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At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

GIF Supercritical Water Cooled Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Supercritical Water-cooled Fast reactor (SCFR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) SCWR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the SCWR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of SCWR system designers. It updates the SCWR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF SCWR SSC, follows the highlevel paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the PR&PP features of the eight proposed GIF SCWR designs. Two small modular reactors, the Canadian SSR and the Canada/China/Europe ECC-SMART are also mentioned. An overview of the fuel cycles for the GIF designs are provided. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

GIF Gas Cooled Fast Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Gas-cooled Fast reactor (GFR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) GFR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the GFR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of GFR system designers. It updates the GFR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF GFR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the PR&PP features of the GIF GFR 2400 MWth reference design. The ALLEGRO reactor is also described. The EM2 and HEN MHR reactor are mentioned. An overview of fuel cycle for the GFR reference design and for the ALLEGRO reactor are provided. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

GIF Very High Temperature Reactor: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This report is part of a series of six white papers, prepared jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the six System Steering Committees (SSCs) and provisional System Steering Committees (pSSCs). This publication is an update to a similar series published in 2011 presenting the status of Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for each of the six systems selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for further research and development, namely: the Sodium-cooled fast Reactor (SFR), the Very high temperature reactor (VHTR), the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), the Molten salt reactor (MSR) and the Supercritical water–cooled reactor (SCWR). This white paper represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Very-High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) reference designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) VHTR System Steering Committee (SSC). The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP features of the VHTR reactor technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of VHTR system designers. It updates the VHTR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees and provisional System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems, the GIF R&D activities, and an increased understanding of the PR&PP features. The white paper, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF VHTR SSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF PR&PP Evaluation Methodology to investigate the key points of PR&PP features extracted from the reference designs of VHTRs under consideration in various countries. A major update from the 2011 report is an explicit distinction between prismatic block-type VHTRs and pebble-bed VHTRs. The white paper also provides an overview of the TRISO fuel and fuel cycle. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for PP, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors. The document follows a common template adopted by all the white papers in the updated series.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation

Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Testing and Evaluation of Security Response at High-Consequence Nuclear Facilities

High-consequence nuclear facilities are required to implement a physical protection system (PPS) capable of preventing a design basis threat (DBT) adversary from completing radiological sabotage or theft of nuclear material. Response forces are a core component of the PPS. A rigorous testing and evaluation program is required to ensure that the response forces are appropriately trained and equipped and are capable of meeting the regulatory and mission requirements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Notional Chemical Facility PathTrace Modeling Study

This SAND report provides system effectiveness analysis results for notional chemical facilities. Two facilities were analyzed in total, evaluating the effectiveness of the unique security systems in place at each location. Each analysis looked at a range of threat and response capabilities, specific target configurations, and task times to acquire target material in both theft and release scenarios. This report details results for both facilities.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Security-by-Design Recommendations for Domestic and International Deployments

This report outlines methods vendors can use to incorporate security-by-design (SeBD) into their microreactor facility design to support and address security for both U.S. and international deployment. The team developed a hypothetical below-grade microreactor with a physical protection system (PPS) to protect the microreactor against acts of theft and sabotage and evaluated it against two adversary attack scenarios defined by a group of adversary subject matter experts (SMEs). The hypothetical microreactor facility consists of two distinct buildings. The first is the above-grade protected area (PA) entry control point (ECP) building, which houses security personnel responsible for conducting screenings and managing access to the PA. The second building is the reactor building, which features both an above-grade floor and a below-grade floor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Nuclear Security Risks for HALEU Fuels

There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Technical Evaluation of Self-Protection Dose Rates in U.S. Domestic Nuclear Security Policy

U.S. nuclear security policy uses radiation self-protection as a basis for reducing material attractiveness, but existing dose-rate criteria may not reflect the time scales of theft or sabotage. This report evaluates whether the commonly cited 1 Gy/h at 1 m criterion can plausibly cause adversary task failure during short-duration malicious acts.

Fritchie, Jacob Wesley [Sandia National Laboratori↗
DOE OSTI2023

Simulated Impact of Shortened Strings in Commercial and Utility-Scale Photovoltaic Arrays

The deliberate removal of photovoltaic modules from a string can occur for various reasons encompassing maintenance, measurements, theft, or failure, reducing that string length relative to others when replacement modules are not available and there are not any viable alternative makes and models that could be inserted. This phenomenon, delineated in our prior experimentally validated research, manifests two significant effects: (1) a shift in the ideal maximum power point and (2) the induction of potentially substantial reverse currents in the shortened strings at open-circuit voltage, VOC. However, the scalability and asymptotic limits of these observed behaviors concerning array size remained undetermined. In this study, we elucidate the operational dynamics of such arrays by manipulating two mismatch-contributing variables in simulated arrays of up to 900 strings: the number of removed modules per string (indicative of the level of mismatch, ranging up to 5) and the quantity of shortened strings (1 to 60). Simulation outcomes underscore that mismatch severity impacts array operation more than the proportion of shortened strings. This research delves into the practical ramifications of operating with shortened strings, including implications for low-irradiance operation and the manifestation of deleterious reverse currents (>35 A in specific cases), emphasizing the need for careful array configuration for optimal performance and safety in these implementations.

Energy & Fuels↗
DOE OSTI2015

A Selectivity based approach to Continuous Pattern Detection in Streaming Graphs

Cyber security is one of the most significant technical challenges in current times. Detecting adversarial activities, prevention of theft of intellectual properties and customer data is a high priority for corporations and government agencies around the world. Cyber defenders need to analyze massive-scale, high-resolution network flows to identify, categorize, and mitigate attacks involving net- works spanning institutional and national boundaries. Many of the cyber attacks can be described as subgraph patterns, with promi- nent examples being insider infiltrations (path queries), denial of service (parallel paths) and malicious spreads (tree queries). This motivates us to explore subgraph matching on streaming graphs in a continuous setting. The novelty of our work lies in using the subgraph distributional statistics collected from the streaming graph to determine the query processing strategy. We introduce a “Lazy Search" algorithm where the search strategy is decided on a vertex-to-vertex basis depending on the likelihood of a match in the vertex neighborhood. We also propose a metric named “Relative Selectivity" that is used to se- lect between different query processing strategies. Our experiments performed on real online news, network traffic stream and a syn- thetic social network benchmark demonstrate 10-100x speedups over selectivity agnostic approaches.

graphs, cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2024

Security of Mobile Radiological Sources: Overview of Industry Applied Technologies

Small radiological sources used in industrial settings recurrently require transit between job sites. Securing these sources, while stationary, can be addressed with standard security approaches and equipment. Transport of these sources increases the risk and complexity of managing and maintaining control of these sources. Implementing methodologies to securely monitor and locate sources improves response and resolution of anomalous events during transit. The Mobile Source Transit Security (MSTS) system was developed to improve security and provide situational awareness of these mobile sources throughout their job cycle. The MSTS development effort focused on creating a set of systems that could be successfully implemented in industrial radiography and well-logging applications. The MSTS team worked to address source presence and location through use and storage. The MSTS system monitors radiological sources as they move from the base of operations to the job site and back. The system provides near-real-time monitoring of the mobile source location and status and early notification of source loss or theft by transmitting operational status and alerting anomalous conditions over telematic links worldwide. The MSTS system can trigger an armed response or initiation of search and recovery operations and will automatically alert management and responsible staff if a radioactive source is lost or stolen whether it is on-site, in transport, or in storage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1979

Antitheft container for instruments

Antitheft container is used to prevent theft of calculators, portable computers, and other small instruments. Container design is simple and flexible enough to allow easy access to display or input systems of instruments, while not interfering with power input to device.

Kerley, J. J., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Portable appliance security apparatus

An apparatus for securing a small computer, or other portable appliance, against theft is described. It is comprised of a case having an open back through which the computer is installed or removed. Guide members in the form of slots are formed in a rear portion of opposite walls of the case for receiving a back plate to cover the opening and thereby secure the computer within the case. An opening formed in the top wall of the case exposes the keyboard and display of the computer. The back plate is locked in the closed position by a key-operated plug type lock. The lock is attached to one end of a hold down cable, the opposite end thereof being secured to a desk top or other stationary object. Thus, the lock simultaneously secures the back plate to the case and retains the case to the stationary object.

Kerley, J. J.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Applying the take-grant protection model

The Take-Grant Protection Model has in the past been used to model multilevel security hierarchies and simple protection systems. The models are extended to include theft of rights and sharing information, and additional security policies are examined. The analysis suggests that in some cases the basic rules of the Take-Grant Protection Model should be augmented to represent the policy properly; when appropriate, such modifications are made and their efforts with respect to the policy and its Take-Grant representation are discussed.

Bishop, Matt↗
NASA NTRS1993

Low gravity environment on-board Columbia during STS-40

The first NASA Spacelab Life Sciences mission (SLS-I) flew 5 June to 14 June 1991 on the orbiter Columbia (STS-40). The purpose of the mission was to investigate the human body's adaptation to the low gravity conditions of space flight and the body's readjustment after the mission to the 1 g environment of earth. In addition to the life sciences experiments manifested for the Spacelab module, a variety of experiments in other scientific disciplines flew in the Spacelab and in Get Away Special (GAS) Canisters on the GAS Bridge Assembly. Several principal investigators designed and flew specialized accelerometer systems to characterize the low gravity environment. This was done to better assess the results of theft experiments. This was also the first flight of the NASA Microgravity Science and Applications Division (MSAD) sponsored Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS) and the first flight of the NASA Orbiter Experiments Office (OEX) sponsored Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment accelerometer (OARE). We present a brief introduction to seven STS-40 accelerometer systems and discuss and compare the resulting data.

Rogers, M. J. B.↗