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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

HCEI Road Map: 2011 Edition (Brochure)

This road map outlines the 2011 key goals and strategies of the Hawaii Clean Energy Initiative, was founded based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Hawaii and the U.S. Department of Energy in 2008.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Army Energy and Water Reporting System Assessment

There are many areas of desired improvement for the Army Energy and Water Reporting System. The purpose of system is to serve as a data repository for collecting information from energy managers, which is then compiled into an annual energy report. This document summarizes reported shortcomings of the system and provides several alternative approaches for improving application usability and adding functionality. The U.S. Army has been using Army Energy and Water Reporting System (AEWRS) for many years to collect and compile energy data from installations for facilitating compliance with Federal and Department of Defense energy management program reporting requirements. In this analysis, staff from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory found that substantial opportunities exist to expand AEWRS functions to better assist the Army to effectively manage energy programs. Army leadership must decide if it wants to invest in expanding AEWRS capabilities as a web-based, enterprise-wide tool for improving the Army Energy and Water Management Program or simply maintaining a bottom-up reporting tool. This report looks at both improving system functionality from an operational perspective and increasing user-friendliness, but also as a tool for potential improvements to increase program effectiveness. The authors of this report recommend focusing on making the system easier for energy managers to input accurate data as the top priority for improving AEWRS. The next major focus of improvement would be improved reporting. The AEWRS user interface is dated and not user friendly, and a new system is recommended. While there are relatively minor improvements that could be made to the existing system to make it easier to use, significant improvements will be achieved with a user-friendly interface, new architecture, and a design that permits scalability and reliability. An expanded data set would naturally have need of additional requirements gathering and a focus on integrating with other existing data sources, thus minimizing manually entered data.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

From Bombs to Breast Cancer Imaging: Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the United States, one in eight women will be affected by breast cancer. According to the American Cancer Society, breast cancer is the most commonly diagnosed - as well as the second most fatal - cancer in American women. It is estimated that there will be nearly 200,000 diagnoses of breast cancer this year; more than 40,000 of these will be fatal. Although advances in medical technologies have greatly increased the odds of surviving the disease, the increase in screenings has not resulted in a significant reduction in the breast cancer mortality rate. Moreover, recent studies have even suggested that an increase in these methods might, in itself, cause cancer. A new tool for early detection and diagnosis of breast cancer, supported by an award from the Breast Cancer Research Program (BCRP) of the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs of Department of Defense, could give women a new advantage in the fight against breast cancer. This LANL-led project will integrate ultrasound tomography (UST) with recent discoveries in the field of cell and tissue biomechanics to improve breast cancer detection and characterization. UST uses ultrasound waves instead of X-rays to identify and characterize breast tumors. This technology reveals small mechanical-property changes within the breast. These changes are often the earliest signs of breast cancer. Additionally, UST is effective for women with dense breast tissue, who have a higher risk of developing breast cancer. Because the technology does not use radiation, UST can also be used as frequently as needed for women with a high risk of developing breast cancer. In contrast, mammography, the only routine breast-cancer screening tool currently available, is not effective for women with dense breast tissue and may come with unwanted side-effects caused by ionizing radiation. UST has great potential to become an alternative breast-cancer screening tool because of UST's advantages and benefits over mammography. Currently, there is fierce debate surrounding the age at which breast cancer screening should begin, and once begun, how often it should occur. The American Cancer Society recommends yearly mammograms starting at age 40. On the other hand, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force recommends against routine so early. Rather, the Task Force recommends biennial mammography screening for women aged 50 to 74 years. The ten-year discrepancy in the onset of screening results from recent data suggesting that the frequent use of X-ray radiation during screenings could potentially increase the likelihood of developing cancer. This danger is increased by the low sensitivity and accuracy of mammograms, which sometimes require multiple screenings to yield results. Furthermore, mammograms are often not only inaccurate, but average appalling misdiagnoses rates: about 80% false positives and 15% false negatives. These misdiagnoses lead to unwarranted biopsies at an estimated health care cost of $2 billion per year, while at the same time, resulting in excessive cases of undetected cancer. As such, the National Cancer Institute recommends more studies on the advantages of types and frequency of screenings, as well as alternative screening options. The UST technology developed at LANL could be an alternative option to greatly improve the specificity and sensitivity of breast cancer screening without using ionizing radiation. LANL is developing high-resolution ultrasound tomography algorithms and a clinical ultrasound tomography scanner to conduct patient studies at the UNM Hospital. During UST scanning, the patient lies face-down while her breast, immersed in a tank of warm water, is scanned by phased-transducer arrays. UST uses recorded ultrasound signals to reconstruct a high-resolution three-dimensional image of the breast, showing the spatial distribution of mechanical properties within the breast. Breast cancers are detected by higher values of mechanical properties compared to surrounding tissues. Thus, high-resolution breast images obtained using LANL's novel UST algorithms have the potential to detect breast cancer at its earliest stage. The goal of this Multi-Team Award project is two-fold: (1) develop a novel, safe and cost-effective breast-imaging technique, and (2) improve the specificity and sensitivity of breast cancer imaging. The project is expected to integrate basic research with clinical studies, perform substantive cross-disciplinary training among scientists on the teams and involve participation of consumer advocates. Those involved in the project are optimistic about future developments.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as Appendix F of this report. The requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this report. The proposed post-closure requirements consist of visual inspections to determine the condition of postings and radiological surveys to verify contamination has not migrated. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 547; and (2) The transfer of CAU 547 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Shock and Detonation Physics at Los Alamos National Laboratory

WX-9 serves the Laboratory and the Nation by delivering quality technical results, serving customers that include the Nuclear Weapons Program (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies. The scientific expertise of the group encompasses equations-of-state, shock compression science, phase transformations, detonation physics including explosives initiation, detonation propagation, and reaction rates, spectroscopic methods and velocimetry, and detonation and equation-of-state theory. We are also internationally-recognized in ultra-fast laser shock methods and associated diagnostics, and are active in the area of ultra-sensitive explosives detection. The facility capital enabling the group to fulfill its missions include a number of laser systems, both for laser-driven shocks, and spectroscopic analysis, high pressure gas-driven guns and powder guns for high velocity plate impact experiments, explosively-driven techniques, static high pressure devices including diamond anvil cells and dilatometers coupled with spectroscopic probes, and machine shops and target fabrication facilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 545: Dumps, Waste Disposal Sites, and Buried Radioactive Materials Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0, with ROTC 1

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 545, Dumps, Waste Disposal Sites, and Buried Radioactive Materials, in Areas 2, 3, 9, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (1996, as amended February 2008). Corrective Action Unit 545 is comprised of the following eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs): • 02-09-01, Mud Disposal Area • 03-08-03, Mud Disposal Site • 03-17-01, Waste Consolidation Site 3B • 03-23-02, Waste Disposal Site • 03-23-05, Europium Disposal Site • 03-99-14, Radioactive Material Disposal Area • 09-23-02, U-9y Drilling Mud Disposal Crater • 20-19-01, Waste Disposal Site While all eight CASs are addressed in this CADD/CR, sufficient information was available for the following three CASs; therefore, a field investigation was not conducted at these sites: • For CAS 03-08-03, though the potential for subsidence of the craters was judged to be extremely unlikely, the data quality objective (DQO) meeting participants agreed that sufficient information existed about disposal and releases at the site and that a corrective action of close in place with a use restriction is recommended. Sampling in the craters was not considered necessary. • For CAS 03-23-02, there were no potential releases of hazardous or radioactive contaminants identified. Therefore, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for CAU 545 concluded that: “Sufficient information exists to conclude that this CAS does not exist as originally identified. Therefore, there is no environmental concern associated with CAS 03-23-02.” This CAS is closed with no further action. • For CAS 03-23-05, existing information about the two buried sources and lead pig was considered to be sufficient, and safety concerns existed about the stability of the crater component. Therefore, a corrective action of close in place with a use restriction is recommended, and sampling at the site was not considered necessary. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation to support the recommendation for closure of CAU 545 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from August 20 through November 02, 2007, as set forth in the CAU 545 Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the DQO process: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. • Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 545 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels established in this CADD/CR. The results of the CAI identified no COCs at the five CASs investigated in CAU 545. As a best management practice, repair of the fence enclosing CAS 03-08-03 has been completed. Therefore, the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • Close in place COCs at CASs 03-08-03 and 03-23-05 with use restrictions. • No further corrective action for CAU 545. • No Corrective Action Plan. • Corrective Action Unit 545 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 545.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of the Super ESPC Program: Level 2 -- Recalculated Cost Savings

This report presents the results of Level 2 of a three-tiered evaluation of the U.S. Department of Energy Federal Energy Management Program's Super Energy Savings Performance Contract (Super ESPC) Program. Level 1 of the analysis studied all of the Super ESPC projects for which at least one Annual Measurement & Verification (M&V) Report had been produced by April 2006. For those 102 projects in aggregate, we found that the value of cost savings reported by the energy service company (ESCO) in the Annual M&V Reports was 108% of the cost savings guaranteed in the contracts. We also compared estimated energy savings (which are not guaranteed, but are the basis for the guaranteed cost savings) to the energy savings reported by the ESCO in the Annual M&V Report. In aggregate, reported energy savings were 99.8% of estimated energy savings on the basis of site energy, or 102% of estimated energy savings based on source energy. Level 2 focused on a random sample of 27 projects taken from the 102 Super ESPC projects studied in Level 1. The objectives were, for each project in the sample, to: repeat the calculations of the annual energy and cost savings in the most recent Annual M&V Report to validate the ESCO's results or correct any errors, and recalculate the value of the reported energy, water, and operations and maintenance (O&M) savings using actual utility prices paid at the project site instead of the 'contract' energy prices - the prices that are established in the project contract as those to be used by the ESCO to calculate the annual cost savings, which determine whether the guarantee has been met. Level 3 analysis will be conducted on three to five projects from the Level 2 sample that meet validity criteria for whole-building or whole-facility data analysis. This effort will verify energy and cost savings using statistical analysis of actual utility use, cost, and weather data. This approach, which can only be used for projects meeting particular validity criteria, is described in Shonder and Florita (2003) and Shonder and Hughes (2005). To address the first objective of the Level 2 analysis, we first assembled all the necessary information, and then repeated the ESCOs' calculations of reported annual cost savings. Only minor errors were encountered, the most common being the use of incorrect escalation rates to calculate utility prices or O&M savings. Altogether, our corrected calculations of the ESCO's reported cost savings were within 0.6% of the ESCOs' reported cost savings, and errors found were as likely to favor the government as they were the ESCO. To address the second objective, we gathered data on utility use and cost from central databases maintained by the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration, and directly from some of the sites, to determine the prices of natural gas and electricity actually paid at the sites during the periods addressed by the annual reports. We used these data to compare the actual utility costs at the sites to the contract utility prices. For natural gas, as expected, we found that prices had risen much faster than had been anticipated in the contracts. In 17 of the 18 projects for which the comparison was possible, contract gas prices were found to be lower than the average actual prices being paid. We conclude that overall in the program, the estimates of gas prices and gas price escalation rates used in the Super ESPC projects have been conservative. For electricity, it was possible to compare contract prices with the actual (estimated) marginal prices of electricity in 20 projects. In 14 of these projects, the overall contract electricity price was found to be lower than the marginal price of electricity paid to the serving utility. Thus it appears that conservative estimates of electricity prices and escalation rates have been used in the program as well. Finally we calculated the value of the reported energy savings using the prices of utilities actually paid by the sites instead of the contract prices. In 16 of the 22 projects (where this calculation was possible), the recalculated annual cost savings were greater than the annual cost savings reported by the ESCO. In the aggregate for the 22 projects analyzed, the annual cost savings calculated using actual energy prices were found to be 111% of the ESCO-reported savings. Using statistical methods to expand this estimate to the entire 102-project population of Super ESPC projects, we estimate that the total annual cost savings calculated using actual energy prices instead of contract energy prices are about 110% of the reported annual cost savings. We can combine the results of the Level 1 and Level 2 studies to estimate overall cost savings realized by the government for the entire 102-project population of Super ESPC projects examined in Level 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Validation Analysis of the Shoal Groundwater Flow and Transport Model

Environmental restoration at the Shoal underground nuclear test is following a process prescribed by a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) between the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada. Characterization of the site included two stages of well drilling and testing in 1996 and 1999, and development and revision of numerical models of groundwater flow and radionuclide transport. Agreement on a contaminant boundary for the site and a corrective action plan was reached in 2006. Later that same year, three wells were installed for the purposes of model validation and site monitoring. The FFACO prescribes a five-year proof-of-concept period for demonstrating that the site groundwater model is capable of producing meaningful results with an acceptable level of uncertainty. The corrective action plan specifies a rigorous seven step validation process. The accepted groundwater model is evaluated using that process in light of the newly acquired data. The conceptual model of ground water flow for the Project Shoal Area considers groundwater flow through the fractured granite aquifer comprising the Sand Springs Range. Water enters the system by the infiltration of precipitation directly on the surface of the mountain range. Groundwater leaves the granite aquifer by flowing into alluvial deposits in the adjacent basins of Fourmile Flat and Fairview Valley. A groundwater divide is interpreted as coinciding with the western portion of the Sand Springs Range, west of the underground nuclear test, preventing flow from the test into Fourmile Flat. A very low conductivity shear zone east of the nuclear test roughly parallels the divide. The presence of these lateral boundaries, coupled with a regional discharge area to the northeast, is interpreted in the model as causing groundwater from the site to flow in a northeastward direction into Fairview Valley. Steady-state flow conditions are assumed given the absence of groundwater withdrawal activities in the area. The conceptual and numerical models were developed based upon regional hydrogeologic investigations conducted in the 1960s, site characterization investigations (including ten wells and various geophysical and geologic studies) at Shoal itself prior to and immediately after the test, and two site characterization campaigns in the 1990s for environmental restoration purposes (including eight wells and a year-long tracer test). The new wells are denoted MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3, and are located to the northnortheast of the nuclear test. The groundwater model was generally lacking data in the north-northeastern area; only HC-1 and the abandoned PM-2 wells existed in this area. The wells provide data on fracture orientation and frequency, water levels, hydraulic conductivity, and water chemistry for comparison with the groundwater model. A total of 12 real-number validation targets were available for the validation analysis, including five values of hydraulic head, three hydraulic conductivity measurements, three hydraulic gradient values, and one angle value for the lateral gradient in radians. In addition, the fracture dip and orientation data provide comparisons to the distributions used in the model and radiochemistry is available for comparison to model output. Goodness-of-fit analysis indicates that some of the model realizations correspond well with the newly acquired conductivity, head, and gradient data, while others do not. Other tests indicated that additional model realizations may be needed to test if the model input distributions need refinement to improve model performance. This approach (generating additional realizations) was not followed because it was realized that there was a temporal component to the data disconnect: the new head measurements are on the high side of the model distributions, but the heads at the original calibration locations themselves have also increased over time. This indicates that the steady-state assumption of the groundwater model is in error. To test the robustness of the model despite the transient nature of the heads, the newly acquired MV hydraulic head values were trended back to their likely values in 1999, the date of the calibration measurements. Additional statistical tests are performed using both the backward-projected MV heads and the observed heads to identify acceptable model realizations. A jackknife approach identified two possible threshold values to consider. For the analysis using the backward-trended heads, either 458 or 818 realizations (out of 1,000) are found acceptable, depending on the threshold chosen. The analysis using the observed heads found either 284 or 709 realizations acceptable. The impact of the refined set of realizations on the contaminant boundary was explored using an assumed starting mass of a single radionuclide and the acceptable realizations from the backward-trended analysis.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 371 is located in Areas 11 and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 371 is comprised of the two corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 11-23-05, Pin Stripe Contamination Area • 18-45-01, U-18j-2 Crater (Johnnie Boy) These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on November 19, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 371. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 371 includes the following activities: • Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. • Conduct radiological surveys. • Measure in situ external dose rates using thermoluminescent dosimeters or other dose measurement devices. • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine internal dose rates. • Combine internal and external dose rates to determine whether total dose rates exceed final action levels (FALs). • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine whether chemical contaminants are present at concentrations exceeding FALs. • If contamination exceeds FALs, define the extent of the contamination exceeding FALs. • Investigate waste to determine whether potential source material is present. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy; and U.S. Department of Defense. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted following approval of the plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 130: Storage Tanks Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 130: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 130 are located within Areas 1, 7, 10, 20, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site. Corrective Action Unit 130 is comprised of the following CASs: • 01-02-01, Underground Storage Tank • 07-02-01, Underground Storage Tanks • 10-02-01, Underground Storage Tank • 20-02-03, Underground Storage Tank • 20-99-05, Tar Residue • 22-02-02, Buried UST Piping • 23-02-07, Underground Storage Tank This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective action investigations and provides data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 130 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implemented any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation-derived wastes. From August 4 through September 30, 2008, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 130, Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, confirm that no residual contamination is present, and properly dispose of wastes. Constituents detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels to identify COCs for CAU 130. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities indicates that no further action is necessary because no COCs were identified at any CAU 130 CAS. Debris removal from these CASs was considered a best management practice because no contamination was detected. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at all CAU 130 CASs. • A Notice of Completion to DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 130. • Corrective Action Unit 130 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

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Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 562 is located in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 562 is comprised of the 13 corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 02-26-11, Lead Shot • 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain • 02-59-01, Septic System • 02-60-01, Concrete Drain • 02-60-02, French Drain • 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain • 02-60-04, French Drain • 02-60-05, French Drain • 02-60-06, French Drain • 02-60-07, French Drain • 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall • 23-99-06, Grease Trap • 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on December 11, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 562. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 562 includes the following activities: • Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. • Conduct radiological surveys. • Perform field screening. • Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine the nature and extent of any contamination released by each CAS. • Collect samples of source material to determine the potential for a release. • Collect samples of potential remediation wastes. • Collect quality control samples. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; DOE, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996; as amended February 2008). Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted following approval of the plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 117: Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 117: Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 117 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 26-41-01, Pluto Disassembly Facility, located in Area 26 of the Nevada Test Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 117 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 117 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From May 2008 through February 2009, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 117, Area 26 Pluto Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purpose of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels to determine COCs for CAU 117. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities indicated that the final action levels were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) reported as total Aroclor and radium-226. A corrective action was implemented to remove approximately 50 cubic yards of PCB-contaminated soil, approximately 1 cubic foot of radium-226 contaminated soil (and scabbled asphalt), and a high-efficiency particulate air filter that was determined to meet the criteria of a potential source material (PSM). Electrical and lighting components (i.e., PCB-containing ballasts and capacitors) and other materials (e.g., mercury-containing thermostats and switches, lead plugs and bricks) assumed to be PSM were also removed from Building 2201, as practical, without the need for sampling. Because the COC contamination and PSMs have been removed, clean closure of CAS 26-41-01 is recommended, and no use restrictions are required to be placed on this CAU. No further action is necessary because no other contaminants of potential concern were found above preliminary action levels. The physical end state for Building 2201 is expected to be eventual demolition to slab. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is the recommended corrective action for CAS 26-41-01 in CAU 117. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 117. • Corrective Action Unit 117 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

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Advanced battery technology for electric two-wheelers in the people's Republic of China.

This report focuses on lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery technology applications for two- and possibly three-wheeled vehicles. The author of this report visited the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) to assess the status of Li-ion battery technology there and to analyze Chinese policies, regulations, and incentives for using this technology and for using two- and three-wheeled vehicles. Another objective was to determine if the Li-ion batteries produced in China were available for benchmarking in the United States. The United States continues to lead the world in Li-ion technology research and development (R&D). Its strong R&D program is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy and other federal agencies, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the U.S. Department of Defense. In Asia, too, developed countries like China, Korea, and Japan are commercializing and producing this technology. In China, more than 120 companies are involved in producing Li-ion batteries. There are more than 139 manufacturers of electric bicycles (also referred to as E-bicycles, electric bikes or E-bikes, and electric two-wheelers or ETWs in this report) and several hundred suppliers. Most E-bikes use lead acid batteries, but there is a push toward using Li-ion battery technology for two- and three-wheeled applications. Highlights and conclusions from this visit are provided in this report and summarized.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 482: Area 15 U15a/e Muckpiles and Ponds Nevada Test Site

This Corrective Action Decision Document /Closure Report (CADD/CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 482 U15a/e Muckpiles and Ponds. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 482 is comprised of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) and one adjacent area: CAS 15-06-01, U15e Muckpile; CAS 15-06-02, U15a Muckpile; CAS 15-38-01, Area 15 U15a/e Ponds; and Drainage below the U15a Muckpile. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure with no further corrective action, by placing use restrictions on the three CASs and the adjacent area of CAU 482. To support this recommendation, a corrective action investigation (CAI) was performed in September 2002. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. (3) Provide sufficient information and data to determine appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 482 dataset from the CAI was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Tier 2 FALS were determined for the hazardous constituents of total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH)-diesel-range organics (DRO) and the radionuclides americium (Am)-241, cesium (Cs)-137, plutonium (Pu)-238, and Pu-239. The Tier 2 FALs were calculated for the radionuclides using site-specific information. The hazardous constituents of TPH-DRO were compared to the PALs defined in the CAIP, and because none of the preliminary action levels (PALs) were exceeded, the PALs became the FALs. The radionuclide FALs were calculated using the Residual Radioactive (RESRAD) code (version 6.21). The RESRAD calculation determined the activities of all radionuclides that together would sum to an exposure dose of 25 millirem per year to a site receptor (based on their relative abundances at each CAS). Based on the field investigation, the following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: (1) CAS 15-06-01 - None. (2) CAS 15-06-02 - Cs-137 and Pu-239. (3) CAS 15-38-01 - Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, and Pu-239. (4) Drainage below CAS 15-06-02 - Cs-137 and Pu-239. Based on the data and risk evaluations, the DQO data needs presented in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan were met, and the data accurately represent the radiological and chemical risk present at CAU 482. Based on the results of the CAI data evaluation, it was determined that closure in place with use restrictions is the appropriate corrective action for CAU 482 and that use restrictions will effectively control exposure to future land users. This is based on the fact that even though the FALs were exceeded in a few samples, this remote, controlled access site poses only limited risk overall to public health and the environment. Given the relatively low levels of contamination present, it would create a greater hazard to worker safety, public health, and the environment to remove the contamination, transport it, and bury it at another location. Therefore, DTRA provides the following recommendations: (1) Close COCs in place at CAS 15-06-02, CAS 15-38-01, and the drainage below CAS 15-06-02 with use restrictions. (2) No further action for CAU 482. (3) A Notice of Completion be issued to DTRA by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 482. (4) Move CAU 482 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) presents information supporting the selection of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) leading to the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 562 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-26-11, Lead Shot • 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain • 02-59-01, Septic System • 02-60-01, Concrete Drain • 02-60-02, French Drain • 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain • 02-60-04, French Drain • 02-60-05, French Drain • 02-60-06, French Drain • 02-60-07, French Drain • 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall • 23-99-06, Grease Trap • 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of CAAs for the 13 CASs within CAU 562. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 27, 2009, through May 12, 2010, as set forth in the CAU 562 Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: • Determine whether COCs are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. • Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. A data quality assessment (DQA) performed on the CAU 562 data demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the data for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the COCs for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at 10 of the 13 CASs in CAU 562, and thus corrective action is required. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 562 is shown in Table ES-1. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the 13 CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 562. • No further action is the preferred corrective action for CASs 02-60-01, 02-60-06, and 02-60-07. • Clean closure is the preferred corrective action for CASs 02-26-11, 02-44-02, 02-59-01, 02-60-02, 02-60-03, 02-60-04, 02-60-05, 23-60-01, 23-99-06, and 25-60-04. The preferred CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. The alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The alternatives meet all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site and will reduce potential exposures to contaminated media to acceptable levels. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CASs 02-60-01, 02-60-06, and 02-60-07. • Clean closure is recommended for the remaining 10 CASs in CAU 562. • A Corrective Action Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection that contains a detailed description of the proposed actions that will be taken to implement the selected corrective actions.

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