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To discuss illicit nuclear trafficking

The Illicit nuclear trafficking panel was conducted at the 4th Annual INMM workshop on Reducing the Risk from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials on February 2-3, 2010 in Washington DC. While the workshop occurred prior to the Nuclear Security Summit, April 12-13 2010 in Washington DC, some of the summit issues were raised during the workshop. The Communique of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit stated that 'Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.' The Illicit Trafficking panel is one means to strengthen nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Such a panel promotes nuclear security culture through technology development, human resources development, education and training. It is a tool which stresses the importance of international cooperation and coordination of assistance to improve efforts to prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking. Illicit trafficking panel included representatives from US government, an international organization (IAEA), private industry and a non-governmental organization to discuss illicit nuclear trafficking issues. The focus of discussions was on best practices and challenges for addressing illicit nuclear trafficking. Terrorism connection. Workshop discussions pointed out the identification of terrorist connections with several trafficking incidents. Several trafficking cases involved real buyers (as opposed to undercover law enforcement agents) and there have been reports identifying individuals associated with terrorist organizations as prospective plutonium buyers. Some specific groups have been identified that consistently search for materials to buy on the black market, but no criminal groups were identified that specialize in nuclear materials or isotope smuggling. In most cases, sellers do not find legitimate buyers; however, there have been specific cases where sellers did find actual terrorist group representatives. There appears to be a connection between terrorist groups engaged in trafficking conventional arms and explosives components that are also looking for both nuclear materials and radioisotopes. Sale opportunities may create additional demand for such materials. As we can observe from Figure 1, many cases in the mid-90s involved kilogram quantities of material. There were smaller amounts of material moved in 2001, 2003 and 2006. While we have seen less trafficking cases involving PujHEU in recent years, the fact that it continues at all is troubling. The trafficking cases can be presented through their life cycle: Diversion of materials leads to Trafficker and then to Terrorist/Proliferator. Most of the information we have in trafficking cases is on the Trafficker. In 16 cases reported by the IAEA, there are 10 prosecutions of the involved trafficker. However, there are no confirmed diversions of material recorded in any of the 18 seizures. Most seizures were sting operations performed by law enforcement or security agents with no actual illicit end-user involved.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Security during the Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants: Technical Basis for Access Authorization and Fitness-For-Duty Requirements

A technical letter report to the NRC summarizing the findings of a benchmarking study, literature review, and workshop with experts on current industry standards and expert judgments about needs for security during the construction phase of critical infrastructure facilities in the post-September 11 U.S. context, with a special focus on the construction phase of nuclear power plants and personnel security measures.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Safeguards; Evaluating Safeguards and Security Risks and Benefits for Advanced and Small Modular Reactor Deployments

Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Chemodynamical Census of the Milky Way's Ultra-Faint Compact Satellites. I. A First Population-Level Look at the Internal Kinematics and Metallicities of 19 Extremely-Low-Mass Halo Stellar Systems

Deep, wide-area photometric surveys have uncovered a population of compact ($r_{1/2} \approx$ 1-15 pc), extremely-low-mass ($M_* \approx$ 20-4000 $M_{\odot}$) stellar systems in the Milky Way halo that are smaller in size than known ultra-faint dwarf galaxies (UFDs) and substantially fainter than most classical globular clusters (GCs). Very little is known about the nature and origins of this population of "Ultra-Faint Compact Satellites" (UFCSs) owing to a dearth of spectroscopic measurements. Here, we present the first spectroscopic census of these compact systems based on Magellan/IMACS and Keck/DEIMOS observations of 19 individual UFCSs, representing $\sim$2/3 of the known population. We securely measure mean radial velocities for all 19 systems, velocity dispersions for 15 (predominantly upper limits), metallicities for 17, metallicity dispersions for 8, and $\textit{Gaia}$-based mean proper motions for 18. This large new spectroscopic sample provides the first insights into population-level trends for these extreme satellites. We demonstrate that: (1) the UFCSs are kinematically colder, on average, than the UFDs, disfavoring very dense dark matter halos in most cases, (2) the UFCS population is chemically diverse, spanning a factor of $\sim$300 in mean iron abundance ($\rm -3.3 \lesssim [Fe/H] \lesssim -0.8$), with multiple systems falling beneath the "metallicity floor" proposed for GCs, and (3) while some higher-metallicity and/or younger UFCSs are clearly star clusters, the dynamical and/or chemical evidence allows the possibility that up to $\sim$50% of the UFCSs in our sample (9 of 19) may represent the smallest and least-massive galaxies yet discovered.

Cerny, William [Yale U.] (ORCID:0000000316977062)↗

Resilient Core Networks for Energy Distribution

Abstract—Substations and their control are crucial for the availability of electricity in today’s energy distribution. Ad- vanced energy grids with Distributed Energy Resources require higher complexity in substations, distributed functionality and communication between devices inside substations and between substations. Also, substations include more and more intelligent devices and ICT based systems. All these devices are connected to other systems by different types of communication links or are situated in uncontrolled environments. Therefore, the risk of ICT based attacks on energy grids is growing. Consequently, security measures to counter these risks need to be an intrinsic part of energy grids. This paper introduces the concept of a Resilient Core Network to interconnected substations. This core network provides essen- tial security features, enables fast detection of attacks and allows for a distributed and autonomous mitigation of ICT based risks.

Kuntze, Nicolai↗

Cyber threat assessment of machine learning driven autonomous control systems of nuclear power plants

We report advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber–physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Anticipatory and Deceptive AI Utilizing Bayesian Belief Networks

The U.S. military defines antiterrorism as the defensive posture taken against terrorist threats. Antiterrorism includes fostering awareness of potential threats, deterring aggressors, developing security measures, planning for future events, interdicting an event in progress, and ultimately mitigating and managing the consequences of an event. Recent events highlight the need for efficient tools for training our military and homeland security officers for anticipating threats posed by terrorists. These tools need to be easy enough so that they are readily usable without substantial training, but still maintain the complexity to allow for a level of deceptive reasoning on the part of the opponent. To meet this need, we propose to integrate a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model for threat anticipation and deceptive reasoning into training simulation environments currently utilized by several organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD). BBNs have the ability to deal with various types of uncertainties; such as identities, capabilities, target attractiveness, and the combinations of the previous. They also allow for disparate types of data to be fused in a coherent, analytically defensible, and understandable manner. A BBN has been developed by ORNL uses a network engineering process that treats the probability distributions of each node with in the broader context of the system development effort as a whole, and not in isolation. The network will be integrated into the Research Network Inc,(RNI) developed Game Distributed Interactive Simulation (GDIS) as a smart artificial intelligence module. GDIS is utilized by several DoD and civilian organizations as a distributed training tool for a multiplicity of reasons. It has garnered several awards for its realism, ease of use, and popularity. One area that it still has room to excel in, as most video training tools do, is in the area of artificial intelligence of opponent combatants. It is believed that by utilizing BBN as the backbone of the artificial intelligence code, a more realistic and helpful training experience will be available and enemy combatants that move and strategize with purpose will be obtained.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Smart Grid Information Clearinghouse (SGIC)

Since the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 was enacted, there has been a large number of websites that discusses smart grid and relevant information, including those from government, academia, industry, private sector and regulatory. These websites collect information independently. Therefore, smart grid information was quite scattered and dispersed. The objective of this work was to develop, populate, manage and maintain the public Smart Grid Information Clearinghouse (SGIC) web portal. The information in the SGIC website is comprehensive that includes smart grid information, research & development, demonstration projects, technical standards, costs & benefit analyses, business cases, legislation, policy & regulation, and other information on lesson learned and best practices. The content in the SGIC website is logically grouped to allow easily browse, search and sort. In addition to providing the browse and search feature, the SGIC web portal also allow users to share their smart grid information with others though our online content submission platform. The Clearinghouse web portal, therefore, serves as the first stop shop for smart grid information that collects smart grid information in a non-bias, non-promotional manner and can provide a missing link from information sources to end users and better serve users’ needs. The web portal is available at www.sgiclearinghouse.org. This report summarizes the work performed during the course of the project (September 2009 – August 2014). Section 2.0 lists SGIC Advisory Committee and User Group members. Section 3.0 discusses SGIC information architecture and web-based database application functionalities. Section 4.0 summarizes SGIC features and functionalities, including its search, browse and sort capabilities, web portal social networking, online content submission platform and security measures implemented. Section 5.0 discusses SGIC web portal contents, including smart grid 101, smart grid projects, deployment experience (i.e., use cases, lessons learned, cost-benefit analyses and business cases), in-depth information (i.e., standards, technology, cyber security, legislation, education and training and demand response), as well as international information. Section 6.0 summarizes SGIC statistics from the launch of the portal on July 07, 2010 to August 31, 2014. Section 7.0 summarizes publicly available information as a result of this work.

Rahman, Saifur↗

Domestic Extremism: Countering the Threat Posed to Critical Assets

Domestic extremism has been a growing concern in the United States in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the threat of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered in the Office of Radiological Security’s radiological source security mission. In this effort, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions and next steps. Twenty-two subject matter experts participated in a series of five focus group sessions. Questions focused on definitions of domestic extremism, potential changes in the threat, best practices in securing facilities, assets, and personnel, and any perceived gaps. Upon completion of the focus groups, notes were analyzed thematically to identify any recurring patterns in the results. In addition, a review of academic, industry, and government literature was conducted to understand the threat, describe the process of radicalization to extremism, and to identify empirically informed practices in prevention and response. Results of this project demonstrated that further work is needed to define domestic extremism in law, regulation, and policy, to help the U.S. develop a consistent response to the threat within organizations. This is especially important, as SMEs emphasized the need for early intervention in prevention efforts, noting that organizations need clear guidance on when and how to intervene. In addition, the need for social media monitoring was discussed, although challenges remain to do so with appropriate respect for privacy and civil liberties concerns.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ILLICIT TRANSIT INTERDICTION GLOBAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to enhance the security of radioactive materials during transport by analyzing commonalities in cargo thefts conducted by non-state groups such as thieves and terrorists. This research focuses on identifying patterns and trends in the methods used to steal high-value cargo, with the goal of applying these insights to improve transport security of radioactive materials. Key questions addressed include the frequency of specific tools, techniques, and insider involvement in thefts, as well as the use of weapons, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized tools. Findings will inform security design improvements and industry practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. The study involves a comprehensive review of literature and case studies, utilizing data sources from 2018 to 2023. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to thefts of valuable cargo in transit, with a focus on incidents involving non-state actors. The methodology will include statistical and inferential analysis to identify trends, with results visualized through pie charts, frequency analyses, and terrain maps. The discussion will highlight the implications of findings and provide actionable recommendations for strengthening security measures. Limitations such as data availability and reporting inconsistencies will be acknowledged. Suggestions for future improvements will be constructed using existing case studies and expert feedback. The study’s outcomes aim to raise awareness within the industry, inform policy decisions, and enhance security protocols for radioactive material transport. Metrics for impact include the potential publication of findings, presentations at conferences to raise awareness, and the subsequent actions taken by stakeholders based on the research. By identifying trends and vulnerabilities and suggesting improvements, this research contributes to preventing the illicit use of nuclear and radiological materials.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide a basic overview of radiological/nuclear search operations, including the application of radiological detection instrumentation and best practices for operational tactics, techniques and procedures. This module will introduce basic radiological/nuclear search operations and include the following: (1) A review of the principles of optimizing detection, (2) An understanding of radiation hazards and alarms, and (3) An examination of nuclear security measures best practices for buildings and stadium complexes, large areas, roadways and parking areas, and pedestrian and vehicle entrance portals.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Operation and Security Considerations for Heat Pipe Cooled Microreactors

Microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) are anticipated to be key elements in the United States' carbon-free energy portfolio, serving as reliable power sources for remote communities, disaster relief zones, extraterrestrial deployments, and backup power needs. Microreactors employ technologies that are substantially more advanced and recent compared to conventional reactors. Furthermore, they are of a drastically smaller scale and are designed to be operated in a diverse set of locations, offering operational flexibility and mobility. In addition, the autonomous or semi-autonomous operation of microreactors with minimal or no on-site staff is anticipated. These factors give rise to specific challenges with regards to their safety and security. The present work investigates considerations related to heat pipe operation, reactor transport, and cyber/cyberphysical security to ensure the indirect and direct consequences of nefarious actors’ actions are understood and can be mitigated by design or through physical security measures. In addition, future directions are proposed for consideration by both HPMR designers and for regulators.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Climate-derived tensions in Arctic security.

Globally, there is no lack of security threats. Many of them demand priority engagement and there can never be adequate resources to address all threats. In this context, climate is just another aspect of global security and the Arctic just another region. In light of physical and budgetary constraints, new security needs must be integrated and prioritized with existing ones. This discussion approaches the security impacts of climate from that perspective, starting with the broad security picture and establishing how climate may affect it. This method provides a different view from one that starts with climate and projects it, in isolation, as the source of a hypothetical security burden. That said, the Arctic does appear to present high-priority security challenges. Uncertainty in the timing of an ice-free Arctic affects how quickly it will become a security priority. Uncertainty in the emergent extreme and variable weather conditions will determine the difficulty (cost) of maintaining adequate security (order) in the area. The resolution of sovereignty boundaries affects the ability to enforce security measures, and the U.S. will most probably need a military presence to back-up negotiated sovereignty agreements. Without additional global warming, technology already allows the Arctic to become a strategic link in the global supply chain, possibly with northern Russia as its main hub. Additionally, the multinational corporations reaping the economic bounty may affect security tensions more than nation-states themselves. Countries will depend ever more heavily on the global supply chains. China has particular needs to protect its trade flows. In matters of security, nation-state and multinational-corporate interests will become heavily intertwined.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Network Randomization and Dynamic Defense for Critical Infrastructure Systems

Critical Infrastructure control systems continue to foster predictable communication paths, static configurations, and unpatched systems that allow easy access to our nation's most critical assets. This makes them attractive targets for cyber intrusion. We seek to address these attack vectors by automatically randomizing network settings, randomizing applications on the end devices themselves, and dynamically defending these systems against active attacks. Applying these protective measures will convert control systems into moving targets that proactively defend themselves against attack. Sandia National Laboratories has led this effort by gathering operational and technical requirements from Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and performing research and development to create a proof-of-concept solution. Our proof-of-concept has been tested in a laboratory environment with over 300 nodes. The vision of this project is to enhance control system security by converting existing control systems into moving targets and building these security measures into future systems while meeting the unique constraints that control systems face.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

User Access to Scientific Facilities via 5G: A Cyber Security Thought Experiment

5G is more than an over-the-air radio technology upgrade. It is a strategy to extend Mobile Network Operator service offerings beyond traditional voice, instant messaging and Internet access. 5G Mobile Network Operators will offer new telecommunication services that include enhanced guarantees of confidentiality, integrity and availability. How could such services change the way Science collaborations connect scientists to supercomputers and other scientific facilities? Current scientific collaborations implicitly trust cloud service providers to securely store and process data. The perceived risks of outsourcing Science data security are counterbalanced by assurances that cloud providers operate at a scale that allows them to implement security measures impractical for Science collaborations (e.g. continuous system administrator behavioral monitoring and strict individual separation of duties). If that is true for a cloud service provider like Amazon Web Services (2018 revenue: $25.7 billion), could it also be true for Mobile Network Operators like Verizon Wireless (2018 revenue: $91.7 billion) or AT&T Mobility (2018 revenue: $71.3 billion)? DOE Leadership Class supercomputer facility users currently access them from the public Internet via Secure Shell. The sponsors and operators of the supercomputer facilities have determined that the public Internet path between the Scientist’s Device and the Login Node does not natively provide enough confidentiality or integrity to protect those communications. Therefore, the facilities achieve additional confidentiality and integrity by requiring Secure Shell encryption across those untrusted network paths. Using 5G Network Slice technology, a Mobile Network Operator may offer communication services between supercomputer users and facilities that natively provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees. Sponsors and operators of supercomputer facilities may determine that these guarantees provide enough confidentiality and integrity to protect those communications. If so, a 5G Network Slice could replace an SSH session running over the public Internet. Finally, this use case could be extended to other Office of Science user facility access requirements. Consider microscopy instruments at (e.g.) the Center for Nanoscale Materials or the Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory. The embedded systems controlling such instruments may not always support encrypted network access technologies like SSH. 5G Network Slices may offer an alternative to current VPN or SSH tunneling techniques, with additional benefits like guaranteed minimum bandwidth.

5G↗