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Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Collaboration with United States Army Cyber School (USACyS) for Signals Manipulation (LDRD External Report Summary)

Savannah River National Laboratory has been investing into its cybersecurity capabilities over the last few years. Cybersecurity has been a rapidly growing area for the CSRA in general and has included the consolidation of Cyber and Electronic Warfare units at Fort Gordon. This consolidation has been driven by the convergence of cyberwarfare and electronic warfare as the technologies behind both fields unify. This convergence, investment by SRNL into cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, and the desire for collaboration between the Army and SRNL has resulted in an opportunity for SRNL to develop R&D capabilities in electronic warfare that will complement SRNL’s cybersecurity efforts. Discussions between SRNL and the U.S. Army Cyber School (USACyS) has identified a general gap in electronic warfare capability in which both entities could contribute to solves.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Collaboration with USACyS for Signals Manipulation

Savannah River National Laboratory has been investing into cybersecurity capabilities since 2019. Cybersecurity has been a rapidly growing area for the CSRA in general and has included the consolidation of Cyber and Electronic Warfare units at Fort Gordon. This consolidation has been driven by the convergence of cyberwarfare and electronic warfare as the technologies underpinning Army Cyber Command’s vision of Information Warfare. This convergence, investment by SRNL into cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, and the desire for collaboration between the Army and SRNL has resulted in an opportunity for SRNL to develop R&D capabilities in electronic warfare that will complement SRNL’s cybersecurity efforts. Discussions between SRNL and the U.S. Army Cyber School (USACyS) has identified a general gap in ICS training lab capability in which both entities could contribute to solve. It is proposed to design and architecture that meets this need.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Matrix Characterization in Threat Material Detection Processes

Matrix characterization in the threat material detection is of utmost importance, it generates the background against which the threat material signal has to be identified. Threat materials (explosive, chemical warfare, ...) are usually contained within small volume inside large volumes of variable matrices. We have studied the influence of matrix materials on the capability of neutron systems to identify hidden threat material. Three specific scenarios are considered in some details: case 1--contraband material in the sea containers, case 2 - explosives in soil (landmines), case 3 - explosives and chemical warfare on the sea bottom. Effects of container cargo material on tagged neutron system are seen in the increase of gamma background and the decrease of neutron beam intensity. Detection of landmines is more complex because of variable soil properties. We have studied in detail space and time variations of soil elemental compositions and in particular hydrogen content (humidity). Of special interest are ammunitions and chemical warfare on the sea bottom, damping sites and leftovers from previous conflicts (WW-I, WW-II and local). In this case sea sediment is background source and its role is similar to the role of the soil in the landmine detection. In addition to geochemical cycling of chemical elements in semi-enclosed sea, like the Adriatic Sea, one has to consider also anthropogenic influence, especially when studying small scale variations in concentration levels. Some preliminary experimental results obtained with tagged neutron sensor inside an underwater vehicle are presented as well as data on sediment characterization by X-Ray Fluorescence.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Decontamination Strategy for Large Area and/or Equipment Contaminated with Chemical and Biological Agents using a High Energy Arc Lamp (HEAL)

A strategy for the decontamination of large areas and or equipment contaminated with Biological Warfare Agents (BWAs) and Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) was demonstrated using a High Energy Arc Lamp (HEAL) photolysis system. This strategy offers an alternative that is potentially quicker, less hazardous, generates far less waste, and is easier to deploy than those currently fielded by the Department of Defense (DoD). For example, for large frame aircraft the United States Air Force still relies on the combination of weathering (stand alone in environment), air washing (fly aircraft) and finally washing the aircraft with Hot Soapy Water (HSW) in an attempt to remove any remaining contamination. This method is laborious, time consuming (upwards of 12+ hours not including decontamination site preparation), and requires large amounts of water (e.g., 1,600+ gallons for a single large frame aircraft), and generates large amounts of hazardous waste requiring disposal. The efficacy of the HEAL system was demonstrated using diisopropyl methyl phosphonate (DIMP) a G series CWA simulant, and Bacillus globigii (BG) a simulant of Bacillus anthracis. Experiments were designed to simulate the energy flux of a field deployable lamp system that could stand-off 17 meters from a 12m2 target area and uniformly expose a surface at 1360 W/m2. The HEAL system in the absence of a catalyst reduced the amount of B. globigii by five orders of magnitude at a starting concentration of 1.63 x 107 spores. In the case of CWA simulants, the HEAL system in the presence of the catalyst TiO2 effectively degraded DIMP sprayed onto a 100mm diameter Petri dish in 5 minutes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cutaneous exposure to vesicant phosgene oxime: Acute effects on the skin and systemic toxicity

Phosgene Oxime (CX), an urticant or nettle agent categorized as a vesicant, is a potential chemical warfare and terrorist weapon. Its exposure can result in widespread and devastating effects including high mortality due to its fast penetration and ability to cause immediate severe cutaneous injury. It is one of the least studied chemical warfare agents with no effective therapy available. Thus, our goal was to examine the acute effects of CX following its cutaneous exposure in SKH-1 hairless mice to help establish a relevant injury model. Results from our study show that topical cutaneous exposure to CX vapor causes blanching of exposed skin with an erythematous ring, necrosis, edema, mild urticaria and erythema within minutes after exposure out to 8 h post-exposure. These clinical skin manifestations were accompanied with increases in skin thickness, apoptotic cell death, mast cell degranulation, myeloperoxidase activity indicating neutrophil infiltration, p53 phosphorylation and accumulation, and an increase in COX-2 and TNFα levels. Topical CX-exposure also resulted in the dilatation of the peripheral vessels with a robust increase in RBCs in vessels of the liver, spleen, kidney, lungs and heart tissues. These events could cause a drop in blood pressure leading to shock, hypoxia and death. Together, this is the first report on effects of CX cutaneous exposure, which could help design further comprehensive studies evaluating the acute and chronic skin injuries from CX topical exposure and elucidate the related mechanism of action to aid in the identification of therapeutic targets and mitigation of injury. - Highlights: • Phosgene oxime cutaneous exposure causes skin blanching, edema and urticaria. • Penetration of phosgene oxime causes dilation of vasculature in internal organs. • Mast cells could play an important role in phosgene oxime-induced skin injury. • Phosgene oxime could induce low blood pressure and hypoxia leading to mortality. • Data is significant for developing a phosgene oxime-induced skin injury model.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Neurobehavioral impairments, generation of oxidative stress and release of pro-apoptotic factors after chronic exposure to sulphur mustard in mouse brain

Recent global events have focused attention on the potential threat of international and domestic chemical terrorism, as well as the possibility of chemical warfare proliferation. Sulphur mustard (SM) is one of the potent chemical warfare agents (CWA), which initiates a cascade of events that converge on the redox mechanisms common to brain injury. The present study was designed to examine the effects of chronic SM exposure on neurobehavioral impairments, mitochondrial oxidative stress in male Swiss Albino mice and its role in inducing apoptotic neuronal cell death. The animals were divided into four groups (control, low, medium and high dose) of 5 animals each. Exposure to SM was given percutaneously daily for 12 weeks. The results demonstrated impairment in neurobehavioral indices viz. rota rod, passive avoidance and water maze tests in a dose dependent manner. There was a significant increase in lipid peroxidation and protein carbonyl content whereas, decrease in the activity of manganese superoxide dismutase (MnSOD), glutathione reductase and glutathione peroxidase suggesting impaired antioxidant defense system. Immunoblotting of cytochrome c, Bcl-2, Bax and activation of caspase-3 suggest induction of apoptosis in a dose dependent manner. Finally, increased p53 expression suggests that it may target the mitochondrial pathway for inducing apoptosis in response to DNA damage signals. In conclusion, chronic SM exposure may have the potential to generate oxidative stress which may trigger the release of cytochrome c as well as caspase-3 activation in neurons leading to cell death by apoptosis in a dose dependent manner which may in the end be responsible for the disruption of cognitive functions in mice.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Molded plasmonic crystals for detecting and spatially imaging surface bound species by surface-enhanced Raman scattering.

This report introduces a type of plasmonic crystal that consists of metal coated nanostructures of relief molded on a polymer film as a substrate for surface-enhanced Raman scattering (SERS). Such crystals exhibit SERS enhancement factors of {approx} 10{sup 5}, over large areas and with sufficiently high levels of uniformity for precise two-dimensional Raman mapping of surface bound monolayers. The ease of fabrication together with the high sensitivities and spatial resolution that can be achieved suggests an attractive route to SERS substrates for portable chemical warfare agent detection, environmental monitors, noninvasive imaging of biomolecules, and other applications.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Science & Technology Review March 2010

This month's issue has the following articles: (1) Countering the Growing Chem-Bio Threat -- Commentary by Penrose (Parney) C. Albright; (2) Responding to a Terrorist Attack Involving Chemical Warfare Agents -- Livermore scientists are helping the nation strengthen plans to swiftly respond to an incident involving chemical warfare agents; (3) Revealing the Secrets of a Deadly Disease -- A Livermore-developed system helps scientists better understand how plague bacteria infect healthy host cells; (4) A New Application for a Weapons Code -- Simulations reveal for the first time how blast waves cause traumatic brain injuries; (5) Testing Valuable National Assets for X-Ray Damage -- Experiments at the National Ignition Facility are measuring the effects of radiation on critical systems; and (6) An Efficient Way to Harness the Sun's Power -- New solar thermal technology is designed to supply residential electric power at nearly half of the current retail price.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Adsorption and decomposition of dimethyl methylphosphonate on size-selected (MoO 3 ) 3 clusters

The adsorption and decomposition of dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), a chemical warfare agent (CWA) simulant, on size-selected molybdenum oxide trimer clusters, i.e. (MoO3)3, was studied both experimentally and theoretically. X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), temperature programmed reaction (TPR), and density functional theory (DFT)-based simulations were utilized in this study. The XPS and TPR results showed both, desorption of intact DMMP, and decomposition of DMMP through the elimination of methanol at elevated temperatures on (MoO3)3 clusters. Theoretical investigation of DMMP on (MoO3)3 clusters suggested that, in addition to pure (MoO3)3 clusters, reduced molybdenum oxide clusters and hydroxylated molybdenum oxide clusters also play an important role in decomposing DMMP via a “reverse Mars–van Krevelen mechanism”. The present study, which focused on oxide clusters, underlines the importance of surface defects, e.g., the oxygen vacancies and surface hydroxyls, in determining the reaction pathway of DMMP, in agreement with previous studies on thin films. In addition, the structural fluxionality and the Lewis acidity of molybdenum oxide clusters, i.e. (MoO3)3, may make them good candidates for adsorption and decomposition of chemical warfare agents with similar structures to DMMP.

Tang, Xin↗