SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “Safety Case”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Digitalization, Management and Synthesis of Thermal Hydraulic Legacy Data Using Dynamical System Scaling
A unique attribute of the nuclear industry is the extent by which designers, developers, operators, and regulators pay attention to demonstrating the safety case. The safety case for nuclear systems is a written, traceable expression of safety, demonstrating the system’s protective measures against uncontrolled radiological releases. The nuclear installation resiliency or safety takes overriding priority over function and performance. The preparation of the safety case heavily relies on extensive experimental campaigns that challenge the target design under a spectrum of postulated accident scenarios. For safety reasons, these experiments are typically conducted in sub-scale test apparatuses intended to reproduce the postulated accident scenarios and event sequences realistically but subject to proven similarity criteria, often referred to as scaling analyses. Since the dawn of the nuclear industry, significant resources have been committed to the construction and operation of such test facilities and a massive amount of data has been generated. Such test data have been and are still used to validate the fundamental assumptions of nuclear power plant phenomena. As we move into the digital world, capturing this multi-decades worth of information in a transparent, easily accessible, and usable manner for the public and industry stakeholders is of paramount importance. Over the last few years FPoliSolutions has been actively developing an enterprise digital data ontology platform (FPoliDON) intended to do just that. The concept was introduced in a paper at the previous NURETH edition and has been significantly enhanced since. With the vision of helping designers use the data to assess their safety case evaluation models, the platform was designed not only to ontologically organize the experimental data, but also to guide the user in the complex analytics associated with the interpretation and use of such test results. A new feature which has been recently added is the ability for the user to access a library of sophisticated mathematical procedures for performing scaling analyses. For this purpose, the Dynamical System Scaling (DSS) procedure invented by Dr. Jose’ Reyes was formulated as one of the services in the digital platform. These methods have been demonstrated to provide an excelled mathematical apparatus to identify similarity criteria or quantify distortions between measured data and the target prototypical conditions. Moreover, DSS can provide a level of synthesis across SETs and IETs which has the promise to yield efficiency in the evaluation code assessment activities. This is often a daunting and expensive task to set up evaluation models that support the safety case of current and future nuclear power plants.
Piloted Well Clear Performance Evaluation of Detect and Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance
Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions (RTCA, 2013). Those requirements will apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the United States (U.S) National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS collectively operating in the NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace safety case. Foremost among these is calculation of the systems risk ratio, the degree to which a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard (FAA, 2013). The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the pilots ability to maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA operational and performance requirements can be finalized. Much research has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace (Dalamagkidis, 2009, Ostwald, 2007, Gillian, 2012, Hesselink, 2011, Santiago, 2015, Rorie 2015 and 2016). Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation and flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a deployable system, so it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements for future traffic displays (Calhoun, 2014). Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new displays, but have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS equipped with DAA systems in the NAS (Bell, 2012). Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation standards. Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case (Park, 2014 and Johnson, 2015). The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well clear as a function of display features and surveillance sensor error. This quantification will help enable selection of a minimum set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch experiments will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all foreseeable operational conditions.
Deep Borehole Disposal Safety Analysis.
This report presents a preliminary safety analysis for the deep borehole disposal (DBD) concept, using a safety case framework. A safety case is an integrated collection of qualitative and quantitative arguments, evidence, and analyses that substantiate the safety, and the level of confidence in the safety, of a geologic repository. This safety case framework for DBD follows the outline of the elements of a safety case, and identifies the types of information that will be required to satisfy these elements. At this very preliminary phase of development, the DBD safety case focuses on the generic feasibility of the DBD concept. It is based on potential system designs, waste forms, engineering, and geologic conditions; however, no specific site or regulatory framework exists. It will progress to a site-specific safety case as the DBD concept advances into a site-specific phase, progressing through consent-based site selection and site investigation and characterization.
MANAGING UNCERTAINTIES ASSOCIATED WITH RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL: TASK GROUP 4 OF THE IAEA PRISM PROJECT
It is widely recognized that the results of safety assessment calculations provide an important contribution to the safety arguments for a disposal facility, but cannot in themselves adequately demonstrate the safety of the disposal system. The safety assessment and a broader range of arguments and activities need to be considered holistically to justify radioactive waste disposal at any particular site. Many programs are therefore moving towards the production of what has become known as a Safety Case, which includes all of the different activities that are conducted to demonstrate the safety of a disposal concept. Recognizing the growing interest in the concept of a Safety Case, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is undertaking an intercomparison and harmonization project called PRISM (Practical Illustration and use of the Safety Case Concept in the Management of Near-surface Disposal). The PRISM project is organized into four Task Groups that address key aspects of the Safety Case concept: Task Group 1 - Understanding the Safety Case; Task Group 2 - Disposal facility design; Task Group 3 - Managing waste acceptance; and Task Group 4 - Managing uncertainty. This paper addresses the work of Task Group 4, which is investigating approaches for managing the uncertainties associated with near-surface disposal of radioactive waste and their consideration in the context of the Safety Case. Emphasis is placed on identifying a wide variety of approaches that can and have been used to manage different types of uncertainties, especially non-quantitative approaches that have not received as much attention in previous IAEA projects. This paper includes discussions of the current results of work on the task on managing uncertainty, including: the different circumstances being considered, the sources/types of uncertainties being addressed and some initial proposals for approaches that can be used to manage different types of uncertainties.
UK regulatory review of the double contingency principle in criticality safety - 14379
The UK's regulatory regime is based on Licence Conditions (LCs) attached to a Nuclear Site Licence (NSL) and is non-prescriptive in nature. The law requires licensees to reduce health and safety risks to workers and the public 'so far as is reasonability practicable' (SFAIRP), and this framework provides licensees with flexibility to achieve this. Guidance for inspectors on the assessment of nuclear safety cases has been published in Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) and supporting Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs). These guidance documents have recently been reviewed in the light of the Fukushima accident. The opportunity has also been taken to reconsider the use of the Double Contingency Principle used in criticality safety cases, an approach commonly regarded as the preferred means of criticality control internationally and featured in the SAPs and TAGs. Licensees in the UK have adopted several approaches in nuclear criticality safety cases based upon a combination of deterministic and probabilistic safety cases using the Double Contingency Principle and Design Basis Analysis. ONR has developed a targeted intervention to sample a number of nuclear safety cases in order to test the adequacy of methodologies used to secure nuclear criticality safety. This paper reports the results of this intervention and considers the need to review the advice currently given by the UK nuclear regulator, including on use of the Double Contingency Principle. (authors)
A Taxonomy of Fallacies in System Safety Arguments
Safety cases are gaining acceptance as assurance vehicles for safety-related systems. A safety case documents the evidence and argument that a system is safe to operate; however, logical fallacies in the underlying argument may undermine a system s safety claims. Removing these fallacies is essential to reduce the risk of safety-related system failure. We present a taxonomy of common fallacies in safety arguments that is intended to assist safety professionals in avoiding and detecting fallacious reasoning in the arguments they develop and review. The taxonomy derives from a survey of general argument fallacies and a separate survey of fallacies in real-world safety arguments. Our taxonomy is specific to safety argumentation, and it is targeted at professionals who work with safety arguments but may lack formal training in logic or argumentation. We discuss the rationale for the selection and categorization of fallacies in the taxonomy. In addition to its applications to the development and review of safety cases, our taxonomy could also support the analysis of system failures and promote the development of more robust safety case patterns.
Evaluation of AI-Enabled Digital Documented Safety Analysis: A Case Study
Safety basis documentation development and review under U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authorization have emerged as critical constraint throttling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, with traditional processes demanding extraordinary resource investment that delays the delivery of these technologies. Traditional Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) processes rely on static documents with limited traceability [U.S. DOE]. The regulatory review and engagement processes are similarly constrained, often requiring significant effort and extensive manual verification. The scale of this challenge is exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of the NuScale application, which required over 250,000 staff hours and the evaluation of approximately two million pages of documentation [Bergman 2021]. The volume and complexity of information within nuclear licensing applications or authorization reviews demands innovative approaches to document generation and data management.
Dynamic Assurance Cases: Closing the Loop Between Design and Operational Assurance
Safety cases are typically used to certify systems at design time as being approved for operation. However, systems typically undergo changes in operation. We present ongoing work extending the safety case concept to account for operational updates.
Use of tsunami in the validation of scale 6.1 for the Swedish spent fuel repository - 14381
In March 2011 SKB applied to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) for a permit to build a final repository for spent Fuel and an encapsulation plant (Clink). The application contained a criticality safety analysis for the canisters to be used in Clink and the copper canister to be used in the final repository. In 2012 SSM requested several updates to the application. One of SSM's concerns was the validation of the codes. SSM emphasized that SKB must improve the method to select critical experiments to the validation suite. To satisfy this demand, SKB used the tool Tsunami in the Scale 6.1 code package to select experiments from the handbook of criticality experiment (IHECSBE). With help of sensitivity files SKB evaluated almost 700 experiments from the LEU-COMP-THERM library. SKB then picked the experiments that most resembled our safety cases. The sensitivity coefficient, ck, from Tsunami has been used to evaluate the similarity between the experiments and the applications. It has been considered that a ck over 0.8 provides a 'good enough' similarity between the experiment and our evaluated safety cases. For the different safety cases between 50-600 experiments satisfied the 0.8 criteria giving a good base of data for statistical analysis. It is worth noticing that PWR-fuel generally receives a higher ck than BWR fuel. Initial analysis shows that the differences in results between BWR and PWR can be explained by a larger sensitivity for the U{sup 238} n,n' part of the cross section in the PWR cases. To make sure the validation covers all materials and required physical parameters a gap analysis was made using engineering judgement by criticality safety experts. From this exercise additional experiments were added to the suite. This paper will discuss the Tsunami results for different safety cases and the reasons for differences between them. It will also present the final results of the validation and discuss experiments that were excluded from the validation suite. (authors)
International Approaches for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Geological Formations: Report on Fifth Worldwide Review
The goal of the Fifth Worldwide Review is to document evolution in the state-of-the-art of approaches for nuclear waste disposal in geological formations since the Fourth Worldwide Review that was released in 2006. The last ten years since the previous Worldwide Review has seen major developments in a number of nations throughout the world pursuing geological disposal programs, both in preparing and reviewing safety cases for the operational and long-term safety of proposed and operating repositories. The countries that are approaching implementation of geological disposal will increasingly focus on the feasibility of safely constructing and operating their repositories in short- and long terms on the basis existing regulations. The WWR-5 will also address a number of specific technical issues in safety case development along with the interplay among stakeholder concerns, technical feasibility, engineering design issues, and operational and post-closure safety. Preparation and publication of the Fifth Worldwide Review on nuclear waste disposal facilitates assessing the lessons learned and developing future cooperation between the countries. The Report provides scientific and technical experiences on preparing for and developing scientific and technical bases for nuclear waste disposal in deep geologic repositories in terms of requirements, societal expectations and the adequacy of cases for long-term repository safety. The Chapters include potential issues that may arise as repository programs mature, and identify techniques that demonstrate the safety cases and aid in promoting and gaining societal confidence. The report will also be used to exchange experience with other fields of industry and technology, in which concepts similar to the design and safety cases are applied, as well to facilitate the public perception and understanding of the safety of the disposal approaches relative to risks that may increase over long times frames in the absence of a successful implementation of final dispositioning.
Thermal Modeling Study for Geologic Borehole Conceptual Design - 17148
Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN-CNEN/SP) is developing a strategy for safe, permanent disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) from industrial and medical applications within Brazil. The Institute is proposing modifications to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Borehole Disposal of Sealed Radioactive Sources (BOSS) concept originally developed by the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa. The current Brazilian modified design differs from the IAEA design in that the disposal zone is below 300 m versus 30 m of the boss concept, and will be used to dispose of a much larger number of DSRS. These modifications result in a considerable departure from the generic safety case established by IAEA. Therefore, a new safety case is required to assess radiological and thermal impacts among other considerations. Predictive modeling and simulations were performed to address impacts of the proposed borehole concept at the early design stage in order to provide timely improvements to the concept and a traceable rationale for decisions made throughout the program as required by the safety case. Preliminary objectives of the modeling effort were focused on evaluating the mechanical and thermal loads anticipated within the current Brazilian borehole disposal concept in order to assess potential material and design issues. This paper presents the thermal modeling predictions and performance results for the proposed BOSS design. (authors)
Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures
We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.
Defining Baconian Probability for Use in Assurance Argumentation
The use of assurance cases (e.g., safety cases) in certification raises questions about confidence in assurance argument claims. Some researchers propose to assess confidence in assurance cases using Baconian induction. That is, a writer or analyst (1) identifies defeaters that might rebut or undermine each proposition in the assurance argument and (2) determines whether each defeater can be dismissed or ignored and why. Some researchers also propose denoting confidence using the counts of defeaters identified and eliminated-which they call Baconian probability-and performing arithmetic on these measures. But Baconian probabilities were first defined as ordinal rankings which cannot be manipulated arithmetically. In this paper, we recount noteworthy definitions of Baconian induction, review proposals to assess confidence in assurance claims using Baconian probability, analyze how these comport with or diverge from the original definition, and make recommendations for future practice.
Strategic considerations for developing future underground research facilities - 15114
The suite of existing underground research facilities (URFs) and their various operational histories and contexts provides useful insights to consider when deciding a particular URF location and approach (generic or site-specific) for new disposal facility research programmes. Even the smallest URF represents a large capital investment and a significant ongoing operational mortgage when recognizing the typically decades-long site characterization and data collection thought necessary to support a defensible safety case or safety assessment. Thus making such investments should be approached with an understanding of the short- and long-term implications for such factors as cost, location, data quality, public acceptance, operational risk, opportunity for design optimization, etc. and with an understanding of the potential risk management issues to help ensure the URF programme achieves the intended objectives. (authors)
Demonstrating compliance with moderator content limits in uranium dioxide powder upon leaving a furnace environment
A challenge was posed to the criticality safety consultant to consider whether instrumentation identified by Plant Management in an existing facility could be claimed as appropriate safety measures to ensure compliance with moderator content limits in uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2}) powder. During processing of low enriched UO{sub 2}, trays of powder are heated in a steam and hydrogen environment in order to reduce fluoride levels. Whilst in the furnace environment criticality safety is ensured by the geometry of the furnace trays used to convey the powder; however, upon leaving the furnace the UO{sub 2} is bulked to a 210 litre drum subject to limited moderation control. Under fault conditions there is a potential that the powder may become wetted due to an imbalance in furnace gas flows resulting in steam condensing in the cooling section of the furnace. Therefore, the safety case methodology followed suggests that two independent and diverse safety measures are provided to terminate the progression of the fault(s) to criticality. The existing criticality safety case credits an infra-red moisture meter as one of two safety measures; however, the calibration procedure required to ensure this device remains suitable is a considerable challenge from a plant operability perspective. As an initial review failed to identify any suitable like-for-like replacement, the National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) Nuclear Safety Section were requested by the customer to consider the existing criticality safety case and investigate whether any existing instrumentation could be used as an alternative method of detecting conditions in which excess moisture could be present within the furnace trays. A number of solutions were proposed and the benefits and challenges around each are discussed in this paper, concluding with the approach adopted by the project. (authors)
The criticality incident detection system omission cases for the fuel routes at EDF energy power stations - 14280
Criticality safety cases have been produced to justify the omission of criticality alarms from the fuel routes of EDF Energy's UK power stations. This work has addressed the UK regulator's expectations that adequate criticality warning systems should be provided wherever fissile material is present, unless a safety case shows that no criticality excursion could give any individual a whole body dose exceeding the annual whole body dose limit of 20 mSv, or that the predicted frequency of such excursions is acceptably low. In the UK, EDF Energy operates eight nuclear power stations; one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor stations (AGRs). At these stations, the term 'fuel route' is used to encompass all of the ex-reactor arrangements for the handling and storage of both new fuel and discharged irradiated fuel. These fuel routes were all designed in the 1980's (or earlier), using sound deterministic criticality safety principles, from which it was concluded that criticality alarms were not required in any of these areas. Subsequent changes to UK regulations have resulted in the need for the stations' criticality safety cases to be updated to include formal justifications for the omission of criticality alarms from these fuel routes. The EDF Energy Criticality Incident Detection System (CIDS) omission cases have been produced using the principles originally developed for UKAEA in the early 1960's by Aspinall and Daniels. These principles continue to be regarded as a best-practice approach by UK industry. Modern UK regulations also incorporate the ALARP principle, which requires operators to minimize and balance all of the safety risks from power station operations, so that the risks to both the public and to workers are As Low As is Reasonably Practicable. This paper describes how the work undertaken used the so-called Aspinall and Daniels criteria in conjunction with the requirements of the ALARP principle. The fuel storage pond at the Sizewell B PWR was addressed by dose calculations to show that, from the shielding effects of the concrete structure and the pond water, the potential consequences of a criticality accident could not result in a radiation dose in excess of 20 mSv. All of the other fuel route areas were addressed on the basis that, even if all of the active engineered and administrative criticality controls were to fail, a criticality accident would still not be reasonably expected, i.e. the predicted frequencies of all such excursions are acceptably low. (authors)
Comprehensive Lifecycle for Assuring System Safety
CLASS is a novel approach to the enhancement of system safety in which the system safety case becomes the focus of safety engineering throughout the system lifecycle. CLASS also expands the role of the safety case across all phases of the system's lifetime, from concept formation to decommissioning. As CLASS has been developed, the concept has been generalized to a more comprehensive notion of assurance becoming the driving goal, where safety is an important special case. This report summarizes major aspects of CLASS and contains a bibliography of papers that provide additional details.