogen for both transportation and distributed energy systems; however, these technologies need to be analyzed as they apply to an actual site. The physical infrastructure and hydrogen use cases for PDX will be analyzed, a risk assessment will be performed on the hydrogen infrastructure and distributed energy system. These assessments will be useful for understanding how each of these technologies would perform as applied to a large public facility and public safety. The results of this CRADA, and an impact of the DOE funding, will evaluate hydrogen as a key fuel for PDX and will accelerate by several years availability of hydrogen, fuel cells, and other low-carbon technologies.

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS1988

Spacecraft Fire-Safety Experiments for Space Station: Technology Development Mission

Definitions, overall descriptions, and preliminary apparatus and instrumentation requirements are presented for three spacecraft fire-safety experiments appropriate for inclusion in a growth-version of the Space Station. The experiments are as follows: 1. Combustion and Flame Spread of Typical Spacecraft Materials in a Low Velocity Convective Flow in Low Gravity 2. Fire and Fire-Extinguishant Interactions with Various Fire Scenarios in Low Gravity 3. Smoldering and Deep-Seated Combustion in Low Gravity. The experiments were selected from an assessment of recommendations for advanced technologies for prevention, detection, and control of fires in spacecraft. The experiments and their facilities are intended to constitute a portion of a Spacecraft Fire Safety Technology Development Mission (TDM). Basic requirements for the mission study are that the Space Station is essential for the accomplishment of the experimental objectives and that the technology being developed is appropriate for the growth version of the Space Station. The advantages of these three experiments are that, not only do they explore problems relevant to the Space Station operation and utilization, but also they constitute tests adaptable to two multiuse facilities installed in the Space Station laboratory module, the Combustion Tunnel Facility and the Combustion Facility. Three additional spacecraft fire-safety experiments, essential precursors to the TD M for near-term performance, are also described as follows: 1. Near-Term Testing of Materials for Combustion and Flame Spread 2. Near-Term Extinguishment of Fires in a Low-Gravity Test Bed 3. Post-Fire Recovery of Sensitive Electrical and Electronic Equipment. For all the experiments, the study defines accommodations in terms of first-order space, mass, power, consumables, and crew-time estimates. The study also reviews the key problems to be addressed, namely experiment safety hazards, non-intrusive diagnostics development and waste-products disposal. A preliminary task and time schedule for design, development, and experiment fabrication is proposed.

Youngblood, Wallace W.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Value of abstraction in performance assessment – When is a higher level of detail necessary?

In this study, different approaches in performance assessment (PA) of the long-term safety of a repository for radioactive waste were examined. This investigation was carried out as part of the DECOVALEX-2023 project, an international collaborative effort for research and model comparison. One specific task of the DECOVALEX-2023 project was the Salt Performance Assessment Modelling task (Salt PA), which aimed at comparing various models and methods employed in the performance assessment of deep geological repositories in salt. In the context of the Salt PA task, three distinct teams from SNL (United States), Quintessa Ltd (United Kingdom), and GRS (Germany) examined the consequences of employing different levels of abstractions when modelling the repository's geometry and implementing various features and processes, using the example of a simple hypothetical repository structure in domal salt. Each team applied their own tools: PFLOTRAN (SNL), QPAC (Quintessa) and LOPOS (GRS). These differ essentially regarding numerical concept and degree of detail in the representation of the underlying physical processes. The discussion focused on when simplifications can be appropriately applied and what consequences result from them. Furthermore, it was explored when and if a higher level of fidelity in geometry or physical processes is required.

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DOE OSTI2025

Benchmark Gap Assessment for the Manufacturing of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuels

This document develops basic critical conditions for spheres—moderated and unmoderated, as well as reflected and unreflected—in consideration of nuclear criticality safety of a potential fuel production facility producing high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel of several different types like tristructural-isotropic (TRISO), uranium metal and alloys, oxide and non-metallic forms. In addition to spherical arrangements, TRISO particle manufacturing process–specific equipment is modeled as it would be for the criticality safety analysis. The objective is to develop representative systems that can then be used for comparison with existing benchmarks. SCALE/TSUNAMI is used to assess the similarity index between these systems to assess validation gaps for possible fuel production applications of proposed advanced reactors. Several different fuel types were evaluated, including TRISO, uranium metal, uranium molybdenum, uranium zirconium, uranium dioxide, uranium nitride, uranium hydride, U-ZrH, and uranium chloride. This selection of fuel types covers a breadth of proposed reactor types, as well as intermediate steps in the production and fabrication of the fuel

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DOE OSTI2020

A Comparison of RESRAD and GoldSim Models for Assessing Radiological Dose for a RCRA Landfill - 20418

US Ecology Idaho (USEI) operates a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C, Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) Facility on a 640-acre property in Owyhee County, Idaho. USEI accepts a wide variety of RCRA-exempt low activity radioactive wastes, including naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and technologically enhanced NORM (TENORM) (USEI 2009). The performance of the landfill with regard to radiological operating permit requirements was previously assessed using a model constructed with the residual radioactivity (RESRAD) computer program, developed by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). RESRAD supports the evaluation of several environmental transport pathways related to a radionuclide-contaminated soil source term, but it was not conceived as a model for the evaluation of landfill radiological performance. A more comprehensive and realistic model is desired in order to better support submissions to both the State of Idaho's Department of Environmental Quality as well as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A Performance Assessment (PA) computer model was developed using GoldSim software for the USEI RCRA Subtitle C landfill. The RESRAD computer model was specifically developed for calculating soil cleanup criteria and radiological dose and cancer risk from residual radioactive material in soil. To evaluate site-specific conditions, users may select from among a number of available environmental transport and exposure pathways and modify 'default' parameter values. In GoldSim, a user must construct the model 'from scratch.' However, this modeling is facilitated by a number of specialized elements available in GoldSim to support a radiological mass transport model. These include elements for defining radiological decay and ingrowth, container failure and radiological release, advective and diffusive transport, and other processes. Advantages afforded by the use of RESRAD for modeling radiological dose for a RCRA Subtitle C landfill include ease of use and reasonable flexibility in specifying site-specific conditions. GoldSim allows for considerably more flexibility and site-specificity than RESRAD, including evaluation of potentially relevant environmental transport processes not supported in RESRAD. The probabilistic modeling capabilities of GoldSim also far exceed those of RESRAD. The pros and cons of RESRAD and GoldSim for this modeling problem are explored with a focus on identifying approaches and critical factors in identifying the appropriate platform. The capabilities of RESRAD and GoldSim for mathematically modeling the disposal system will be contrasted and compared. For example, the existing RESRAD radiological safety assessment evaluated potentially complete exposure pathways related to infiltration to groundwater and upwards diffusion of radon. Additional transport pathways identified in the USEI Idaho facility Conceptual Site Model include deposition of radon decay products in cover material, root uptake of radionuclides in disposed wastes by native plants, and mixing of cover material by burrowing animals. Results of the two models and how the different transport and dose pathways affect results will be discussed. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

FY23 PFLOTRAN Development Support: GDSA PFLOTRAN

This report details the FY23 contributions to PFLOTRAN development by PNNL code developers (i.e., Dr. Glenn Hammond) under the Spent Fuel Waste Science and Technology Campaign within the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy to support the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Framework.

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NASA NTRS1980

Rating hydrogen as a potential aviation fuel

The viability of liquid hydrogen, liquid methane, and synthetic aviation kerosene as future alternate fuels for transport aircraft is analyzed, and the results of a comparative assessment are given in terms of cost, energy resource utilization, areas of fuel production, transmission airport facilities, and ultimate use in the aircraft. Important safety (fires) and some environmental aspects (CO2 balance) are also described. It is concluded that fuel price estimates indicate the price of synthetic aviation kerosene (synjet) would be approximately half of the price calculated for liquid hydrogen and somewhat less than that of liquid methane, with synjet from oil shale reported to be the least expensive.

Witcofski, R. D.↗

DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

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DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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NASA NTRS2000

International Agreement on Planetary Protection

The maintenance of a NASA policy, is consistent with international agreements. The planetary protection policy management in OSS, with Field Center support. The advice from internal and external advisory groups (NRC, NAC/Planetary Protection Task Force). The technology research and standards development in bioload characterization. The technology research and development in bioload reduction/sterilization. This presentation focuses on: forward contamination - research on the potential for Earth life to exist on other bodies, improved strategies for planetary navigation and collision avoidance, and improved procedures for sterile spacecraft assembly, cleaning and/or sterilization; and backward contamination - development of sample transfer and container sealing technologies for Earth return, improvement in sample return landing target assessment and navigation strategy, planning for sample hazard determination requirements and procedures, safety certification, (liaison to NEO Program Office for compositional data on small bodies), facility planning for sample recovery system, quarantine, and long-term curation of 4 returned samples.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2001

A Low Cost GPS System for Real-Time Tracking of Sounding Rockets

This paper describes the development as well as the on-ground and the in-flight evaluation of a low cost Global Positioning System (GPS) system for real-time tracking of sounding rockets. The flight unit comprises a modified ORION GPS receiver and a newly designed switchable antenna system composed of a helical antenna in the rocket tip and a dual-blade antenna combination attached to the body of the service module. Aside from the flight hardware a PC based terminal program has been developed to monitor the GPS data and graphically displays the rocket's path during the flight. In addition an Instantaneous Impact Point (IIP) prediction is performed based on the received position and velocity information. In preparation for ESA's Maxus-4 mission, a sounding rocket test flight was carried out at Esrange, Kiruna, on 19 Feb. 2001 to validate existing ground facilities and range safety installations. Due to the absence of a dedicated scientific payload, the flight offered the opportunity to test multiple GPS receivers and assess their performance for the tracking of sounding rockets. In addition to the ORION receiver, an Ashtech G12 HDMA receiver and a BAE (Canadian Marconi) Allstar receiver, both connected to a wrap-around antenna, have been flown on the same rocket as part of an independent experiment provided by the Goddard Space Flight Center. This allows an in-depth verification and trade-off of different receiver and antenna concepts.

Markgraf, M.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Flight Performance Evaluation of Three GPS Receivers for Sounding Rocket Tracking

In preparation for the European Space Agency Maxus-4 mission, a sounding rocket test flight was carried out at Esrange,, near Kiruna, Sweden on February 19, 2001 to validate existing ground facilities and range safety installations. Due to the absence of a dedicated scientific payload, the flight offered the opportunity to test multiple GPS receivers and assess their performance for the tracking of sounding rockets. The receivers included an Ashtech G12 HDMA receiver, a BAE (Canadian Marconi) Allstar receiver and a Mitel Orion receiver. All of them provide CIA code tracking on the L1 frequency to determine the user position and make use of Doppler measurements to derive the instantaneous velocity. Among the receivers, the G12 has been optimized for use under highly dynamic conditions and has earlier been flown successfully on NASA sounding rockets [Bull, ION-GPS-2000]. The Allstar is representative of common single frequency receivers for terrestrial applications and received no particular modification, except for the disabling of the common altitude and velocity constraints that would otherwise inhibit its use for space application. The Orion receiver, finally, employs the same Mitel chipset as the Allstar, but has received various firmware modifications by DLR to safeguard it against signal losses and improve its tracking performance [Montenbruck et al., ION-GPS-2000]. While the two NASA receivers were driven by a common wrap-around antenna, the DLR experiment made use of a switchable antenna system comprising a helical antenna in the tip of the rocket and two blade antennas attached to the body of the vehicle. During the boost a peak acceleration of roughly 17g's was achieved which resulted in a velocity of about 1100 m/s at the end of the burn. At apogee, the rocket reached a maximum altitude of over 80 km. A detailed analysis of the attained flight data will be given in the paper together with a evaluation of different receiver designs and antenna concepts.

Bull, Barton↗

NASA NTRS2002

Flight Performance Evaluation of Three GPS Receivers for Sounding Rocket Tracking

In preparation for the European Space Agency Maxus-4 mission, a sounding rocket test flight was carried out at Esrange, near Kiruna, Sweden on February 19, 2001 to validate existing ground facilities and range safety installations. Due to the absence of a dedicated scientific payload, the flight offered the opportunity to test multiple GPS receivers and assess their performance for the tracking of sounding rockets. The receivers included an Ashtech G12 HDMA receiver, a BAE (Canadian Marconi) Allstar receiver and a Mitel Orion receiver. All of them provide C/A code tracking on the L1 frequency to determine the user position and make use of Doppler measurements to derive the instantaneous velocity. Among the receivers, the G12 has been optimized for use under highly dynamic conditions and has earlier been flown successfully on NASA sounding rockets. The Allstar is representative of common single frequency receivers for terrestrial applications and received no particular modification, except for the disabling of the common altitude and velocity constraints that would otherwise inhibit its use for space application. The Orion receiver, finally, employs the same Mitel chipset as the Allstar, but has received various firmware modifications by DLR to safeguard it against signal losses and improve its tracking performance. While the two NASA receivers were driven by a common wrap-around antenna, the DLR experiment made use of a switchable antenna system comprising a helical antenna in the tip of the rocket and two blade antennas attached to the body of the vehicle. During the boost a peak acceleration of roughly l7g's was achieved which resulted in a velocity of about 1100 m/s at the end of the burn. At apogee, the rocket reached an altitude of over 80 km. A detailed analysis of the attained flight data is given together with a evaluation of different receiver designs and antenna concepts.

Bull, Barton↗

NASA NTRS2008

Crew Activity Analyzer

The crew activity analyzer (CAA) is a system of electronic hardware and software for automatically identifying patterns of group activity among crew members working together in an office, cockpit, workshop, laboratory, or other enclosed space. The CAA synchronously records multiple streams of data from digital video cameras, wireless microphones, and position sensors, then plays back and processes the data to identify activity patterns specified by human analysts. The processing greatly reduces the amount of time that the analysts must spend in examining large amounts of data, enabling the analysts to concentrate on subsets of data that represent activities of interest. The CAA has potential for use in a variety of governmental and commercial applications, including planning for crews for future long space flights, designing facilities wherein humans must work in proximity for long times, improving crew training and measuring crew performance in military settings, human-factors and safety assessment, development of team procedures, and behavioral and ethnographic research. The data-acquisition hardware of the CAA (see figure) includes two video cameras: an overhead one aimed upward at a paraboloidal mirror on the ceiling and one mounted on a wall aimed in a downward slant toward the crew area. As many as four wireless microphones can be worn by crew members. The audio signals received from the microphones are digitized, then compressed in preparation for storage. Approximate locations of as many as four crew members are measured by use of a Cricket indoor location system. [The Cricket indoor location system includes ultrasonic/radio beacon and listener units. A Cricket beacon (in this case, worn by a crew member) simultaneously transmits a pulse of ultrasound and a radio signal that contains identifying information. Each Cricket listener unit measures the difference between the times of reception of the ultrasound and radio signals from an identified beacon. Assuming essentially instantaneous propagation of the radio signal, the distance between that beacon and the listener unit is estimated from this time difference and the speed of sound in air.] In this system, six Cricket listener units are mounted in various positions on the ceiling, and as many as four Cricket beacons are attached to crew members. The three-dimensional position of each Cricket beacon can be estimated from the time-difference readings of that beacon from at least three Cricket listener units

Murray, James↗

NASA NTRS1992

Buffet test in the National Transonic Facility

A buffet test of a commercial transport model was accomplished in the National Transonic Facility at the NASA Langley Research Center. This aeroelastic test was unprecedented for this wind tunnel and posed a high risk for the facility. Presented here are the test results from a structural dynamics and aeroelastic response point of view. The activities required for the safety analysis and risk assessment are described. The test was conducted in the same manner as a flutter test and employed on-board dynamic instrumentation, real time dynamic data monitoring, and automatic and manual tunnel interlock systems for protecting the model.

Young, Clarence P., Jr.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Past Approaches for Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Waste Disposal in the United States—Part 1: Safety Criteria and Treatment of Uncertainty

The United States (US), with its 50-year experience in developing deep geologic disposal for transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), has much to share with other countries. Yet, other countries are better able to translate the US experience and corresponding policy decisions into solutions sensible for their country when they understand the compliance requirements in US laws and regulations. This paper presents past approaches in the generic and site-specific standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing regulations of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the framework provided by (1) key questions of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, and (2) international consensus standards. Both the 1985 EPA generic standards, as updated in 1993 and applied at the operating Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the EPA 2008 site-specific standards and implementing regulations, as applied at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in southern Nevada for SNF and HLW, adopt the strategy of using quantitative, probabilistic analysis to assess performance and compliance.

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DOE OSTI2020

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

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DOE OSTI2023

Passive Safety System Reliability Analysis: Methodology, Application, and Results

Many advanced reactor designs rely on passive systems to provide assurance that certain safety functions, such as reactivity control and reactor heat removal, are maintained during transient scenarios. The performance of these systems is sensitive to boundary and environmental conditions and can lead to functional failure, which is the inability of the system to perform as intended even without any physical failures. Additionally, conditions can cause the passive systems to operate in an intermediate or degraded state. These operational modes of passive systems and their overall reliability can be difficult to capture in traditional probabilistic frameworks where discrete operating modes are assumed or time-dependent boundary conditions are not accounted for. Novel strategies and methods are needed to be able to capture the reliability of these passive systems and their impact on facility safety. The current abstract provides a summary of such a methodology and examples of its use in a case study, the GE Hitachi (GEH) PRISM probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) PSA.

Bucknor, M.↗