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At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1994

Environmental testing to prevent on-orbit TDRS failures

Can improved environmental testing prevent on-orbit component failures such as those experienced in the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) constellation? TDRS communications have been available to user spacecraft continuously for over 11 years, during which the five TDRS's placed in orbit have demonstrated their redundancies and robustness by surviving 26 component failures. Nevertheless, additional environmental testing prior to launch could prevent the occurrence of some types of failures, and could help to maintain communication services. Specific testing challenges involve traveling wave tube assemblies (TWTA's) whose lives may decrease with on-off cycling, and heaters that are subject to thermal cycles. The development of test conditions and procedures should account for known thermal variations. Testing may also have the potential to prevent failures in which components such as diplexers have had their lives dramatically shortened because of particle migration in a weightless environment. Reliability modeling could be used to select additional components that could benefit from special testing, but experience shows that this approach has serious limitations. Through knowledge of on-orbit experience, and with advances in testing, communication satellite programs might avoid the occurrence of some types of failures, and extend future spacecraft longevity beyond the current TDRS design life of ten years. However, determining which components to test, and how must testing to do, remain problematical.

Cutler, Robert M.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Optimizing the Galileo space communication link

The Galileo mission was originally designed to investigate Jupiter and its moons utilizing a high-rate, X-band (8415 MHz) communication downlink with a maximum rate of 134.4 kb/sec. However, following the failure of the high-gain antenna (HGA) to fully deploy, a completely new communication link design was established that is based on Galileo's S-band (2295 MHz), low-gain antenna (LGA). The new link relies on data compression, local and intercontinental arraying of antennas, a (14,1/4) convolutional code, a (255,M) variable-redundancy Reed-Solomon code, decoding feedback, and techniques to reprocess recorded data to greatly reduce data losses during signal acquisition. The combination of these techniques will enable return of significant science data from the mission.

Statman, J. I.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Optimizing the Galileo Space Communication Link

The Galileo mission was originally designed to investigate Jupiter and its moons utilizing a high rate, X-band communication downlink with a maximum rate of 134.4 kb/s. However, following the failure of the high-gain antenna (HGA) to fully deploy, a completely new communication like design was established that is based on Galileo's S-band, low-gain antenna.

Gallileo↗
NASA NTRS2011

Adding a Second Ku-Band Antenna to the International Space Station

The International Space Station, as originally developed, used the Ku-Band Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System communications link to transmit non-critical data to the ground. Since becoming operational, the use for the link evolved to include additional services that, although also not critical, were deemed to be necessary for the crew. The external Ku-Band Antennas were designed for transport to the ISS in the shuttle cargo bay and thus are not suitable for manifesting on any current cargo vehicle. The original intent was to stow two spare antennas on orbit in a protective container until such time as they were needed to replace a failing unit which is a long and complicated process due to the complexity of the removal and replacement procedure. The Boeing Company proposed manifesting one of those spare antennas in an operable configuration eliminating the need for an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) to correct the first failure and as such minimizing the time to hours rather than weeks required to restore the Ku-Band communications link after failures. After the first failure, an EVA would be scheduled to replace the failed antenna with the stowed spare antenna. Because the hot spare is activated internal to the ISS, the replacement of the failed unit can be done when convenient rather than in haste. This paper describes the methodology used to locate a suitable site to add a new antenna mast to the ISS as well the process followed to fabricate, deliver and install the new interface hardware. Because this was not planned when the ISS was originally designed, structural, power, data and Intermediate Frequency signal connections had to be found for use. With the movement of the P6 solar array element from the initial location in the center zenith location of the ISS to the end of the port side of the truss and concurrent relocation of one string of S-Band communications assets, there were candidate power, data and structural connections available on the Z1 Truss. The engineering team evaluated these residual interfaces for use and designed cabling and structural elements for the candidate interfaces. The antenna was recently installed on ULF-4 and has completed a preliminary checkout. Included in this check out were evaluation of the power level received from the TDRS and evaluation of the gimbal position feedback for consideration in the static bias pointing matrix. This process demonstrates the ability to modify and upgrade manned space vehicles as either need or technology requires.

DuSold, Chuck↗
NASA NTRS2008

2008 Year in Review

In February of 2008; NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC), NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and The Applied Research Laboratory at Penn State University demonstrated a pilot implementation of an Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) capability at the Launch Complex 20 of KSC. The following significant accomplishments are associated with this development: (1) implementation of an architecture for ground operations ISHM, based on networked intelligent elements; (2) Use of standards for management of data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) leading to modular ISHM implementation with interoperable elements communicating according to standards (three standards were used: IEEE 1451 family of standards for smart sensors and actuators, Open Systems Architecture for Condition Based Maintenance (OSA-CBM) standard for communicating DIaK describing the condition of elements of a system, and the OPC standard for communicating data); (3) ISHM implementation using interoperable modules addressing health management of subsystems; and (4) use of a physical intelligent sensor node (smart network element or SNE capable of providing data and health) along with classic sensors originally installed in the facility. An operational demonstration included detection of anomalies (sensor failures, leaks, etc.), determination of causes and effects, communication among health nodes, and user interfaces.

Figueroa, Jorge Fernando↗
NASA NTRS1979

Spacecraft automated operations

Trends in automation of planetary spacecraft are examined using data from missions as far back as Mariner '67 and up to the highly sophisticated Galileo. Nine design considerations which influence the degree of automation such as protection against catastrophic failures, highly repetitive functions, loss of spacecraft communications, and the need for near-real-time adaptivity are discussed. Rapid growth of automation is shown in terms of on-board hardware by plots of number of processors on board, the average speed of processors, and total core memory. The number of commands transmitted from the ground has grown to 5 million bits in Voyager, so that increases in mission complexity have increased both in spacecraft automation and ground operations. Achieving greater automation by transferring ground operations to the spacecraft with the current means of controlling missions, are considered noting proposed changes. For the future, improved computer technology, more microprocessors and increased core storage will be used, and the number of automated functions and their complexity will grow. It is concluded that using the growing computational capability of spacecraft will achieve more autonomy thus reversing the trend of increased mission complexity and cost.

Bird, T. H.↗
NASA NTRS1995

The Geopause

Coupled to the Earth and protected by the geomagnetic field, terrestrial matter in the plasma state dominates a larger region of space than was suspected when the 'space age' began, a region we refer to as the geosphere. Accelerated and heated by solar wind energy, this matter expands in size and increases in mass density in response to the Sun's ultraviolet spectrum, heliospheric conditions, and the occurrence of severe space storms. Such storms regularly damage spacecraft, interfere with communications, and trigger power grid interruptions or failures. They occur within the geopause region, that is, the volume defined by the limits of the instantaneous boundary between plasmas that are primarily heliospheric and geospheric. The geopause is analogous in some ways to the heliopause but also resembles the terrestrial air-sea interface. It is the boundary layer across which the supersonically expanding solar plasma delivers momentum and energy to the terrestrial plasma and gas, exciting them into motion, 'evaporating' them into space, and dissipating considerable amounts of power in thermal forms, while generating energetic particles through repeated storage and explosive release of electromagnetic energy. The intensity of the solar wind and the orientation of its magnetic field jointly control the strength of the coupling between solar and terrestrial plasmas and hence the occurrence of severe storms in the geopause region.

Moore, T. E.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Marsbee - Swarm of Flapping Wing Flyers for Enhanced Mars Exploration: NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) - Phase I: Final Report

Mars exploration has received significant interest from academia, industry, government, and the general public. Despite continued interest, flying on Mars remains challenging, mainly due to the ultra-thin Martian atmospheric density. Although the gravitational acceleration on Mars is 38 percent of Earth's 9.8 meters per second squared, the Martian atmospheric density is only 1.3 percent of the air density on Earth. The aerodynamic forces are proportional to the ambient fluid density. Therefore, flying near the surface of Mars has been considered nearly impossible. The proposed mission architecture (Fig. 1) consists of a Mars rover (already existing) that serves as a mobile base for Marsbees - a deployable swarm of small bio-inspired flapping wing vehicles. In one ConOps scenario, each Marsbee would carry an integrated stereographic video camera and the swarm could construct a 3D topographic map of the local surface for rover path planning. These flying scouts would provide a "third-dimension" to the rover capabilities. In other scenarios, each part of the swarm of Marsbees could carry pressure and temperature sensors for atmospheric sampling, or small spectral analyzers for identification of mineral outcroppings. In each scenario, the rover acts as a recharging and deployment/return station and data and communication hub. Human exploration of Mars is one of the major objectives of NASA and commercial entities such as SpaceX and Boeing. The identified innovations unique to the bio-inspired flapping Marsbee provide viable multi-mode flying mobility for Martian atmospheric and terrain exploration. A swarm of Marsbees provides an enhanced reconfigurable Mars exploration system that is resilient to individual component failures. These Marsbees can carry sensors and wireless communication devices in combination with a Mars rover and helicopters. These enhanced sensing and information gathering abilities can contribute to the following NASA Mars mission objectives: i) "Determine the habitability of an environment", ii) "Obtain surface weather measurements to validate global atmospheric models", and iii) "Prepare for human exploration on Mars." Various commercial entities, e.g. SpaceX and Boeing, are investing in technologies to transport humans to Mars.

Kang, Chang-kwon↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the communication and tracking subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA analysis process utilized available Communication and Tracking hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Gardner, J. R.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Analyzing and Detecting Problems in Systems of Systems

Many software systems are evolving complex system of systems (SoS) for which inter-system communication is mission-critical. Evidence indicates that transmission failures and performance issues are not uncommon occurrences. In a NASA-supported Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) project, we are researching a new approach addressing such problems. In this paper, we are presenting an approach for analyzing inter-system communications with the goal to uncover both transmission errors and performance problems. Our approach consists of a visualization and an evaluation component. While the visualization of the observed communication aims to facilitate understanding, the evaluation component automatically checks the conformance of an observed communication (actual) to a desired one (planned). The actual and the planned are represented as sequence diagrams. The evaluation algorithm checks the conformance of the actual to the planned diagram. We have applied our approach to the communication of aerospace systems and were successful in detecting and resolving even subtle and long existing transmission problems.

Lindvall, Mikael↗
NASA NTRS2014

The EDSN Intersatellite Communications Architecture

The Edison Demonstration of Smallsat Networks (EDSN) is a swarm of eight 1.5U Cubesats developed by the NASA Ames Research Center under the Small Spacecraft Technology Program (SSTP) within NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD). EDSN, scheduled for launch in late 2014, is designed to explore the use of small spacecraft networks to make synchronized, multipoint scientific measurements, and to organize and pass those data to the ground through their network. Networked swarms of these small spacecraft will open new horizons in astronomy, Earth observations and solar physics. Their range of applications include the formation of synthetic aperture radars for Earth sensing systems, large aperture observatories for next generation telescopes and the collection of spatially distributed measurements of time varying systems, probing the Earth's magnetosphere, Earth-Sun interactions and the Earth's geopotential. The EDSN communications network is maintained and operated by a simple set of predefined rules operating independently on all eight spacecraft without direction from ground based systems. One spacecraft serves as a central node, requesting and collecting data from the other seven spacecraft, organizing the data and passing it to a ground station at regular intervals. The central node is rotated among the spacecraft on a regular basis, providing robustness against the failure of a single spacecraft. This paper describes the communication architecture of the EDSN network and its operation with small spacecraft of limited electrical power, computing power and communication range. Furthermore, the problems of collecting and prioritizing data through a system that has data throughput bottlenecks are addressed. Finally, future network enhancements that can be built on top of the current EDSN hardware are discussed.

Communications↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗
NASA NTRS1989

Some Protocols For Optical-Fiber Digital Communications

One works best in heavy traffic, another, in light traffic. Three protocols proposed for digital communications among stations connected by passive taps to pair of uni-directional optical-fiber buses. Mediate round-robin, bounded-delay access to buses by all stations and particularly suited to fast transmission. Partly because transmission medium passive (no relay stations) and partly because protocols distribute control of network among all stations with provision for addition and deletion of stations (no control stations), communication network able to resist and recover from failures. Implicit token propagates in one direction on one bus and in opposite direction on other bus, minimizing interval of silence between end of one round and beginning of next.

Yeh, Cavour↗
NASA NTRS1978

Report of the Seasat Failure Review Board

The Seasat spacecraft failed on October 9, 1978, after satisfactory operation in orbit for 105 days, as a result of a loss of electrical power in the Agena bus that was used as a part of the spacecraft. This loss of power was caused by a massive and progressive short in one of the slip ring assemblies that was used to connect the rotating solar arrays into the power subsystem. The most likely cause of this short was the initiation of an arc between adjacent slip ring brush assemblies. The triggering mechanism of this arc could have been either a wire-to-brush assembly contact, a brush-to-brush contact, or a momentary short caused by a contaminant that bridged internal components of opposite electrical polarity. The slip ring assembly, as used in the Seasat spacecraft, was connected into the power subsystem in such a way that most of the adjacent brush assemblies were of opposite electrical polarity. This wiring arrangement, together with the congested nature of the design itself, made the Seasat slip ring assembly a unique, first-of-a-kind component that was particularly prone to shorting. The possibility of slip ring failures resulting from placing opposite electrical polarities on adjacent brush assemblies was known at least as early-as the summer of 1977 to other projects within the contractor's organization. Furthermore, failures of slip ring assemblies due to shorting between brushes had been experienced by the prime contractor on slip ring assemblies used by other programs. That the Seasat organization was not fully aware of these potential failure modes was due to a breakdown in communication within the contractor's organization.

Lundin, Bruce T.↗
NASA NTRS2013

The Need for Intelligent Control of Space Power Systems

As manned spacecraft venture farther from Earth, the need for reliable, autonomous control of vehicle subsystems becomes critical. This is particularly true for the electrical power system which is critical to every other system. Autonomy can not be achieved by simple scripting techniques due to the communication latency times and the difficulty associated with failures (or combinations of failures) that need to be handled in as graceful a manner as possible to ensure system availability. Therefore an intelligent control system must be developed that can respond to disturbances and failures in a robust manner and ensure that critical system loads are served and all system constraints are respected.

May, Ryan David↗
NASA NTRS2000

ISS Fiber Optic Failure Investigation Root Cause Report

In August of 1999, Boeing Corporation (Boeing) engineers began investigating failures of optical fiber being used on International Space Station flight hardware. Catastrophic failures of the fiber were linked to a defect in the glass fiber. Following several meetings of Boeing and NASA engineers and managers, Boeing created and led an investigation team, which examined the reliability of the cable installed in the U.S. Lab. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Components Technologies and Radiation Effects Branch (GSFC) led a team investigating the root cause of the failures. Information was gathered from: regular telecons and other communications with the investigation team, investigative trips to the cable distributor's plant, the cable manufacturing plant and the fiber manufacturing plant (including a review of build records), destructive and non-destructive testing, and expertise supplied by scientists from Dupont, and Lucent-Bell Laboratories. Several theories were established early on which were not able to completely address the destructive physical analysis and experiential evidence. Lucent suggested hydrofluoric acid (HF) etching of the glass and successfully duplicated the "rocket engine" defect. Strength testing coupled with examination of the low strength break sites linked features in the polyimide coating with latent defect sites. The information provided below explains what was learned about the susceptibility of the pre-cabled fiber to failure when cabled as it was for Space Station and the nature of the latent defects.

Leidecker, Henning↗
NASA NTRS2011

ISS Regenerative Life Support: Challenges and Success in the Quest for Long-Term Habitability in Space

This presentation will discuss the International Space Station s (ISS) Regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) operations with discussion of the on-orbit lessons learned, specifically regarding the challenges that have been faced as the system has expanded with a growing ISS crew. Over the 10 year history of the ISS, there have been numerous challenges, failures, and triumphs in the quest to keep the crew alive and comfortable. Successful operation of the ECLSS not only requires maintenance of the hardware, but also management of the station resources in case of hardware failure or missed re-supply. This involves effective communication between the primary International Partners (NASA and Roskosmos) and the secondary partners (JAXA and ESA) in order to keep a reserve of the contingency consumables and allow for re-supply of failed hardware. The ISS ECLSS utilizes consumables storage for contingency usage as well as longer-term regenerative systems, which allow for conservation of the expensive resources brought up by re-supply vehicles. This long-term hardware, and the interactions with software, was a challenge for Systems Engineers when they were designed and require multiple operational workarounds in order to function continuously. On a day-to-day basis, the ECLSS provides big challenges to the on console controllers. Main challenges involve the utilization of the resources that have been brought up by the visiting vehicles prior to undocking, balance of contributions between the International Partners for both systems and resources, and maintaining balance between the many interdependent systems, which includes providing the resources they need when they need it. The current biggest challenge for ECLSS is the Regenerative ECLSS system, which continuously recycles urine and condensate water into drinking water and oxygen. These systems were brought to full functionality on STS-126 (ULF-2) mission. Through system failures and recovery, the ECLSS console has learned how to balance the water within the systems, store and use water for contingencies, and continue to work with the International Partners for short-term failures. Through these challenges and the system failures, the most important lesson learned has been the importance of redundancy and operational workarounds. It is only because of the flexibility of the hardware and the software that flight controllers have the opportunity to continue operating the system as a whole for mission success.

Bazley, Jesse A.↗