Statistical Methods for Developing Cybersecurity Response Thresholds for Operational Technology Using Historical Data
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Grady, John Connor↗
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Results for “Technology and Operations”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Survey of Cybersecurity Governance, Threats, and Countermeasures for the Power Grid
The convergence of Information Technologies and Operational Technology systems in industrial networks presents many challenges related to availability, integrity, and confidentiality. In this paper, we evaluate the various cybersecurity risks in industrial control systems and how they may affect these areas of concern, with a particular focus on energy-sector Operational Technology systems. There are multiple threats and countermeasures that Operational Technology and Information Technology systems share. Since Information Technology cybersecurity is a relatively mature field, this paper emphasizes on threats with particular applicability to Operational Technology and their respective countermeasures. We identify regulations, standards, frameworks and typical system architectures associated with this domain. We review relevant challenges, threats, and countermeasures, as well as critical differences in priorities between Information and Operational Technology cybersecurity efforts and implications. These results are then examined against the recommended National Institute of Standards and Technology framework for gap analysis to provide a complete approach to energy sector cybersecurity. We provide analysis of countermeasure implementation to align with the continuous functions recommended for a sound cybersecurity framework.
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL: Preprint
The clean energy transformation led to the integration of distributed energy resources on a top of the grid, and so a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Operational technology environments are becoming a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are software/hardware intensive, have ever increasing demands to exploit advances in commodity of software/hardware infrastructures, and this for good reasons - improving energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, thus undesirable outcomes will surely happen. The use of formal methods will remove ambiguity, increase automation and provide high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.
formal methods↗
Aerospace Food Technology
Operational and technological problems of improvement in space flight feeding for future manned space missions
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Beacon Monitor Operations Experiment: Technology for Low Cost Operations
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beacon monitor technology telemetry tracking cost ↗
Technologies for Networked Enabled Operations
Current point-to-point data links will not scale to support future integration of surveillance, security, and globally-distributed air traffic data, and already hinders efficiency and capacity. While the FAA and industry focus on a transition to initial system-wide information management (SWIM) capabilities, this paper describes a set of initial studies of NAS network-enabled operations technology gaps targeted for maturity in later SWIM spirals (201 5-2020 timeframe).
Glass, B.↗
Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL
The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.
formal methods↗
Exploration Technologies for Operations
Although the International Space Station (ISS) assembly has been completed, the Operations support teams continue to seek more efficient and effective ways to prepare for and conduct the ISS operations and future exploration missions beyond low earth orbit. This search for improvement has led to a significant collaboration between the NASA research and advanced software development community at NASA Ames Research Center and the Mission Operations community at NASA Johnson Space Center. Since 2001, NASA Ames Research Center has been developing and applying its advanced intelligent systems and human systems integration research to mission operations tools for several of the unmanned Mars missions operations. Since 2006, NASA Ames Research Center has also been developing and applying its advanced intelligent systems and human systems integration research to mission operations tools for manned operations support with the Mission Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center. This paper discusses the completion of the development and deployment of a variety of intelligent and human systems technologies adopted for manned mission operations. The technologies associated with the projects include advanced software systems for operations and human-centered computing. Human-centered computing looks to the processes and procedures that people do to perform any given job, then attempts to identify opportunities to improve these processes and procedures. In particular, for mission operations, improvements are quantified by specifically identifying how a tool can increase a persons efficiency, enhance a persons functional capability, andor improve the assurance of a persons decisions. The Ames development team has collaborated with the Mission Operations team to identify areas of efficiencies through technology infusion applications in support of the Plan, Train, and Fly activities of human-spaceflight mission operations. The specific applications discussed in this paper are in the areas of mission planning systems, mission operations design modeling and workflow automation, advanced systems monitoring, mission control technologies, search tools, training management tools, spacecraft solar array management, spacecraft power management, and spacecraft attitude planning. We discuss these specific projects between the Ames Research Center and the Johnson Space Centers Mission Operations Directorate, and how these technologies and projects are enhancing the mission operations support for the International Space Station. We also discuss the challenges, problems, and successes associated with long-distance and multi-year development projects between the research team at Ames and the Mission Operations customers at Johnson Space center. Finally, we discuss how these technology infusion applications and underlying technologies might be used in the future to support on-board operations of the crew and spacecraft systems as human exploration expands beyond low earth orbit to destinations in the solar system where communications delays will require more on-board autonomy and planning by the crew. Longer communications delays will require that the ground mission operations support will be primarily strategic in nature, while the tactical level of planning, systems monitoring and control, and failure analysisisolationrecovery will be the responsibility of both the spacecraft autonomous systems and the crew. Our expectation is that the technologies
mission operations↗
Propulsion Technology Lifecycle Operational Analysis
The paper presents the results of a focused effort performed by the members of the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) Functional Requirements Sub-team to develop propulsion data to support Advanced Technology Lifecycle Analysis System (ATLAS). This is a spreadsheet application to analyze the impact of technology decisions at a system-of-systems level. Results are summarized in an Excel workbook we call the Technology Tool Box (TTB). The TTB provides data for technology performance, operations, and programmatic parameters in the form of a library of technical information to support analysis tools and/or models. The lifecycle of technologies can be analyzed from this data and particularly useful for system operations involving long running missions. The propulsion technologies in this paper are listed against Chemical Rocket Engines in a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) format. The overall effort involved establishing four elements: (1) A general purpose Functional System Breakdown Structure (FSBS). (2) Operational Requirements for Rocket Engines. (3) Technology Metric Values associated with Operating Systems (4) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of Chemical Rocket Engines The list of Chemical Rocket Engines identified in the WBS is by no means complete. It is planned to update the TTB with a more complete list of available Chemical Rocket Engines for United States (US) engines and add the Foreign rocket engines to the WBS which are available to NASA and the Aerospace Industry. The Operational Technology Metric Values were derived by the SPST Sub-team in the form of the TTB and establishes a database for users to help evaluate and establish the technology level of each Chemical Rocket Engine in the database. The Technology Metric Values will serve as a guide to help determine which rocket engine to invest technology money in for future development.
Robinson, John W.↗
Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education
The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.
99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment
Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.
08 HYDROGEN↗
Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment
Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.
08 HYDROGEN↗
The Benefits of a Software Bill of Materials Program at Nuclear Facilities
Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both information communications technology and operational technology environments. Often, a supplier or other entity discloses vulnerability information about software components and subcomponents used in a digital asset, but an asset owner is unable to quickly ascertain if the vulnerable component is installed in their facility. The generation and use of a software bill of materials (SBOM) for installed digital assets can enable an asset owner to quickly identify if and where a component is used, allowing them to evaluate the risk and determine necessary risk treatments. The integration of an SBOM program into a nuclear facility not only improves vulnerability management and risk management processes, it also benefits asset and configuration management, cybersecurity, and supply chain programs. This paper reviews the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development program’s work on integrating an SBOM program into a nuclear facility. It also provides a discussion on the benefits of such a program.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Accelerator Operations and Technology Division Introduction: Empyrean Visit January 16, 2024 [Slides]
LANL has a long history in the accelerator field and is the primary NNSA accelerator laboratory.
43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
Informing Cybersecurity Decisions With the Value-at-Risk Framework
Security at every site is critical to making hydropower a strong contributor to the country's grid, but with ongoing development and expanding capabilities, the diversity of the existing hydropower fleet makes across-the-board investment decisions difficult. The threat of cyberattacks naturally increases as the interconnection of Information Technology and Operational Technology networks broadens. Hydropower plants require custom analyses that are specific to the unique challenges and characteristics of any given facility. Facilities, however, often do not have the necessary resources for managers to make informed decisions on investments based on assessed capabilities and risks.
50 EE - Wind and Water Power Program - Water (EE-4↗
Informing Cybersecurity Decisions With the Value-at-Risk Framework
Security at every site is critical to making hydropower a strong contributor to the country's grid, but with ongoing development and expanding capabilities, the diversity of the existing hydropower fleet makes across-the-board investment decisions difficult. The threat of cyberattacks naturally increases as the interconnection of Information Technology and Operational Technology networks broadens. Hydropower plants require custom analyses that are specific to the unique challenges and characteristics of any given facility. Facilities, however, often do not have the necessary resources for managers to make informed decisions on investments based on assessed capabilities and risks.
cybersecurity↗
Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection in SCADA-Assisted OT Networks Using Ensemble-Based State Prediction Model
The cybersecurity threats of power system gradually grow due to the increased sophisticated interactions between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) networks. False data injection attack (FDIA) that aims to compromise the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) measurement and disturb the system operation is one of such cyber threats. Such attacks can potentially lead to significant operational issues at the control centers and substations, and hence, result in severe physical consequences. To avoid catastrophic failure across the power grid resulting from these attacks, it is essential to arm the OT network with real-time vulnerability assessment tools. To this end, this paper outlines various drawbacks of the Purdue architecture model to defend against cyberattacks in the OT network. Furthermore, a novel ensemble-based state prediction model is proposed to detect cybersecurity anomalies in SCADA assisted OT networks. The proposed model uses control center level generation and load forecasts, scheduled, and forced outages, power flow solutions, and the substation level historical data. The hypothesis of the proposed scheme relies on the fact that additional control center and substation data can hardly be accessed and compromised by attackers. One of the vital features of the proposed scheme is an hour-ahead prediction of the operational feasibility of the SCADA measurement range at the control center and substation in real time helps in detecting anomalies in measurements across both substation and the control center.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Control and Non-Payload Communications Links for Integrated Unmanned Aircraft Operations
Technology for unmanned aircraft has advanced so rapidly in recent years that many new applications to public and commercial use are being proposed and implemented. In many countries, emphasis is now being placed on developing the means to allow unmanned aircraft to operate within non-segregated airspace along with commercial, cargo and other piloted and passenger-carrying aircraft.In the U.S., Congress has mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration reduce and remove restrictions on unmanned aircraft operations in a relatively short time frame. To accomplish this, a number of technical and regulatory hurdles must be overcome. A key hurdle involve the communications link connecting the remote pilot located at a ground control station with the aircraft in the airspace, referred to as the Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) link. This link represents a safety critical communications link, and thus requires dedicated and protected aviation spectrum as well as national and international standards defining the operational requirements the CNPC system. The CNPC link must provide line-of-site (LOS) communications, primarily through a ground-based communication system, and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communication achieved using satellite communications. In the U.S., the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is charged with providing the technical body of evidence to support spectrum allocation requirements and national and international standards development for the CNPC link. This paper provides a description of the CNPC system, an overview of NASA's CNPC project, and current results in technology assessment, air-ground propagation characterization, and supporting system studies and analyses will be presented.
Kerczewski, Robert J.↗