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At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1971

System safety management: A new discipline

The systems theory is discussed in relation to safety management. It is suggested that systems safety management, as a new discipline, holds great promise for reducing operating errors, conserving labor resources, avoiding operating costs due to mistakes, and for improving managerial techniques. It is pointed out that managerial failures or system breakdowns are the basic reasons for human errors and condition defects. In this respect, a recommendation is made that safety engineers stop visualizing the problem only with the individual (supervisor or employee) and see the problem from the systems point of view.

W. C. Pope↗
NASA NTRS2012

Combining System Safety and Reliability to Ensure NASA CoNNeCT's Success

Hazard Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the Limited-Life Items List (LLIL), and the Single Point Failure (SPF) List were applied by System Safety and Reliability engineers on NASA's Communications, Navigation, and Networking reConfigurable Testbed (CoNNeCT) Project. The integrated approach involving cross reviews of these reports by System Safety, Reliability, and Design engineers resulted in the mitigation of all identified hazards. The outcome was that the system met all the safety requirements it was required to meet.

Havenhill, Maria↗
NASA NTRS1971

System safety in the operational phase

The operational phase of system safety is investigated. Data cover manufacturing, test operations, materials handling, flight tests, and operational mission analysis.

John Gera, Jr↗
NASA NTRS1974

ASRDI oxygen technology survey, Volume 7: Characteristics of metals that influence system safety

A literature survey and analysis of the material and process factors affecting the safety of metals in oxygen systems is presented. In addition, the practices of those who specify, build, or use oxygen systems relative to the previous is summarized. Alloys based on iron, copper, nickel, and aluminum were investigated representing the bulk of metals found in oxygen systems. Safety-related characteristics of other miscellaneous metals are summarized. It was found that factors affecting the safety of metals in oxygen systems exit in all phases of the evolutionary process, from smelting and mill techniques through end-production fabrication. The safety of a given metal in an oxygen system was determined to be influenced by the particular service requirement. The metal characteristics should favorably influence fulfillment of these requirements. Thus, no singular metal or alloy could be classified as safest for all types of oxygen service.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1971

System safety in manned versus unmanned programs

The differences in applying system safety techniques to manned and unmanned spacecraft are outlined. The Skylab Earth Orbiting Laboratory and the Viking Mars Lander were compared. Common aspects, differences, and mission objectives are used as major criteria in developing a safety procedure.

George B. Mumma↗
NASA NTRS2015

Safety System for Controlling Fluid Flow into a Suction Line

A safety system includes a sleeve fitted within a pool's suction line at the inlet thereof. An open end of the sleeve is approximately aligned with the suction line's inlet. The sleeve terminates with a plate that resides within the suction line. The plate has holes formed therethrough. A housing defining a plurality of distinct channels is fitted in the sleeve so that the distinct channels lie within the sleeve. Each of the distinct channels has a first opening on one end thereof and a second opening on another end thereof. The second openings reside in the sleeve. Each of the distinct channels is at least approximately three feet in length. The first openings are in fluid communication with the water in the pool, and are distributed around a periphery of an area of the housing that prevents coverage of all the first openings when a human interacts therewith.

England, John Dwight↗
NASA NTRS2018

Safety System for Controlling Fluid Flow into a Suction Line

A safety system includes a sleeve fitted within a pool's suction line at its inlet. The sleeve terminates with a plate that resides within the suction line. The plate has holes formed therethrough. A housing defining distinct channels is fitted in the sleeve so that the distinct channels lie within the sleeve. Each of the distinct channels has a first opening on one end thereof and a second opening on another end thereof. The second openings reside in the sleeve. The first openings are in fluid communication with the water in the pool, and are distributed around a periphery of an area of the housing that prevents coverage of all the first openings when a human interacts therewith. A first sensor is coupled to the sleeve to sense pressure therein, and a second pressure sensor is coupled to the plate to sense pressure in one of the plates' holes.

England, John Dwight↗
NASA NTRS2005

CRYOGENIC UPPER STAGE SYSTEM SAFETY

NASA s Exploration Initiative will require development of many new systems or systems of systems. One specific example is that safe, affordable, and reliable upper stage systems to place cargo and crew in stable low earth orbit are urgently required. In this paper, we examine the failure history of previous upper stages with liquid oxygen (LOX)/liquid hydrogen (LH2) propulsion systems. Launch data from 1964 until midyear 2005 are analyzed and presented. This data analysis covers upper stage systems from the Ariane, Centaur, H-IIA, Saturn, and Atlas in addition to other vehicles. Upper stage propulsion system elements have the highest impact on reliability. This paper discusses failure occurrence in all aspects of the operational phases (Le., initial burn, coast, restarts, and trends in failure rates over time). In an effort to understand the likelihood of future failures in flight, we present timelines of engine system failures relevant to initial flight histories. Some evidence suggests that propulsion system failures as a result of design problems occur shortly after initial development of the propulsion system; whereas failures because of manufacturing or assembly processing errors may occur during any phase of the system builds process, This paper also explores the detectability of historical failures. Observations from this review are used to ascertain the potential for increased upper stage reliability given investments in integrated system health management. Based on a clear understanding of the failure and success history of previous efforts by multiple space hardware development groups, the paper will investigate potential improvements that can be realized through application of system safety principles.

Smith, R. Kenneth↗
NASA NTRS1971

System safety engineering in the development of advanced surface transportation vehicles

Applications of system safety engineering to the development of advanced surface transportation vehicles are described. As a pertinent example, the paper describes a safety engineering efforts tailored to the particular design and test requirements of the Tracked Air Cushion Research Vehicle (TACRV). The test results obtained from this unique research vehicle provide significant design data directly applicable to the development of future tracked air cushion vehicles that will carry passengers in comfort and safety at speeds up to 300 miles per hour.

Harry E. Arnzen↗
NASA NTRS2009

Towards A Comprehensive Consideration of Epistemic Questions in Software System Safety

For any software system upon which lives depend, the most important question one can ask about it is, 'How do we know the system is safe?' Despite the critical importance of this question, no widely accepted, generally applicable answer exists. Instead, debate continues to rage over the question, with theorists and practitioners quarrelling with each other and amongst themselves. This paper suggests a possible way forward towards quelling the quarrels, based on refining the critical safety question into additional questions, which may be more likely to have answers on which a consensus can be reached.

Holloway, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Survey of Spaceflight Safety Systems /Survey period: July 1981 June 1982/

Information from the Survey of Spaceflight Safety Systems considered most applicable to present and future spaceflight activities is summarized. Mission reports for the first three Shuttle Orbiter flights discuss all anomalies which occurred and their resolution, such as the solid rocket booster ignition overpressure spike, and thermal tile damage. Two emergency rescue systems for orbiting space stations are proposed: a dish type rescue capsule and a reusable orbit vehicle. Prebreathing and stage decompression are considered as means of protecting astronauts against decompression effects. The Spacelab Space Sled experiments are described, as is a test program on the assembly of large space structures completed in mid-1981. Finally, collision hazards for space missions are estimated, and operational procedures for minimizing these hazards are discussed.

Brown, N. E.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Spaceflight Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety Data

Presented were Reliability Analysis, consisting primarily of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and System Safety Analysis, consisting of Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA), performed to ensure that the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re- Configurable Testbed) Flight System was safely and reliably operated during its Assembly, Integration and Test (AI&T) phase. A tailored approach to the NASA Ground Support Equipment (GSE) standard, NASA-STD-5005C, involving the application of the appropriate Requirements, S&MA discipline expertise, and a Configuration Management system (to retain a record of the analysis and documentation) were presented. Presented were System Block Diagrams of selected GSE and the corresponding FMEA, as well as the PHAs. Also discussed are the specific examples of the FMEAs and PHAs being used during the AI&T phase to drive modifications to the GSE (via "redlining" of test procedures, and the placement of warning stickers to protect the flight hardware) before being interfaced to the Flight System. These modifications were necessary because failure modes and hazards were identified during the analysis that had not been properly mitigated. Strict Configuration Management was applied to changes (whether due to upgrades or expired calibrations) in the GSE by revisiting the FMEAs and PHAs to reflect the latest System Block Diagrams and Bill Of Material. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, and shipped to the launch site without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to safeguard the flight system when it was interfaced to the various GSE were successful.

Fernandez, Rene↗
NASA NTRS1971

Reflections on system safety and the law

The application of law to the determination of what constitutes safeness is discussed. The numerous factors are analyzed which enter into the decisions of courts in deciding what is safe and what is unsafe. It is pointed out that as technology changes, legal interpretations of safety also change. Arguements are given for the use of system safety techniques and better engineering analyses as instruments of defense against liability.

Daniel F. Hayes Sr.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Flight Safety System September 27, 2005, Aircraft Test

This report describes the first aircraft test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS). The test was conducted on September 27, 2005, near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a privately-owned single-engine plane and evaluated the performance of several basic flight safety rules using real-time data onboard a moving aerial vehicle. This test follows the first road test of AFSS conducted in February 2005 at KSC. AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility (WEF) project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations. The mission rules are configured for each operation by the responsible Range Safety authorities and can be loosely categorized in four major categories: Parameter Threshold Violations, Physical Boundary Violations present position and instantaneous impact point (TIP), Gate Rules static and dynamic, and a Green-Time Rule. Examples of each of these rules were evaluated during this aircraft test.

Simpson, James C.↗